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PREFACE
In the six years between the moment I started as a Ph.D. student at the ICS and the moment I
write this preface, the total amount of time that I actually thought I would ever complete this
dissertation cannot have been more than one year. After being overjoyed to be assigned as
‘aio’, it did not take long to become convinced that I had chosen the wrong job. It was not
because of a lack of interest in the subject of my research project. I found and still find that
this subject was one of the best I could have worked on: theoretically, methodologically and
personally interesting and in my view also societally relevant.
However, a few months after the start already I lost courage. The isolated character of
dissertation research, the feeling that everything worth writing has already been written, as
well as the new and scary experience of facing a task I could not oversee made me decide to
quit. Luckily, there were people who convinced me not to. Arie, who unfailingly listened,
always insisted that I could do it and who from the start urged that I should seek my own style
of doing the project. Sigi Lindenberg, who miraculously always showed sympathy to my
doubts, allowed me the space for considering my ambiguity and never failed to make me feel
he backed me.
So I continued and worked for some time with fresh effort. Then the doubt and despair
returned and again I decided to quit. And again there were dear people who withheld me from
doing so. Arie again, but also Delfina with whom I exchanged innumerable email messages
about the burden of being a Ph.D. student. And Jim, Marjolein, Agnes, Rene and Evelien: lots
of times we shared frustrations and despair but also ambitions and most of all much self-
irony. This cycle of continuing - deciding to quit - and again continuing without much
conviction - repeated itself for about four years. I do not know how many times I have told
people that I would surely be more happy if I’d work for Albert Heijn.
In struggling with the project and with myself, I collided with several people who stood close
by. With Arie, for one. In the ICS-setting I collided with my initial supervisors, Ivo Molenaar,
Karin Sanders and Sigi. At least part of this collision was my fault and I am sorry for that. I
am grateful to Ivo and Karin for their supervision in the first period, in which I learned a lot.
I am also grateful to Sigi that he was still willing to proceed as my supervisor and to Henk de
Vos that he agreed to join the new team. When it became clear that I needed more expert
supervision for the qualitative analyses, I was by chance referred to Fred Wester of the
University of Nijmegen. This appeared to be very lucky, for not only did Fred – without yet
knowing whether he would get anything out of it - provide the methodological help I needed
and save me from drowning, his practical and down to earth approach also stimulated me
greatly.
Yet I still never actually imagined finishing the job. Sometimes I almost forgot that I wanted
to quit: not thinking too much about how I ever would finish it, I often actually enjoyed the
work. But every time I was reminded of the ‘aim’, of the dissertation that would have to be
written and defended, my conviction that I would not finish the project grew.
It is impossible to say which people helped me more: those who took my doubts and despair
seriously or those who waved my concerns away or distracted me in many ways. Important
distractions were the weekly games of squash with my colleagues; the great talks I had with
Anna Petra, Corine and Carlijne about work, life and love; the walks and talks with Arlette,
drinking litres and litres of tea; and the dictionary game which weekly provided hilarious
nonsense.
Still, I doubt whether this book would ever have been completed had I not learned to seek
other activities outside my work. In line with the things I found when exploring my
respondents’ production strategies, I learned that having parallel production functions
(dividing one’s attention) is crucial for preventing standstills and keeping in a high gear. To
some extent, the work with the youth clubs of the Regenboog served this function.
Both my social and physical well-being and my productivity at work greatly benefited from
my generous adoption by the swimming club of Ten Boer in spring 1999. The training hours
provided lots of fun and made me feel more fit and healthy than I had in a long time. In
addition, I found many friends there. Although I enjoy the contacts with all members of the
club, some have become especially dear: Bert Jan, Rutger and Johnny, Rien, Romke and
Bram, Martijn, Marijke and Marlies. And of course Reinier, who proved to be a great trainer
and an even better friend.
Being absorbed in many things outside work, it came almost as a surprise when, at the
beginning of Summer 2000, the manuscript was suddenly almost finished. The actual
completion still took almost a year, though. Partly because of a serious illness and slow
recovery, partly also because my new job in Den Haag took all the time and energy I had.
However, my boss and colleagues in Den Haag - Rein Zunderdorp, Marieke Dawson and the
others - are such stimulating company that after my recovery, the completion of the last bits
and pieces of the manuscript went quickly and pleasantly. It would have taken more time,
though, if Reinold had not shown such warm hospitality, saving me much travelling between
Den Haag and Groningen. Clearly, family and in particular siblings are valuable ‘sleeping
resources’ –  I am glad though that my stays in Rotterdam reawakened the bond with Reinold.
So now the dissertation is actually finished. For me, going through this process was
worthwhile. And indeed, writing a dissertation does not mean you confine yourself forever to
a lonely life as a scientist. It is great to find that at any moment, you may choose to go in a
new direction if you want. The funny thing is, sometimes you can indeed have it both ways:
doing research and being a consultant, finishing your dissertation and working for Albert
Heijn.
After this personal account, a number of people remain to be thanked for the practical
contributions they made. In the first place, my respondents. I thank them for their time and
trust. Then, Albert Helder, who operated the cameras during the focus group interviews. Also,
the students who assisted in the transcription of the audio and videotapes; they did their job
very conscientiously. I am also grateful to the Nicolaas Mulerius fund for financing the
empirical part of this study. Finally, I thank Prof. Robert Lane for his extensive and thorough
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CONCERNING THE WELL-BEING OF
INDIVIDUALS: AN INTRODUCTION
1.1.  Quality of life, happiness, social well-being: how little we know about these 
        concepts we are so familiar with
Interviewer:
“Now what would you say is ‘quality of life’? What is it to you?”
Kees Nagelkerke (male, age 37):
“For me quality of life is what I have now: a normal life. After all those years of being an
alcoholic, just living a normal life again. But I must admit I‘d like to have a girl friend
too. That is the one thing I miss.”
Johan Berghuis (male, age 60):
“Of course quality of life has to do with having a good income, a nice house, being
healthy, but for me, what it all boils down to is that I am not dependent on anyone. That I
do not have to ask for things, either for help or permission, but that I have my
independence. Losing that would mean unhappiness for me. So health is important
because if I were ill or handicapped, that would make me dependent.”
Barbara van Kesteren (female, age 53):
“Happiness or well-being is in so many things. I can thoroughly enjoy presiding over a
political meeting, when there is a big conflict and the atmosphere is really tense, and then
to orchestrate the discussion and decision taking… It gives me fuel to live on for months
sometimes. But also very small, simple things. Like - and that for all my ferocity about
women’s liberation - when I am ironing the laundry, and I make a good job of it, and the
shirts and things look so crisp and neat… such things can also make me feel extremely
happy. I don’t know why, but when you ask me about the quality of my life, it’s these
things that matter.”
Cobie Strating (female, age 45):
“Quality of life is not having to worry about having a roof over your head, about having
food. Security of basic needs. Being safe from warfare. Being healthy, fit enough to take
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care of yourself. And also that you have family and friends whom you can turn to in case
of need. I do not have to see them every day, oh no, but just to know that they are there if
you need them.”
Carol Groothuis (female, age 28):
“Being healthy is the crucial thing for a happy life, for a good quality of life. For health is
a prerequisite for all other things you may want to do. When you’re not healthy, you just
do not feel well, and you can’t enjoy the things you do so much.”
Barend van der Weijde (male, age 76):
“I enjoy my life, I find the quality of my life very high. You know I am already 76 years
old, and I can still get along as arbiter in the junior soccer competition. But most
importantly: I still have a fantastic relationship with my wife. It is even better since I am
retired. We have all day together, and we still make love every day, sometimes in the
afternoon when we have a little siesta. Not technical ‘sex’ always, but far better:
completely relaxed and lovingly laying together, hugging… Now that is the highest
quality of life you may get.”
Anneke de Wit (female, age 60):
“I am happy when I know all is well with my children. If only all is well with them, and if
I know they get along well, I am satisfied and grateful. And if something is amiss with
any of my children, well, then I worry and I can’t feel good or happy. For me that is all
that counts, I am not interested in money or houses or fancy holidays. And as for ‘quality
of life’, for me that is when everything is well ordered and predictable, no unexpected
things happening. I like to know exactly what will happen and how things will be. Then I
find the quality of my life best.”
Frank Zuidema (male, age 41):
“For me it is just the reverse: I need variation and surprise to feel happy. The enjoyment
of life for me is in the unexpected, the unplanned things that happen upon your way. And
that I have the time and freedom to react to these. Variation, that’s really the essence for
me of a ‘quality of life’ or well-being. That’s the one side of it. Besides there is one
precondition for me to be happy at all, and that is my family: my wife and my two sons.
But provided they are there and they are all right, it is the variation and freedom to do
what I want that constitute the quality of my life.”
Barbara van Kesteren, again:
“Now that I think about it, it seems to me that the main thing really is to have goals. It
does not matter so much what these goals are, as long as you have things to strive for,
goals that you deem worth while, that give you direction and that you can move towards.”
Here are eight people, all responding from their own experience of life when asked what
‘quality of life’ or ‘happiness’ is. Eight highly idiosyncratic responses, some of which may be
more in tune with our own ideas than others, but probably we can empathise with all to some
extent.  It is remarkable that, different though the responses may be, people appear to know
well what you mean when asked about their ‘well-being’, ‘happiness’ or ‘quality of life’. Even
though they may fill in the meaning of these concepts after their own fashion and experience,
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there is an implicit understanding of what we are talking about. Apparently, well-being,
happiness and quality of life1 are familiar concepts to most people.
 Some elements of what is ‘happiness’ or ‘quality of life’ reappear in more than one statement
(such as health, the well-being of family and loved ones, material security), suggesting that
there may be some common core in or some common basis of happiness, well-being and
quality of life. Yet overall these eight responses suggest that happiness and quality of life are
highly idiosyncratic matters.
As perhaps they should be? Probably, you find the differences in these eight people’s
responses completely natural, and you would not have expected to find more similar responses
if you would have asked some number of people yourself. For are not all people unique, every
person facing a unique living situation, and having a unique psychological make-up and
background? And do people not differ as well in the specific goals that they strife for,
according to which they evaluate their life?
Many people will feel more comfortable with the notion that happiness is a highly
idiosyncratic experience - a result of character, idiosyncratic circumstances and personal goals
-  than with some claim that in the end the personal differences in people’s appraisal of their
life are mere ripples on a sea of common factors. After all, looking at the eight responses
above, who would be able to distil these common factors and the common core of the
concepts of well-being, happiness and quality of life?
Yet, perhaps unwittingly, the concepts of well-being, quality of life and happiness are dealt
with in daily life as if they had a universal meaning and as if they depended by and large on
the same factors for all people. Indeed, many forms of substantial social policy, on national,
local and organisational levels, assume that there is a relatively large common core in people’s
subjective experience of happiness and well-being, and that the factors favouring well-being
and happiness coincide to a large extent for all people. For many purposes, in daily practice,
people have to act as if well-being would mean largely the same and depend on largely the
same things for different people. Moreover, for many purposes in daily practice, people have
to act as if it were known what factors enhance or impede well-being and happiness. To some
extent, it may be true that people ‘know’ what factors enhance well-being, but considering the
matter critically, it appears that much is still unknown or implicit about these so familiar
concepts of well-being, happiness and quality of life.
1.2.  The pursuit of well-being at a larger scale: why we want a general conceptualisation
1.2.1. THE PURSUIT OF WELL-BEING IN MANY WAYS, TIMES AND PLACES
The pursuit of well-being, be it individually or collectively, has been a common theme in
philosophy, religion, law and literature in all ages and places. It seems that people have sought
ways to enhance their material and social conditions in all cultures, and there is ample reason
to believe that the pursuit of individual well-being and societal well-being may in all these
different times and places have coincided as frequently as clashed.
In most religions there are many rules and commandments that, although they order
individuals to do (or leave) things possibly against their own immediate inclination for the
                                                
1   Until more refined distinctions between these concepts are discussed in Chapter 2, ‘happiness’ and
‘(subjective) well-being’ are used interchangeably for people’s subjective enjoyment of life, and ‘quality of life’
is used to refer to the whole of subjective experience and objective conditions of life. 
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benefit of the social community, can easily be seen to benefit the individuals’ well-being in
the long run precisely through the general order or stability or prosperity that the rules bring
about. In the Jewish and Christian tradition there are ancient rules about giving alms to the
poor, taking responsibility for widows and orphans of one’s kin, acquitting debts in the years
of jubilee, et cetera. All such religious laws and duties can be understood as directions for the
pursuit of both general and - consequently - individual well-being.  Even many of the old-
testamentical regulations concerning food production and preparation which may - to the non-
Jewish of today - seem mere rites complicating life, appear when considered seriously, to have
been directly relevant for the achievement and maintenance of hygiene and health, prosperity
and sustainable agriculture. Likewise, in Buddhism and Taoism, as well as in the Islam, many
rules and wise insights provide guidance about how to live in harmony with fellow men, with
other creatures and with inanimate nature.
But the legacy of our ancestors concerning the ways to enhance well-being extends well
beyond religious or religiously inspired rules. Also ancient philosophers, statesmen and other
political and economical leaders have sought for the best ways to maintain and increase
collective well-being2, and left us much of their ideas, either in writing, in law and legislation
or in historical experience. In the 17th century, the philosophical interest in ‘the good life’ and
the societal conditions that make for it had a marked revival in the work of the ‘utopians’
(which, however, has yielded but very little lasting insights). And of course the pursuit of
well-being and the nature of happiness have been a common theme for novelists and poets of
all times. Also in a more material sense, many appliances, machines, building materials and
everyday techniques that we know, are the result of inventors who sought for ways to improve
the ease and quality of life. With this legacy of thought and experience, it is no wonder that
notions of what well-being is and what conditions favour it belong to the common cultural
baggage of people, which education may only add to and refine.   
In the present day as always, the pursuit of well-being is still a common theme in much of
people’s work and private doings, and it certainly is a common motive behind social (and
economic) policy. In daily life, individuals continuously do things that affect their subjective
well-being. Their choices about how they spend their time, where and with whom, as well as
how they spend their money and other resources have both immediate and delayed effects on
their own level of well-being. But people do not only make choices for themselves. Many
policy makers face the task of deciding how to enhance or defend collective well-being, and
voters may consider which notions and policies make sense. In different settings also, people
make decisions that are meant to, and will, affect the well-being of others. Parents decide on
the upbringing and education of their children. Children, when their parents are ageing,
sometimes have to decide how to organise the care for  their parents. Teachers – ideally - try
to teach their pupils not only the contents of the prescribed books, but also social, emotional
and other skills and attitudes that may improve their later lives. Nurses and medical specialists
must daily take decisions about how and whether to treat their patients, decisions which are at
least partly based on what they believe will result in the best ‘quality of life’ or subjective
well-being of the patient. Architects base their designs for new buildings at least partly on
their ideas of the effects of physical environment on people’s well-being.
                                                
2   ‘Collective well-being’ refers to the general level of well-being in a society, irrespective of how exactly this is
defined or assessed: either as an average of individuals’ levels of subjective well-being or as an overall measure
of levels of subjective well-being and societal (economic or political) performance or in some other way.
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It is thus quite common that people have to act on the basis of some notion of a common core
in all people’s individual well-being, and on the basis of some notion of what - generally -
makes for well-being.  Although by and large all people will have general and considerably
coinciding ideas of what happiness and well-being are, there is no clear, unambiguous
definition or conceptualisation of well-being at hand that can straightforwardly be used.
Despite the long history of the pursuit of well-being and the whole cultural legacy guiding our
thoughts about it, the concept is indeed even so vague and elusive still that mere well-meaning
discussions about how to enhance well-being end up in a maze of conceptual confusion, more
often than not. And beyond an approximate consensus about a core set of general conditions
deemed beneficial to well-being,  there is by no means sufficient knowledge about the relation
between living conditions and the well-being people experience to provide unequivocal
guidance for policy makers and others that want to enhance the well-being of others. It is
clear, and part of our common sense, that things like food, shelter, safety, health (care),
clothing, education and freedom belong to the basic necessities for a good life, and are thus
among the main ingredients for well-being and happiness. But beyond these common sense
notions it is not clear how to proceed and enhance quality of life or well-being.
When we consider how people in daily practice deal with situations where they have to make
decisions that will affect the well-being of others, a range of strategies and solutions can be
observed. These may be ordered along a continuum.  One pole of this continuum represents a
strategy that asserts that every person is the best judge of what he needs and wants, and that
people are fully capable to decide on and take care of their own well-being, so all any other
person or any policy should do is provide maximum freedom to act. This is a highly liberal
stance, and – in somewhat moderated forms - it can be observed not only in liberal nations
social and economic policies, but also on small scale, such as in child raising, education, et
cetera. The opposite extreme holds that people either do not know what is good for them, or
are incapable of acting adequately in their own interest, so they need others to decide what is
best for them and to provide them with it. This strategy may raise associations with some
centralised economic systems in communist and socialist societies, but it is a very common
strategy in daily life, such as in education, health care, and child raising. In most real life
situations we find an approach somewhere in between both extremes.
So people frequently have to act and make decisions on the basis of what they believe will
enhance the well-being of others. Partly such decisions will be based on introspection,
assuming that other people’s well-being and the determinants thereof will be largely similar 
to one’s own; partly such decisions will also be based on tradition and habit; and they may
also be based partly on empirical evidence and research.  However, empirical research into
determinants of well-being is not ‘simply’ a matter of assessing the relation between objective
living conditions and subjective well-being: it is much complicated by the lack of an
intersubjective conceptualisation of well-being.
1.2.2. A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT TO ILLUSTRATE OUR LIMITED KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONTENT
AND DETERMINANTS OF WELL-BEING
In order to clarify the tension that exists between our implicit understanding of the essence
and determinants of well-being on the one hand and the lack of an explicit and unambiguous
conceptualisation and of actual knowledge about well-being enhancing factors on the other
hand, we will, as a thought experiment, consider how a policy maker might seek to enhance
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the well-being of his subjects. 
Suppose that you govern some country. You are a benevolent governor, and it is your main
objective to further the happiness of your subjects. The National Treasury is well filled, and
you are to decide how these public resources will be spent. How will you decide on your
policy?
Perhaps you will think that, for the well-being of all, the foremost concern is to make sure that
all subjects, or all households, have a minimum income. But thinking through on this strategy,
several problems would inevitably hamper its straightforward implementation. Here let’s
concentrate on two problems that derive directly from a lack of knowledge about the nature
and determinants of well-being. Firstly, there is the question of what would be a reasonable
‘minimum income’. In order to answer this question, you might list a number of minimal
necessities of life, for buying which the minimum income should be sufficient. In fact, what
you are doing then resembles the second strategy you might wish to adopt (see below) and has
by and large the same problems as that second strategy.  Secondly, if you do not know what
are the main preconditions for happiness or well-being, you cannot know either if these are
purchasable goods. If not, e.g. if well-being would primarily depend on certain public goods,
giving everybody a minimum income may hardly contribute to your subjects’ well-being, and
be merely a waste of money that might have done much more good if used to produce public
goods.
Perhaps then you’ll think that priority should be given to providing all subjects with goods
and services that meet basic needs: food, shelter, clothing, education, health care provisions,
safety. On first sight this might seem a more substantial solution than a minimum income
policy. However, here again numerous complications arise as soon as we try to set a first step.
 The first problem here concerns the decision of what commodities are ‘basic necessities’, or
what conditions are prerequisite to well-being. There may be broad consensus that goods such
as food, shelter, clothing, et cetera, are necessary to some degree for having a good quality of
life, that is, for well-being and happiness. But on closer look, it is not clear how to delineate
the set of prerequisites. Does education belong to it? Many people may think so, yet a
considerable proportion of the youth in obligatory education may believe that they would be
much better of without it. Students playing truant or dropping out of school may signal that
the relation between education and subjective well-being may not be unequivocal. And how
about ‘shelter’- what kind of housing should be considered minimal? This obviously depends
not only on climate, but also on cultural judgements about for example privacy needs. And as
to food, this item on the list of basic necessities also requires specification. For in order to
contribute to well-being, people should have neither too little nor too much food (calling for
self-restraint, which if successful still costs effort, and if failing may result in obesity and loss
of well-being because of that), and we might also want that the food they have be safe, healthy
and tasteful. Still, the problem remains of how to decide which commodities make for well-
being. Does public transport belong to these? Or democracy? Or full employment? And who
decides about this?
The second problem blocking our way (assuming that we could overcome the first) lies in
the paternalistic character of this kind of social policy. Who are you, as governor, to decide
what people should have, how they should - minimally - be housed, how much schooling they
should get, et cetera? What about freedom of choice? If one values autonomy and freedom of
choice highly, one might prefer a policy in which people are given access to all basic
necessities for well-being, instead of rationing these from above. But that would lead us back
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some way to the first strategy, and invoke again part of the problems related to that.
The third problem is how to deal with complementarity and substitutability of goods. For -
say, in the case of food - it is not the case that people need say 75 grams of rice daily; they
may as well eat an equivalent amount of potatoes, bread or pasta instead, for what they really
need is a minimum of carbohydrates. Thus, when designing the provision of adequate food,
we should understand which products are functional substitutes. The same of course holds for
the provision of other necessities: mobility may be ensured either by access to (good, free)
public transport or by provision of a car; safety may be ensured either by having many
policemen patrolling the streets or by realising good illumination, and installing video
camera’s while having a smaller number of policemen actually on patrol. However, for many
of the goods that might be ‘basic necessities’, substitutability relations are not all clear.
Moreover, we should also take into account complementarity relations. For example, children
may profit but partly from good schooling, if the curriculum requires that pupils do some
hours of homework after school while the children are forced to spend their non-school hours
in paid work, to enhance the family income. Or, the free provision of wheelchairs to
physically disabled people will be of little avail to them as long as public terrain and public
buildings are made accessible to wheelchairs. So, obviously, what really matters are the
implicit ‘functions’3 that the basic goods have for our subjects, and these implicit functions
determine which goods and commodities may be used to substitute the other, and which
complements are needed for particular commodities to have their intended effects. 
Fourthly, what if the public means fall short of the general provision with basic
necessities? Should we solve this by cutting down a little on all different commodities,
allowing all subjects with a little less food, a little smaller and cheaper houses, a little less
education, or should we rather keep the level of provision of some goods intact and do all the
economising on the somewhat ‘less basic’ or ‘less necessary’ commodities? But then we need
to be able to rank the goods we had - with much difficulty - identified as ‘basic commodities’
for well-being in order of their contribution to well-being, a task even more problematic than
the initial selection of goods.
A fifth problem with the strategy of providing all subjects with the basic necessities for
well-being concerns the nature of well-being or happiness, in particular the question to what
extent well-being and happiness are positional goods. Knowing about human traits like
jealousy, envy, gloating and rivalry, we might suspect that perhaps well-being is wholly or
partly dependent on one’s relative position. If so, providing all your subjects with equal
amounts of basic goods would not necessarily increase the well-being of all, nor even the
average well-being in your country.
And sixthly, providing people with basic necessities may at the same time deprive them of
an important source of happiness and well-being if it is true, as some authors claim (e.g. Dow
& Juster 1985, Csikszentmihalyi 1997, but also see the last statement in section 1.1.), that the
process of achieving goals and the personal involvement in achieving of desired states have at
least as great an effect on people’s well-being as the desired states themselves. If the process
of working to achieve what one wants does indeed yield more well-being than ‘having’ what
one wants, we should perhaps not simply provide people with what they want, but rather
ensure that they have possibilities to attain what they want through directed efforts.
Concluding: this second strategy is also highly problematic; in fact our knowledge of the
                                                
3    In Chapter 2, where Amartya Sen’s approach to ‘commodities and capabilities’ is discussed, this notion and
similar ideas will be considered more extensively.
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nature and determinants of well-being falls far short of what would be required for well-
informed decisions about provision of basic necessities to enhance general well-being.
If you’d be discouraged by the obstacles, dilemma’s and doubts involved in the two possible
strategies sketched above, you might hope to find a way out by ordering a nation-wide
investigation, in which all your subjects are asked how happy and well they are. On the basis
of this investigation, you might single out all subjects who have reported to be less than
moderately happy, or perhaps single out the 10 or 20 percent who reported the lowest levels of
well-being as target groups for your policy.
Yet here again we run up against the problem that we do not know enough about the nature
and determinants of well-being.  In the first place, if we do not know quite precisely what we
mean with ‘well-being’, how we want to define the content of the concept, we may not be sure
that by asking people about their ‘well-being’ we tap the same thing for all respondents. What
if people differ in their interpretation of the term? More in general, it seems to be important to
have a good notion of the nature of a concept or phenomenon, especially if it’s abstract, before
setting out to measure it. For without that, there is no way of telling how valid the
measurement results are, nor how well comparable they are between respondents.  In  the
second place, we would need to know whether or to what extent subjective well-being is
something absolute, or whether it is in fact relative by nature. If well-being would be wholly
or largely relative, not only would we have to interpret the empirical data differently than if
they referred to absolute levels of well-being, but we would also want to know what reference
groups or reference points respondents used in rating their own well-being. For relative
measures can only be interpreted in relation to the reference level.
In the third place, we would want to know to what extent subjective well-being is subject to
adaptation. Surveys investigating subjective well-being are frequently met with scepticism of
people’s ability to judge their own well-being. It is objected that such judgements must be
faulty because people get adapted to their own life and living conditions, whether poor or
advantageous, and perceive these as ‘neutral’. More generally, it is objected that by lack of
objective reference points, people’s assessments of their own well-being cannot be compared.
In the fourth place, we would want to know to what extent subjective well-being is stable or
fleeting. Surveys investigating happiness and subjective well-being often meet the objection
that such subjective feelings are fleeting affects, and that even if respondents give truthful and
adequate assessments of their own well-being, their mood and thus their subjective well-being
may be changed within half an hour, making all survey results merely random. It may of
course be argued in defence that the mood-inducted variation evens out in large scale surveys
and need not prevent us from detecting more stable differences in level of well-being between
categories of people, but still we would want to know more about the nature of well-being
also with regard to its stability over time, or - rather - its fleeting and its stable components.
Besides these problems concerning the nature of the concept you want to investigate in your
survey, there remains the original problem that even if you identify people whose well-being
is markedly low,  you still have no clue about how to enhance it. 
Now this thought experiment is not meant to suggest that in this book you will find solutions
to the problem of how to enhance general well-being through social policy.  It should have
made clear, however, that
(a) we do have some general notions about the content and the determinants of well-being,
happiness and quality of life; 
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(b) these notions are not very precise, however: there is considerable uncertainty about the
relation between factors and subjective well-being, as well as about the exact nature and
content of ‘well-being’ (mainly regarding the different aspects by which people may
experience it, the extent to which it is absolute or relative, its stable and transient
elements, and its state and process elements);
(c) the concepts of well-being, happiness and quality of life play a central role in everyday
practical policy issues as well as in individual decisions; and
(d) perforce we take many decisions, with possibly large impact, on the basis of vague but
seemingly familiar notions, while ideally we would want much better insight into the
nature and causes of well-being.
 
1.3.        Some questions concerning the concept and determinants of individual
well-being
In the foregoing, we have seen that in general people are very familiar with the concepts of
happiness and well-being. Most people have no difficulty in applying these concepts to
themselves and their own situation, and have clear notions about how happy they are and
about their level of well-being. To a considerable extent, people appear to have no misgivings
either about judging the well-being and happiness of others. Most people find it completely
natural to feel sorry for someone who wants food or shelter, or to assume that the well-being
of a single or childless person could have been higher if he had met a suitable partner or if she
would but have had children. Yet, when asking people to define or describe the meaning or
content of the concepts of ‘happiness’ or ‘well-being’, these familiar concepts appear vague
and elusive, and only after considerable difficulty people come up with some answers; which
are usually of a highly idiosyncratic nature. The same occurs when asking about the
prerequisites and determinants of happiness and well-being: there is much confusion,
disagreement and uncertainty about these. And this is not only the case when asking a chance
selection of people: also in the scientific literature and among people who are professionally
involved with these questions no clear and generally accepted conceptualisations of happiness
and well-being are found, and the body of knowledge about determinants and prerequisites of
well-being is at best incomplete.
Given the many situations in which one faces decisions that will affect the well-being of
others, as well as situations where enhancement of someone else’s well-being is the salient
goal, it is clear that clarification of the concept and better insight into the factors that affect
subjective well-being is highly desirable and relevant.    
Now that we have seen that individual well-being and the pursuit thereof can manifest itself in
highly idiosyncratic forms; that there is much unclarity in the common thinking about the
concept of well-being; and that policy ends and practical issues yet desire clarity and
unanimity about the concept, its common core and its determinants, we may consider which
are the main questions that must be answered to reach a clear conceptualisation and general
insight in determinants of well-being.
In order to get a better grasp of what we are actually looking for, it may be helpful to consider
why one would expect that there be a common core in people’s experience of well-being and
common factors that determine well-being. Of course, people’s biological needs would be
very similar, as humankind is simply a biological species. Few readers would expect the
biological or physical component of well-being to differ much between people. At least, I
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think most people will hold it likely that by and large (age related variations excepted) all
people have similar biological needs, and will experience similar physical reactions to either
fulfilment or thwarting of these needs. Now in the literature about subjective well-being,
about quality of life or about human needs and motivation, we can see the same reasoning
applied to people’s psychological or social-psychological needs and well-being (Maslow
1970; Rokeach 1979; Pervin 1989). There are many theories about human needs, which are all
based implicitly or explicitly upon the assumption that people are all the same as to their
needs, physiologically as well as social psychologically. Most theories grant that people’s
concrete situations may lead to somewhat different ways in which these needs manifest
themselves, but at some level of abstraction they still claim it is the same set of needs that
holds for all people. Among the more prominent of these theories are the work of Maslow
(1970), Rokeach (1979), and sociobiologists such as Bowlby (1984).
Very similar to theories about human needs, although put in different terms that emphasise
rather the psychological processes that are activated by human needs, are motivation theories
(e.g. Pervin 1989; Bandura 1989 etc; Ford 1992). These theories assume that at some level of
abstraction, people’s motivations and strivings or goals are identical. As the goals and motives
that are proposed in motivation theories confirm, these theories differ from theories of human
needs rather in emphasis than in contents4.
What matters here is that theories of human needs and goals are frequently interpreted as if -
and some theories indeed explicitly assume that - the fulfilment of these needs or achievement
of these goals constitutes and determines subjective well-being. Thus, with regard to the
clarification of the concept of subjective well-being, the first question to which we want an
answer is what universal human goals or needs make for well-being. We want to know what
ultimate goals the assumed instrumental chains of goals end in, because these are the goals (or
needs, if that term is preferred) that are supposed to represent the components of subjective
well-being. In other words, because it is supposed that a number of universal human goals or
needs exist whose fulfilment would determine subjective well-being, the attempt to gain better
insight into the nature of subjective well-being translates into the question of which are the
universal and ultimate (in the sense of instrumental chains) human goals or needs. If we can
distil from the literature on human needs and human goals a (theory that proposes a)
convincing set of universal human goals or needs, this set of goals or needs may enable us to
understand the nature and phenomenology of well-being and to make explicit its components
and aspects.
To prevent any misunderstandings about the objective of this study, it must be stressed here
that we do not want to clarify the concept of well-being in the sense of providing a precise and
perfectly unambiguously formulated definition, as if we were describing the concept for a
dictionary.  The objective of this study, instead, is to investigate the phenomenon of well-
being and the feelings, perceptions and (psychological?) processes underlying it. For when we
ask people about their well-being, they usually know intuitively what response to give, even
                                                
4   A problem in human needs theories and motivation theories is that they refrain from specifying any particular
structure in the sets of needs or goals that they propose. Practically all theories present the human needs or goals
they propose as equivalents, whereas after a little thought (and sometimes even at first sight) it seems obvious
that the goals or needs are interrelated, either causally or instrumentally, and that there may also be a clear
hierarchical ordering in their relevance for the individual human’s well-being. In as far as universal human needs
or goals are indeed instrumentally related or hierarchically ordered, we would of course want a theory to be
explicit about that, so that it may help us to better understand the relation between the fulfilment of these needs or
achievement of these goals and the resulting level of subjective well-being.
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though they would be confused when asked about the exact meaning of ‘well-being’. The term
‘well-being’ is an abstract term, for which I do not seek to find a linguistic description, but
rather an explanation of what’s beneath: what processes or components constitute ‘well-being’
as people perceive and experience it, partly unconsciously as it may be? The objective is thus
to arrive at propositions about the partly or wholly unconscious processes and aspects of
‘feeling well’ that affect the intuitive response of people when asked about their well-being.
A second, but directly related issue that demands attention is that of the determinants of social
well-being. The idea that the ultimate universal human goals or needs that make for subjective
well-being are themselves realised through other, instrumental goals, does not imply that the
instrumental chains are single-path chains. 
Suppose that one of the goals people strife for were ‘being admired’ or ‘distinguishing oneself
from others’. There would be many alternative ways to win admiration from other people.
Even among the eight respondents we met in section 1.1., there is considerable variety in how
they try to win admiration (or distinguish oneself) from others:
Kees Nagelkerke for example, in as far as he cares about distinguishing himself from others,
is mainly concerned with resisting the temptation to relapse into his old drinking habits, and
derives pride and satisfaction from his success thus far, even more because he realises that
there are but few severe alcoholics who succeed so well.
Johan Berghuis is admired for  the high status job he has held, his wealth and broad education
and knowledge, and the fascinating anecdotes he can tell about his exotic travels.
Barbara van Kesteren has more than one way to distinguish herself and feel admired. She
takes pride in dressing daringly and fashionably, which certainly draws attention in the small
and somewhat backward village where she lives, but she also distinguishes herself from the
majority of middle-aged women by presiding over several local organisations and by leading a
local political party.
Carol Groothuis sometimes grudges doing low-skilled work and people treating her equal to
her poorly educated colleagues while she herself holds a university degree. She yearns for a
higher level job, not so much because she does not enjoy her present work, but rather because
she wants the recognition for what she actually is. Lacking this opportunity thus far, she tries
to make up for it by excelling in sports; she is greatly improving her (considerable) athletic
achievements.
Barend van der Weijde openly asks and receives admiration for all the things he still does
despite his age. He is far more active socially and physically than the average 76 year old, and
takes pride and satisfaction in it.
Anneke de Wit, who over the past 45 years has dedicated herself completely to the housework
and raising her children, initially denies that she wants admiration or distinction, but later she
tells that she feels her housekeeping is much better organised than that of all other people she
knows: “There is nothing special that I am good at. I have no education and I have never had a
paid job. But then I have the time to make sure my house is in perfect order, and I save us
loads of money by being efficient and by repairing things. While all those people who want to
combine working and raising children and what more, they usually make a mess of it and lose
much of the money they make in that way.”
Frank Zuidema, finally, takes pride in going his own way, in not letting social norms dictate
his choices in life. He shows pride in defying public opinion e.g. with regard to his choice for
a career as a nurse and his choice to let his wife be the main earner and work only 30%
himself. He boasts of defying the societal pressure to be busy and care for income and career,
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and enjoys the contrast between his own freedom, the autonomy over his daily activities, and
the yoke of obligations under which the majority of people live.
Indeed, for a universal ultimate goal, there may be a number of parallel paths, along different
instrumental goals. People may use widely varying ways to realise social well-being. For some
part, the differences in how people achieve their - similar - goals may follow from differences
in their capacities and other resources. For some part, the differences may also be simply path-
dependencies: having once made a particular turn, chosen a particular way, this one choice
will steer later choices. For an other part, the ways people choose to attain their goals of
course also depend on prevailing norms and values in their social environment: Carol
Groothuis can only use her athletic achievements as a substitute to get admiration under the
condition that there are sufficient people around who appreciate sports.
But, as we saw in the case of Barbara van Kesteren, people may also use more than one means
to realise a particular goal. Most people participate in more than one social context, and
different contexts usually differ in norms and values as well as in available means to realise
certain goals.  For example, many people participate in the context of a family, in the context
of friendships, but also in the context of their job or the context of a holiday or the context of
the religious community they belong to. In all these different contexts, people’s goals and
needs are the same. But the way in which a certain need may be met is likely to be very
different in these various contexts.
Thus, when we want to gain a better insight in and knowledge of the determinants of well-
being, we should probably differentiate between social contexts in which well-being may be
realised. To do so, however, requires a choice of which social contexts to distinguish. This is a
choice that must be made before a sensible attempt to chart the relevant objective factors that
affect well-being can be started. 
Assuming that well-being results from needs being met and goals being realised, the questions
about the identification and content of human goals and about the objective conditions that
determine the possibilities for achieving these goals, would sufficiently summarise the
challenge of gaining a better notion and understanding of well-being and its determinants.
Yet, we should not too easily assume that the relation between well-being and the realisation
of goals lies only in the goals that are realised. It was already mentioned in section 1.2.2. (as
the sixth problem related to ‘basic needs’ policies) that the process of working towards one’s
goals may in itself be an important source of well-being. The activities and sense of purpose
and of improvement involved in progressing towards one’s goals and also approaching
intermediate, instrumental objectives, may result in well-being just as well. At least, we must
reckon with the probability that not only the end state but also the process towards it matter
for subjective well-being. In the literature, we find authors of high reputation claim that the
process of approaching one’s goals makes for subjective well-being (e.g. Dow & Juster 1985;
Csikszentmihalyi 1997). But also introspection and common experience support this notion.
Just remember Barbara’s second statement in section 1.1.:
“Now that I think about it, it seems to me that the main thing really is to have goals. It
does not matter so much what these goals be, as long as you have things to strife for,
goals that you deem worth while, that give you direction and that you can move towards.”
The recent fuss over the ‘sudden wealth syndrome’5, referring to the psychosocial problems
                                                
5    The term was first used in the Los Angeles Times in the spring of 2000. See also Rosenberg’s article
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experienced by people who have become instantly very rich, through successful speculation in
the financial market or through winning a lottery, suggests something similar.
It seems that people need goals that they can work towards, not only because of what the
actual realisation of the goal will bring them, but also and possibly even more because having
goals provides structure to one’s life and invests every tiny step along the road towards the
goals with value and satisfaction. But there appears to be even more to the notion that the
process matters than only the progress towards one’s goals. Some twenty years ago a pop song
was titled ‘it ain’t what you do, it’s the way that you do it’. When subjective well-being is
concerned, this may be very true. Both in the literature and in common experience there is
evidence that not only the content, the final realisation of and the progress towards one’s goals
matter, but that the way in which goals are achieved matters too. For example, the subjective
well-being one experiences if a goal is achieved wholly through one’s own efforts is likely to
be higher than if there was a large component of luck. It might also be the case that people
derive more well-being from a process in which the speed of approaching one’s goals
gradually increases than a process that gradually slackens. Possibly, people derive more well-
being from a course of action they  have decided on autonomously than from a course of
action prescribed by someone else. Perhaps the predictability of progress also matters for the
subjective well-being that it yields. If progress is predictable, people may anticipate the
realisation of their goals and savour their success in anticipation. But for all we know,
unexpected success may, once realised, also give extra well-being just because of its
unexpectedness. And probably there are more characteristics of the way in which people
pursue the realisation of their goals that matter for the amount of well-being they derive from
the process.  It seems that we need to know much more about these ‘process-preferences’
before we can ever think that we understand what well-being is and how it comes about. Thus,
the third main question we must consider is that of process versus results. The notion that
subjective well-being not only depends on ‘state’ or level of goal realisation but also on
‘getting there’ is thus nothing new. It would be a step forward, however, to identify what
features or elements of ‘getting there’ matter. What features of the process of goal realisation
affect the level of subjective well-being? Which are the main relevant aspects of these
procedural preferences? How does the way in which people organise their lives affect their
eventual level of well-being?
Summarising, from the way I look at it, the problems and puzzles concerning the nature and
determinants of subjective well-being cluster around three themes. Firstly, the theme of goals:
what universal human goals are there and - correspondingly - what are the universal aspects or
components of subjective well-being?  Secondly, the theme of objective conditions that make
for well-being: What are, in different social contexts, the main relevant objective conditions
that affect goal achievement? What social contexts should be distinguished to arrive at a
practicable categorisation of determinants of well-being? And thirdly, the theme of procedural
preferences: to the extent that well-being is derived not only from one’s state of being but also
from the process of striving for one’s goals, what features of the process affect the level of
subjective well-being that is derived?
                                                                                                                                                        
“Luxeleed”, NRC Handelsblad, June 3 2000.
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1.4.  About the contents of this book
This book reports on the dissertation research I conducted in search of answers to the
questions expounded above. I have started out on my search with a study of the literature
about quality of life studies and an analysis of the state of the art in that field of research.
Chapter 2 is dedicated to a detailed exposition of the main present theoretical problem in
quality of life studies, namely the lack of a theory of human goals that relates objective
conditions to subjective well-being. The chapter includes an analysis of what kind of theory is
needed to solve that problem, and a critical assessment of the potential of the main existing
approaches (in particular theories of human goals) to do that job.
In this study, I have taken up one of the more promising approaches for further examination
and elaboration, namely Lindenberg’s (e.g. 1986, 1993, 1996) Social Production Function 
(SPF) theory. An extensive presentation and discussion of this theory is provided in Chapter
3.  SPF theory is a theory of goal-directed behaviour, in which a hierarchy of human goals is
explicitly proposed. At the most general level of this hierarchy of goals, the theory asserts that
overall subjective well-being is constituted by two universal human goals, namely social and
physical well-being. For both of these universal goals, the theory then proposes some - still
general and rather abstract - essential elements or ‘first order instrumental goals’.
The examination of the merits and weaknesses of Social Production Function theory revealed,
first,  some serious problems in the conceptualisation of the universal and first order
instrumental goals; the theory’s main concepts. Without a solution for these problems, the
theory is but partly fit for application to the theoretical problem in quality of life studies.
Ambiguity and unclarity of concepts cause confusion when comparing and relating SPF
theory to other, more established approaches and concepts in that field, and they impede the
valid  operationalisation and thus the empirical measurement of these central concepts. This
first problem with SPF theory centers around the first of the three themes identified in section
1.3.: the theme of universal human goals and of universal aspects or components of subjective
well-being.
The examination of SPF theory’s strengths and weaknesses also revealed a problem with
regard to the identification of the objective conditions that affect subjective well-being.
Although the main notion of theory concerns the realisation of well-being through concrete
resources and activities, it is practically mute as to which resources - that is, which objective
conditions - are most relevant for well-being. In Chapter 3 it is explained clearly that
empirical investigation as to the main relevant conditions or resources for the realisation of
well-being is wanted. This second problem with SPF theory concerns the second of the three
themes identified in section 1.3.: the theme of objective conditions that affect well-being.
The first two problems were found to exist mainly with regard to social well-being and only to
a much lesser degree regarding physical well-being. Therefore, it was decided that the
research questions derived from these problems would be restricted to social well-being alone.
A third problem in SPF theory appeared to be that one part of it (namely the ‘metagoals’, i.e.
the goals and preferences people have as to how they structure their lives and realise their
well-being) is as yet far less elaborated and specified than the rest. Yet, from the perspective
and established knowledge of quality of life studies and well-being research, it must be
expected that this somewhat under-elaborated part is no less relevant for explaining and
predicting well-being and quality of life than the better elaborated and more frequently used
parts of the theory.  The metagoals and preferences that people have concerning how they go
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about the production of well-being, of course refer  to the issue of process well-being and
procedural preferences; the third of the three themes identified in section 1.3. above. From
this observation, the third task I took upon myself followed: to explore the as yet under-
specified part of the ‘metagoals’ in SPF theory,  to identify the main metagoals and possibly to
provide some clues as to how they are related to each other and to the other  elements of
Social Production Function theory. The three problems thus identified in SPF  theory are, in
section 3. 6,  translated into the research problems for the empirical part of this study.
Given the research problems, an adequate design had to be chosen for the empirical study. The
character of the research questions suggested an exploratory and qualitative approach: the
objectives for the study were not to get information on actual levels and distribution of well-
being, nor of the empirical prevalence of particular goals, resources or conditions, but rather
to explore the actual content of certain concepts; to obtain an inventory of the diverse aspects
that people actually perceive as components of well-being and quality of life; and to make an
inventory of what might be the main relevant conditions for well-being.
Chapter 4 describes the methods of data collection and analysis that I have used. Theoretical
sampling resulted in a selection of  respondents (or cases) for the empirical study.  
A triangulation of methods was used for data collection: (1) written questionnaires which the
respondents filled in at home, about their evaluation of aspects of their life, their general
happiness and well-being, their activity patterns, main sources of well-being, and their own
notions of the main determinants of quality of life; (2) focus group interviews about the
determinants and phenomenology of aspects of well-being and quality of life; (3) time use
studies, charting the participants’ activity patterns and accompanying moods during one week;
and (4) individual face-to-face interviews with the respondents who participated in the time
use study.
The focus group data and the data from the individual interviews were analysed (with the help
of a specialised application for computer-aided analysis of qualitative data: ATLAS/ti),
following a strategy for analysis based on Wester’s (1984, 1995) version of Glaser & Strauss’
(1967) ‘grounded theory approach’. The data from the preliminary questionnaire and the time
use studies were used for triangulation and to provide additional data where the information
from the focus group and individual interviews was incomplete.
Chapters 5 through 7 report on the results of the exploratory study. In Chapter 5 the results
concerning the first research question are presented. The phenomenology of the concepts that
were as yet ambiguous or unclear in the basic model of  Social Production Function theory is
discussed there, resulting in improved, more specific conceptualisations of the three
components (or first order goals) which, according to SPF theory, constitute social well-
being.  These conceptualisations do not have the form of rephrased definitions or of theory-
based descriptions of the abstract concepts. Rather, the concepts are filled in with sets of
distinctive aspects that were identified in a broad empirical inventory of the feelings and
perceptions that constitute people’s subjective social well-being. In other words, the concepts
are empirically grounded by identifying the various and distinctive aspects by which these
components of social well-being manifest themselves in people’s perception. The theme of
univeral human goals and of universal aspects or components of well-being is thus central in
Chapter 5.
In Chapter 6 the main relevant conditions and resources that affect social well-being that were
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found in the empirical study are presented and discussed. The theme of Chapter 6 thus
concerns the objective conditions that make for well-being. Although the inventory of
‘objective conditions’ facilitating the realisation of social well-being that emerges from this
study has no pretense of being complete or final, it is thought to contain, at a slightly
abstracted level, all the essential factors that determine opportunities for social well-being. An
equally or perhaps even more substantial result of this part of the study is the development of
a systematic way of charting the relevant conditions for social well-being at an individual
level. By distinguishing six general social contexts it was possible to arrive at a systematic
inventory that also reveals much of how the resources and conditions relate to each other: as
substitutes or as complements (or not at all). The value and potential uses of this systematic
approach to conditions for social well-being is considered in Chapter 6. 
 
The third theme, concerning the part that the process of approaching one’s goals plays in
subjective well-being, is taken up in Chapter 7. The results of my attempt at identifying and
conceptualising the ‘metagoals’ in SPF theory are reported there. Based on the qualitative data
and the analysis thereof, a set of hierarchically ordered metagoals is proposed. In addition to
this, the relation of these metagoals to the concept of ‘cognitive well-being’ is discussed.
According to the established notions in quality of life studies, cognitive well-being and
affective well-being are the two components of overall subjective well-being. Since the
elements in the basic model of SPF theory represent affective well-being, it would be
advantageous if the cognitive component of well-being were fully represented in the
metagoals, for in that case SPF theory would indeed encompass the whole range of aspects
and elements of ‘overall well-being’ or ‘subjective quality of life’. Chapter 7 ends with
answering whether indeed we may consider the cognitive component of well-being to by fully
represented in the metagoals I propose in that chapter.
In the course of this book, we thus gradually get deeper and deeper into the particulars of
Social Production Function theory, a process in which one may feel to lose touch with the
general problems and questions from which we started out, concerning quality of life and how
to enhance it. Therefore in Chapter 8, I retrace my steps and try to give a critical evaluation of
the whole study and its results from the general perspective sketched in the present chapter. In
the light of the practical and theoretical problems to which you were introduced in this first
chapter, what may be the use of the notions gained in this study and of the elaboration of SPF
theory that we achieved?
CHAPTER TWO
THEORETICAL EMBEDDING:
QUALITY OF LIFE STUDIES’ CORE
CONCERN
2.1. Introduction
In the previous chapter, several questions and difficulties were discussed concerning the
concepts of ‘quality of life’, subjective well-being and happiness, as well as concerning the
hope to find systematic relations between some objective conditions and these subjective
perceptions. The curious lack of actual knowledge and conceptual clarity about these concepts
which yet are so familiar to most people have been illustrated with statements of a set of eight
Dutch adults: eight very different individuals, living in very different situations, pursuing
idiosyncratic goals, yet having also some strivings and values in common.
The present chapter is intended to explain the positioning of the main problems and debates
concerning quality of life and subjective well-being in the relevant theoretical literature, and
to provide an analytical assessment of the main problems that should be tackled with priority
in order to achieve progress in quality of life studies.
In section 2.2. we will do some sightseeing in the exciting terrain of quality of life studies.
This field of research will be explored, its borders will be sketched, its core business
identified, its history referred to, and we will pause to consider some of its most interesting
landmarks during this tour. Following the initial acquaintance, a critical assessment will be
given of the state of the art in the field of quality of life research. Special emphasis is put on
the question to what extent the two main branches in the field have thus far been able to deal
with the central concern of quality of life research. It will be found then that the core problem
which quality of life research has not yet been able to solve concerns the relation between
subjective well-being and objective circumstances and actions. In section 2.3. the six main
approaches in quality of life studies will be discussed and evaluated according to how well
they are able to cope with the field’s core concern. This survey leads to the diagnosis that
none of the current approaches in quality of life studies is sufficiently equipped to deal with
the core concern. Section 2.3. ends with an argument for  the necessity of using a theory of
human goals combined with a theory of agency (that is, a theory explaining the process
through which goals are attained) to solve this problem. This need for a theory of human goals
and of the process underlying goal attainment then leads us, in section 2.4., into the realm of
rational choice sociology. In the rational choice approach, theorists start out from the basic
assumption that people behave rationally, that is, in a way that best serves their interests given
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the restrictions they face. This basic assumption centers around the same process that in
quality of life research is still a black box: namely the process through which objective
conditions affect subjective well-being, life satisfaction or happiness. After concisely explain-
ing the main features of the typical explanatory model in the rational choice approach, I will
proceed to assess to what extent this approach offers what we came to look for. It will then
appear that very thing we are looking for, a theory of human goals, is also wanting, or at least
problematic, in the rational choice approach.
This being the case, the next step in our quest involves an excursion into the theories of
human goals that can be found in various sociological and psychological disciplines. This will
be undertaken in section 2.5. The main theories of human goals that we find to exist in the
literature are screened there with regard to the extent to which they match the requirements
established by both our initial aim (i.e. to contribute to theory formation in quality of life
studies) and by the approach we have chosen to take (i.e.. the rational choice approach).
In section 2.6. the main insights gained in this chapter will be summarised, culminating in a -
sharply focussed conclusion concerning the theory that is wanting in quality of life research
and concerning the possibilities to fill this void. The chapter ends with the assertion that
Social Production Function theory is one of the better suited candidates to eventually fill the
void in quality of life studies, but that this theory is at present not sufficiently elaborated to do
this job.
2.2. Exploring the field of quality of life studies
2.2.1. FIRST IMPRESSIONS
Definition and delineation of the field of quality of life studies
Quality of life research is a field of study that is usually not clearly defined, and, judging by
the criterion whether certain researchers and authors consider themselves to be part of this
field of study or not, considerable variation can be found regarding its delineation. Some
authors refer to the field of quality of life studies as comprising also the social indicators
movement, marketing studies, political economy, and certain branches of human ecology.
Other authors define the field in a much narrower sense, restricted to include little more than
research on subjective well-being. Obviously, the different views of what quality of life
studies comprise, reflect different views of what the concept ‘quality of life’ refers to and how
it should be defined. Different interpretations of the term ‘quality of life’ range from equating
it with purely subjective ‘happiness’ to interpreting it as a set of objective, material (and / or
social) living conditions which assumedly facilitate or hinder ‘a good life’.  
Because of the lack of consensus, I feel free here to delineate the field of study - according to
my own preferences - quite broadly. In my view, the field of study might be defined to
comprise all theoretical and empirical research dealing with any of the following questions:
What constitutes ‘a good life’, ‘subjective well-being’, or ‘happiness’? How do quality of life
or any of its components come about? What are the facilitating and restricting conditions for
the attainment of this? What norms should be observed considering the equity of the
distribution of quality of life? And what are the consequences of differences in quality of
life1?
These questions are tackled by theorists and empirical researchers from many different disci-
                                                
1     The term ‘quality of life’, then, is used in this book in an equally broad sense, to refer to ‘the quality of a
person’s life as it is lived’, which comprises both living conditions and (resulting) happiness or well-being.
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plines alike, and therefore the field of quality of life studies has a highly multidisciplinary
character.
It comes as no surprise that the different disciplines concerned with quality of life studies vary
widely with regard to which questions and which part of the problems are emphasised. And
consequently, there is much variation between disciplines in the extent of knowledge and
theoretical elaboration about different aspects of well-being or quality of life. This seems to be
the main argument in favour of a preliminary broad delineation of the field, to include all
disciplines and research programmes concerned with questions regarding ‘quality of life’, as
each discipline involved may have much to gain from the more advanced knowledge on some
aspects that other disciplines can offer2.
Even though the field of quality of life research is very broad, it is possible to indicate which
are the core issues in the field and what are more peripheral or derivative concerns. I hold the
main issue in quality of life studies to be the relation between objective or external conditions
and subjective well-being, satisfaction or happiness. Insight in this relation forms the
foundation for much governmental policy, whether economic, social, environmental or other;
beliefs about this relation also form a powerful explanatory factor for human behaviour in all
realms of life (that is, if one accepts the assumption that people usually seek well-being).
Thus, subjective well-being is, either implicitly or explicitly, the ultimate goal or evaluative
criterion for much governmental, organisational and individual behaviour. The investigation
of whether and how particular factors affect subjective well-being has therefore high practical
relevance. Moreover, in the absence of thorough insight in the determinants of subjective
well-being, it is not difficult to manipulate both evaluations and arguments for the
legitimisation of particular policy interventions. A good understanding of what set of living
conditions affect subjective well-being, and in what way, provides a defence against
opportunistic use of policy arguments.
All other issues in the field of quality of life research can be considered either to follow from
this central concern, to be subservient to it or to deal with the application of gained insights.
Such derivative concerns or specific applications are, for example, measurement issues (social
indicators, how to monitor quality of life), social accounting (how to weigh different
indicators into indexes and, possibly, how to forecast future developments of quality of life),
psychological research (psychological processes involved in perception and cognition of well-
being), application of quality of life measures in decision making on the allocation of health
care budgets (cf. Albrecht & Fitzpatrick 1994), evaluation criteria for social policy (e.g. policy
for social activation of the long-term unemployed, cf. Van Bruggen 2000), et cetera.
History and development of the field of quality of life and subjective well-being research
Although the questions that are dealt with in quality of life studies are by no means new - one
need just think of ancient philosophers and of the utopists from the Middle Ages to realise this
- the interest in the subject has markedly revived in recent decades, beginning in the 1960's.
Several factors may be held responsible for this marked revival of the interest in quality of life
                                                
2   In fact, based on this idea, a multidisciplinary international society for quality of life studies, the ISQOLS, was
founded in 1995, organizing a platform (through yearly conferences, an Internet discussion group and active
informal networking) for cooperation and mutual exchange of ideas between quality of life researchers from all
disciplines. After the first five years of its existence, it seems that this society indeed fills a need for many of the
researchers on this subject.
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and social indicators.
Firstly, in affluent industrial societies, the majority of the population no longer needed to
struggle to keep above the subsistence level. With the increasing affluence in these highly
developed countries, doubts began to be raised about economic growth as societies major
goal. The conviction began to grow that further economic growth would not automatically
lead to increased human well-being. At the same time, the threat of environmental depletion
began to be perceived and was seen to point to the eventual boundaries to further economic
growth. The tension between ever increasing (individual and aggregate) productive capacity
and simultaneously growing doubts about the desirability of further expansion of production,
raised new questions about the objectives that should guide economic and societal efforts.
In the initial phases of the ‘social indicators movement’ optimism about the feasibility of
‘guided social change’ gave an extra impetus to the attempts to develop indicators for societal
well-being and quality of life. Although the optimism about social engineering has by now
declined, the need for other than economic indicators is still sharply felt (UNDP 1991). In
more recent years, the proceeding globalisation of markets and policies (ibid., p.10) and - in
some countries, amongst which the Netherlands - the economically driven dismantling of the
welfare state (cf. the discussion in Veenhoven & Ouweneel 1995) also indicate the need for a
broadly accepted set of indicators for quality of life in a society, that can complement
economic evaluation criteria. 
In the late 1960s and the 1970s, some landmark studies were published which are by now
considered to be ‘classics’, such as Bauer (1966), Campbell & Converse (1972, 1976) and
Andrews & Withey (1976). They were followed by a hausse of empirical and theoretical work
on social indicators, social well-being and quality of life which does not yet seem to have
reached its peak. The theme of social well-being or quality of life reporting became
conventional in UNDP reports and national monitoring, and several journals on the subject
have become well-established (the most important of which are Social Indicators Research
and SINET - Social Indicators NETwork news). The field also found its niche in the ‘Working
Group on Social Indicators and Social Reporting’ of the International Sociological
Association.
Despite all these efforts however, the state of theorising about quality of life still resembles
that of a field in its initial stages: there is still much debate about the conceptualisation of the
main subject, there is only a small fraction of theory or empirical knowledge about which
consensus exists, and - less depressing and more exciting than these two facts - the field, the
theories and the insights are at present still in an astoundingly rapid and continual
development.
Recent overviews of the state of the art in quality of life studies and subjective well-being
(SWB) research
Because of the diverse and multidisciplinary character of all research that is comprised under
the label of quality of life studies, it is proportionally difficult to assess the present state of
knowledge in ‘the field’. Still, some highly informative overviews of the present insights
about quality of life and its determinants and preconditions have recently been published by
distinguished researchers (e.g. Diener et al. 1999; Offer 1996; Land 1996).
Diener et al. give a comprehensive account of the progress that has been made in subjective
well-being research over the past three decades, taking a largely psychological perspective,
but also borrowing from relevant studies in other disciplines. Summarising their main
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conclusions, Diener et al. observe that 1) much, mainly cross-sectional, empirical evidence
has been gathered, which has mainly shown that the empirical relationships between personal
and situational characteristics at the one hand and components of subjective well-being at the
other are far less simple and straightforward than leading studies from the 1960s suggested; 2)
it has become clear that the concept of subjective well-being consists of several separate
components, namely positive and negative affect and cognitive life satisfaction; 3) the
research efforts of recent decades have led to the identification of a number of theoretical
issues and empirical problems that seem relevant and promising for further investigation; and
4) much of the major questions regarding subjective well-being and its determinants are yet
unsolved, such as the causal direction of the correlates of SWB, the interaction between
internal factors like personality traits and external circumstances, the processes underlying
adaptation, and the differential influence that input factors have on the components of SWB
(Diener et al. 1999, p. 277).
Land’s (1996) overview of the state of the art is written from a slightly different point of view,
namely from the perspective of social indicators research rather than from a more general
psychological perspective like Diener’s.  Land spends little attention to the psychological
processes underlying the perceptions and cognitions of quality of life, and concentrates instead
on the achievements in monitoring the quality of life effects of social and societal change. His
diagnosis of the state of affairs largely coincides with the general impression described in this
section. Two interesting observations Land makes are worth mentioning here. Firstly, he
describes that the period of seeming stagnation in quality of life studies and social indicator
research, which occurred from the end of the 1970s to the mid-1980s, proves, when looking
back at it from the present, rather to have been a period of consolidation in which social
reporting and social monitoring have become regular and well-organised activities in many
countries (ibid., p.6). Secondly, Land observes that in the mid-1990s, social indicators have
not conquered the role they were initially believed to receive in social planning and guided
social change, but yet they have gained considerable influence in terms of placing social well-
being or quality of life issues on the political agenda and supplying material to the media and
the public debate. This ‘more realistic’ view of the role of quality of life research is aptly
expressed by the term ‘model of enlightenment’ (Land 1996, p. 6; cf. Noll & Zapf, 1994, p.
11). 
Land identifies five topics as most relevant for social indicators research in the next few years,
namely the collection and analysis of longitudinal data (this priority he shares with Diener et
al.); the application of social accounting and modelling within substantial policy fields; the
development of prospective social reporting; the assessment and evaluation of recent efforts to
construct summary indices (such as found in the UNDP 1994 and Diener 1995); and finally,
the harmonisation of different national reporting systems and further development of
international reporting systems and international comparative quality of life studies (ibid., p.
6,7). Though indisputably very important, these ‘priorities’ for the immediate future are very
vague and exclude but little.
Offer, in the somewhat kaleidoscopic In Pursuit of the Quality of Life (1996), presents
contributions from ten different research programmes in the field, each representing a
different perspective. His book covers the main research programmes and disciplines involved
in quality of life studies, and gives an up-to-date impression of the state of the art in the field.
As far as I know, Offer’s book is unique in being so comprehensive, and the separate chapters
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of the contributing authors confirm that there is only limited communication, co-operation and
exchange of ideas between the different perspectives or research programmes. However good
an introduction to the broad field In Pursuit of the Quality of Life presents, it could not
possibly include work from all leading figures in quality of life studies. It does for example
not contain contributions from Sen, Diener or Csikszentmihalyi, to name but three of the most
renowned scholars from different disciplines. Yet the important work from all leading
researchers and theorists is covered at least indirectly in the contributions of their contributing
colleagues.
2.2.2.    UNSOLVED DIFFICULTIES IN QUALITY OF LIFE STUDIES: COPING WITH THE CORE
CONCERN
In section 2.2.1., I have identified what I consider to be the central concern of quality of life
studies, namely to establish and investigate how objective living conditions and other factors
that are open to human intervention affect subjective well-being. The present section
concentrates on the progress that has been made and the approaches that have been taken in
trying to deal with this core concern of quality of life studies.
The first crude conclusion when perusing the literature on quality of life is that despite
impressive research efforts, consensus has not yet been reached about content, adequate
indicators and main determinants of ‘quality of life’.
The most broadly accepted set of indicators for quality of life would probably be that which is
used by the United Nations Development Program (e.g. UNDP 1994) for ranking nations
according to the quality of the living conditions they provide, the so-called Human
Development Index (HDI). Surely, the Human Development Index is generally seen to
provide relevant and valuable information, but its use is restricted to specific information
needs and to specific countries. The HDI does provide an index measure that adequately
reflects differences between countries and developments of countries over time on the basis of
three index components: national income (with some weighting to capture the diminishing
marginal returns to income), educational attainment (indicated by adult literacy and mean
years of schooling) and life expectancy. As can be expected, the HDI discriminates well
between poor or underdeveloped countries at the one hand and highly developed countries at
the other, and to that extent the global country rankings it produces are uncontested. The
precise ranking of countries within the two groups (well-off versus poorly-off countries),
however, meets much more criticism and opposition. For example, when comparing the
quality of life in the Netherlands with that in Sweden, Germany or Great Britain, the relative
ranking of these countries is much more dependent on the specific conceptualisation of quality
of life and the relative weights attributed to its component parts, than when comparing the
Netherlands with a third world nation3.
Another limitation to the use of the HDI is that it is largely based on indicators of living
conditions at the country level. The instrument is hardly adequate for comparing the quality of
life of different groups or categories of people within a country, even though most quality of
life researchers are aware that the well-being of different categories of people in a society can
differ vastly, partly because of unequal access to resources such as education, health care,
                                                
3    See also the discussion in Chapter 1 about the relation between economic welfare and subjective well-being
or quality of life.
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public employment, housing, transportation et cetera. Moreover, the three indicators on which
the HDI is based can hardly be supposed to cover all relevant aspects of quality of life, such as
(political) freedom, (opportunities for) social well-being and so on. Notwithstanding the
nontrivial progress achieved with the Human Development Index, there thus remains much
work to be done in measuring and monitoring living conditions pertaining to ‘quality of life’.
Apart from the nature of the quality of life concept (which has the pretension to represent
people’s dearest values and most heartfelt concerns), which makes the aim of reaching
consensus about it a difficult affair from the start, the limited success in finding at least an
approximately satisfactory set of indicators for quality of life seems also partly due to the
approaches that have been taken. Although there have been numerous different approaches,
they can all be categorised in two main branches. These two main branches, which Land
(1996) labelled as objective versus subjective, generally coincide with a focus on respectively
a nation- or aggregate and an individual level of analysis, and lack a theory linking the levels.
In the first branch of quality of life studies, comprising the objective approaches, objective
living conditions (often at a macro level) are measured and used as indicators for quality of
life. The objective branch is found in most social indicator programmes at the national or
international level (national policy councils, the United Nations, the OECD, et cetera).
General practice in these programmes is to choose the optimal available or feasible measures
for either output or performance in relevant policy fields (Henderson 1974; UN 1989; UNDP
1991) and use these either separately or combinedly as an index to indicate quality of life.
The selection of indicators and their interpretation is however not backed by a consistent
theory that explains how objective living conditions are linked to individual subjective well-
being. For many of the indicators that are frequently used, their relevance for general
subjective well-being is just common sense; it is, for example, seldom contested that there be
a positive effect of health care provisions and free schooling on quality of life, even though
theoretical foundations for these relations might not be so easily constructed. There are,
however, also many indicators with less face validity as indicators of well-being or quality of
life (for example the indicator of science graduates as percentage of total number of graduates,
the number of radios per capita or the social security benefits expenditure), and as soon as it
comes to the relative weight of objective indicators or to their impact on individual quality of
life or subjective well-being, the limitations of the objective approach become visible.
Although indicators of this type are certainly useful for general comparisons between
countries, and also for comparisons over time within certain policy fields within countries,
they are ultimately not satisfactory as social indicators for quality of life, because they are not
systematically related to individual well-being.
A number of problems regarding the use of measures of objective conditions in certain policy
fields as indicators for individual well-being can be distinguished. Firstly, the relation of
input-indicators4 to individual well-being is obviously unreliable and weak, as this strongly
depends on the efficiency with which the inputs are used. Secondly, there is no sound theory
on how performance in certain policy domains relates to individual well-being. Thirdly, even
if a positive relation between performance in specific policy fields and individual well-being
is assumed, no insight in substitution effects exists. That is, within policy fields there are
                                                
4     I.e. indicators reflecting the input of resources into social policies or collective provisions such as health care,
safety (police), infrastructure et cetera.
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mostly only ad hoc notions about how alternative means or resources can compensate for or
substitute one another, while between fields there is no notion at all whether or how an
improvement of conditions in the one field can make up for a deterioration of conditions in
another field. (What would for example be the net effect on quality of life of a policy in which
government spendings on health care are increased with 4 percent and government spendings
on education or safety decreased with 2 percent?). Fourthly, it is unknown whether the
selected indicators indeed cover the most relevant factors that constitute individual well-
being, and what proportion of individual well-being depends on the policy fields-related
measures that are used as quality of life indicators. 
The second branch in quality of life studies, comprising the subjective approaches, is found
with researchers and research groups that concentrate on measuring individuals' subjective
well-being or subjective evaluation of their life quality (e.g. Veenhoven 1984; 1994; 1995;
Andrews and Withey 1976; Campbell, Converse & Rogers 1976; Michalos 1991; Schulz
1995; and many others). Partly because of the shortcomings of the objective approach (cf.
Diener & Suh 1997), these authors advocate the measurement of subjective evaluations of
quality of life at the individual respondent level (although of course for comparing
communities or nations, these individual scores are aggregated to e.g. a nation mean score for
happiness). Increasingly sophisticated methods and measures for assessing individual
subjective well-being, happiness and satisfaction with life have been developed since the
1960s. By now it has sufficiently been shown that the conventionally used measures have
adequate psychometric properties.
The empirical research on happiness and subjective well-being has provided a large amount of
valuable data, which have given cause to adjust and qualify many formerly held beliefs about
the relation between objective conditions and well-being (see e.g. Veenhoven & Timmermans
1998, for the qualification of assumptions concerning the relation between economic
performance and subjective well-being; or Veenhoven 1994). This qualification of many
crude assumptions about what would make people happy is indeed no small accomplishment
of this subjective approach, but simultaneously with proving that the objective social
indicators approach is not satisfactory for studying quality of life, this must of course also lead
to the conclusion that the subjective approach alone cannot suffice either.
What still lacks is a theory that can explain differences (and even more puzzling similarities)
in life satisfaction from the individual’s life situation. The empirical relation between
subjective evaluations of quality of life and objective conditions is often studied (e.g.
Veenhoven 1984; 1995), but results are seldom unequivocal5. Even where in individual cases
subjective quality of life is found to change when specific objective conditions change, the
relation between these specific objective conditions and life satisfaction is hardly ever
replicated when comparing groups living under the various conditions. And even where on the
individual level specific changes in a particular life condition can be shown to improve quality
of life, it is not clear whether the effect will last and what the combined effect of multiple
changes in living conditions will be. Moreover, statistical correlations as found in empirical
                                                
5    In Veenhoven (1994) metadata on ‘correlates of happiness’ are presented. Correlations of varying strength
between ‘life satisfaction’ or ‘happiness’ and objective conditions are found. However, without theoretical
arguments for the selection of predictors and hypotheses about where correlations are expected, and of what sign,
interpreting these data is risky. Furthermore, it reveals nothing of the multivariate causality.
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data may or may not be spurious; one can not tell definitely in the absence of a theoretical
model of how subjective well-being is brought about. Thus, without a theory explaining how
the combined relevant living conditions ‘determine’ individual subjective quality of life, no
measurement of subjective quality of life has practical applicability for evaluating social
policies or the development of society.
In fact, the research into subjective well-being and its ‘correlates’ (Veenhoven 1994), seems to
have focused solely on subjective well-being as a state, and has not considered the agency
aspect of well-being. That is, it appears that the process through which subjective well-being
is attained and maintained at the individual level, has hardly been included in the investigation
of its outcomes. Yet I believe that only through opening the black box of the agency part of
subjective well-being we will be able to understand how complex combinations of conditions
affect the eventual subjective state of well-being.
The observation that, in quality of life research, a theory explaining how subjective well-being
and objective conditions are related is still wanting, is shared by several authors in the field
(cf. Zapf 1987, p. 7-8). Accordingly, several approaches have been tried to develop such a
theory explaining individual appreciation of quality of life. In the following section, I will
discuss the main different approaches in quality of life studies over the past three decades,
which have sought to establish, at the level of individuals, a causal link between objective
conditions and consequent subjective well-being. In discussing these various approaches, I
will assess their respective strengths and weaknesses and derive from these a set of criteria or
requirements that seem necessary for a successful theory relating subjective well-being to
objective conditions in an agency perspective.
2.3. Six approaches in Quality of Life studies: how do they cope with the core concern
Below I will discuss the following approaches: Andrews & Withey’s (1976) bottom-up
approach of life satisfaction, using satisfactions with life domains on several criteria; the time-
use approach, with as outstanding examples Dow & Juster (1985) and Heady & Wearing
(1992); multiple discrepancies theory (Michalos 1991); Schulz’s (1995) resource theory; the
Basic Needs approach of Fei, Ranis & Stewart (1979; Stewart 1985, 1996); and Sen’s (1985)
capabilities and functionings approach.
Of course there are many other approaches that touch upon the same subject matter as these
six. In selecting the main relevant approaches to be discussed in this section, I took only
approaches from within the field of quality of life studies, leaving aside other possibly
interesting approaches that have thus far only been used in other fields. From the ‘quality of
life’-theories I then sifted out those approaches which, in some way and at least to some
extent, relate subjective well-being and objective conditions. These two ‘filters’ explain why I
do not go into, for instance, values studies (such as the work of Rokeach 1979 or Namenwirth
& Weber 1987), nor into theories of mood and affect (e.g. Russell & Barrett 1999; Cacioppo
et al. 1999) which do not include any link to objective conditions such as material resources or
concrete activities.  
Before proceeding to the discussion of these approaches, there is however one other approach
that deserves mentioning, namely Veenhoven’s (1996) ‘happy life expectancy’ approach. This
approach does establish a link between the branch of quality of life studies that concentrates
on objective indicators and the branch focussing on subjective well-being, although it does in
26  THEORETICAL EMBEDDING
fact not concern the mechanism or process through which objective resources and restrictions
are converted into subjective well-being, i.e. the agency aspect of well-being. Veenhoven's
(1996) ‘happy life expectancy’-indicator attempts to achieve a synthesis between objective
and subjective indicators of quality of life in a different way. It proposes a nation-level
indicator obtained by multiplying the average life expectancy in a nation by the average score
on Veenhoven’s happiness-measure, thus denoting the average expected number of happy
years for a person in the nation under study. This measure is intuitively appealing, and
certainly seems an improvement as compared to purely subjective or objective indicators.
However, due to its foundation on life expectancy estimates, its usefulness is restricted to
inter-nation comparisons. Also, it does incorporate both an objective and a subjective
component, but in the ‘happy life expectancy’ indicator, both components are output factors,
and the approach does not provide clear handles to identify the relevant input factors; thus its
informative and guiding potential to policy making is restricted.
2.3.1.THE ANDREWS & WITHEY APPROACH: BOTTOM-UP DETERMINED SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING
With the publication of Social Indicators of Well-being: American’s Perception of Life
Quality in 1976, Andrews and Withey reported on what may be considered the first
comprehensive investigation of the level and structure of subjective well-being on a nation-
wide scale6. Since its publication, the book is not only been used for questionnaire items by
many researchers, but it still is one of the leading works in the field with regard to the
argumentation it provides for social indicators research as well as to the exemplary design of
the study. The richness of the Andrews and Withey data is still admired by many beginning
researchers.
Andrews and Withey started out with a broad set of rather basic exploratory questions about
well-being: what exactly are its components, how do these relate to one another, combine,
change over time, and vary across social, cultural, geographical groupings.
“After gaining knowledge about these matters, one would be ready to begin exploring the
causes, and the effects, of differences in well-being” (ibid., p. 7).
Although they restrict their own efforts to the problem of developing and selecting subjective
indicators, namely measures of perceived well-being, they strongly stress the importance of
combining objective (or in their terminology ‘externally based’) indicators and subjective (or
‘internally based’) indicators of well-being if policy implications are to be derived.
To answer the basic research questions, Andrews and Withey resorted to an exploratory
design. After extensive consulting of literature on human goals and life concerns, they drew
up a list of some eight hundred possible human goals and life concerns, which they carefully
condensed to a list of about sixty concern items. These were used for a first investigation of 
their importance and clustering on a representative sample of Americans. Gradually,
redundant items were removed, troublesome items rephrased and some initially left out items
were added, until a list of 123 items tapping life concerns was accepted. The items were used
in four national sample surveys, one local survey and re-interviews of a sample of respondents
                                                
6    The equally ‘classical’ The Quality of American Life: Perceptions, Evaluations and Satisfactions by
Campbell, Converse and Rogers appeared just before, also in 1976. As in fact there was cooperation of some
degree between both studies, it is neither very clear nor important which of these excellent studies was actually
the first. For reasons of space, I only discuss the Andrews and Withey study here.
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of one of the national surveys (total n=5422), complemented by another national survey
conducted by Campbell et al (1976). Additionally, Andrews and Withey conducted a series of
exploratory interviews with a small set of heterogeneous individuals.
This enabled Andrews and Withey to construct a map of the main life concerns, which intends
to depict how “people organise their perceptions of well-being”: how the life concerns fit
together in people’s thinking. This step indeed seems crucial in order to have a basis for
further research. However, one could expect that doing this in a purely exploratory way,
unguided by theory, makes the effort highly vulnerable to unrecognised distortion by the
specific procedure that is applied. Below I will argue that this has indeed caused interpretation
problems in the maps constructed by Andrews and Withey. 
Gradually during their research, Andrews and Withey developed a conceptual framework for
understanding the way components of well-being interact. A basic choice that they already
had to make at the start was for a bottom-up or a top-down approach. They chose the bottom-
up approach, which assumes that satisfactions on (aspects of) the different life concerns
combine into overall satisfaction or happiness7. The alternative top-down approach would
assume that people’s overall subjective well-being determines their evaluation of aspects of
life rather than the other way round. Andrews and Withey acknowledge that some feedback
loops are likely at work, but argue that the influence from the specific to the general is most
plausible as well as relevant for policy ends8.
The conceptual model that Andrews and Withey developed distinguishes two dimensions: a
criteria-dimension and a domain dimension. Criteria are
“the values, standards, aspirations, goals, and - in general - ways of judging what the
domains of life afford (....) A large subset of what we have termed ‘criteria’ turns out to
be a somewhat shared dream to be loved, liked and accepted, responsible, respected,
somewhat independent, somewhat secure, interested in life, comfortable, competent,
successful and to have fun” (ibid., p.12).
Operationalisations of these criteria in the study include ‘achievement’, ‘beauty and
attractiveness’, ‘independence and freedom’, ‘variation and stimulation’, ‘safety’, et cetera.
Domains refer to social institutions and activities through which people’s needs and
aspirations can be met. These include family, schools, jobs, medical facilities, stores and
businesses where you buy or work, welfare offices and services, units of local government,
unions, neighbourhoods and recreational facilities, and so forth.
The conceptual relationship between the two dimensions can be clarified in a matrix (figure
2.1.) in which the evaluations of well-being can be visualised at three levels of specificity.
Three levels of well-being are distinguished: at the most general level we find the satisfaction
with life as a whole, represented by E... At the middle level, somewhat more specific, are both
                                                
7    This assumption is debated however. Without substantive theory, this mystery of ‘the hen or the egg’ can not
be solved. Some support for the bottom-up approach is offered by the fact that it is not hard to find people who,
while reporting a high overall satisfaction, are still very much dissatisfied about certain aspects of their life. Even
though adherents of the top-down approach are probably right in their claim that overall satisfaction will tend to
colour partial satisfactions, people with either high or low overall satisfaction are still perfectly able to evaluate
the relative satisfaction they derive from different aspects of their life. So it seems that both approaches are partly
right. For further discussion, see Diener (1984) and Scherpenzeel & Saris (1996).
8    SPF theory, that will be expounded in section 2.5.6. and in Chapter 3, shares this position.
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the domain satisfactions (e.g. the satisfaction with one’s job or with one’s marriage) and the
criteria-satisfactions (e.g. the satisfaction with the amount of achievement or independence in
one’s life), represented by respectively Ei. and E.j. A still more specific level is represented by
the Eijs within the cells.
Criteria
→
Domains ↓          Eij → → → → → → → Ei.
             ↓ ↓
             ↓ ↓
             ↓ ↓
             ↓ ↓
             ↓ ↓
          E.j → → → → → → → E..
   Eij = Affective evaluative response to a particular domain with respect to a particular criterion
   Ei. = General affective evaluative response to a domain (across criteria)
   E.j = General affective evaluative response to a criterion (across domains)
   E. .= General affective evaluative response to life-as-a-whole, i.e. perceived quality of life        
   Figure 2.1.:  Two-Dimensional Conceptual Model (Andrews and Withey, 1976, p. 13)  
From figure 2.1. it is clear how Andrews and Withey conceptualise the relationship between
criteria-evaluations, domain-evaluations and general perceived well-being. Their hypothesis
as to how evaluations may combine across levels is that “the evaluations at the margins may
be derived by some appropriate combination of the evaluations in their respective rows or
columns”(p.14), though a simple additive relation is not assumed. This hypothesis is
formulated for both the criteria-evaluations and the domain-evaluations. A second hypothesis
is that “global evaluations - i.e., how a person feels about life as a whole - may be the result of
combining the domain evaluations or the criteria evaluations in a manner analogous to that
outlined above [for the evaluations at the margins]”(p.14).
Andrews and Withey explicitly add a number of assumptions that weaken their conceptual
model. These assumptions are that neither domains nor criteria are necessarily shared by all
people, nor do they all have the same weight for all people, nor do they combine into general
subjective well-being in the same way for all people, nor are the relations with (aspect) well-
being necessarily in the same directions for all people. In our opinion this amounts to
dismantling the conceptual model almost before it is tried, and rather leaves us with empty
hands as to the understanding and explanation of perceived well-being.
Or, stated differently, by allowing unlimited substitution, the specification of what really
matters is avoided. Still, with this weak model, the authors succeeded in detecting and
presenting a huge amount of information on (variation of) the level and structure of
perceptions of well-being in a large group of respondents.
As shortly mentioned above, the advance in understanding perceptions of well-being, which
the Andrews and Withey-study could have brought about, is hampered by a substantial
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problem. As no clear a priori theoretical framework was at hand, and thus no hypotheses
existed on what would be crucial relations in the data, the methods for analysing the data
could not be appropriately chosen to reveal whether relations and structures of specific
interest existed.9 In other words, the purely exploratory approach resulted in technically
correct but sometimes not optimally informative and meaningful analyses of the data. The
results are often uninterpretable. For example, the procedure used for ‘mapping of life
concerns’ (smallest space analyses on the scores obtained on all investigated items), will per
definition lead to a map where substitutes for the achievement of one and the same goal are
located at maximum distance of each other. Closeness of ‘concerns’ can result either from
items to which people are indifferent, from items that tap concerns that are functional
complements, or from items that measure the same concern. It is therefore hardly possible to
attach any interpretation to the maps (they should in no case be interpreted as ‘the way
people’s perceptions of well-being are structured’!), and they seem only valuable for
researchers facing a problem of what items to select to cover certain aspects of well-being.
Interpretation problems of this kind abound in the book. Yet, given a firmer theoretical
framework, the data collected by these authors can be of rather unique value for assessing the
plausibility of assumed relationships between components of perceived well-being, as well as
the relative importance of different life concerns.
2.3.2.   THE ROLE OF ACTIVITIES IN ACHIEVING WELL-BEING: THE TIME USE APPROACH
The investigation of time use and its relation to (aspects of) well-being originates for the
largest part from research on consumer behaviour and marketing studies, while it also has
some branches rooted in psychology (for example Csikszentmihaly 1997, 1992).
Although the time use approach did not really start with the work of authors like Juster,
Stafford and Dow (1985), and time use inventories were applied already in the 1950’s, I
consider Juster and Stafford’s Time, Goods and Well-being (1985) as one of the landmark
books in this approach, and the first in which strong theoretical arguments for the time use
approach are presented.
Their time use approach to well-being is positioned by Dow and Juster in the evolution of
economic writings from the sole focus on the production of goods and services through the
market, and the measurement of market output, via a broadening of attention to include goods
and services that are not conventionally priced as market output, to the inclusion of time and
time use as determinants of satisfaction or well-being. As they argue, thus far economics has
treated time use only in a highly simplified way, in which ‘leisure time’ always is a ‘good’, as
opposed to paid labour, which is always a disutility, regardless of the specific activities and
conditions involved in leisure and work. Clearly, more can be said about the ‘utility’ or well-
being effects of time either spent on leisure or on work (this obvious fact of course lies at the
basis of much studies in the social relations, sociotechnics and related research, where the
main idea is that by redesigning the physical en social environment of the working process,
productivity will raise as a result of increased enjoyment of the work). Juster and Dow
                                                
9    For example, the two dimensions, domains and criteria, would from the point of view of resource theory, the
basic needs approach or social production functions theory be expected to roughly cover respectively resources
or production factors and instrumental (first order) goals, respectively. Thus, we would expect the two
dimensions to behave differently, which, by choosing appropriate analyses for both, could very likely be tested.
In fact, the ‘maps’ Andrews and Withey present for criteria-concerns and domain-concerns separately (p. 38-39,
47) lend some face-value support to this idea.
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therefore propose a theory of well-being that unites the economists’ perceptions of the
importance of material goods and service flows with the insights of other social scientists
regarding a broader spectrum of preferences in one framework: the analysis of time allocation
to both market and non-market activities.
In this theory the basic resources available to individuals for the production of well-being are
defined as total available time, on the one hand, and the stock of (inherited) ‘wealth’ on the
other, with wealth being defined very broadly to include not only conventional capital assets,
but also human capital skills, environmental assets, stocks of associations between
individuals, and so forth. Individual or societal well-being is seen as resulting from the
application of those resources to the production of market and non-market output. These
outputs are then combined with non-market time to produce other non-market outputs, and
ultimately satisfactions or utility. In Dow and Juster’s thinking about the generation of well-
being, total available time plays a crucial role, not only as an input into a variety of market and
non-market production activities, including leisure, but equally important as a direct source of
satisfaction. Dow and Juster argue that people have preferences over all uses of time, and that
all activities generate not only observable and measurable outcomes in the form of market and
non-market goods, but also outputs which consist of satisfactions from the activities
themselves (ibid. p.399). They assume that people have preferences for every activity they
might engage in, and those preferences (‘process benefits’ in Dow and Juster’s terminology)
are assumed to influence both the way in which people allocate time and the well-being they
derive from this allocation of time.
In the remainder of their work, Dow and Juster concentrate on the measurement of process
benefits and the relation between these and the perceived quality of life. The identification,
measurement and assessment of influences of ‘market and non-market goods’ is not further
elaborated upon. ‘Process well-being’ is measured by Dow and Juster by means of time use
inventories, in which respondents fill in for each thirty minutes during a week, what they were
doing. In addition, respondents were asked to rank each of a set of 22 activities on a scale
from 0 through 10 with regard to the enjoyability of the activity (respondents were specifically
instructed to disregard the desirability of the outcome or result of the activities). By
multiplying the mean amount of time spent on each activity with the enjoyability score of the
activity (the process benefits) and summing over all activities a respondent reports, Dow and
Juster arrive at a score on ‘process well-being’, which is defined as PWB = ∋ni=1 wi* ti. (For
the precise computations and the manipulations used to check for possible variation in ‘anchor
points’ between respondents, see Dow and Juster, 1985, p. 402-406). 
The findings with regard to process well-being that Dow and Juster present (based on data
from the 1975-76 national survey of time use among American families, n=975), reveal some
interesting patterns.  Females, married people, younger people, unemployed people and people
with children have lower process well-being scores than their respective counterparts. These
results most likely indicate that various demographic or situational characteristics impose
constraints upon the individual that lead to lower per hour process well-being. The gender
effect can, for example, reflect the fact that being female is typically associated with a set of
activities that have low process benefit scores: many household production activities (ibid. p.
409). The same reasoning seems to hold for being married and having children: although
highly valued states of being in themselves, apparently there are considerable obligations
attached to these states that have low process benefit scores.
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However, notwithstanding the interest of these findings, the association between measures of
process well-being and satisfactions with quality of life among the research population
appeared to be almost zero. Also, the most powerful predictors of process well-being scores
explain very little of the variation of life satisfaction among the population. Dow and Juster
account for this lack of association by pointing out that the measure of process well-being
stands relatively isolated in time:
“...Process well-being measures a set of satisfactions associated with an individual’s
current set of activities, and with the goods and service flows associated with those
activities. The life satisfaction measure reflects an assessment of certain stocks or
contexts that may be thought of, in part, as a consequence of past activities” (p. 410-411).
They further mention ‘investments motives’ as something which, while absent from their
theoretical framework, may simultaneously lower process well-being scores and increase life
satisfaction. This observation seems indeed crucial in explaining the low associations of
process well-being scores with overall well-being. Regarding the early recognition by Dow
and Juster of the importance of investment mechanisms, it is striking and disappointing to
observe that through the following decade the negligence of investment mechanisms persisted
in all quality of life studies using time use data. Consequently, also in the last ten years, the
enjoyment of activities as observed in time use data was found to relate at best slightly to life
satisfaction. So it seems that we cannot account for well-being simply in terms of time
allocation to enjoyable activities, a finding that Heady and Wearing (1992) have succinctly
expressed as “hedonism fails”10.
The negligence of investment activities by concentrating on hedonic levels is not the only
weakness of the time use approach. Objections can also be made against the sole reliance on
individuals’ subjective evaluations of the enjoyment of activities. As will be explained in
more detail below, where the work of Sen is discussed, such reliance on completely subjective
evaluations is highly vulnerable to standard shifts: adaptation to longstanding living
conditions (whether these are very poor or very good) can cause individuals to shift their
evaluation standards. This mechanism then makes the obtained subjective evaluations highly
questionable as indicators of ‘real’ well-being. 
2.3.3. MULTIPLE DISCREPANCIES THEORY: FROM THE HEDONIC FRYING PAN INTO THE FIRE OF
        STANDARD SHIFT
In quality of life research only few attempts to advance theoretical models of how diverse
factors are related to each other and to the subjective perceptions they elicit have been seen
thus far, and of these few, multiple discrepancies theory is one of the more elaborated.
Within his multiple discrepancies theory, Michalos (1985, 1991) has developed an elaborate
theoretical framework to explain the quality of life. (Whether the dependent in his theory is
really ‘quality of life’, or rather ‘life satisfaction’ - the cognitive component of well-being - is
debatable, and I will return to this problem below).
Multiple discrepancies theory is a strongly cognitive based approach, based on different
comparisons. In these comparisons, the focus is not on objectively measurable discrepancies,
                                                
10    In section 2.3.1., it was already noted that most researchers by now agree that overall subjective well-being
or ‘happiness’ results from two ingredients: both hedonic level and life satisfaction, that is, both affect and
cognition, should be considered.
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but on perceptions: a number of perceived discrepancies are measured, which are assumed to
influence the perceived discrepancy between what the individual has now and what he wants
(the self-wants variable). The self-wants variable again explains ‘net satisfaction’. The
comparisons that are part of Michalos’ theory are based on several socio-psychological
theories. Reference group theory has inspired the self /other comparison; equity theory
provided the self / deserved comparison; and the temporal comparisons (progress/future/best)
are based on aspiration theory (Schulz 1995, p. 156).
In addition to these core parts of the theory, Michalos has added a group of variables to which
he refers as mediators or conditioners. These mediators or conditioners include
sociodemographic variables as well as self-esteem and social support. The core of the
theoretical framework of Multiple Discrepancies Theory is shown in figure 2.2. (adapted from
Michalos 1985, p. 357).
Being one of the first serious attempts to advance a theoretical framework for quality of life
research is already praiseworthy, but multiple discrepancies theory also has some appealing
features in itself.
The integration of insights from diverse psychological approaches (reference group theory,
equity theory, aspiration theory, et cetera) is certainly one of the theory’s strengths. A second
strength is the explicit inclusion of cognitive evaluations that are explicitly extended beyond
the hedonic level of the moment. In multiple discrepancies theory, the investment
mechanisms, which are so troublesome in the time use approach, are thus - though implicitly














Figure 2.2.:    Perceptual core of Michalos' Multiple Discrepancies Theory
CHAPTER 2 33
A third potential strength, which however heavily depends on the quality of measurements
and may therefore easily turn into a major weakness, is the inclusion of both the self/others
and the self/best comparisons. The first of these concerns the relative well-being of the
respondent within his reference group (his social environment), while the latter is supposed to
concern the respondent’s position as compared to some absolute yardstick, that is irrespective
of the individual’s reference group. It is the latter comparison that may be troublesome, for
how would we know whether the respondents succeed in abstracting from their reference
groups? There may be considerable (and systematic!) variation in the degree to which
respondents can actually imagine an absolute ‘best’ life, and consequently the resulting
indicator may be more or less unreliable. Per saldo the two comparisons (self/others and
self/best) thus should be expected to result in a considerable reference-group effect on the
perceived discrepancies between what one has now and what one wants.
There are a few more weaknesses of multiple discrepancies theory to be discussed here. A
clear and critical discussion of the general adequacy of multiple discrepancies theory as
compared to resources theory is found in Schulz (1995), on whom the first two of the
following remarks are based.
As can be seen in figure 2.2., the central predictor for net satisfaction is the discrepancy
between what one has now and what one wants. Rather high standardised regression
coefficients are found between the two (Schulz 1995, p 156). One could however question
whether the self/wants variable does in fact explain anything in the sense of satisfactory
logical explanation. The discrepancy between what one has and what one wants is
conceptually very close, if not similar to (dis)satisfaction. The high explained variance may in
fact reflect a tautology. The same problem extends to a lesser degree to the set of comparisons
at the left part of the model. Thus, the only part of the model that might really provide
substantive explanation, would be the set of conditioners. The mechanisms by which these
affect satisfaction are however not explicated, which brings us to our second remark.
The set of ‘conditioners’ or ‘mediators’ with which Michalos expanded his core model, is in
fact not really integrated into the model. Michalos only assumes a moderating effect of these
variables on the way perceived discrepancies affect net satisfaction, but he fails to formulate
assumptions regarding their meaning and regarding the mechanism through which the
mediation takes place. This is not very surprising, as a little thinking reveals that the set of
sociodemographic variables, self esteem and social support should be expected to affect the
relations in the core model in multiple ways. Firstly, these variables will surely affect the
person’s present objective situation (‘what one has now’, the left side of the multiple
comparisons); secondly, they will very likely also affect the aspirations of the person, his
reference groups and his ideas of justice (the right side of the multiple comparisons); thirdly,
they are likely to affect the evaluation of the discrepancies; and fourthly, they may also affect
the strength of the association between the ‘perceived self now/wants’ variable and net
satisfaction. Explicating all these relations would complicate the theoretical model to a high
degree. It would in fact turn the multiple discrepancies theory into some resource model. But
still, including socio-economic variables without explicating the mechanism through which
they influence the other effects may yield a better description of the problem (through the
correlations obtained between socio-economic variables and the dependent variable), but it
does not explain the problem.  Neither does the addition of self-esteem and social support,
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although Michalos reports that the social support and self-esteem measures significantly
increased the theory’s power to explain life satisfaction. As yet it is even unclear whether high
self-esteem is a prerequisite of high quality of life, or rather a result of long-lasting positive
reinforcements. In any case, the variable has nothing to do with multiple discrepancies
comparisons. Just like social support, which is essentially a resource, it belongs to an other
‘family’ of theories (ibid., p 156). In principle, multiple discrepancies theory might be
integrated with some resource theory into one unifying framework. The necessary handles to
achieve such an overarching theory are however not present in multiple discrepancies theory. 
  
Our third and final remark regarding the adequacy of multiple discrepancies theory for the
explanation of well-being concerns the dependent variable. In Michalos (1985), both
happiness and satisfaction are used as dependent variables. But in later works (e.g. Michalos
1991) it appears that Michalos neglects happiness and uses only net satisfaction, or life
satisfaction, which refers solely to the cognitive component of subjective well-being.
Restricting the focus to the cognitive component of subjective well-being is not harmless.
Even though Andrews and Withey (1976) found high intercorrelations between different
partial operationalisations of well-being (Schulz 1995, p.154), this does not justify equating
well-being with its cognitive component. The high intercorrelations found by Andrews and
Withey may not be robust over sub-populations of respondents living under the most or the
least favourable conditions. Especially since we have seen that the satisfaction component is
more vulnerable to reference group effects, satisfaction alone cannot safely be assumed to be
an adequate indicator of overall well-being11. 
In fact, the intercorrelations that were found, were not at all that high: for example the
Pearson’s r that was found between the measures for satisfaction with one’s life and for
happiness as used by Andrews and Withey varied from  .49 to .63. For two partial measures of
one underlying concept, these figures do not seem high enough to justify equating of the
underlying concept with just one of its components.
Summarising, we may say that, despite several very attractive and desirable features (such as
the inclusion of insights from diverse psychological approaches, and the capability to handle
investment behaviour), multiple discrepancies theory does not yet provide a satisfactory
framework for explaining quality of life. However, it does sensitise quality of life researchers
to the importance of theoretical frameworks to guide and interpret empirical research.  
2.3.4. RESOURCE THEORY: AN ATTEMPT TO IMPROVE ON MULTIPLE DISCREPANCIES THEORY
In the previous section we have seen that Schulz (1995) seriously criticises Michalos’ multiple
discrepancies theory, and in this I agree with him. In principle, I also agree with the alternative
approach Schulz defends, namely resource theory. According to Schulz, the resource
approach basically amounts to the rather traditional view that satisfaction and happiness
depend on certain living conditions. The focus is here on the relationship between rather
objective existing conditions and net satisfaction, while cognitive processes like perception,
aspirations, comparisons et cetera need not be part of the model. Schulz depicts the resource
                                                
11    Sole reliance on satisfaction as indicator for well-being would overestimate within-group variance while
underestimating between-group variance. In other words: the average well-being of the people in a group that as
a whole is better off is underestimated, while the average well-being of those in less favoured groups would be
flattered. As soon as such figures would have consequences for policy, this is an unacceptable inaccuracy. 
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model as follows (figure 2.3.):
Schulz argues that, in addition to material objective conditions, also non-material resources
should be measured in an objective way and included among the relevant resources, as these
have been shown to play a very important role in satisfaction and happiness12. Though the
basic model of resource theory has intuitive appeal, it gives little clues about how to get
beyond the general idea and concretise what resources are relevant. Schulz acknowledges this
point and proposes a temporary solution, using the domains-concept of Andrews and Withey:
“It is certainly one weakness of the resource approach that it does not allow for a
definition of all living conditions necessary to reach a high level of satisfaction.
Therefore, in this research, the solution has been to define ‘domains of life’; satisfactions
with the domains of life explain very well global satisfaction or global happiness. We can
try, moreover, to explain domain satisfaction with rather objective conditions.” (Schulz
1995, p. 158)
Yet, this does not really solve the problem. One difficulty that remains is that
“…the ‘domains’ do not apply to all people, so it is difficult to compare different groups.
The domain ‘work’ or ‘job’ does not exist for housewives, or the domain ‘spouse’ or
‘partner’ for many people living as singles, or according to other new lifestyles. What can
be done is to replace these categories by more basic ones such as satisfaction with sex,
satisfaction with communication, satisfaction with what a person does most of the time,
and so on, then these categories of satisfaction can be explained by specific resources”
(Schulz 1995, p. 158).
In fact, what Schulz suggests in the last few lines of the quote, is to treat domains as
something instrumental in attaining other, more basic, things. Although Schulz himself does
not name these more basic things as something different from the domain-type resources, the
relation between the plain resources and ‘more basic things’ reminds of the domain- versus
criteria-dimension in Andrews and Withey, while it might also be understood as something
like the ‘functionings’ Sen focuses on (see below). As will be seen in chapter 3, it shows an
                                                
12   It is interesting that Schulz stresses the importance of attempting to measure in a more objective way what he
denotes as the most important sources of happiness: “the life partner, friends, colleagues - the social network”
(ibid., p 158).
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Figure 2.3.:    Resource theory (Schulz 1995, p. 157)
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even more striking similarity with the relation between lower level resources and activities
and higher level goals in Lindenberg’s Social Production Function theory. 
Schulz illustrates the exposition of resource theory by presenting the results of a study of the
determinants of satisfaction and happiness among 354 students of the University of Vienna. In
these results it becomes even clearer that in order to provide real explanation, resource theory
still needs much elaboration. For one thing, as long as the model does not specify what are the
most basic and universal needs or goals people have, it cannot be decided which resources one
should necessarily measure in order to cover the main components of satisfaction.
Schulz concludes with formulating a list of suggestions for further research and theory
formation, of which the following seem the most important:
- “Resource variables should also include behaviours, because the adequate use of material
resources and the factor of time seems to be highly relevant”;
- “Resource theories should try to combine their approach with cognitive elements
(aspirations, comparisons, etc.)” (Schulz 1995, p. 167).
Summarising, Schulz proposes the use of some type of resource theory for the explanation of
satisfaction and happiness, that links objective conditions with subjective well-being.
Although the explanation of subjective well-being from objective resources may not result in
very high R2, it provides much more relevant information than multiple discrepancies theory
where the predictors are conceptually close to the dependent variable. However, the resource
theory as presented by Schulz is far from elaborated, and needs a lot of specification in order
to bring forth an operational model. Most importantly, a specification is needed of the
resources that are considered relevant, and of their hypothesised relations to each other and to
overall well-being.
Schulz gives one rather vague suggestion with regard to the problem of what resources to look
at. He in fact raises an important point there, when he argues that many of the classical
indicators of objective well-being have lost much of their relevance in contemporary affluent
western societies, simply because the most basic needs for survival are generally met. He
therefore advocates concentration on those resources that are not yet (equally) available to
everyone. We have two objections to this strategy. Firstly, one should be extremely careful
before one accepts the assertion that the basic resources for survival are sufficiently available
to everyone in modern Western society. There is still evidence that for some people, even
though their number may be small, the most basic resources are still in jeopardy. And even if
the assertion were true, it would seem unwise to stop monitoring the availability of these basic
resources. Our second objection concerns the effects of Schulz’s proposal for the possibilities
for international comparisons. If a set of indicators for well-being would only contain those
elements that are of actual concern to affluent western societies, these indicators, if applied to
other countries as well, would blur the substantial differences in well-being between
countries. Thus, while for detecting differences in well-being within countries Schulz’s
suggestion is certainly valuable, we still need to include basic resources in our research too, to
be able to judge the average level of well-being in the country.
2.3.5. THE BASIC NEEDS APPROACH: A MORE REFINED SORT OF RESOURCE THEORY
Stewart (1996) describes the Basic Needs approach that was originally proposed by Fei, Ranis
& Stewart (1979) as an alternative to the use of GNP as a measure of well-being, and also
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compares its merits with those of Sen’s capabilities approach and the Human Development
Index as used by the UNDP. The Basic Needs approach sees “income as a means rather than
an end from the perspective of well-being”, namely as a “means to the basic goods and
services necessary for a decent life, (...) defined in terms of levels of health, nutrition, and
literacy [or educational achievement]” (Stewart 1996, p. 48).
In the Basic Needs approach
“the relationship between the end (the decent life) and the means (the goods and services
consumed) has been described variously as a ‘metaproduction function’ (Fei, Ranis and
Stewart) and a ‘human production function’ (UNDP, Human Development Report).
Formally this relationship may be represented as: L* = f (Bi, Bii, Biii ...) where L* is the
quality of life achieved, defined in terms of health, nutrition etc, and Bi, Bii, Biii ... are the
basic needs goods and services which lead to its realisation. We shall call this relationship
the metaproduction function. It represents a complex empirical relationship that can be
observed at many levels - world, country, household, or individual level. To give it
meaning, the first necessity is to define the elements which constitute L*, or the decent
life. The basic goods approach has defined the characteristics rather minimally as health,
nutrition, and some indicator of educational achievements. These three are included on
the grounds that these are ‘basic’ characteristics which (a) would probably achieve
universal consent as universal human needs; (b) have some claim to priority as being
necessary preconditions for other aspects of a full life, such as enjoyment of art or sport;
and (c) are relatively easy to measure” (Stewart, ibid., p. 48-49).
The core of the basic needs approach is schematically represented in figure 2.4.
In this basic description of the core idea of the basic needs approach, we can already discern
some interesting similarities and differences with other approaches. Firstly, it should be
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Figure 2.4.:  Core of the Basic Needs approach (after Stewart 1996, p. 55)
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in terms of objective elements rather than in terms of subjective well-being. Thus, strictly
speaking, the basic needs approach does not meet the requirement formulated earlier in this
section, that to have the potential to achieve progress in quality of life research, a theory
should pay attention to both subjective well-being and to objective factors or conditions, and
address the causal relation between both. However, the Basic Needs approach might be
extended to include the subjective evaluation of life quality as well. In principle, this might be
achieved in a rather straightforward manner. One would need to add a measure of subjective
well-being to the operationalisation of L*, which would best be conceptualised as the
common resultant of the three more objective elements by which L* is now operationalised. In
practice, however, extending the Basic Needs approach with a measure of subjective well-
being may prove less straightforward, for it may take some effort to find a subjective measure
that is satisfactorily correlated with the objective elements of L*. It is indeed not at all clear
whether all components of L* will be highly correlated with SWB.
Secondly, what is striking is the conceptualisation of the relation between the basic goods and
the resulting life quality. This is described as a metaproduction function, indicating that even
the basic goods themselves do not directly affect quality of life, but that they are means of
production, which only through being used or applied in some purposeful process, contribute
to the achievement of a good life. This notion is quite essential in this approach, and it is the
very same notion that is also found in Sen’s functionings and capabilities approach (see
below) and in Lindenberg’s social production function theory (see section 2.5). Two
implications of the notion of (meta-) production functions should be noted. In the first place,
this notion implies that the value of objective goods for the achievement of well-being
depends on what people do with the goods or services they have. In the second place, it
implies that the composition of the ‘basket’ of goods and services matters, for the analogy
with factors in a production function raises the notions of substitutability and complementarity
of goods.   
Thirdly, what should be noticed about the core idea of the basic needs approach, is that it is
indeed about basic needs and a minimally decent or good life. As we shall also see shortly,
when discussing the common operationalisation of the three elements of the ‘decent’ life, this
feature of the approach indicates that it is mainly useful for assessing the achievements of
underdeveloped or economically backward countries; in e.g. western industrialised countries
its discriminative power would be very small, as there the basic goods of literacy and nutrition
are practically attainable for all and life expectancy is generally high. The basic needs
approach is thus most - and even almost exclusively - adequate for application to
economically and/or socially backward countries.
Fourthly, the basic needs approach works with an index-type criterion for ‘good life’, which
automatically means that there is the problem of how to weigh the components that together
constitute the index. One way to proceed concerning the weighting problem, is to incorporate
a single outcome criterion just one level beyond the L*, namely a measure of subjective well-
being. However, this will not be a matter of ‘simply’ adding a SWB measure to the
framework, for it requires that all objective elements of L* correlate highly with SWB (see the
first remark on the Basic Needs approach, above).
Fifthly, by concentrating on basic needs, this approach side-steps one of the problematic
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aspects associated with the use of GNP per capita as measure of well-being, namely that of the
income distribution. In the basic needs approach, income distribution is no direct element of
the assessment of quality of life, but indirectly it is in some degree. The distribution of income
is “taken into account so far as it affects the ability of each member of society to gain access
to the goods and services necessary for a decent life. However, beyond that, once everyone has
access to enough BN goods and services, the BN approach says nothing about income
distribution” (Stewart 1996, p. 50). This seems to be a highly elegant solution that keeps a
safe balance between too much neutrality (as in the GNP per capita approach, that takes the
income distribution for granted) and too much normative prescription, which - no matter what
distribution of income would be taken as ideal or just - would be sure to raise much
opposition.
The focus on basic or essential goods vis-à-vis non-basic goods in the BN approach also
permits ranking of alternative situations according to their desirability. However, the
necessary valuations involved make this a normative and thus potentially controversial matter.
For further reading on this feature of the BN approach, and in particular its implications as
compared to the capabilities approach of Sen that does refrain from valuation of particular
goods, I refer to Stewart (1996, p. 53-54) 
When looking beyond the core idea to its translation into actual measures and the use thereof,
more specific observations can be made. The three basic characteristics are usually
operationalised as follows. For health, life expectancy is used as a measure; for (inverse)
nutrition, rates of child malnutrition are used; and for educational achievement, literacy rates
are used as indicator.
These operationalisations underscore the remark above that the approach seems most suitable
to the study of quality of life in poor or socially backward countries (cf. Stewart 1996, p. 64);
these specific indicators that are chosen are not sensitive in the higher ranges of life quality
that are found in more affluent, modern western societies. In this sense, the basic needs
approach is much more restricted than e.g. Sen’s functionings and capabilities approach, in
which all sorts of ‘higher level’ capabilities can be dealt with than merely the basic functions
for survival on which the basic needs approach concentrates.
It can also be noted that, although the core idea of the approach does not principally exclude
this, the social component of well-being and ‘decent’ living seems to be rather neglected in
the operationalisations as compared with the physical component of well-being. Most likely
this is a consequence of enormous difficulties in reaching consensus on what are universally
essential goods and services necessary for leading a socially good or decent life13.
What the basic needs approach in its particular operationalisation does emphasise, is the kind
of goods and services that usually come about only by public provision. It thus shifts attention
from the mere height of GNP per capita to the way in which public means are allocated. Its
potential relevance for policymaking, monitoring and evaluation is therefore considerable, be
it restricted to countries in which serious deprivation still prevails. 
                                                
13    The only ‘good’ that is likely to receive almost universal acceptance as a basic means of attaining a decent
social life might be paid employment, but employment rates could impossibly be used as basic needs indicators
because of contamination with child labour (which most people would agree is inversely related to a decent life),
with ideologically based differences in female labour participation (which are difficult to interpret in terms of
quality of life), and with differences in formalization of labour/employment (in less industrialized countries,
different proportions of the total of productive labour are organized in the form of paid jobs).     
40  THEORETICAL EMBEDDING
2.3.6. THE WORK OF SEN: FUNCTIONINGS AND CAPABILITIES
It has already been referred to several times: the capabilities approach to social well-being,
advocated by Sen. This unconventional but highly respected economic theorist (and winner of
the 1998 Nobel-prize for economics) provides us with some useful suggestions and sharp
analyses of often neglected problems. He is most concerned about development economics
and has devoted much effort to drawing attention of mainstream economists to the problems
of justice and well-being in underdeveloped economies. Sen (1977) has argued that several of
the assumptions underlying utilitarianism are either empirically incorrect or are founded on
seriously questionable values (cf. Stewart 1996, p. 47), and he consequently rejects as
unacceptable and even misleading the use of GNP as an indicator for human well-being,
which implicitly relies on these assumptions. 
In Commodities and Capabilities (1985), Sen again attacks utilitarianism, on more theoretical
grounds. Here, the main argument is that the classical notion of utility as used in economics, is
an inadequate criterion for assessing or evaluating well-being, for the following reasons.
Firstly, the notion of utility has been used with various different meanings: in classical
utilitarianism, utility is seen as satisfaction or happiness; in much modern utilitarianism as
desire-fulfilment; while “in much of modern economics ‘utility’ serves other purposes too,
standing for whatever the person maximises (or can be seen as maximising) or simply for the
person’s well-being or advantage no matter how that is judged.” (Sen 1985, p. 2,3). Secondly,
and more importantly, giving several distinct meanings to ‘utility’ at the same time, we run
the risk of implicitly assuming that these meanings would in reality coincide with each other:
“...one’s view of one’s own welfare and the maximand in choice behaviour may each
respectively be called ‘utility’ without great difficulty, but if both are called ‘utility’ and
treated as the same, then it would have  been implicitly presumed that what one always
maximises is indeed one’s own welfare” (ibid., p. 3,4).
And even though a person’s actions and his interests are obviously related, for judging a
person’s interests it is too crude a simplification to equate it to his actions or behaviour. 
What then, Sen asks, should be the yardstick to measure a person’s well-being? The usual
approach within economics is to look at the amount of commodities a person possesses, that
is, to look at his opulence. A somewhat more refined version of this approach, introduced by
Gorman (1956) and Lancaster (1966), views commodities in terms of their characteristics, i.e.
their various desirable properties, which enable the person who possesses the good to put it to
various uses.
Sen points out however that “the characteristics of the goods do not tell us what the person
will be able to do with those properties” (p. 9); this still depends on the personal physical and
mental capabilities and on the social and physical settings. Thus, in judging the well-being of
a person, it would also be insufficient to limit the analysis to the characteristics of the goods
possessed. Which brings Sen to his main statement: in order to judge the well-being of
persons, we have to consider their functionings. Functionings are defined as what the person
succeeds in doing with the commodities and characteristics at his or her command.14
                                                
14    In this main statement of his book, Sen surprisingly contradicts himself however. After having argued, in
Chapter 1, that it is the ‘advantage’ of a person that really matters, rather than his achieved well-being, the choice
for ‘functionings’ as the best level to approach well-being seems to be somewhat inconsistent. “ ‘Advantage’
refers to the real opportunities that the person has, especially compared with others. The opportunities are not
judged only by the results or the level of well-being achieved... The freedom to achieve well-being is closer to the
notion of advantage than well-being itself”  (ibid. p. 5). The key reason why Sen in the remainder of his book
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“A functioning is an achievement of a person: what he or she manages to do or to be. It
reflects, as it were, a part of the ‘state’ of that person. It has to be distinguished from the
commodities which are used to achieve those functionings. It has to be distinguished also
from the happiness generated by the functioning” (Sen 1985, p. 10).
In the introduction to Choice, Welfare and Measurement (1997), Sen summarises his
conceptualisation of the process through which utility is realised in the following diagram:
In disentangling the levels at which commodities and capabilities affect the individuals’ well-
being, Sen thus distinguishes three substantively different levels at which the problem of
measuring well-being can be approached: (1) the level of utility; (2) the level of opulence; and
(3) the level of functionings. While the first two levels are more standard approaches, Sen
defends the third, which in fact lies in between.
The main remaining problem in Sen’s book seems to be the lack of substantive filling-in of
the functioning-vector15. Here Sen falls back in line with mainstream economics that avoids
the specification of preferences or ‘needs’. The functionings and capabilities approach is
empty with regard to what it is people need or want or value; it rather specifies a mechanism
through which non-specified goods and services are - at the individual level - converted into
utility or subjective well-being.
Still, Sen seems to be the first who, in the field of quality of life, managed to find a solution
for the problem of substitution. While before Sen, there were only approaches that either
allowed unlimited substitution (like the Andrews & Withey approach, but also multiple
discrepancies theory and others), or no substitution at all (like Schulz’s resource theory, but
also the implicit approaches used in the social indicators programmes at the (inter-) national
level), with the functionings approach Sen has achieved a way around these undesirable
extremes, by assuming that there are essential functionings and substitutable goods with
which to achieve these functionings. This notion of limited substitution is an essential part of
                                                                                                                                                        
prefers ‘functionings’ as the indicator of well-being might be the inherent comparison to others in ‘advantage’,
which would induce immense context-effects, especially when studying the well-being of persons in different
countries or cultures.
15    Elsewhere, Sen specifies a list of functionings he considers relevant (Sen 1992). This list comprises elements
like health, money, absence of shame and other components, for the selection of which Sen offers no theoretical
arguments, however. The list seems not to be intended as a complete list of important functionings, and it does









Figure 2.5.: Sen's model of the relation between a good and a person (Sen 1997, p. 30)
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Sen’s approach, and it is indeed crucial for understanding the relation of objective resources to
the production of subjective well-being. But in the case of Sen’s approach it is clear what we
still want: a theory of goals that can provide a substantive filling-in of the functionings Sen
proposes as central focus of well-being and quality of life assessments.
2.3.7. TO WHAT EXTENT CAN CURRENT APPROACHES IN QUALITY OF LIFE RESEARCH DEAL
WITH ITS CORE CONCERN?
From the foregoing discussion of the ability of six main approaches in quality of life studies to
explain how objective conditions affect subjective well-being, we can distil a number of
criteria on which to evaluate the approaches:
1. A theory aiming to explain subjective well-being or life satisfaction should include a
    specification of goals. In the discussion of the Andrews and Withey approach, of resource
    theory and of the approach that Sen advocates, we saw that, when no goals are specified, it
    is neither clear what we should measure nor how measurements of different life concerns
    should be interpreted.
2. Next to requiring a specification of goals, we also want these goals placed in a hierarchical
     structure. As was seen in the discussion of the Andrews and Withey approach and of
     resource theory, human goals need not only be identified but their relative importance
     should be assessed as well. Without clear ideas about relative importance, we cannot
     explain different effects on overall well-being when restrictions are imposed on either the
     one goal or the other.
3. The third element we would wish in a theory of well-being is a specification of the
     instrumentality relations between goals. Again in the discussion of the Andrews and
Withey approach and in Schulz’s version of resource theory, the lack of instrumentality
relations between goals was found problematic.
4. Related to the second and third criterion, it also seems desirable that an adequate theory of
     social well-being be able to handle substitution. That is, the theory should neither allow
     unlimited substitution (for that position extremely limits the explanation of differences in
     subjective well-being), nor should it overlook all possibilities for substitution (for that
     position leads to the kinds of problems encountered by e.g. national social indicators
     programmes: it prohibits explanation of differences in well-being between people whose
     command over the resources of interest is equal). An adequate theory of well-being should
     thus be able to identify and explain instances where different means are used to attain the
     same ‘higher order’ goal, or where a low level of well-being on one component is (partly)
     compensated for by an increased level of another component of overall well-being. Both in
     Schulz’s resource theory and in the Andrews and Withey approach the ability to handle
     substitution is clearly absent. 
5. The fifth criterion that I propose for assessing the potential of theories to explain well-
being is whether inherent relations to objective conditions are contained. This element was
most clearly found wanting in multiple discrepancies theory, and the time use approach.
6. A next requirement that we think a theory for explaining quality of life should meet, is
what we call stability against standard shift. With this requirement we mean that
distortions of reported well-being due to shifted standards (whether the shift is induced by
reference groups or by habituation to certain levels of (un)well-being) should be evaded if
possible. If the use of self-reports that are susceptible to distortions by shifted standards
cannot be evaded, the risk of distortions should be taken into account in the interpretation
of findings, and where possible minimised by using additional, more objective
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measurements (that is, some sort of triangulation is advised). Of the discussed approaches,
the two examples where stability against standard shift seems insufficiently ensured are the
Andrews and Withey approach and multiple discrepancies theory.
7. The discussion of the time use approach has brought to bear that an adequate theory for
     explaining well-being or quality of life should be able to handle long-term interests (i.e. to
model or interpret investment activities). In fact, what we imply here is that any
conceptualisation of  ‘quality of life’ should include at least some enduring elements:
quality of life is more than just the hedonic experience of the ‘here and now’. Activities
directed at the preservation of present well-being or at increased opportunities for future
well-being should therefore not be judged only by their present cost/benefit ratio; at least a
discounted value of later returns should be considered too.
The relative degree to which the reviewed approaches seem to meet the 7 criteria is presented
in table 2.1. The signs in this table are mere indications and should be read with caution. 
  Table 2.1.: Comparison of 6 approaches to explaining subjective well-being.
approaches: →
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stability against 
standard shift
     0      -         --      +       +    + / 0
long-term interests   + / -     --         -      0       0      0
Overall, as table 2.1. shows clearly, it seems that three of the approaches we have discussed
meet more of the criteria than the rest, namely Schulz’s resource theory, the basic needs
approach of Stewart et al. and the functionings and capabilities approach of Sen. Being partly
similar, namely with regard to the way they conceptualise the process through which objective
resources are - at the level of the individual person - converted into subjective well-being, it is
not surprising that these approaches have approximately similar scores regarding their
potential for our problem. What these three approaches also have in common, however, are
the criteria they do not meet, namely the specification of (ultimate) goals and, an allied
problem, the inclusion of long-term interests. The failure to provide a substantial specification
of the ultimate goals of individuals is a void these three approaches have in common with
each of the other approaches we have considered.
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2.3.8. DIAGNOSIS: WHAT AILS QUALITY OF LIFE RESEARCH?
On the basis of the review of the state of the art on quality of life studies that was presented in
this section, it would be wrong to conclude that this field of study is in ill health. To the
contrary, it can be seen to blossom and develop with vigour that researchers from other fields
of study might well envy. The yield of this rapid development in the past three or four decades
is considerable: many difficulties concerning the measurement of well-being and quality of
life have been solved, increasingly sophisticated measurement instruments have been
developed, an impressive quantity of empirical data has been collected throughout the world,
and increasing consensus is achieved regarding the content and meaning of subjective well-
being concepts. Still, despite these many achievements, most research efforts in the field thus
far appear to have circumvented the core concern of quality of life studies, namely the relation
between objective conditions on the one hand and subjective well-being on the other. In the
literature from the past 20 years, only a few attempts to tackle this core concern can be
discerned. Interestingly, these attempts reveal quite fundamental dissensus about what should
be the approach that is used to tackle the core business of quality of life studies. Above, these
approaches are described and their respective merits evaluated. It was seen there seen that
none of these approaches can as yet boast of having all required features to be able to
accomplish the desired explanation of how subjective well-being is brought about at the level
of individuals.
In trying to trace the causes of each approach’s limitation with regard to this eventual task, a
number of criteria have surfaced that a theory would need to incorporate in order to be more
successful. First and foremost, any theory about how objective conditions affect subjective
well-being should focus at the individual level. This requirement is essential if we want the
approach to result not only in the possibility of comparing and explaining the quality at a
nation level, but also at the level of individuals and categories of people. Second, the focus at
the individual level should concern the process and mechanism through which objective
resources are converted into subjective well-being. Although previous research has
extensively investigated the statistical relations between numerous objective conditions and
subjective well-being, these relations are yet hardly understood and often the direction of
causality is all but clear. To get a better understanding of how various objective conditions or
resources affect the eventual level of well-being of individuals, it is necessary to shift the
focus of the investigation from subjective well-being as a state towards subjective well-being
as something people continuously try to attain and maintain. That is, the agency aspect of the
realisation of well-being should be incorporated. An additional reason for wanting this is that
only by opening the black box of the process through which subjective well-being is realised,
we can gain insight in substitution mechanisms and in complementarity relations between
resources; an insight that we need in order to assess the consequences of the availability of
certain combinations of resources and conditions.
We thus want an individual-level theory explaining how objective conditions hinder or
facilitate the realisation of well-being. In our review of existing approaches, it was seen that,
broadly speaking, the term well-being in this statement is usually interpreted in one of the
following two ways: either it is interpreted in a rather minimal way as the fulfilment of a
number of basic needs, that is, of the physiological needs that are essential for survival (cf.
Stewart’s Basic Needs approach, part of Sen’s ‘functionings’ and also the main part of social
indicators used by the UNDP) or it is interpreted to refer to the extent to which people’s
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circumstances enable them to attain their goals or aspirations (cf. Michalos’ MDT; Schulz’s
resource theory; again Sen’s functionings and capabilities approach).
The minimal interpretation, that concentrates on a minimum level of well-being, is most
practicable when one is interested in comparing or monitoring living conditions in countries
that are very poor off or extremely inegalitarian. If, in contrast, one is interested in the quality
of life of (categories of) people in relatively affluent societies where almost everyone is
secured of the means for subsistence, the second interpretation is more applicable. Although
Michalos’ multiple discrepancies theory, Schulz’s resource theory and Sen’s functionings and
capabilities approach do interpret subjective well-being in the sense of the extent to which
goals or aspirations can be attained, they do, however, not specify what goals people strive
for, and are in that way still empty. Unless a specification of goals, preferably hierarchically
ordered, is added to these approaches, they will not provide the insight we are looking for. But
even if an acceptable hierarchy of goals were specified, these approaches would still be silent
with regard to the behavioural processes and mechanisms underlying the realisation of goals.
Summarising, it appears that the field of quality of life studies is in need of a theory of
individual goal directed behaviour, as well as of a specification of a hierarchy of goals.
In section 2.4., the search for a suitable theory of individual goal directed behaviour and for an
accompanying theory of goals will be started. Given the considerations expounded here
regarding what characteristics these theories are desired to have, the logical place to start this
search seems to be the realm of the rational choice approach. For this approach explicitly
takes individual goal directed behaviour as its starting point.
2.4. In search for a theory on the production of well-being: recourse to a Rational
Choice approach
2.4.1. RATIONAL CHOICE SOCIOLOGY: WHY SHOULD WE SEEK HELP HERE?
In the above, we have assessed the need of quality of life studies for an individual level theory
of goal directed behaviour and an accompanying specification of goals. We have also seen
that none of the approaches and theories that are currently in use in that field possesses the
desired combination of features to have the potential to provide in this need. For that reason, it
appears necessary to take recourse to theories outside the subject field of quality of life
studies. It is not necessary, however, to start searching unguidedly. Even though we do have
step outside the boundaries of the subject for the moment, we may still prevent ourselves from
getting lost in a completely unfocused search, because the set of desired features for the
wanted theory, formulated at the end of section 2.3., steers us logically to one particular
approach, or family of theories. This approach, or family of theories, is the Rational Choice
approach.
Rational Choice sociology as a branch of the discipline has gained some position over the last
two or three decades. Contrary to what is frequently believed, neither rational choice
explanations nor the model of man they build on are new to the sociological enterprise,
however. In fact, the approach is firmly rooted in the main classical sociological works (see
e.g. Hedström and Swedberg, 1996, who stress that rational choice theory draws on an
‘exceptionally rich sociological heritage’, p.128).
1) The main distinctive characteristic of Rational Choice (RC) theory is - obviously - the
assumption of rational behaviour. This assumption holds that, in any specific situation,
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people behave rationally, that is, in a way that best serves their interests given the
restrictions they face. This core assumption implies a number of sub-assumptions that,
from the perspective of quality of life studies, it may be helpful to make explicit: 
2) people have interests or can experience ‘utility’; people actively seek to maximise their
utility or further their interests in the face of scarcity, which means that they need to
make choices;
3) people choose between alternative actions by weighing the costs and expected utility
of these alternatives, implying that people do not blindly maximise present utility but
consider delayed consequences as well.
Note that this is an assumption: rational choice theorists do not claim or believe that all
concrete persons do in all concrete situations rationally weigh the expected benefits and costs
of all possible actions, but they hold that as a generally applicable simplification, this
assumption provides a good approximation of reality.
Besides the rationality-assumption, there are some more special features of RC theory that are
worthwhile to expound here. Three essential characteristics of RC theory are that it uses
analytical modelling; that it is founded upon the principle of methodological individualism,
and that it seeks to explain observed phenomena by the intentions of the actors (Hedström and
Swedberg, 1996, p. 128).
As to the analytical character of rational choice theory, this means that in this type of
theorising, more or less abstract models are explicitly introduced to explain concrete empirical
observations. Of course, explaining or even describing empirical facts or events always
requires a certain degree of abstraction and selection of what is essential in the specific case.
However, in most other approaches in sociology, this incompleteness and abstraction from the
overwhelming complexity of empirical reality, is less explicitly recognised. According to
Hedström and Swedberg, this failure to recognise the necessity and function of abstraction
may be held responsible for many irrelevant disputes in the discipline; theories, models and
assumptions being attacked for being incomplete or unrealistic rather than being judged
according to their success in explaining the empirical observations at hand.
Rational Choice theory explicitly chooses models that are incomplete and more abstract than
reality. Its main characteristic assumption, that people behave rationally, is not presented as
claiming to be an accurate description of real individual behaviour, but rather as a
simplification which, if applied in the explanatory model, works quite well. The typical
explanatory model in rational choice theory seeks to incorporate only the essential features of
situations that guide utility-maximising behaviour. The quality or value of rational choice
models is thus not determined by the extent to which they describe reality truthfully, but by
the adequate choice of situational characteristics on which the potential to provide intentional
explanations of the empirically observed behaviour depends.
As to the principle of methodological individualism on which rational choice theory is
founded, this holds that “social phenomena are in principle only explicable in terms of
individuals’ actions” (ibid., p. 131, referring to Schumpeter, 1908, p. 88-98)16.
                                                
16   It is possible to distinguish between a strong version of methodological individualism, in which only
explanations are excepted that include no references to aggregate social phenomena in the explanans, and a weak
version in which non-explained social phenomena are accepted as part of the explanation (ibid, p. 131, referring
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Methodological individualism stands in sharp contrast to other theoretical approaches that
hold that “structural outcomes can and should be explained directly in terms of structural
causes, without giving any explicit attention to the role of human agency” (ibid., p. 131). For a
methodological individualist, explaining processes that generate macro-level change and
variation requires showing how macro-states at time 1 influence the behaviour of individual
actors and how their actions add up to new macro states at time 2 (ibid., p. 131). Coleman
(1990, p. 3-5) formulates the arguments in favour of methodological individualism with
compelling force, although he emphatically states that it is the internal analysis of system
behaviour he wants to promote, which need not in all cases mean that the ‘below system
level’ of the explanations indeed be the level of individual actions and orientations. Coleman
proposes four reasons for choosing to explain system level phenomena by “examining
processes internal to the system, involving its components parts, or units at a level below that
of the system”. Firstly, this strategy enables researchers to have larger number of cases for
their statistical analyses as well as a better fit between the unit of analysis and the level at
which the data are gathered (which is often the level of individuals). Secondly, when
intervention should be considered, there are clear advantages in explaining phenomena at the
same level as that where interventions can implemented: ordinarily a level below that of the
system as a whole and often the level of individual actors. Only if the explanation provides
insight in the processes at the same level as where the intended intervention is to take place, it
provides guidance for designing such interventions. Thirdly, Coleman argues that
“explanations based on internal analysis of system behaviour in terms of actions and
orientations of lower-level units is likely to be more stable and general than an explanation
which remains at the system level”. Fourthly, as Coleman points out, the model of man
implied in methodological individualism deviates from that of the homo sociologicus, and
allows for a more intentionally acting and responsible man. This model of a rational,
purposefully acting man is more congruent with the very point of departure of much
sociological research, namely the belief that the functioning and development of social
systems is not merely an autonomous process, but that it is susceptible to changes in the
behaviour of the system’s parts.
As we saw in section 2.3., also in quality of life studies it is desirable to take the individual
level as the level of analysis, because it is at this level that we may find the process and
mechanisms which relate objective conditions to subjective well-being. Only through
understanding the process of the realisation of well-being at the individual level, it may be
possible to explain differences in well-being between people and to establish the role and
importance of particular resources for the achievement of quality of life.
As to the third essential characteristic of the rational choice approach, the emphasis on
intentional explanation, this term refers to the distinction Elster (1983) made between the
types of explanations used by social scientists: these are either causal, functional or intentional
(or combinations of these). According to Hedström and Swedberg, “it can be shown that all
reasonable functional explanations can be expressed more clearly in causal and/or intentional
terms” (ibid., p. 132). 
Causal explanations usually consist of showing statistical causality, that is, they show that
empirically a certain event A is usually followed by another event B. When it is checked that
                                                                                                                                                        
to Udehn, 1987). However, the weak version of methodological individualism is used in the large majority of
applications as it allows to address a far larger and more sociologically relevant range of explanatory problems.
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no other event is likely to be the cause of both A and B, the causal explanation of B by A is
accepted. However, this kind of causal explanations do not provide insight in the question
why A would lead to B, i.e. what the underlying process or behaviour is. To understand the
link between the occurrence of B as a consequence of A at a deeper level, we want to
understand why the individual actors involved choose to behave upon situation A in that way
which brought forward situation B. That is, we then look for Verstehen (Weber, e.g. 1904,
1922), or an intentional explanation.
An intentional explanation seeks to explain individual behaviour by reference to the outcome
it was intended to bring about17. This is not to say that such explanations need study the actual
subjective meanings of the concrete actors, in the rational choice approach they rather have an
analytical form, which “obtains generality by the attribution of purpose to actors. The
theoretical analysis consequently (...) [involves] the intentions of typical, but hypothetical
actors” (Hedström & Swedberg, 1996, p. 132).  As Coleman (1990, p. 13) phrases it: at the
individual level, purposive theory of action is
“ordinarily the dominant model of action we apply when we say we understand the action
of another person: we say that we understand the ‘reasons’ why the person acted in a
certain way, implying that we understand the intended goal and how the actions were seen
by the actor to contribute to that goal”. 
This third characteristic of the rational choice approach is not the same as, but neatly fits with
the broadly accepted notion in quality of life research that subjective well-being should - at
least partly - be explained as a consequence of the extent to which a person succeeds in
realising his or her goals (which implies that people do have goals and strive to realise these,
and that the mechanisms involved in the realisation of subjective well-being are closely
related to the process in which the individual pursues his goals).
Considering the core features of the rational choice approach, it appears that this approach is
highly congenial to the main notions in quality of life research, and in particular to the kind of
theory that is wanted for the field of quality of life studies. This provides an argument for
recoursing to the rational choice approach in the search for a theory of goal directed behaviour
that can be applied to quality of life studies. In the following subsection, the prototypical
explanatory model in the rational choice approach is expounded at some length, in order to
make clear how goal oriented behaviour is usually modelled in the RC approach. After this,
the discussion will again be focused more strictly on the search for a suitable and practicable
theory of goal directed behaviour.  
2.4.2. THE PROTOTYPICAL EXPLANATORY MODEL IN RATIONAL CHOICE SOCIOLOGY
The characteristic features of rational choice theory expounded above, materialise in the
prototypical explanatory model used in the RC approach. This typical model is a central tool
in RC explanations, offering a broadly applicable system for systematic situational analyses
and supporting the analyst in getting a firm grip on the different components of the theory.
In the exposition of the typical RC explanatory model, I will identify the typical elements of
                                                
17   In this sense, it appears that many people who would not consider themselves as adherents of the rational
choice approach, in fact tend to use the same assumptions when trying to explain behaviour. As Hechter &
Kanazawa (1997, p. 192) aptly put this: “many sociologists, like the character in Moliere’s Bourgeois
Gentilhomme who was startled to learn that he was speaking prose, unwittingly rely on rational choice mecha-
nisms in their own research.” 
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the model as this may help the reader to see how it can be applied to explain different
elements of empirical reality and what its limitations are.
In its most elementary form, the assumption of rationality can be modelled as follows:
This partial model represents the assumption that all behaviour can be understood as the
results of individual choices for that course of action that best serves their individual interests
given the opportunities and constraints of the particular situation. The complete prototypical
explanatory model in RC studies comprises more elements than merely this theory of
purposeful action, however. Given that sociology is mainly concerned with the interplay
between the macro and the micro level of social systems (see Coleman, ibid., p. 6 and further)
rather than with the behaviour of isolated individuals (as psychology is), the theory of rational
individual behaviour is typically applied to explain observed phenomena at aggregate levels,
thus the explanatory model does include these aggregate states as well:
This form of the RC-model is the form that is usually referred to as Coleman’s (1990) model
of internal analysis of system behaviour. Its main and obvious merit lies in the fact that it
seeks to explain aggregate phenomena in terms of the disaggregate individual actors’
behaviour (cf. section 2.4.1.). According to Coleman, the main problems for the analyst to
solve are the macro-to-micro and the micro-to-macro transitions. Any model or theory that




Figure 2.6.:  Schematic representation of the theory of rational purposeful action
Figure 2.7.:  Prototypical model of internal analysis of system behaviour
state or event at macro- or system
level at t=1
state or event at macro- or system
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macro - micro link micro - macro link
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fails to explicate these transitions is incomplete.
Coleman places most emphasis on the micro-to-macro transition, or the aggregation of the
individual behaviour. This problem of how to aggregate outcomes at lower levels to outcomes
at the system level is indeed often a complex one. It is seldom adequate to merely sum the
individual actions; the more the macro level really refers to a social system, the less likely it is
that simple summing of micro outcomes will suffice. Thus, the complete typical RC-
explanatory model needs statements (so-called transformation rule, Lindenberg 1983) that
specify how the actors’ individual behaviour aggregates to a new state or event at the
aggregate or macro level. It depends on the phenomena, or the dependent variable at the
macro level, under study what is an adequate micro-macro assumption. In some cases, e.g.
when studying election outcomes, it may be adequate to simply sum individual behaviour.
When studying collective action, an assumption that involves a threshold value may be more
appropriate. In many cases, however, when the eventual aggregate outcome of individual
behaviour depends on more complex interactions and when there are interdependencies
between the behaviours of the actors at the micro level (such as in competition or bargaining
situations), even more complex assumptions may be called for.
The reason why Coleman puts more emphasis on the importance of adequate modelling of the
micro-to-macro transition than on adequate bridge-assumptions for the macro-to-micro
transition, seems to lie in the fact that the former tends to get less attention from theorists than
the latter, rather than in any ground for believing the one to be more crucial for adequate
modelling than the other. It is the macro-to-micro link, however, where our interest and that of
quality of life studies lies. I presently turn to that part of the model.
The macro-to-micro link typically consists of so-called bridge assumptions (Lindenberg 1983)
that explicate how the parameters of the action selection for the actors at the micro level is
affected by the phenomenon (the independent variable) at the macro level. These bridge
assumptions are the main tools for systematic situational analysis. They are represented by the
arrow from the state or event at the aggregate level at time =1 towards the action situation of
the micro-level actors.
Given the assumption of rational purposeful behaviour (see figure 5) it is logical to structure
the situational analysis accordingly, that is, to specify bridge assumptions for each of the
separate elements of the model of behaviour at the micro level. Thus, application of the
explanatory model would require bridge-assumptions on the micro-actors’ set of behavioural
alternatives, their perceptions or beliefs regarding these, and their interests or utility.
The most obvious effect of macro states on individuals’ action situation is the effect on their
set of behavioural alternatives: the constraints and opportunities for interest seeking
behaviour. Although some constraints upon and resources of individual actors with regard to
their interest seeking potential are not (or not closely) related to macro states (such as
individual inborn talents or handicaps, or constraints caused by age), much of the set of
behavioural alternatives is determined by the macro-situation the actor faces. And even when
individually determined resources and constraints are concerned, the effects of these on one’s
set of behavioural alternatives are often dependent upon the external situation18. In the RC-
                                                
18   In any case, it is the interaction between macro states and individual behaviour that is the core of the
sociological discipline; constraints and resources that are purely individually based and are not affected by
CHAPTER 2 51
model, the situationally salient constraints and resources often constitute the core of the
situational analysis (whether the actors are assumed to perceive these constraints and
opportunities correctly or not, see below). The typical modelling  - roughly spoken - often
takes the form of: (a) what are the alternative courses of action open to individuals in the
situation at hand; (b) what resources should the actor have in order to be able to perform each
of the alternative courses of action; and (c) what are the costs and expected benefits associated
with the alternative courses of action. On the basis of these three elements, the most rational
course of action for different actors, given their different control over relevant resources, can
be identified.
In order to maintain the analytical character of modelling, only a few features of the empirical
situation at hand are selected for inclusion in the model, for reality is far too complex to
represent integrally in any model. This means that it is part of the task of the analyst to decide
which are the salient constraints and resources, thus the relevant behavioural alternatives in
the situation under analysis. It seems logical, however, that only after deciding what are the
actors’ general goals or interests, there is a criterion for deciding what are the relevant
behavioural alternatives and the restrictions. Yet in many specific applications, there are so-
called institutional utility arguments (Lindenberg 1980) that can serve instead of a general
theory of goals in analysing a situation. Institutional utility arguments are institutionalised
instrumental goals. For example, the assumption that the main goal of entrepreneurs in a
market situation is to make profit is an institutional utility argument.
These institutional utility arguments, however, are no sufficient solution for modelling. In
situations where the goals and interests of actors are not institutionalised, it seems that some
general or ‘final’ goals must dictate what features of the situation form constraints upon the
realisation of these goals, and what are the relevant alternative courses of action. The
objective restrictions to the set of alternative actions will in their turn influence the shape of
the situational goals.
Generally, the specification of assumptions concerning the restrictions and resources and the
set of behavioural alternatives for RC modelling will be closely related to the specification of
general and situational goals; the two elements of the model are closely interdependent. To be
able to arrive at a sensible selection of what restrictions and behavioural alternatives to
include in the model, it seems that the rational choice explanatory model does need an
assumption concerning the actors’ general goals or interests.
 
In recent years, theorists have increasingly sought to build models which better fit
psychological reality, that is, many RC adherents have worked to incorporate the insight that
people, when trying to choose rationally, choose their actions on the basis of their perception
of the behavioural situation and their perceptions or beliefs regarding the future consequences
of alternative courses of behaviour. These perceptions or beliefs need not necessarily be an
accurate representation of the actual set of behavioural alternatives and of the future
consequences of actions, and, what is more, the actors’ perceptions are necessarily a selection
of the most salient features of the choice situation, as (see above) the ‘real’ situation is far too
complex to be mentally mapped inclusively. Thus, letting go of the simplifying assumption of
perfect information, more complex assumptions concerning the actors’ perception of the
situation were needed, which can be summarised by the term bounded rationality (cf. Simon
                                                                                                                                                        
external factors rather belong to the field of the psychological, medical or biological disciplines.
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1982). The more complex assumptions that have been suggested and used include - amongst
others - that of short-sightedness, framing etc. (e.g. Lindenberg & Frey 1993; Kahneman &
Tversky 1979, 1984; Loewenstein & Elster 1992).
In their presentation of the ‘prototypical RC explanatory model’, Hedström and Swedberg
give the perceptions or beliefs of the actors a place as basic element in the model (ibid. p.
128). However, it seems more legitimate to leave the choice whether or not to use the
assumption of perfect information (as is e.g. done in the standard analyses of a perfect market
in economics) to the discretion of the theorist. This would imply that one should not go
further (neither less far) than asserting that the prototypical model includes an assumption on
the actors’ information and perceptions about their situation, this assumption may be either
that of perfect information or a more complicated assumption.
It should be mentioned here that there may be a danger in replacing too simple, or too abstract
assumptions with more complex assumptions that more closely represent reality. This danger
is that, in trying to capture empirical complexity more truthfully in the model, the model may
lose much of its potential for its original purpose of analytical explanation. This danger looms
large particularly when the emphasis tends to shift from the relation between the macro level
and the behavioural situation of the micro level actor towards complex processes and
mechanisms within the micro level actor. This distinction, which approximately coincides
with the sociological versus the psychological realm of theorising, is extensively discussed in
Lindenberg (1992, p. 6-8) who calls the former type ‘individual2’ theories, and the latter type
‘individual1’ theories. ‘Individual1’-theories are theories that are designed to be used at a
lower level of abstraction than the ‘individual2'-theories, which are more common in and
useful for the sociological mode of analysis. The main difference between ‘individual1’ and
‘individual2’ theories is that the former require far more empirical information at the level of
individual actors than the latter, the former are far more ‘greedy’. ‘Individual1’ type theories
are generally the more adequate for the aims of typical applications of a theory in psychology.
But for the typical applications of theory in rational choice sociology, and in particular for
application in quality of life research, the latter type is much better suited. The difference
between the two types of theory is perhaps most easily perceived when represented
graphically in form of the prototypical explanatory model that was explained above (see figure
2.8.).
Figure 2.8. illustrates that ‘individual1’- theories go ‘deeper’ into the processes at the
individual level than ‘individual2’- theories, which remain more superficial. But ‘individual 1’
theories can only do so at the cost of increasing the distance to the macro- or system level in
the explanatory model, thus by straining the macro-micro and the micro-macro links. (Note
that in figure 2.8. I left out the arrow from the micro level back to the system level for the
‘individual1’ theory. I did so because this micro-macro link is seldom achieved). If the
purpose of the analysis lies primarily in the understanding of what happens at the individual
level, ‘individual1’ theories are likely to be more adequate than ‘individual2’ theories. If,
instead, the primary interest of the analysis lies in the macro-micro and micro-macro links, i.e.
on the explanation of system level observations through processes on the level of the system’s
constituent parts, ‘individual2’ theories are more appropriate, even though they are less refined
and detailed with regard to the precise processes within the individual actors.
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It thus depends on the purpose of the analysis what type of theory is the more appropriate. The
two types of theories are not necessarily antagonists, they rather complement each other and
ideally they should also be compatible to each other. That is, if the problem one is dealing
with calls for a relatively superficial ‘individual2’- theory, one should ideally use one which is
not at odds with the more refined insights into the individual-level process that relevant
theories of the ‘individual1’- type provide. If using an ‘individual2’- theory, one need not heed
all intricacies of the process within the individual actors, but if possible, one’s theory should
not be in opposition to those who do.
The question whether or not one should use more complex and realistic assumptions
concerning the actors’ perceptions of their situation cannot be answered in general. This
depends on the particular research question one is interested in. But in filling in the
assumptions of the macro-micro link, one should always keep the distinction between
‘individual1’- and ‘individual2’- type theories in mind, and decide which type of theory it is
that one wants, prior to choosing the actual assumptions one will use.
   
Now to which of these two types should the theory that is wanted for quality of life studies,
for which we are looking, belong? In the previous section it was stated that what is wanted is a
theory that explains how subjective well-being is realised at the individual level and what is
the role therein of objective conditions. So we do want some insight in what happens at the
individual level. Yet the main purpose for which we want to have such a theory is the
investigation of (conditions for) quality of life at aggregate levels, typically the comparison of
the well-being of various groups and categories of people, and the explanation of differences
in subjective well-being between these. A theory that is very ‘greedy’ with regard to
information at individuals’ level is not very practicable for this purpose. So we want our
theory to be of the ‘individual2’ type, yet it should as much as possible build on knowledge
and insights which relevant ‘individual1’ type theories can offer.
With regard to how the assumptions concerning the actors’ perception of their situation
should be filled in in the theory we are looking for, this means that - at least in the beginning -
we may choose to keep it as simple as possible, that is, not to worry about framing effects et
cetera and just assume people to have perfect perceptions of their situation. If desirable,
Figure 2.8.: 'Individual 1' - and 'individual 2' - theories in explanatory models
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complications concerning imperfect perceptions or bounded rationality may be added to the
theory we hope to find in later phases. For the present, the main concern is to find a
practicable theory of individual utility-maximising behaviour, and in the search for this the
filling in of the assumptions concerning the actors’ interests and goals is much more
important. In the next subsection, I will discuss the problem of how to find adequate
assumptions concerning the actors’ goals and interests at some length.
2.4.3. THE CHOICE OF ADEQUATE BRIDGE-ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE MACRO-MICRO LINK: THE
ACTORS’ GOALS
The third and final element of the basic behavioural model (see figure 2.6.) are the actors’
goals. For the model to be applied to any particular situation, this last element requires
specification just like the other elements to arrive at a ‘complete’ explanation or prediction. It
is impossible to judge which of a number of alternative courses of action best serves the
actors’ interests19, and thus, what would - given the behavioural situation under study - be a
rational response, if the actors’ interests remain unspecified. This argument may be carried
even further, by pointing at the impossibility of selecting the relevant restrictions and
opportunities for situational analysis when the actors’ goals are not previously specified. In
short, the explanatory model needs assumptions regarding the actors’ goals as well.
For a long time, researchers have shrunk from the task of specifying actors’ goals, probably
largely due to the success and influence of the economic approach to this problem. In
economics, the prototypical explanatory and predictive model is essentially similar to the
typical RC model as it is presented here, but essential to the economic paradigm is that it
consistently uses the same particular assumptions as bridge-assumptions. These consistently
applied assumptions of the traditional economic model are the following. In the first place, the
actors’ goals, i.e. their utility are considered to be unknown and idiosyncratic, but they are
assumed to be reflected in revealed preferences. In the second place, preferences are assumed
to be stable. In the third place, preferences are assumed to be individual, meaning that it is
considered acceptable to explain differences in behaviour between individuals by asserting
that their individual preferences or tastes differ. In the fourth place, essential to economics is
the bridge-assumption with regard to the relevant constraints and opportunities: these are
assumed to be given by budgets and (relative) interpersonally objective prices, which are both
measured and defined in terms of scarce and tradable goods, i.e. market-goods.
These economic bridge-assumptions imply that, to explain or predict behaviour, it is always
crucial that the actors’ previous or ‘initial’ revealed preferences be known. Just knowing a
person’s budget and the prices of the available commodities does not provide sufficient
information to explain what combination of commodities this person will purchase (unless
one would accept as such the tautology that the observed behaviour is explained by the
preferences it reveals). What seems crucial to the application of the explanatory model using
                                                
19     In this and the following section, the terms goals, needs, interests and values are frequently used. They are
not synonymous. Stated simply, values are what people, according to the holders of the value, ought to strive for.
Goals are the things that people actually strive for, and they may be substitutable. Needs reflect the essential
requirements for people to remain (biologically and psychologically) well, and they are not substitutable.
Interests are usually conceived of as people’s economic goals, but sometimes I also use the term to refer to things
‘of interest’ to people, to things that are useful to them in the pursuit of their goals.
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the traditional economic bridge-assumptions is that it should concern some change in
comparison to a previous state, e.g. the effect of a change in relative prices, or the effect of a
change in the actors’ budget. A comparison of different (groups) of individuals, making
different choices under different economic conditions (such as the budget constraints and the
relative prices), can, given the set of assumptions outlined here, not conclusively point at the
situational constraints as the explanatory variables, for the basic assumption that preferences
are individual implies that the (groups of) individuals that are compared just make different -
but still rational - choices because they derive utility from different things.
The traditional set of economic bridge-assumptions offers a powerful and successful tool for
modelling. However, its restrictions that were just presented limit its use for the situational
analysis (Hedström & Swedberg 1996) or internal analysis of system behaviour (Coleman
1990). For the very aim of these modes of analysis is to explain the way in which certain
system-level outcomes occur as a consequence of the influence of some prior system-level
circumstance on the behaviour of its parts. Using the traditional economic set of bridge-
assumptions it is only possible to arrive at such an explanation when individual variations in
preferences as a source of differences in behaviour can be ruled out, that is, when the
researcher has information on the behaviour (the revealed preferences) of the actors prior to
the moment when the system-level independent variable(s) took effect. And even then, the
revealed preference assumption only works if preferences are assumed to be stable. In cases
where such information is not available, or when it is not adequate to restrict the analysis to
behaviour involving economic commodities, a different set of bridge-assumptions is thus
needed. 
This certainly applies to the case of quality of life studies or, more specifically, to the problem
of how objective conditions affect the realisation and level of subjective well-being. This
problem is typically studied in contexts where there are no systematic individual level data
about revealed preferences. Moreover, the process it concentrates on is likely to involve
largely non-market goods and the restrictions that are relevant in this process are likely to lie
largely outside the sphere of traditional economics. As was explained in section 2.2., the very
origin of quality of life studies and its core question lies in the rejection of the traditional
economic view of well-being and in the desire to add to this restricted view by extending the
scope of the quality of life concept beyond the limited realm of market goods and economic
restrictions.
Many applications of the RC-explanatory model in sociology indeed deviate from the strict set
of assumptions about individual preferences from the traditional economic modelling, often
for the reasons mentioned above. In such cases, when the traditional economic bridge-
assumptions are not adequate, different assumptions are required for making the model
operational, as for any situational analysis of rational behaviour the interests of the actors need
be specified. The difficult question is how this is to be done.
In any case, the assumptions should do away with the notion of individual preferences in order
to avoid the very restrictions attached to the traditional economic modelling. In some way
then, the bridge-assumptions concerning the actors’ preferences should assert that differences
in actors’ goals be either absent or be only dependent on situational constraints20.
                                                
20   This intentional abstraction from possible psychological differences between actors also contrasts the typical
model of man used in sociology to the model of man typically used in psychology, see Lindenberg 1992. Note,
again, that the abstraction serves a model, which is a tool to facilitate dealing with the complex reality rather than
an attempt to describe reality. 
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Hedström and Swedberg (1996, p. 129) seem to suggest that the interests or behavioural goals
of the actors should be situationally specified. They do however not offer any suggestion as to
how this be done.
In principle, it seems that there are three alternatives to the revealed preferences-solution. The
first alternative is a pure ad-hoc specification of goals, formulating assumptions concerning
the actors’ goals ad hoc in every application of the model. The second alternative is to assume
that there is a particular set of specified goals that actors seek to maximise in no matter what
behavioural situation, i.e. one could choose to specify the most likely universal goals, and
have these as the goal-element in each application of the model. The third alternative at first
sight resembles a compromise between these two extremes, and is in fact a further elaborated
version of the second alternative. This would be the assumption that there exists a fixed set of
universal goals, which may in different concrete situations translate into different situational
goals that are instrumental to the maximisation or achievement of the universal goals.
The choice between these three alternatives is not merely a matter of personal taste: it also has
implications for the value of the models that are built and for the generalisability and potential
of the explanations and theories that are derived. If one chooses the first alternative (as I
believe many do), one must be prepared to accept the disadvantage connected to all ad hoc
explanations, namely that it hardly contributes to more general theory formation. In my
opinion, this would be a sufficient argument to prefer one of the other alternatives. However,
even if one is willing to take the lesser theoretical value of ad hoc explanations for granted, it
may prove more difficult than it seems at first sight to stick to this first alternative. The
problem that may arise is that not all ad hoc specifications of goals may be accepted by one’s
audience, and not all ad hoc specifications of goals may result in explanations in the sense of
Verstehen. For a Verstehen-kind of explanation, the specification of the situational goals
should make sense to the readers.
Consider some simple problem like the following. It may often happen that when certain
things (e.g. alcohol consumption, or purchasing violent computer games) become forbidden
for children, the forbidden behaviour will become more frequent for some sub-groups of
youths. A possible ad hoc explanation could involve the assumption that all children like to be
punished, and that they therefore all strive to do whatever will cause punishment, and that the
children who are most skilled to avoid preventive measures succeed in attaining this utility-
enhancing state. However, I have little doubt that the theorist who would propose this
explanation would receive very little respect, because this explanation makes far ‘less sense’
than an explanation based on the assumption that youths seek status and distinction for being
tough and daring, and that the chance of punishment is not the motivating factor, but one of
the costs they are willing to pay for the status they may get. This accords with Hedström &
Swedberg’s assertion that, while assumptions should simplify reality and thus not represent it
exactly, “there are no inherent advantages in basing theories on descriptively false
assumptions” (ibid., p.130).
It is important to realise the implications of the fact that most people would agree on which
goal-assumptions ‘make sense’ or ‘make no sense’, even if they have never themselves been
in a situation similar to the one under analysis. It seems to imply that the second or third
alternative are closer approximations to reality than the first, and that in fact the specification
of actors’ goals in an ad hoc manner - if plausible - is hardly an arbitrary process. Obviously,
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even when researchers choose for ‘ad hoc’ assumptions about actors’ goals, they do base their
choice of what goals to assume on some consistency check with general ideas about what
people seek and value. In my opinion, if this is the case, it is hardly legitimate to continue ‘ad
hoc’ specification of goals instead of attempting to make the implicit ‘reasonableness’-
standard explicit and thereby enable progressive theory formation.
Now what if one prefers the second alternative? That is, what happens when assuming that
individuals have a fixed set of particular goals, which is similar for all people? Obviously, in
order to receive at least some acceptance, such a set of fixed goals should be chosen carefully
to correspond as good as possible with general notions of what people need or value. This can
in all likelihood only be achieved when the goals that are chosen are formulated at a sufficient
level of abstraction. The more concrete and specific the goals that are assumed, the more
opposition and disagreement one should expect to arise. For example, the assumption that all
people value pleasure will hardly be challenged, but much disagreement is to be expected
when trying to define pleasure in less abstract terms, i.e. when one would assume that all
people value and seek pleasure from games or from comics. There have been multiple
attempts to define and gain consensus on a set of goals or needs that apply to all people (cf.
Ford 1992; Maslow 1954; Erikson 1977, etc; see also section 2.5.). The encouraging thing
about these attempts is that, though there is by no means consensus on what exactly is the best
typology of goals or how certain goals should best be conceptualised, there appears to be a
broad base about which general agreement exists: all typologies of goals or needs include the
basic biological or physical needs of the human organism, they all include some element
referring to positive functioning of the individual in relation to other individuals, some
element referring to positive functioning of the individual as distinct from other individuals,
and some element referring to the full development of one’s talents and capacities. 
As bridge-assumption in the RC explanatory model, however, the specification of an
assumedly universal set of fixed goals seems insufficient to serve the purpose of situational
analysis. That is, when applying the model to concrete situations in order to explain and
understand the course of action that the actors choose, the abstractly conceptualised universal
goals will always need to be translated into the concrete outcomes the actors expect from their
alternative actions. Thus, when using a theory of universal fixed goals as assumption
concerning the actors’ interests, one needs to make additional situational bridge-assumptions
(whether explicitly or implicitly) to analyse any concrete choice situation.
For example, suppose that ‘being admired’ would be a universal fixed goal. If, from this goal,
we would want to explain how women walking react to getting flattering remarks or being
whistled at in passing on the street, it is clear that we need to know the situational goals.
When the woman is alone, she may indeed feel gratified in her desire for admiration, and
‘accept’ the remark or whistle. When instead she is together with some other women, she may
feel it necessary to remain aloof, in order to retain the other women’s admiration. In that case
the situational goals might be ‘being admired for being above vulgar remarks’, ‘being admired
for getting admiring remarks from strangers and not being sensitive to it - perhaps because of
being used to it?. Depending on the group of others she is with, she may also want to react to
the stranger with some witty or daring remark. In that case the situational goals might be
‘being admired for being witty’ or ‘being admired for being daring and self confident’.
Often, the translation of the abstract universal goals into the concrete expected consequences
of behaviour upon which the actors base their choice of action will appear self-evident and
even trivial. But however trivial the translation, for the sake of theory formation it should
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better be made explicit.
The solution suggested above, to complement the assumption of a set of universal fixed goals
with additional assumptions on the translation of the universal goals into specific
consequences of the alternative actions the actors choose from, comes very close to the third
way to deal with the goals-element in the explanatory model. This third way was above
referred to as a more elaborated form of the ‘fixed set of universal goals’-solution.
This third option would, like the second, consist of the assumption that there exists a fixed set
of universal goals, which in different concrete situations translate into different situational
goals. (Such situational goals can also be called instrumental goals, as they are instrumental to
the realisation of one or more universal goals.) The difference would be that here the theory of
goals would include a specification of the mechanism by which such concrete situational
goals are related to the abstract goals and to one another.
It would thus also include criteria for deciding whether certain concrete situational goals
should be considered to be complements or substitutes in their relation to the abstract
universal goals. It is relevant that hypotheses about this can be deduced from the theory of
goals, because the rationality of alternative courses of action depends on the functional
relationship between the alternative concrete goals. In principle it seems that this third option
for filling in the bridge-assumption concerning the actors’ interests is preferable to the second
(and thus also to the first). It is to be preferred above the second for two reasons.
In the first place, when the theory of goals that is used already includes the criteria for
deciding what are the interrelations between concrete situational goals, and how these in turn
are related to the abstract universal goals, this enables the researcher to focus all attention on
the situational analysis at hand. By reducing the number of ‘unknowns’ (or ad hoc elements)
in the general part of the explanatory model, the researcher is forced to more detailed,
systematic and precise analysis of the situational factors explaining behavioural variations.
In the second place, this fixation of one more part of the explanatory model makes it more
clear when repeated failure to provide satisfactory explanations should lead to adjustment of
the theory of goals21, whereas in case both the additional bridge-assumptions concerning
instrumental goals and the selection of salient situational factors are left to vary, it is far more
difficult to find criteria for adjusting either.    
Thus, in cases where the traditional economic assumptions regarding preferences do not
provide an adequate tool for the problem under study, there seems to be good reason to prefer
replacing them with a theory of goals that consists of at least two parts: (1) a specification of a
set of assumedly universal goals at a sufficient level of abstraction to make them receive
broad consensus and enable their application to diverse concrete situations; and (2) a
specification of the way in which situationally determined concrete interests or instrumental
goals relate to the abstract universal goals and to each other.
It was explained above that for the case of quality of life studies, and in particular for the
problem of how objective conditions affect the realisation and level of subjective well-being,
the traditional economic assumptions are not adequate. Thus the next step in the search for a
theory about the realisation of subjective well-being must be to find a theory of goals that
                                                
21   In such a case, it is of course that part of the theory that deals with the specification of how concrete
situational goals are related to the abstract goals and to one another, that should in the first instance be adjusted,
and only if adjustments in that part of the theory do not lead to improvement, one should seek a solution in
adjusting the set of abstract universal goals. 
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meets the two criteria just formulated. The rational choice approach proper does not contain or
prescribe the use of particular substantive theories of goals. The best strategy for finding an
appropriate quality of life theory therefore seems to take the general behavioural assumptions
of the rational choice approach and complement these with a congenial theory of goals that
meets the two criteria above.
2.5. Pursuing the search for a theory on the production of well-being: an excursion
into theories of human goals
2.5.1. IN SEARCH FOR A THEORY OF GOALS: WHAT TO SEEK AND WHERE TO LOOK
This section simply proceeds from where the foregoing section ends, that is, from the
conclusion that a rational choice approach appears well-suited to the theoretical modelling of
goal-directed behaviour in quality of life research, but that it needs be complemented with a
theory of goals, which the rational choice approach proper does not include. Of course, not
any theory of goals will equally suit our purpose and complement the basic behavioural
assumptions of the rational choice approach. Only a theory of goals that meets the three
requirements that have been identified in section 2.4. will be acceptable. These requirements
were that it should be an ‘individual2'- type theory; that it includes a specification of a set of
assumedly universal goals at a sufficient level of abstraction to make them receive broad
consensus and enable their application to diverse concrete situations; and that it includes a
specification of the way in which situationally determined concrete interests or instrumental
goals relate to the abstract universal goals and to each other. A fourth requirement may be
added: the theory of goals and the underlying model of man should be congenial to the
behavioural theory of the rational choice approach, that is, its (implicit) assumptions must be
compatible with those of the general model into which the theory of goals is to be fitted.
A quick perusal of the literature on human goals shows that there is a multitude of lists and
classifications of what would be universal, fundamental goals. For the present study it is
neither possible nor necessary to consider all these different theories and lists in detail. The
best strategy appears to be to first identify the main disciplinary perspectives in the literature
concerning goals, and then in each perspective concentrate just on one or two theories or lists
of goals which are the most influential, representative or well accepted in that area.
Now which are the main disciplinary perspectives that might offer a finding place for the kind
of theory we want?22 The most obvious perspective is that of motivation theories within
psychology. The majority of these theories consider motivation as being directly related to
human goals, and thus we are likely to find some theories or classifications of goals there as
well.
A second disciplinary perspective that might offer some insights in and theories about human
goals is developmental psychology. Within this subdiscipline, the work of Erikson (1963) is
                                                
22    In this section (2.5.) we will thus search for a theory of goals. Although in common speech the term goals
may be used interchangeably with other terms indicating ‘what people want’ or ‘what people find important or
valuable’, a more narrow conception is intended here. We should not confuse e.g. values with goals. A goal is
something fundamentally different from a value: a value specifies what is desirable, or what one should strive
for, while a goal refers to what is desired, to what one strives for (see also footnote 19). We do discuss some
theories of needs, however, because at this stage identifying what people strive for has priority over the issues of
whether these goals (or needs) are substitutable and whether a hierarchical ordering can be achieved. These two
issues are given due consideration in the discussion of the various theories, though.
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an outstanding example of theories about human goals that are related to developmental
stages.
A third perspective in which insights and theories of human goals might be found is that of
social biology or evolutionary sociology. Authors from this perspective attempt to derive
hypotheses and theories about universal human goals from the basic premise that competition
for survival has steered the ‘selection’ of organisms (i.c. people) that share certain inborn
characteristics, among which are drives and emotions, which continue to shape their goals in
the present. Reasoning of this kind and specification of consequent goals can be found in e.g.
De Vos (1998).
Also in quite different disciplines, theories of goals can be found. For example in political and
development economics, to which not only Stewart and Sen (who do not specify goals,
however, see sections 2.3.5. and 2.3.6.) but also Max-Neef (1989) belong. 
Finally, in applications of the rational choice model in sociology we are likely to find some
theories of goals too, because - as was explained earlier - some goals must always be specified
in order to make the model operational. Often the theories of goals that are applied are
borrowed from one of the disciplinary perspectives above. But there is at least one theory of
goals that has been developed directly for use in rational choice sociology, namely
Lindenberg’s Social Production Function theory. This is the last theory of goals that is
included in the discussion in this section.
2.5.2. MOTIVATION PSYCHOLOGY: MASLOW AND FORD
In motivation psychology, most theories relate human motivation to needs or goals. It is
therefore not surprising that many different typologies, lists and theories of goals and needs
can be found in this discipline. McClelland (1987) and Ford (1992, in particular p. 174-200)
give extensive overviews of the different theories in this field. Only two of these many
theories are selected for present discussion. In the first place, I believe that Maslow’s (1954)
pyramid of goals should be included, if only because it has been so influential since its
publication. The second theory that I will discuss is Ford’s (1992) Motivation Systems
Theory, which is the most comprehensive recent theory in motivation psychology. The main
argument for choosing this theory to be discussed is that it incorporates the majority of
currently broadly accepted insights and has achieved a synthesis of these, so that in discussing
Ford’s MST we can, as much as possible, deal with the whole of motivational theories.
One of the most influential theories of human goals, which stems from motivational
psychology, is Maslow’s pyramid of human goals. Many applications of this theory can be
found throughout a broad range of disciplines. Also in quality of life research, Maslow’s
pyramid of needs has been used as a heuristic to identify relevant aspects on which quality of
life should be assessed. Below, I will first concisely introduce Maslow’s theory, followed by a
critical assessment of its adequacy as a theory of goals for quality of life research.
In Motivation and Personality (1970 [1954]), Maslow expounds his theory of human
motivation. Maslow sets out from the idea that the great variety in motivations and drives that
is seen within and between cultures are only the overt manifestations of the same underlying
basic needs. These basic needs are supposedly universal for all humans in all cultures, and
stand - according to Maslow - in an hierarchical order. How exactly this hierarchy should be
interpreted is not completely clear, a problem that I will return to below. In Maslow’s
hierarchy, what will be a man’s first and foremost motivation is to satisfy his physiological
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needs: the needs for food, drink, sleep and sex. Only after these needs have been satisfied to at
least a minimum degree, other needs will manifest themselves and gain prepotency.
According to Maslow, the physiological needs will disappear into the background as soon as
they are sufficiently satisfied, and cease to exist as active determinants of behaviour:
“At once other (and higher) needs emerge and these, rather than physiological hungers,
dominate the organism. And when these in turn are satisfied, again new (and still higher)
needs emerge, and so on. This is what we mean by saying that the basic human needs are
organised into a hierarchy of relative prepotency. (....) But a want that is satisfied is no
longer a want. The organism is dominated and its behaviour organised only by unsatisfied
needs. If hunger is satisfied, it becomes unimportant in the current dynamics of the
individual” (p. 38).
The next needs to become prepotent motivators are the safety needs, which include security;
stability; dependency; protection; freedom from fear; from anxiety and chaos; need for
structure, order, law, limits; strength in the protector; et cetera. After the safety needs are
satisfied, the belongingness and love needs will emerge, and “the person will feel keenly, as
never before, the absence of friends, or a sweetheart, or a wife or children” (p. 43). Again,
after the love and belongingness needs are fairly well gratified, new needs are claimed to
emerge: the esteem needs. These needs can be subdivided into two groups: the need for self
esteem (achievement, adequacy, mastery and competence, independence and freedom) and the
need for the esteem of others: the desire for reputation or prestige, status, fame and glory,
dominance, recognition, attention, importance, dignity or appreciation.
Even if all the needs mentioned thus far are satisfied, a new restlessness and discontent is
expected to develop, unless the individual achieves self-actualisation, that is, unless he is
doing what he, individually, is fitted for (p. 46). Self-actualisation thus refers to the need for
self-fulfilment, the desire to become more and more what one idiosyncratically is, to become
everything that one is capable of becoming.
Finally, Maslow mentions the aesthetic needs, as the last category of universal needs or
motivators, although he seems somewhat insecure about the position of this group of needs in
the hierarchy. Often in later applications of Maslow’s work, we find the aesthetic needs
excluded.
After having identified the categories of basic needs, Maslow continues to put some
reservational remarks at the postulated hierarchical ordering of the needs. For one thing, it is
acknowledged that reversals in the postulated ordering of needs can quite often be observed.
Maslow accounts for these seeming inconsistencies by stating that
“when a need has been satisfied for a long time, this need may be underevaluated. People
who have never experienced chronic hunger are apt to underestimate its effects and to
look upon food as a rather unimportant thing... It then becomes possible, and indeed does
actually happen, that they may, for the sake of this higher need, put themselves into the
position of being deprived in a more basic need” (p. 52). 
A second partial explanation for these apparent reversals in the hierarchical order that Maslow
mentions is that 
“people who have been satisfied in their basic needs throughout their lifes, particularly in
their earlier years, seem to develop exceptional power to with-stand present or future
thwarting of these needs, simply because they have strong, healthy character structure as a
result of basic satisfaction” (p. 53).
I should add here that Maslow never intended his theory as a theory explaining levels of well-
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being. He explicitly states that it is only a partial theory of motivation, which, even regarding
the subject of motivation, is “not capable of independent existence or validity” (p. 60). For our
purposes, this means that we should be careful not to apply the theory as if it were
independently tenable and valid, and even more so if we would apply it to a series of different
phenomena than the ones it was originally designed to explain.
How should we now judge the adequacy of Maslow’s work as a theory (complemented with
the behavioural assumptions of rational choice) for quality of life research?
Firstly, the whole idea of motivating needs rests upon the assumption that after any need is
satisfied, discontent emerges at the subsequent level. No increase in subjective well-being is
thus assumed when rising in the hierarchy of needs. Although Maslow does not explicitly
state any hypotheses about a possible relation between a rise in the hierarchy of needs and
changes in the level of well-being, some of the mechanisms he does explicitly mention seem
to contradict the assumption of a positive relation between the two. For example, the
explicitly mentioned disappearance and devaluation of already satisfied goals does not foster
the idea that these satisfactions will significantly add to perceived well-being, and neither does
the emergence of new and equally dominating discontent at each subsequent level. It is
therefore doubtful whether the implicit assumption, in quality of life studies that are based on
the Maslovian pyramid of needs, that being located higher in the need-pyramid implies a
higher level of well-being, is justified.  
Secondly, as mentioned above, Maslow claims his hierarchy of needs to hold only for persons
whose basic needs have not been satisfied for a long time. This condition does not hold for the
majority of people in the modern western world on which many of the studies of life quality
concentrate. Thus, for the majority of the people involved in these studies, the hierarchical
order of needs need not apply. This at least reduces the adequacy of Maslovian theory for
explaining levels of well-being or of needs satisfactions in western societies: taking the totally
deprived person as a starting point is not realistic when applying the theory to modern western
societies, as the grounds for hierarchy-reversals as identified by Maslow seem to abound in
the populations concerned.
Thirdly, it can be argued that the safety needs, Maslow’s second hierarchical level, are an odd
category, which is - strictly speaking - meaningless. I think that safety needs are intrinsically
problematic as an autonomous category; they rather seem to derive meaning only from other
needs whose fulfilment requires protection. The safety needs Maslow mentions all seem to be
salient only as far as they serve to protect acquired satisfactions of other needs, and secure the
future availability of means to satisfy other needs. Maslow himself, in giving examples to
clarify the safety needs is forced to refer to the physical needs and belongingness and affection
needs as the things that require protection. I do not argue that safety is not something valuable,
which people strive for, but I do argue that it had better be conceptualised as a different kind
of need or goal that does not form a separate level in the hierarchy but that rather is part of
each of the other hierarchical levels Maslow distinguishes. 
Besides the three main objections to Maslow’s pyramid of need as a goal-theory for quality of
life research, there are a few other remarks left to be made.
Where Maslow speaks of the disappearance or devaluation of satisfied needs, it seems that the
mechanism he implicitly refers to is that which is generally referred to as decreasing marginal
utility. In particular when applying Maslow’s theory in other disciplines, I think the
understanding of what happens (and consequently the possibility of deriving predictions)
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would profit from naming the observed phenomenon indeed as resulting from decreasing
marginal utility of satisfiers for the basic needs.
Further, although Maslow starts out from a critical stance concerning the often too simple
reliance of psychological theories on clinical evidence - that is, on evidence obtained from
pathological cases - in the argumentation Maslow provides for some needs he invokes a
similar critique. His arguments for considering a need as basic rather than as a variable
manifestation of an underlying basic need are strongly based on clinical evidence whether
thwarting of the particular need is known to lead to pathological reactions. Moreover, in many
instances Maslow’s judgements of what is pathological seem to rely heavily on culturally
biased norms of what is ‘healthy’ and what not.
When, finally, we consider the extent to which the theory of Maslow suits the four criteria
formulated in section 2.5.1., we find that the fit is considerable, but not perfect. The first
criterion, that the theory of goals we want should be of the ‘individual2'- type, is met by
Maslow’s pyramid of human needs. There is of course no strict dichotomy of theories into
‘individual1'- and ‘individual2'- types, these two types are rather the poles of a dimension, but
in any case Maslow’s theory of goals is certainly located near the  ‘individual2'- type pole.
The second criterion, that the theory must specify a set of universal goals at a sufficient level
of abstraction to make them receive broad consensus and enable their application to diverse
concrete situations is also sufficiently met in Maslow’s theory of goals. I think that the fact
that Maslow’s pyramid has been so influential can for a large part be attributed to how he
specified the goals: in a general sense hardly any objections have been raised to the goals
Maslow poses as universal. Part of this success seems in turn due to the level of abstraction at
which Maslow formulated the human goals, while also part of it is, I believe, indicative of the
real existence of a number of universal human goals.
As concerns the second part of this criterion, the applicability to diverse concrete situations, it
should be noted what is the logical consequence of the theory’s claim that goals that have
been met cease to be salient. For this claim implies that at any moment people have but one
salient goal, while all the other goals are either already realised and ‘thus’ fallen silent, or if
they are higher in the pyramid, they are not salient yet as long as the lower goals are not all
realised. This consequence of the theory is not necessarily problematic; it is up to the
researcher who wants a theory of goals whether he is willing to accept this implication at the
cost of the possibility to deal with substitution and relative cost effects. 
The third criterion, that the theory must specify the way in which situationally determined
concrete interests or instrumental goals relate to the abstract universal goals and to each other,
is the one Maslow’s theory suits least. Although Maslow does give some examples of how the
goals in his pyramid might be realised, he does not do so systematically. What is worse, is that
Maslow remains even silent on instrumentality relations between the goals in the pyramid. He
just poses a hierarchical order in the satisfaction of basic needs, while, I believe, much could
be clarified by paying attention to the instrumentality of lower order needs in the achievement
of higher order needs. For many elements in the Maslovian pyramid, instrumental relations
between lower and higher levels are easily thought of, providing more logical appeal to the
hierarchical ordering. In the above it was already discussed that this is especially the case for
the safety-need. Overall, on this criterion I believe Maslow’s theory of goals must be judged
unsatisfactory.
The fourth criterion, that the theory of goals be congenial to the behavioural theory of the
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rational choice approach does not cause any problem here; there is nothing in Maslow’s
theory nor in the implicit model of man it is built on that would be incompatible with the
assumptions of the rational choice approach.
The second theory of goals from the perspective of motivational psychology that I want to
discuss here is Ford’s (1992) Motivational Systems Theory. Ford (1992) provides a
comprehensive theoretical framework for understanding human motivation, goal systems, the
influences of situational factors and the extra motivational effect of activities that serve
multiple goals at once. In his Motivational Systems Theory (MST), Ford tries to integrate the
major work from the motivation research program, emphasising those parts of the body of
knowledge on which broad agreement exists, rather than polarising and focusing on the
differences of opinion that exist.     
Motivational Systems Theory  (Ford 1992; Ford & Nichols 1991, 1992) contains in many
aspects exactly the elements that we would want for filling in the interests-assumption in the
RC model: a specification of universal goals, a specification of what situational characteristics
trigger particular goals, ideas with regard to the instrumentality relations between goals, a
recognition of the higher utility and motivation related to multifunctional activities et cetera.
The theory is, moreover, further elaborated and comprehensive than any of the other theories
or approaches discussed in this chapter. And, perhaps its most important recommendation,
Ford has built his theory on the basis of those insights in motivation research and general
psychology that form a common ground to all major approaches; MST thus represents the
most broadly accepted insights about the content and motivating function of goals that exits in
the relevant literature. Yet the theory is not well applicable as a theory of goal directed
behaviour in a rational choice explanatory model.
Let’s first look at the classification of goals (Ford & Nichols 1991; Ford 1992, p. 88-89) that
Ford uses in his MST. Ford & Nichols distinguish 24 different human goals, ordered over six
clusters that again belong to one of two main categories. The main categories Ford and
Nichols distinguish are ‘desired within-person consequences’ and ‘desired person-
environment consequences’. The first category comprises three clusters of goals: affective
goals, cognitive goals, and subjective organisation goals. Affective goals represent
“different kinds of feelings or emotions that a person might want to experience or avoid.
Cognitive goals refer to different kinds of mental representations that people may want to
construct or maintain. Subjective organisation goals represent special or unusual states
that people may seek to experience or avoid that involve a combination of different kinds
of thoughts and feelings” (Ford 1992, p. 87).
The second category also comprises three clusters, namely the self-assertive social
relationship goals, the integrative social relationship goals and the task goals. The self-
assertive social relationship goals “represent the desire to maintain or promote the self”,
whereas the integrative social relationship goals
“represent the desire to maintain or promote the well-being of other people or the social
groups of which one is a part. Task goals represent desired relationships between the
individual and various objects in the environment (including people when they are being
conceived of in impersonal terms)”  (ibid., p. 87).
Together, these two categories are claimed to be exhaustive for “all possible goals
representing some outcome of person-in-context functioning” (ibid., p. 87). In contrast to
Maslow’s pyramid of needs,
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“there is no implication in either the ordering or hierarchical arrangement of these
categories that some goals are more important or more fundamental than others. [...]
Some goals may, on average, be more compelling than others (e.g., happiness, physical
well-being, positive self-evaluations, belongingness) (Ford & Nichols, 1991), but that is
an empirical question rather than a theoretical assumption. [...] It is also important to keep
in mind the fact that behaviour is often (perhaps usually) guided by multiple goals
simultaneously. Indeed, behaviour patterns in which multiple purposes are served by a
common course of action are likely to yield unusually powerful motivational results [...]
Accordingly, there is no assumption in the taxonomy that the activation of one goal will
necessarily preclude the pursuit of other goals” (ibid., p. 86).
When further scrutinising the 24 goals that are subsumed in the six main clusters, two
impressions dominate. The first is that the goals Ford and Nichols distinguish seem very
probable and universal; there is not one of these goals I would oppose against. The second
impression is that, though the 24 goals may be exhaustive, they are certainly not mutually
exclusive; there seems to be considerable overlap between many of the goals. This decreases
the value of the classification scheme as a heuristic or analytical tool; the aim for which it was
intended.
The fact that Ford does not assume any instrumentality relations between the goals, and
emphatically refrains from assuming any fixed order of importance of the different goals for
the individual, implies that the classification scheme can only be applied to individual
situations about which the researcher has detailed data. In other words, the scheme of goals is
intended to be used in a way that is very ‘greedy’ with regard to information on the level of
the particular person under study. This makes the Motivational Systems theory a clear
‘individual1' - type theory. In its further features, especially with regard to the behavioural
mechanisms it involves, Ford’s MST is even more obviously an ‘individual1'- type theory.
Thus, it does not meet the first criterion that we decided should be used. As to the second
criterion, this is only partly met, because the goals that are specified - although they are likely
to meet broad consensus - are not easily applied to concrete situations due to Ford’s claim that
the presence and the importance of the goals strongly differs over individual persons. The
third criterion, that the theory should make clear which instrumental and situational goals
exist and how they lead to the realisation of the general goals, is also partly met. It is met to
the extent that we may conceive of the two categories and the six clusters of goals as general
goals, and of the 24 goals as instrumental goals for the realisation of these. However, the
theory is silent about lower order instrumental or situational goals that would serve the
realisation of the 24 goals. The fourth criterion, finally, is sufficiently met by Ford’s MST, for
it is well compatible with the assumptions of the rational choice model of behaviour.
2.5.3. THEORIES OF GOALS FROM DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: ERIKSON
In developmental psychology, a number of different theories of universal human goals can be
found. One shared characteristic of the various theories or specifications of goals by
developmental psychologists is the general idea that for healthy development, humans need to
achieve some universal faculties or to fulfil some universal developmental tasks, and that a
failure to achieve these faculties leads to psychological pathology and, consequently, to
lowered overall subjective well-being and happiness. The most influential theorists in this
sub-discipline are, of course, Freud, Piaget and Erikson, while also the more recent works of
Loevinger (1976) and Kohlberg (1969) are part of this tradition (cf. McClelland 1987, p. 48-
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58).
As it is besides the aim of this book to provide an introduction to developmental psychology, I
refrain from discussing the work of all these authors. I will rather pick out one, which is - at
least with regard to our interests - largely representative for the others as well, and in
discussing this author explain the limitations of goal-theories from this realm for our
purposes. The one representative of developmental psychology I have chosen to discuss here,
is Erikson.
The ideas of Erik Erikson (1977 [1950]) have been and still are quite influential, in particular
his distinction of the eight ‘ages of man’ with the accompanying life tasks or developmental
goals. The concept of stages in the human motivational development was first advocated by
Freud, but Erikson has importantly elaborated on this. Based on both clinical experience in his
psychoanalytical practice, anthropological case studies in non-industrialised societies, and the
biographical analysis of several extreme or deviant cases (including e.g. Hitler and Gorky),
Erikson formulated the theory that the psychological health and subjective well-being of
people depend on their successful transition through eight universal stages of development,
and the successful completion of the eight corresponding developmental tasks or challenges:
“The strength acquired at any stage is tested by the necessity to transcend it in such a way
that the individual can take chances in the next stage with what was most vulnerably
precious in the previous one” (Erikson 1977, p. 237).
The eight developmental tasks can be understood as the subsequent acquisition by the initially
helpless baby of necessary skills to face the demands of human life. 
The first ‘age’ Erikson distinguishes is that at which a baby will acquire either a sense of basic
trust or of basic mistrust. Successful transition through this developmental stage is of course
defined as the acquisition of basic trust instead of mistrust. Only when the baby has acquired a
basic sense of trust, it is well equipped for the successful transition through the next stage of
its development, in which the acquisition of autonomy is central. A lack of success in this
stage leads the child to develop a basic sense of shame and doubt. When a sense of autonomy
is acquired, the child is ready to enter the third stage Erikson distinguishes, the stage of
initiative versus guilt. In this stage the super-Ego develops as mediator between the child’s
inclination to ‘undertake’ and manipulate his environment and the rules and moral restrictions
imposed by the existence of others. Both an underdeveloped and an overdeveloped super-Ego
will form a hindrance to the child’s functioning in later stages in life, so the task here is to
achieve the right balance. This balance being found, the child is ‘ready’ for the fourth stage
that usually coincides with the entrance into school life. The salient dimension in the fourth
stage is that between industry and inferiority. That is, in this stage the child should master the
skills to handle utensils and tools and be productive, as a preparation to a later role as
provider. If the child fails to grow confident of his productive skills, a sense of inadequacy
and inferiority may develop, which in turn is likely to have a negative effect on further
attempts to become industrious as well as on identification with adult society. After the stage
of industry versus inferiority, follows, in puberty and adolescence, the fifth age, in which the
conquest of identity, as opposed to role confusion, is central. Identity formation includes the
choice of occupation, the search for social values (often materialising in attraction to strong
ideologies), the choice of idols and the forming of ‘clan’-like bonds and exclusion of
‘outgroupers’ Success in conquering identity lets the young adult emerge well-equipped to
enter the next stage, where the main ‘task’ is to conquer intimacy. Only through having a
stable identity the individual has the capacity to “commit himself to concrete affiliations and
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partnerships and to develop the ethical strength to abide by such commitments, even though
they may call for significant sacrifices and compromises” (ibid., p. 237). Failure in this stage
may lead to a deep sense of isolation (and thus decreased subjective well-being)23. After
having passed through the intimacy versus isolation stage, man enters the seventh stage
Erikson distinguishes: that of generativity versus stagnation. This stage may cover the largest
part of adult life. It is the phase in which all previously acquired capacities can be put to use,
in the first place in ‘establishing and guiding the next generation’ (ibid., p. 240), be it one’s
own offspring or not. Failure to take up or accomplish this task may lead to regression to an
obsessive need for pseudo-intimacy, a sense of stagnation and personal impoverishment.
Sometimes this may lead individuals to indulge themselves as if they were their own child
(ibid., p. 240).
The final stage is that of ego integrity versus despair. As Erikson states:
“Only him who in some way has taken care of things and people and has adapted himself
to the triumphs and disappointments adherent to being, the originator of others or the
generator of products and ideas - only in him may gradually ripen the fruit of these seven
stages [...] ...ego integrity” (ibid., p. 241).
Erikson takes some trouble to explain the concept of ego integrity, which, although it is much
broader, may in terms familiar to quality of life studies be conceived of as something
including ultimate life satisfaction. Lack of ego integrity means significant loss of well-being
and satisfaction, and is supposed to be even related to an increased fear of death.
A person who has successfully passed through all stages and who finally reaches ego integrity
may be considered to have had a full and meaningful life; I think it is safe to assume that this
is indeed how Erikson would define ‘quality of life’.
For the largest part Erikson’s ideas of what is desirable development and which skills and
characteristics are necessary for a ‘full’ life will meet with little opposition. However, there
are several aspects that Erikson describes as ‘necessary’ or ‘normal’ or ‘healthy’ that I believe
are strongly normatively inspired. The most obvious instance is where Erikson stresses the
superiority of heterosexuality over homosexuality (ibid., p. 238-239), but also in his
exposition of what the individual should learn in other stages considerable normativity can be
detected. This normativity makes the theory - or at least the way it is specified by the author -
quite vulnerable to criticism.
Now what about the adequacy of Erikson’s theory as a theory of goals for our purpose? Again
this should be assessed on the basis of the four criteria mentioned in section 2.5.1. Erikson’s
theory is sufficiently congenial to a rational choice model of behaviour; I have found no
elements in it that would be incompatible with the rationality assumptions. It is however not
an ‘individual2'- type theory, despite the seeming obviousness of what ‘age’ some person is in.
The reason for considering Erikson’s theory an ‘individual1'- type theory is that it requires
extensive information on the individual person to assess with how much success he has
proceeded through the challenges of earlier ages; an assessment of which is required if one
wants to make assumptions about which goals are presently guiding the behaviour of the
individual as well as for hypothesising about his subjective well-being. It is the same feature
of the theory that makes it unsatisfactory in terms of the remaining two criteria, for although
                                                
23    Erikson adds to his discussion of the ideal result of this stage some more general notions about ‘healthy’
genitality, many of which have a strong normative character, however.
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the theory does specify general and universal human goals, the situationally salient goals are
not determined by characteristics of the situation, but rather by individual characteristics,
namely by the individuals’ private history of psychosocial development. Such a theory is
uncontestedly valuable for psychotherapeutic aims, but it does not suit our present purpose.
2.5.4. THEORIES OF GOALS FROM EVOLUTIONARY SOCIOLOGY OR SOCIOBIOLOGY
In recent years, there appears to be a rapid growth of the number of articles which present
theories or simulation studies that start out from the notion of human evolution shaped by
systematic selection pressures (e.g. Cosmides & Tooby 1992; Tooby & Cosmides 1990;
Maryanski 1994; Stevens & Fiske 1995). Many of these studies, which I will together refer to
as evolutionary sociology or sociobiology, lead to hypotheses about or specifications of
presumed fundamental human emotions, drives and goals. As such, this branch of theorising
should be included in the present perusal of what theories of human goals exist.
Authors from this perspective attempt to derive hypotheses and theories about universal
human goals from the basic premise that competition for survival has, over millions of years,
led to the selection of organisms (i.c. people) that possess certain inborn characteristics that
make them disposed to seek states that were once conducive to survival chances24 and to
avoid states that, in the ancestral environment, would have jeopardised survival. What would
make these presumed evolutionary processes relevant for the present are, according to
adherents of this approach, the consequences for the set of emotions and drives humans are
endowed with. Through reasoning about what emotions would have been helpful in the -
hypothetical - ancestral situation, they give a functional account for the existence of a set of
universal and fundamental emotions, with corresponding goals, in present day people. 
In De Vos (1998), a clear overview of some main work in the social evolutionary perspective
can be found. De Vos (ibid., p. 21-30) distils from this a set of eight social goals, which, he
claims, have been shaped through evolutionary selection pressures and still operate in
contemporary society. These goals are: status (or competition); care and attachment; sex and
pair-bonding; belonging (i.e. ‘reciprocal altruistic group living’, ibid., p.26); social
understanding; trust; fairness; and usefulness and self-esteem. All of these eight goals can be
conceived of as an answer to the question of what would be needed to prevent the unpleasant
experience of our inherited emotions (see critical note below). For example, trust is supposed
to be a goal of people because ‘in cases of repeated betrayal of trust, we feel anxious and lost’
(De Vos 1998, p. 28).
Now what should we think of these evolutionary approaches and the sets of goals or ‘steering
emotions’ that they specify? In the first place we may find that there is much overlap with the
goals specified in other approaches. At least, the social evolutionary perspective does not
appear to lead to the identification of goals or emotions that are not posed by other
perspectives as well.
In the second place, one should note that in this approach, the primary focus is on emotions,
which are triggered by threats to states that - in the ancestral environment - were necessary for
survival. This raises doubts, however, regarding the behaviour guiding potential of these
emotions in situations where no such threats to vital states are involved. In other words: are
                                                
24   ‘Survival chances’ do not refer to individual survival, but to so-called ‘inclusive fitness’, which also includes
the life chances of one’s offspring and close kin.
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the emotions specified sufficient to derive a set of goals from, or do they only point to
‘avoidance goals’, while being silent on goals that operate in the absence of ‘threats’? It
should be noted that the step from the identification of inherited emotions to the identification
of the goals that De Vos (see above) proposes implies the questionable assumption that not
only aversion of threatening states is inborn and invariable but that there are also inborn and
invariable strategies to prevent the occurrence of such threatening situations; which is
something quite different.
In the third place, the adherents of the evolutionary perspective explain the necessity of going
back to the ancestral environment for the explanation of emotions by arguing that our
emotions and inborn needs cannot be explained simply from their function(-ality) in the
present, because the human environment has undergone such radical transformations that
what once was functional may not be so today. But by this very argument they invalidate any
potential claim that the emotions or needs they propose can be inserted in the rational choice
model of goal directed behaviour. For, if the emotions we are endowed with are not (all)
functional in our present social environment, there is no logic in assuming that following them
will maximise a person’s utility or well-being. From the argument of the social evolutionists, I
think it would be more correct to consider the emotions as restrictions that humans have to
cope with, because they are there although they may not suit our present situation.
In the fourth place, parts of the theoretical reconstruction of how certain emotions would have
been selected are highly speculative. Given the large overlap between the emotions identified
in other disciplines (branches of psychology) and in empirical research on contemporary
human beings, it appears that the social evolutionary perspective can at best add an
explanation of why these emotions would be selected instead of certain hypothetical different
emotions, but it does not significantly add to our understanding of which goals operate in the
goal directed action of rational individuals.  
When finally, we evaluate the usefulness of the social evolutionary perspective according to
the four criteria listed in section 2.5.1., we must conclude that it does not meet all of these.
The evolutionists’ set of emotions-based goals may suit the requirement that the theory of
goals be of the ‘individual2'- type, and even that it is not incompatible with the assumptions of
the basic model of rational behaviour. It may also meet the criterion that there be broad
consensus about the goals it specifies (which in this case is no wonder as the perspective does
not propose goals that cannot be found in, or that are conflicting to goals proposed in other
theories and perspectives). Yet the social evolutionary perspective is clearly inadequate when
it comes to the requirement that it should include a specification of the way in which
situationally determined concrete interests or instrumental goals relate to the abstract universal
goals and to each other. There are no more instrumentality relations assumed between the
goals than that they all contribute to inclusive fitness in the ancestral environment. The social
evolutionists’ reasoning does not even assume that realisation of the goals they propose does
also contribute to either survival or inclusive fitness or subjective well-being in the present
world (only in as far as avoiding unpleasant emotions would constitute well-being, which
would be a very narrow conception of well-being).
2.5.5.    THEORIES OF GOALS FROM DEVELOPMENTAL AND POLITICAL ECONOMICS OR POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY: MAX-NEEF
There are a number of (sub-)disciplines, such as political science, developmental and political
economics, and political philosophy that also deal with questions of quality of life, but usually
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approaching these on a very different level: that of the economic and political system.
(Stewart’s Basic Needs approach and Sen’s functionings and capabilities approach (see 2.3.5
and 2.3.6.) are exceptions to this ‘rule’, but as we have seen, they refrain from specifying
goals). As these disciplines are largely foreign and unknown to me, I cannot, with any degree
of confidence, discuss them as a pack. There may be very useful and suitable theories of goals
there of which I have no knowledge, but if there are, they have as yet not made their
appearance into the main arena of quality of life studies.
One theory of goals or human needs that is rooted in political philosophy / developmental
economics I do know of, namely the theory proposed by Manfred Max-Neef (1992). Max-
Neef proposes his theory of human needs as a framework for thinking about political and
economical change and development, especially as concerns economically deprived societies.
Max-Neef’s work, like that of several authors that were discussed above (e.g. Schulz, Stewart,
Sen) or will be discussed shortly (namely Lindenberg, section 2.5.7.), builds on the general
notion that goods and services (broadly conceived to include functions of the political-
economic system) are used by individuals to satisfy a number of universal or ‘fundamental’
needs. There may be large differences in what goods or services that may be used to this end,
largely dependent on time and culture.
According to Max-Neef, human needs
“must be understood as a system; that is, all human needs are interrelated and interactive.
With the sole exception of the need of subsistence, that is, to remain alive, no hierarchies
exist within the system. On the contrary, simultaneities, complementarities and trade-offs
are characteristics of the process of needs satisfaction” (1992, p. 199). 
Max-Neef distinguishes two categories of human needs: existential needs and axiological
needs. Existential needs include the needs of Being, Having, Doing and Interacting.
Axiological needs include the needs of Subsistence, Protection, Affection, Understanding,
Participation, Creation, Leisure, Identity and Freedom. He formulates two postulates:
“[F]irst, fundamental human needs are finite, few and classifiable; and second,
fundamental human needs (such as those contained in the system proposed) are the same
in all cultures and in all historical periods. What changes, both over time and through
cultures, is the way or the means by which the needs are satisfied. [...]..one of the aspects
that define a culture is its choice of satisfiers. [...] Furthermore, needs are satisfied within
three contexts: (1) with regard to oneself (Eigenwelt); (2) with regard to the social group
(Mitwelt); and (3) with regard to the environment (Umwelt)” (ibid., p. 199-200).
According to Max-Neef, any human need that is not adequately satisfied constitutes a poverty
(for example poverty of subsistence, poverty of participation, poverty of understanding) and
each poverty generates pathologies. However, the pathologies he then mentions by way of
illustration all refer to system dysfunctionings rather than pathologies in the individual
persons. At this point it becomes unclear whether Max-Neef is really proposing an individual
level theory of needs or rather a theory on the needs of political-economic systems to be stable
and well-functioning.
More confusion is added when Max-Neef goes on to argue that needs have a twofold
character, representing both deprivation and potential. He goes as far as to say that “to the
degree that needs engage, motivate and mobilise people, they are a potential and eventually
may become a resource” (ibid., p.201). This induces a strange paradox, in which the
satisfaction of fundamental needs would mean the loss of potential and the loss of resources.
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This again would at best make sense only from a system level point of view, in which
people’s unfulfilled needs may be considered a resource because of its mobilising potential.
But from an individual level point of view this claim makes no sense.
Max-Neef uses a schematic representation to summarise his conceptions of needs and
satisfiers (ibid., p. 206-207). He presents a matrix in which the existential needs are at the one
axis and the axiological needs at the other, while the cells contain some possible satisfiers.
In this matrix of needs and satisfiers, I find that the axiological needs now appear as the real
‘needs’ or ‘goals’, while the existential needs seem to coincide rather with different stages in a
process of converting goods into well-being (somewhat similar to the goods-characteristics-
functionings-utility sequence in Sen 1997, or to the respective levels of resources, productive
activities, and first order goals in Lindenberg’s Social Production Function theory, cf. section
2.5.7. and chapter 3). Yet the main impression from the matrix is confusion: it is hardly ever
clear why a certain satisfier would be related to the axiological and / or existential need that it
is placed with. In short, I find that Max-Neef’s system of needs seriously lacks face validity.
The needs that he claims to be fundamental invoke little sense of recognition.
As a theory of goals for our purposes, the work of Max-Neef is not suited. In the first place, it
seems to be neither an ‘individual1'-type nor an ‘individual2'- type theory. As argued above,
Max-Neef’s theory appears to be rather a system-level theory of needs than a theory for
individual-level analysis. Secondly, although it proposes a set of assumedly universal
fundamental needs or goals, the set that is specified is unlikely to gain broad consensus,
because of its opaque structuring and its lack of face validity. It thus fails to meet the third
criterion as well. As regards the fourth criterion, the compatibility with a rational choice
model of individual behaviour, the theory of Max-Neef might be acceptable. However,
considering its apparent inadequacy in terms of the other criteria, this is of no avail.
2.5.6. THEORIES OF GOALS FROM RATIONAL CHOICE SOCIOLOGY: SOCIAL PRODUCTION
       FUNCTION THEORY
A number of sociological applications of the rational choice explanatory model have in the
last decade resorted to a different theory of goals, which originated within the rational choice
approach itself, namely Lindenberg’s (1986, 1996; Lindenberg & Frey 1993) Social
Production Function theory.
Social Production Function (SPF) theory basically asserts that people produce their own well-
being by trying to optimise, within the constraints they are facing, achievement of two
universal goals: physical well-being and social well-being. It holds that systematic differences
exist in the ways individuals achieve well-being. These differences in the way individuals
proceed in their pursuit of the universal goals mirror the differences in resources and
constraints of the individuals’ situations.
Physical and social well-being, according to SPF theory, consist of respectively two and three
so-called ‘first order instrumental goals’, which are also considered to be universal.
The first order instrumental goals are the main means through which people may realise the
universal goals. For physical well-being, stimulation and comfort are identified as the first
order goals. Comfort refers to absence of thirst, hunger, pain, fatigue, et cetera. Stimulation
refers to pleasant arousal, including mental and sensory stimulation and physical effort.
Comfort and stimulation both have a decreasing marginal value for the production of physical
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well-being.
For social well-being, Lindenberg proposes status, behavioural confirmation and affection as
the three first order instrumental goals. Status refers to a relative ranking compared with other
people. Behavioural confirmation is defined as the positive feedback on behaviour by others
(the feeling of having done "the right thing"), which may also take the form of self approval,
when behavioural norms of relevant others are internalised. Affection includes love,
friendship and emotional support. All three instrumental goals are assumed to have decreasing
marginal value for the production of social approval.
An important and purposefully designed characteristic of SPF theory is the hierarchical
ordering of goals, with the ultimate goals at the top, and instrumental goals at lower levels,
linked by production functions that specify the relationship between lower order and higher
order goals25. A social production function is thus basically the specification for a particular
(category of) individual(s) of how well-being is produced. The lower in the hierarchy, the
more context-specific the production function becomes. If a person lacks the necessary
resources for the realisation of a higher level goal, the production of these resources can
become an instrumental goal in itself. Thus, activities may immediately realise an
instrumental goal (production activities), they may increase the potential for future production
(investment) or both.
A second feature of SPF theory is the importance of substitution mechanisms. The three top
layers of the hierarchy are special in the sense that there is limited substitutability. Physical
and social well-being can only to some degree be substitutes for each other in the production
of overall well-being. That is, Lindenberg assumes that some physical and social well-being
will always be necessary for overall subjective well-being. The same holds for the first-order
instrumental goals. Thus, a minimum of affection is always necessary for social well-being
even though affection can, beyond this level, be substituted by behavioural confirmation or
status. Below the three top layers where limited substitutability is assumed, Lindenberg
assumes general substitutability between ‘lower order’ goals. Substitution occurs depending
on the relative cost of alternative goals. For example, if opportunities for achievement of
status are decreasing, a person is likely to increase the production of affection and behavioural
confirmation if those are relatively easier ("cheaper") to produce. Substitution also occurs at
lower levels: if opportunities to produce e.g. status with conventional resources (e.g. occupati-
on) decrease, people may try to substitute alternative resources to produce status.
A third feature of SPF theory is that it enables the evaluation the ‘efficiency’ of alternative
production factors by way of looking at the extent to which they are multifunctional.
According to SPF theory, the most efficient means of production are multifunctional
activities: those that combine production and investment and those that satisfy multiple higher
order goals (Ormel et al. 1996). Thus, the structure of the hierarchy is not a (partial) ordering,
but a semi-lattice.
                                                
25   In the analogy of the production function, which SPF theory shares with the basic needs approach and to a
lesser extent also with Sen’s functionings and capabilities approach, SPF theory invokes the concepts of comple-
mentarity and substitutability of production factors and the notion that the contribution of resources and activities
to the achievement of well-being depends on how and in what combinations they are employed.
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SPF theory has been applied in a number of studies that bear on quality of life (e.g. Nieboer
1997; Steverink 1996; Ormel et al. 1996; Van Eijk 1996), yet, until now, no thorough
empirical investigation has been undertaken of what are the most relevant concrete production
factors for the different first-order goals. The theory as yet thus lacks a specification of lower
level - that is, situationally dependent - instrumental goals, as well as detailed knowledge
about which lower level instrumental goals lead to the realisation of the higher order goals26.
Evaluation of SPF as a theory of goals according to the four criteria leads to the following
judgement. Firstly, the theory is clearly an ‘individual2'- type theory, as it should be (and of
course this is not surprising considering that SPF theory was especially developed to be used
in rational choice-modelling applications). Secondly, SPF theory includes a specified set of
universal goals, namely physical and social well-being. These two universal goals are
specified at a sufficient level of abstraction to ensure broad consensus and enable their
application to diverse concrete situations. Thirdly, the specification of the way in which
situationally determined concrete interests or instrumental goals relate to the abstract universal
goals and to each other is more problematic in SPF theory. Although the general mechanism,
as reflected in the metaphor of the production function, suggests some clarity about important
ways in which lower and higher order goals may be related, the lack of knowledge about what
would be these lower order goals and corresponding resources at lower levels of abstraction,
seriously cut short the theory’s pretension to meeting the third criterion.
Fourthly, Lindenberg’s Social Production Function theory is fully congenial to the
assumptions underlying the behavioural theory of the rational choice approach, which again
need not surprise us.
2.6. Conclusion
After the long ramble we have made in this chapter through such diverse areas as subjective
well-being research, rational choice sociology, motivational and development psychology,
social-evolutionary theory et cetera, it is now time to draw up the balance. What have we
learned on our way, and what useful tools did we find in all these areas?
Our search started out from the field of quality of life studies. In quality of life studies, the
core concern is the investigation of how conditions that are external to the individuals’ mind
affect the level of subjective well-being these individuals experience. We found, however, that
quality of life research has thus far not been very successful in dealing with this core concern,
and from our scan of the main current approaches in quality of life studies, we had to conclude
that, thus far, the field of study is not sufficiently equipped for its core task. What we found
lacking is an individual level theory explaining how, through which process, objective
conditions hinder or facilitate an agent’s active realisation of his well-being.
It was argued then that such a theory might best be sought within the realm of the rational
choice approach. The basic assumptions in the rational choice approach include a focus on
utility or subjective well-being as the final goal and outcome of behaviour, a focus on the
‘agency aspect’ of the realisation of utility or well-being, and the incorporation of conditions
                                                
26   As an exception Tinsley (1978, 1984, 1986, 1993) must be mentioned, who has investigated the fulfilment of
psychological needs through leisure activities. If we see through terminology, the psychological needs that
Tinsley distinguishes can well be conceived of as instrumental goals coupled to SPF theory's first order instru-
mental goals. See also Van Eijk 1996.
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that are external to the individual’s mind as resources and restrictions shaping the potential set
of well-being outcomes.
In the rational choice approach, however, we stumbled on a void regarding the specification of
goals. It was seen that, besides the traditional set economic assumptions on preferences
(which are inadequate for the purpose I have ascribed to quality of life research), there are no
adequate sets of assumptions about individual preferences. What would be needed is a theory
of goals, in which both universal human goals and their relation to instrumental situational
goals is specified. Such a theory would also have to be of the so-called ‘individual2'-type, and
of course it should be compatible with the basic behavioural model in the rational choice
approach, in order to make the rational choice model applicable to the core problems in
quality of life studies.
For such a theory of goals we then went to search in such diverse areas and subdisciplines as
e.g. political philosophy, motivational psychology, psychoanalytical theory. Of course, I have
not been able to thoroughly search all these areas, for this would require immense effort and
time, especially since terminology often differs strongly between these disciplines, and the
theories of goals - if present - are frequently only implicit in differently focussed theories.
Still, judging from what I was able to survey, I have come to the conclusion that there - most
likely - is no theory of goals ready to use that meets the criteria that were previously derived.
Yet there are several theories of goals that do possess some of the required characteristics, in
particular the theories of Maslow, Erikson and Lindenberg. In what they fail to meet, each of
these three theories represents a different problem.
The main problem with the Maslow’s theory, the pyramid of human needs, is the lack of
specification of the way in which situationally determined concrete interests or instrumental
goals relate to the abstract universal goals and to each other. Although instrumentality
relations between the various needs Maslow distinguishes seem quite easy to conceive, doing
so would create a tension with Maslow’s assertion that only one goal at a time is salient, and
that people do not even perceive the needs that have already been met, nor the needs beyond
the one they are presently trying to fulfil.
The main problems, for our purpose, with Erikson’s theory of the eight stages in the
motivational development of men are that it is not an ‘individual2'- type theory, because it
requires extensive information on the past development of the individual person to say what
goals are presently salient, and that, strictly spoken, it does not provide a clue for finding out
situationally determined concrete goals, as the situationally salient goals are not determined by
characteristics of the situation, but rather by the individuals’ private history of psychosocial
development.
The main problem with the Social Production Function theory of Lindenberg is its
insufficiency in specifying how situationally determined concrete instrumental goals relate to
the abstract universal goals and to each other. The general mechanism that relates concrete
instrumental goals to universal goals is suggested (namely, in the metaphor of the production
function), yet there lacks systematic knowledge about what would be these instrumental goals
and corresponding resources at lower levels of abstraction. In order to make SPF theory ready
to be used in quality of life studies, more knowledge is thus needed about the main ways in
which overall and social and physical well-being are realised. In addition to that, we will find
(see Chapter 3) that the content of the goals at the three top layers of the hierarchy is not
immediately clear. In fact, the questions raised in Chapter 1 regarding the meaning or content
of well-being (what are the actual experiences, feelings and mechanisms underneath people’s
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responses when asked about their well-being), need also be answered for the goals at the three
top layers in the SPF hierarchy27. And further, although SPF theory specifies goals in the
sense of what people want to realise (or get), it hardly specifies goals concerning how these
things are realised. Sometimes ‘metagoals’, which refer to the way one’s production functions
are organised, are mentioned by Lindenberg and other SPF authors, but thus far this element
in SPF theory lacks specification and elaboration. In Chapter 1 it was argued that procedural
preferences (not what one strives for, but how the process of achieving it is organised) are
likely to be relevant to subjective well-being as well. If SPF theory is to serve as a theory of
subjective well-being for quality of life studies, the metagoals should thus be further specified
and elaborated.
The main problems I find with the theories of Maslow and Erikson lie at a theoretical level,
and solving them would be complicated because of the need to keep the theories’ consistency
intact. Even if these problems could be solved without violating the character of the theory,
we would next face a number of empirical problems similar to those identified for SPF theory.
The main problems with Lindenberg’s theory do not lie, at least as far as can presently be
seen, at such a fundamental level that solving them might threaten the character and the
consistency of the theory’s core notions. The problem of lack of knowledge about the lower
levels in the hierarchy of goals may well be solved through empirical investigation of people’s
social production functions. The two other problems that require attention, that of the
empirical content of the goals at the three top layers, and of the metagoals, may be more
difficult to solve, but there is no reason to fear that this would undermine the theory’s core
notions.
I have therefore decided, though admittedly somewhat arbitrarily, to attempt the elaboration of
Lindenberg’s theory rather than adapting or changing the theory of Maslow or Erikson. The
remainder of this book focuses on this attempt and its results for Social Production Function
theory.
                                                
27    Actually, this is also the case for the other theories of goals discussed in section 2.5.: in each of these the
goals (or needs) are at best defined in an abstract way, which does not clearly determine the empirical reality they
refer to.
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CHAPTER THREE
SOCIAL PRODUCTION FUNCTION
THEORY: A CLOSER LOOK
3.1.   Introduction
In the first two chapters, some questions concerning the conceptualisation of ‘quality of life’
and subjective well-being and the measurement of its concomitants were expounded. In
Chapter 2, we were introduced to the field of quality of life studies. Its core concern has been
identified, followed by the assertion that at present quality of life studies is insufficiently
equipped to deal with this core task. I have argued that the field needs an individual level
behavioural theory that explains how objective conditions affect subjective well-being, in a
way that does justice to the agency aspect of well-being. The search for a suitable theory of
this kind then brought us to the rational choice approach, which appeared well-suited for our
purpose but for the lack of a complementary theory of goals. Several theories of goals, from
diverse disciplinary perspectives were then examined, and our conclusion was that there
seemed to be no ready to use theory of goals to complement the rational choice model of the
realisation of individual well-being. A few theories of goals might hold the potential to be
elaborated into a suitable theory for our purpose, however, and among these is Lindenberg’s
(1986, 1993, 1996) Social Production Function theory.
This chapter is devoted to a close examination of Social Production Function (SPF) theory.  I
chose this theory, that was already superficially introduced in Chapter 2, from the set of
suitable candidates for the task of achieving progress in quality of life research. In the present
chapter, the theory in its basic form as well as its main applications and extensions thus far are
closely scrutinised and it is assessed what points should be given priority in elaborating,
improving or redressing the theory.
In section 3.2., the reader’s patience is called upon to suffer a repeated exposition of the core
of SPF theory. Although the main notions were already discussed in Chapter 2 (2.5.7.), I will
presently go into much more depth about these. The second part of this section is used to
describe the origin and initial purpose of SPF theory. In case of this theory, it is worthwhile to
give some attention to the process through which it came into being, as its early history
appears to account for some of the theory’s (seeming) imbalances and ambiguities that will be
identified later in this chapter.
In section 3.3., the main applications of SPF theory that have appeared over the past few years
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are reviewed. In this review, three questions will be focussed upon: how the theory has been
used, to what extent the theory itself was tested, and to what extent the empirical evidence
from these studies supports the basic model of SPF theory.
Following the discussion of the applications and extensions of SPF theory thus far, I will in
section 3.4. proceed to consider what these later additions to the theory have contributed to the
conceptualisation and definition of the theory’s universal and first order goals. It is argued
then that the conceptualisation and, consequently, the definition of these goals are still
unsatisfactory.
Besides the conceptualisation of the first order and higher goals, there are some more respects
in which the theory wants further elaboration. These are discussed in section 3.5. For its
application to quality of life studies, a system of indicators that reflect the production factors
at the lower levels of the hierarchy of goals should be elaborated, that can be used for linking
objective conditions to subjective well-being. Also regarding so-called metagoals and
cognitive aspects much remains to be done.
The conclusion of this chapter, section 3.6., then summarises the present state of SPF theory
and lists the main tasks that are yet to be done. From this diagnosis, the specific research
questions for the study reported in subsequent chapters are derived.  
3.2. The basic form and initial purpose of Social Production Function theory
In the previous chapter the main features of SPF theory were already sketched. However, now
that the examination of different theories of goals has led to the decision to elaborate SPF
theory in order to prepare its application to Quality of Life studies, a more thorough exposition
of the theory is warranted.
Basically, SPF theory asserts that people produce their own well-being by trying to optimise,
within the constraints they are facing, the achievement of two universal goals: physical well-
being and social approval.  The core of SPF theory (Lindenberg 1986, 1992, 1993, 1996, etc)
is succinctly summarised by Ormel et al. (1999, p. 67), who state that the “[c]entral
components of SPF theory are (a) the link between the realisation of goals and well-being, (b)
explicit definitions of universal and instrumental goals, and (c) substitution among
instrumental goals according to cost-benefit considerations”.
Located within rational choice theory, SPF theory builds upon the distinction of universal and
individual preferences made in Stigler and Becker’s (1977) household production theory. They
assumed that universal goals can be described in terms of a single utility function, invariant
across individuals, but that systematic differences exist in the ways these individuals achieve
well-being, mirroring differences in resources and constraints of the individual’s situation.
Lindenberg saw that the usefulness of distinguishing between universal and individual
preferences depends on the specification of the universal goals or preferences. In SPF theory,
he specified the universal goals as physical and social well-being. Physical well-being is
basically the major goal that has been used in economic theory, while social well-being has
been the major goal in most sociological theories regarding human strivings. Indeed, the
identification of physical and social well-being as universal human goals was already
proposed by Adam Smith (1759 [1976], p. 116) and has since then generally met with broad
acceptance. For the notion of social well-being as a universal human goal Lindenberg also
claims support among others from e.g. Marshall 1920, Parsons 1937 and Goode 1978.
However, the mere identification of these two universal goals gives only little guidance
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concerning the interpretation or modelling of concrete situations, or the derivation of
particular hypotheses about concrete preferences. That is why, in SPF theory, Lindenberg went
one step further and proposed for both of the universal goals the main forms in which these
may be realised: the first-order instrumental goals. Physical well-being and social approval
are assumed to consist of respectively two and three so-called first-order instrumental goals.
In contrast to the convention in economic theory, to regard physical effort as a cost (which
would imply that minimisation of physical effort would lead to maximal physical well-being),
SPF theory asserts that people also need some degree of arousal to experience physical well-
being. Wippler (1987), building on Scitovsky (1976), identified stimulation and comfort as the
first order goals for physical well-being. Comfort refers to absence of thirst, hunger, pain,
fatigue, et cetera. Stimulation refers to activities that produce arousal, including mental and
sensory stimulation and physical effort. The relation between stimulation and physical well-
being is assumed to approximately follow an inverted U-shape. In opposition to Scitovsky and
Wippler, Lindenberg (1996, p. 173) states that the utility function of arousal is not single
peaked. He rather claims that people may in most states of being, except at extremely high or
low levels of comfort and stimulation, enjoy both an increase in stimulation and in comfort:
“[t]he organism seems to receive pleasure from both a reduction in arousal (i.e. from
increasing comfort) and from and increase in arousal (i.e. from increasing stimulation)
within a large range of arousal”.
For social well-being, Lindenberg proposes status, behavioural confirmation and affection as
the three first order instrumental goals. Status refers to a relative ranking (mainly based on
control over scarce resources). Behavioural confirmation is defined as the positive feedback
on behaviour by others (the feeling of having done ‘the right thing’). Behavioural confirmation
does not always need direct reinforcement of the behaviour: it can also take the form of self
approval, when behavioural norms of relevant others are internalised. Affection includes love,
friendship and emotional support. All three instrumental goals are assumed to have decreasing
marginal value for the production of social approval.
SPF theory has several characteristic features. The three characteristics that are most important
for our purpose are the hierarchical ordering of goals, the role of the relative price effect (or:
the mechanism of - limited - substitution) and the opportunity to compare production factors
with regard to their relative efficiency in the production of well-being.
The first characteristic is the hierarchical ordering of goals, with the ultimate goals at the top,
and instrumental goals at lower levels, linked by production functions that specify the
relationship between lower order and higher order goals1. Social production functions thus
basically specify for a particular (category of) individual(s) how well-being is produced. The
idiosyncrasy or situation-specificity of the production functions increases the lower one goes
in the hierarchy. The production factors (or: means of production) at the lower levels of the
production functions include both activities and material and immaterial resources.
At the levels below that of the five first-order goals, or first-order means of production
                                                
1     In the analogy of the production function, which SPF theory shares with the basic needs approach and to a
lesser extent also with Sen’s functionings and capabilities approach, SPF theory invokes the concepts of comple-
mentarity and substitutability of production factors and the notion that the contribution of resources and activities
to the achievement of well-being depends on how and in what combinations they are employed.
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(Lindenberg 1996, p. 175), three more kinds of means of production are sometimes
distinguished. Firstly, there are the second-order means of production, among which a
distinction can again be made between resources that need to be combined with certain
activities in order to contribute to the realisation of the universal goals, and resources that
contribute to the individual’s social or physical well-being just through the fact that they are
there; the latter are in then referred to as endowments. Secondly, there are the third-order
means of production, which Lindenberg defined as
“those necessary for executing activities and obtaining endowments. Thus, in the
instrumental hierarchy, they are below the level of second-order means of production.
Examples are physical and mental capacities, social and other skills, time, effort, money”
(ibid., p.175).
In other words, if a person lacks the necessary resources for the realisation of a higher level
goal, the production of these resources can become an instrumental goal in itself: a second-
order instrumental goal. Thus, activities may immediately satisfy an instrumental goal
(production activities), they may increase the potential for future production (investments) or
both. Thirdly, there are the fourth-order means of production: 
“those that can be mobilised when changes in production capacity ask for substitution.
These 'latent' resources are analogous to credit or savings. For example, when a partner
dies, part of the lost production capacity for affection may be regained by mobilising
kinship ties that have remained dormant for some time” (ibid., p. 175).
However, in many instances, particular resources belong at more that one of these levels or
orders2. For example, money and physical fitness are both second- and third-order means of
production, and dormant social ties may still contribute directly to the realisation of status. In
this study, I will not systematically distinguish between endowments and other resources nor
between second-order and higher-order means of production. Making such distinctions may be
relevant in particular applications of the theory, but the present study takes a more general and
exploratory approach (in fact concentrates on elaborating more ‘primitive’ elements of the
theory). In the present study, I found it more adequate to leave further distinctions than
between (aspects of) the first-order goals and their main relevant production factors aside for
the time being.
Figure 3.1. may clarify the relations between the different levels of goals in SPF-theory.
The second characteristic of SPF theory is the role of the relative price effect, i.e. the
importance of substitution mechanisms. Instrumental goals are assumed to be substituted
depending on their relative cost. For example, if opportunities for achievement of status are
decreasing (as often happens when ageing), a person is likely to increase the production of
affection and behavioural confirmation if those are relatively easier (“cheaper”) to produce. In
contrast, one might also expect that some high-paid professionals, whose opportunity costs are
high, may find it increasingly costly to invest in the realisation and maintenance of affection,
and may therefore shift ever more of their efforts towards the - relatively cheaper - production
of status and behavioural confirmation in their job (the workaholic-phenomenon).
Substitution can also occur at lower levels: if opportunities to produce e.g. status with
                                                
2      In fact, even the first-order goals may feature as lower order means of production in particular production
functions. For example, the status of a person in high position (say, a politician or mayor) may help him to get
scarce tickets for a soccer final or a pop-concert which an ‘average person’ would not have been able to obtain;
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Figure 3.1.: The hierarchy of goals in Social Production Function theory
(adapted from Ormel et al. 1996)
conventional resources (e.g. occupation) decrease, people may try to substitute alternative
resources to produce status. When a person, in consequence of discharge or retirement, can no
longer obtain status through paid work, he may try to maintain his former level of status by
compensating the loss of work through increased efforts in sports, cultural consumption or
voluntary work. Or, when a pupil at school finds out that he lacks the necessary learning
capacities to obtain behavioural confirmation from the teachers for conforming to their norms
for ‘good’ behaviour and performance, he may resort to rebellious or subversive behaviour
that will bring him behavioural confirmation from some of his fellow-pupils.  
It is important to note that SPF theory does not allow unlimited substitution. The instrumental
hierarchical ordering of goals presupposes limits to substitution, and the higher in the
hierarchy, the narrower to possibilities to substitute between goals. For instance, a person may
freely substitute a game of tennis for an afternoon of fun-shopping as means to realise
stimulation, but he needs some minimum level of stimulation for physical well-being and no
realistic level of comfort can compensate that (e.g. Ormel et al. 1997, p. 1055; Van Bruggen
1997).
A third important feature of SPF theory is that it provides opportunity to evaluate the
‘efficiency’ of alternative production factors. In SPF theory, the most efficient means of
production are multi-functional activities: those that combine production and investment and
those that satisfy multiple higher order goals (Ormel et al. 1996). Thus, when comparing two
alternative ways of producing e.g. stimulation (i.e. two substitutes), not just the expected
‘output’ or benefits in terms of stimulation should be considered, but one must consider the
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cost-benefit ratio of the two, which includes not only the benefits in terms of stimulation, but
also the costs and benefits of the alternatives in terms of comfort, status, behavioural
confirmation and affection; and this not only for the immediate results but also in terms of the
investment value. This may sound highly complicated, and it is indeed, when actually trying to
assess with precision all costs and benefits of a particular action. However, in a general sense,
the notion of multi-functionality is not so hard to apply, and it appears not very difficult to
assess the most important costs and benefits of substitute production factors approximately. It
is, for example, easy to see the approximate differences in the cost-benefit ratio of watching
one’s favourite tv-show or playing a game of squash for stimulation. The first alternative is
obviously less costly in terms of comfort and (probably) of money, but the benefits of the
latter include, besides stimulation, an investment in one’s physical condition, an investment in
one’s squash-playing skills, and, very likely, some social benefits (affection, status and/or
behavioural confirmation) as well because the activity is necessarily done with others. In
general, doing activities together with others may involve certain extra ‘costs’ when compared
with the equivalent solitary activity, while it will also, in almost every case, involve extra
benefits3.
In principle, SPF theory thus seems to combine several features that may help to make
progress in the field of quality of life studies: it is a theory of goals and of purposeful action
that can handle substitution effects, and enables to compare alternative (sets of) production
factors in terms of efficiency.  With regard to the study of how objective conditions affect
quality of life, SPF theory may be helpful in identifying what human goals these conditions
promote or hinder. It may also help, when studying the distribution of access to a particular
resource, to identify what other resources or conditions, that can be substituted in the
attainment of the same goal, should be paid attention to.
To make the level and distribution of external resources (objective conditions) interpretable in
terms of their effect on individual subjective well-being, we need to know both the
combinations of production factors available to the (category of) individual(s) and the relative
efficiency of these production factors in the production of the universal and first order
instrumental goals. 
For a thorough understanding of SPF theory, the aims it was originally intended to serve, the
mechanisms it supposes and the notions behind this, as well as for judging - later in this
chapter - to what extent its applications thus far actually correspond with the original idea and
whether they have yielded necessary elaborations and empirical support to it, it is useful to
give some attention to the early development of the theory.
Lindenberg first presented the core elements of SPF theory in 1984 and in 1986, and added
further explanation and detail to the basic form of the theory in an article with Frey
(Lindenberg & Frey 1993) and in Lindenberg (1996). In Lindenberg (1984) some elements of
what later became SPF theory were introduced in service of an argument concerning potential
suboptimal outcomes in the allocation of social approval (i.e. social well-being). In this article
we find the assumption of overall well-being being dependent on physical and social well-
                                                
3    It should be noted, however, that for a reasonably accurate assessment of the cost-benefit ratio of a particular
activity for a particular person, a large amount of detailed information would be needed. This would not be a
problem in a so-called ‘individual 1’-type theory, but the purpose for which we need SPF theory, and its intended
character of an ‘individual 2’ - type theory, preclude such endeavours.
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being, the latter again resulting from levels of status, behavioural confirmation and affection,
as well as assumptions or ideas about the main ways in which these components of social
well-being can be produced. Important in this article is also the notion that endowments with
these components should be considered as part of a person’s ‘budget’, and that the production
of social well-being can be modelled and analysed with similar methods as economists use for
the production of marketable goods (i.e. using a constraint driven approach and including
relative price effects). Lindenberg (ibid.) uses these notions in support of an argument that
runs as follows: increasing affluence, Lindenberg claims, is accompanied by vanishing social
structures, thus with vanishing of norms and social interaction that are needed for the
realisation of affection and behavioural confirmation. This means that both people’s
endowment with these goods decreases and the prices of these goods increase. As Lindenberg
assumes that the supply of behavioural confirmation and affection is discontinuous, the actual
demand of these will remain below potential demand, and consequently, people’s social well-
being will increasingly depend on their level of status. As status is per definition a relative
good, however, social well-being will necessarily be distributed more unevenly than in the
past. Lindenberg then adds (somewhat speculative) that this will eventually hamper social
engineering because low levels of social well-being would lower self-esteem and lead to
impaired competence of people to react rationally to stimuli in choosing between behavioural
alternatives.
Neither in the first (1984) nor in the second article (1986) in which Lindenberg introduced the
main components of SPF theory, did he present them as an explicit theory: the presentation of
these ideas was not the main purpose of these articles. In Lindenberg (1986) the main
elements of SPF theory (the conceptualisation of the relation between goods and activities and
well-being as a production function, and the specification of the two universal and six first
order instrumental goals), were rather introduced to support the article’s main argument, the
paradoxical effect of privatisation in consumption: people generally prefer not to be restricted
in their consumption by being forced to share with others, yet the less consumption goods
people are obliged to share, the less social well-being they get too. In order to make this
argument, Lindenberg had to introduce a few important notions. In the first place the notion
that the well-being or utility that people realise depends on what they have, what they do with
it, and how they do this. In the second place, he had to introduce the notion of multi-
functionality of certain forms of production, in this case for being able to argue that sharing
arrangements do not only serve the consumption of the good concerned, but also - be it often
unawares - the production and consumption of social well-being. In the third place, in order to
demonstrate the relevance of the paradox he described, Lindenberg had to specify explicitly
that both physical and social well-being are fundamental and universal human goals, and he
had to specify the first order instrumental goals of social well-being as well, in order to define
the universal goal by its contents.  
It is not unimportant to note how SPF theory initially consisted only of a few auxiliary
assumptions, necessary for the completion of an individual-level rational choice explanation.
This auxiliary character appears to have been preserved also in later publications of SPF
theory, to have guided its selective elaboration and to be important for the explanation of the
origin and character of some problems that have arisen in some of the theory’s applications.
In the article with Frey (Lindenberg & Frey 1993, p.195-197), Lindenberg presents a more
mature version of SPF theory. Again, the theory is not introduced as a focal theory which itself
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directly explains an empirical phenomenon. It rather is introduced as an auxiliary theory that is
needed in consequence of the important role that the relative price effect has assumed in
sociological (rational choice) explanations. In recent decades, it has become increasingly clear
that the relative price effect from neo-classical economics is one of the most powerful and
robust regularities in the social sciences (ibid., p. 192). This effect simply holds that as one
good becomes more costly in comparison to other goods, individuals will purchase less of that
good. Lindenberg and Frey argue that the relative price effect also holds for non-market
goods, such as sociology often deals with, and that it is more adequate to assume that there are
identifiable conditions under which the size of the relative price effect will differ (such as
when choices concern the ‘moral dimension’) than that there are realms in which the relative
price effect would - for unspecified reasons - play no role at all (ibid., p.193-193). 
They proceed to argue that theorists should seek to specify the conditions that affect the size
of the relative price effect. From neo-classical economics, two such conditions are already
known, namely the character of the good (whether it is an inferior or a superior good) and the
price changes of other goods to which the good of interest stands in substitutional or
complementary relation. This second condition immediately raises a problem: how can we
decide which are the goods whose relative prices matter? As it is impossible to include all
goods in any theoretical or empirical analysis, the use of the relative price effect in explaining
or predicting behaviour thus requires insight into the relevant alternatives for the good under
consideration. At this point in the argument, the authors then propose SPF theory as a theory
of alternatives. They state that alternatives may come from hierarchical instrumental
connections, from active production, or from biases. SPF theory is a theory of alternatives
based on hierarchical instrumental connections.
In the subsequent exposition of SPF theory, Lindenberg explicitly points at the assumption of
Stigler and Becker (1977) of two kinds of preferences as its inspiration. Stigler and Becker
distinguished between
“universal preferences (goals) that are identical to all human beings and therefore need no
explanation, and instrumental preferences for the means that lead to the ultimate goals [...]
Technically speaking, there is only one utility function for all mankind but there are
systematically different production functions for different kinds of people” (Lindenberg &
Frey 1993, p. 195).
But because Stigler and Becker do not specify the universal preferences or goals, their
assumption still does not preclude ad hoc theorising, nor does it provide a clue about the
complementarity or substitutability relations between instrumental goals. That is the void
which SPF theory was primarily intended to fill, through the identification of the two general
goals (physical well-being and social approval, which are assumed to constitute Stigler &
Becker's universal preferences) and five first order instrumental goals (comfort, stimulation,
status, behavioural confirmation and affection4).
SPF theory does not identify instrumental goals at levels below that of the five first order
instrumental goals. Lindenberg states that
“Still lower level goals are entirely dependent on the opportunities and restrictions an
individual faces.[...] The heuristics for identifying goals is thus driven by a guided search
                                                
4   Lindenberg (1986) and Lindenberg & Frey (1993) still named the third first order instrumental goal for social
well-being ‘affect’, while later the term ‘affection’ was used. The latter term corresponds better with the content
of the concept than ‘affect’, which is usually meant to refer to something different. In the remainder of this book,
I will use the term ‘affection’ for the third first order goal for social approval in SPF theory. 
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for systematic production possibilities for social approval (in its three forms) and physical
well-being (in its two forms). Substitutes and complements will show up as by-products of
the construction of nested social production functions. Seen in this light, it is quite clear
that the virtual set of alternatives is not defined by a utility function imputed by the
researcher but rather by production possibilities for physical well-being and social
approval. Changes in relative prices concerning these possibilities are vital for the
explanation of behaviour. And although we have still no general theory for these
possibilities, we have an explicit search heuristics for discovering them which greatly
reduces the ad hoc theorising on what are relevant changes in relative prices.” (ibid., p. 196,
197; my italics).
The closing sentence of this quote is particularly telling, as it reveals the still auxiliary
character Lindenberg and Frey attribute to SPF theory. Actually, they pose that it is rather a
helpful heuristics for finding out what are the salient behavioural alternatives and relevant
restrictions for rational individuals in a particular situation, than that it is a full-fledged theory
that directly tells, for any particular behavioural situation, what are the salient situational
goals, opportunities and required resources. It should be noted that initially Lindenberg (1984)
used the elements of SPF theory as an analytical model, while here he emphasises that SPF
theory is a heuristic tool to identify situationally determined instrumental goals and
preferences. Using SPF theory in both functions need not be problematic: using it as an
analytical model does not preclude it being a useful heuristics too. Especially the
substitutability between lower order goals in SPF theory invites to use it in both functions.  
The heuristic character of SPF theory makes it ideal for application to problems concerning
the rational choice explanation of behaviour in specific well-defined situations. In several
studies, SPF theory was used and found quite helpful in this way (see also section 3.3.). Thus
far, the conceptualisation of the theory’s main elements has thus far been geared to its use as a
heuristic tool. However, when we want to apply SPF theory to problems that at a more general
level address the question of what constitutes quality of life, we need the theory in its
analytical function rather than as a heuristics (see section 3.5.). Therefore, the
conceptualisation of the theory’s main elements needs to be improved upon, to facilitate the
use of SPF theory as an analytical model.
Gradually, as the number of applications of SPF theory increased and more researchers started
to work with it, several suggestions as to how the basic model might be extended and
elaborated have surfaced. Overall, these suggestions are largely consonant with regard to what
would be the major points for further elaboration. The main points that are raised concern the
desirability of integrating into SPF theory the time perspective (covering investment
behaviour, the effects of anticipated life events (cf. Sanders 1991) on present production
functions and patterned changes of social production functions over the life course), framing
effects (including the effects of a loss-frame on one’s production functions) and so-called
metagoals, that refer to the quality of production functions (which at any rate includes the
vulnerability of these). In Lindenberg (1996) these desired additions to the theory’s basic
model are expounded at some length. In sections 3.4. and 3.5., the metagoals receive further
discussion.
3.3.   Previous applications of Social Production Function theory
Over the past decade, there have been a number of authors that have taken up Lindenberg’s
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SPF theory and applied it to research problems that bear on questions of the quality of life
(e.g. Nieboer 1997; Steverink 1996; Ormel et al. 1996; Van Eijk 1997)5. In general, these
authors have used SPF theory as a tool for building their explanatory models, rather than
testing the core assumptions of SPF theory proper.
In this section, the studies of Nieboer, Steverink and Van Eijk are discussed. The publications
of Ormel and colleagues, who were connected to the overarching research program to which
these three studies belong, are largely based upon empirical evidence of these and require no
separate discussion here. I will discuss the substantive research problems to which SPF theory
was applied but superficially and give attention mainly to the operationalisations of the
theoretical concepts, to empirical evidence concerning the tenability of SPF theory’s
assumptions proper, and to suggestions made by these ‘early users’ of the theory for its further
elaboration and refinement.
Steverink (1996) has applied SPF theory in a study that aimed to explain differences among
physically vulnerable elderly people in their preferences regarding the transition to protected
care environments (rest homes). She approached the preferences regarding the use of care
arrangements as resulting from the confrontation of people’s basic or universal goals with
their varying restrictions. According to a rational choice approach, this confrontation of
people’s basic goals with the alternative opportunities they have for realising them, will lead
each individual to choose that course of action that, given their resources and restrictions, will
best serve the realisation of the universal goals.
Steverink not only adopted this general idea that is central to SPF theory, she also followed
SPF theory’s hierarchy of goals in her specification of the universal goals people strive for.
She distinguished physical and social well-being as well as the five first-order instrumental
goals in her theoretical explanation. According to Steverink, orientation towards
institutionalisation can be explained through (a) the level of the five first-order goals an
elderly person is able to realise and expects to realise in the near future and (b) the subsequent
strength of the ‘loss avoidance’ motive. She argues that over the life course, and especially
towards the later part of life, people gradually lose resources and face increasing restrictions
for the production of well-being. Initially, the loss of resources can be accommodated more or
less through substitution mechanisms: when a person loses the means to produce status or
behavioural confirmation, he will increase his efforts to maintain or even increase his level of
affection, and the same is expected to hold for stimulation respectively comfort. It is
hypothesised that there is a systematic order in the subsequent loss of resources, namely that
ageing people first face a decline in production capacity for stimulation, status and
behavioural confirmation, while the production capacity for comfort and affection will be
corroded only later. Steverink then introduces the concept of a ‘critical stage’ that occurs when
a person has lost the means to realise stimulation, status and behavioural confirmation and can
only strive to maintain his production capacity for affection and comfort. In this critical stage,
the loss avoidance motive becomes predominant. It is assumed to react more strongly to
threats concerning affection than to threats to comfort. Steverink hypothesises that it is the
                                                
5    Lindenberg (1996, p. 182 note 1) also mentions several other studies, less directly concerned with quality of
life issues, in which SPF theory has been applied (Van Liere 1990; Maas 1990; Sanders 1991; Westert 1991;
Wielers 1991; Van der Lippe 1993). However, these authors used selected elements from SPF theory, while in
my view the separate elements are not (exclusive to) SPF theory: it is the combination of elements and their
interrelations that makes SPF theory a distinct theory.
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experienced level of each of the five first order goals and the predominance of the loss
avoidance motive that explain the elderly’s preferences regarding hospitalisation in a rest
home, in combination with a number of external variables such as the availability of rest home
places, the familiarity with the rest home and social pressure from others.
The operationalisation of the five first-order instrumental goals in Steverink’s study is in my
opinion problematic. Stimulation she measured by the number of stimulation-yielding
activities the elderly person engages in at a daily or weekly basis. The distinction between
stimulation-yielding and other activities, however, was made on the basis of unexplicated
arguments and not based on any empirical evidence. Equally problematic as the categorisation
of activities is the fact that it ignores the notion that it depends on the whole of a person’s
production functions what will be the yield of a particular activity. A third objection to
Steverink’s operationalisation of stimulation is that it is the amount of production factors for
stimulation that a person uses rather than the resulting level of stimulation that is measured.
Comfort was operationalised as the inverse of the need for assistance with self-care and daily
housekeeping activities, measured by the 18 item Groningen Activities Restriction Scale
(GARS, cf. Kempen et al., 1993). Given the study's focus on frail elderly people, and the
argument that the extent to which people need assistance depends on their physical
limitations, illness or pain, it is understandable that people’s ability to perform ‘basic’
activities independently is considered to be an indicator of comfort. However, it should not be
considered a perfect indicator, for not only is it well possible that a person's need for
assistance is adequately met and thus no decrease in comfort need to occur, but there may also
be a need for assistance that is not due to physical discomforts and, moreover, the indicator
only pertains to low levels of comfort. For the research problem Steverink dealt with, the latter
objection may be less severe than in other cases, but still this indicator restricts the
possibilities to consider substitution effects (when a person would have a high level of well-
being and use that - to some extent - as a compensation for deficits in the other goals. By using
a more direct measure of the level of comfort of her respondents, most or all of these
objections might have been avoided. 
Status was operationalised as the respondent’s former occupational prestige (for married
women and widows, the husband's former occupational prestige was used). A possible
objection to this well-defendable operationalisation is that it overlooks all other sources of
status that may be relevant, such as marital status, educational attainment, wealth, number of
children, physical capacities, youthful appearance, et cetera. This drawback of Steverink’s
operationalisation of status is - again - related to the fact that she does not operationalise the
level of (subjectively experienced) status, but rather tries to approximate this via the resources
people may use to obtain status.
Behavioural confirmation was operationalised in a way similar to stimulation: on the basis of
the number of activities that were a priori categorised as ‘yielding behavioural confirmation’
in which the respondents were involved at a daily or weekly basis. Here the same objections
hold as for stimulation.
Affection, finally, was operationalised as the score on the Loneliness-scale of De Jong-
Gierveld & Kamphuis (1985). Although this scale is more sensitive at low levels of affection,
I think this operationalisation well chosen.
In the empirical part of her study, Steverink did not really test SPF theory as such, but rather
the hypotheses concerning the effect some elements on the elderly’s orientation towards
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giving up independence. As to the latter, she found significant effects of comfort and
affection, a finding that lends support to the assertion that physical capacities and perceived
social isolation matter for people and affect their motivation to change their ways. Further,
Steverink found comfort and stimulation, as well as behavioural confirmation and affection, to
be positively related. It is unclear to what extent these findings support the basic model of SPF
theory, however, because these findings may be partly artefacts of the operationalisations,
while I also doubt whether such positive relations are indeed what the basic model of SPF
theory predicts.
Overall, in Steverink’s study SPF theory proved to be a useful though not sufficient6 tool for
explaining preferences. SPF theory also proved a useful heuristic tool in her study for
identifying problems of substitution. Steverink’s study does not lead to specific suggestions
for the further conceptualisation of SPF theory or for the measurement of its main concepts.
A second study in which SPF theory played a central part, is Van Eijk’s (1997) dissertation
research on the activity patterns of elderly people and the effects thereof on their subjective
well-being. Van Eijk’s study was instigated by the fact that since the 1980’s western European
countries have increasingly adopted policies that aim to activate elderly people; policies that
are based on the belief that active participation in diverse social activities would positively
affect the mental and physical well-being of elderly people. Van Eijk argues that despite this
strong emphasis on activation policies, empirical knowledge of the actual time use patterns of
elderly people is still insufficient and the hypothesised effect of activities on well-being still
needs to be tested. She investigated the time use patterns of almost 5000 persons over 57 years
of age and describes how both the participation in and the subjective experience of activities
differ according to age, gender, marital status, physical ability, income and occupational
prestige. She then proceeds to investigate the relation of activity patterns to well-being, using
two sets of hypotheses, one derived from a ‘lay approach’ and one derived from SPF theory.
From the lay approach Van Eijk derived two hypotheses, holding that the level of subjective
well-being will be higher the more time is spent on valued activities, and the larger the
proportion of time that is spent on valued activities. From SPF theory she derived the
following hypotheses: firstly, that regardless of general activity levels, the higher the sum of
levels of the five first-order goals, the higher the level of subjective well-being (reflecting the
theory’s basic premise that the first-order goals are at a higher level in the instrumental
hierarchy than activities); secondly, that the association between activity and well-being is
strongest for persons with a moderate level of resources, that it is weaker when all relevant
resources are lacking and that it is weakest when all relevant resources are available (reflecting
the notion of substitution activity for endowments and of the activity’s outcome being
dependent on certain resources). In testing these hypotheses, the study of Van Eijk constitutes
also a test of some of SPF theory’s basic premises.
Her operationalisations of the first-order instrumental goal avoids most of the problems of
Steverink’s operationalisations. Comfort was operationalised by two five-category items, one
tapping self-rated health and the other self-rated independency with regard to daily obligatory
activities. This seems still to be a crude measure for physical comfort, because it may be more
sensitive at lower levels of comfort than at higher levels and because health may not perfectly
coincide with ‘feeling comfortable’, but it certainly covers a larger part of the concept of
                                                
6   Steverink needed to add the notion of people’s anticipations and of the ‘critical stage’.
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comfort than mere independency does. Moreover, in using a self-rating of health, this
operationalisation comes closer to a measure of the level of comfort than an operationalisation
that concentrates on the means for reaching comfort.
Stimulation was operationalised with one four-category item, asking the respondents how
often they have felt bored in the past four weeks. Although it may be objected that here again
the measure is particularly geared to the lower range of stimulation levels and that the concept
of stimulation is probably broader than this operationalisation reflects, it has the advantage
that it refers directly to the level of stimulation (instead of to means for stimulation, as does
Steverink’s operationalisation).
Affection was operationalised with two five-category items, one asking the respondents to
what extent they feel to have close relationships that provide them with a sense of emotional
security and well-being and one asking respondents whether they feel that there are enough
people that they feel close to. Here again, the strong point of these operationalisations is that
they rather well tap the experienced level of affection. It should be noted that the second item
allows that also ‘caring about others’ may contribute to one’s level of affection, a notion that
is at odds with Lindenberg’s original (1984) definition of the concept (see 3.4.2.).
Behavioural confirmation was operationalised with one five-category item, asking respondents
to what extent they feel to have relationships in which their competence and skills are
recognised. This operationalisation seems preferable to that of Steverink, because it comes
closer to measuring the actual level of experienced behavioural confirmation, but still I think it
could be improved upon. For one thing, using this item one will only tap behavioural
confirmation that is realised in enduring relationships, while it is probable that people may
also realise behavioural confirmation in more transient contacts. Further, although recognition
of competence and skills is probably a large part of behavioural confirmation, the first-order
goal may be broader and also include the approval one gets for adhering to shared norms, and
e.g. for sociable behaviour. Due to external restrictions upon the data collection, Van Eijk
could not add an operationalisation of status.
Now what about the empirical support for the basic assumptions of the SPF theory from Van
Eijk’s study? Concerning the first hypothesis, Van Eijk’s data suggest that the effect of
activity on subjective well-being is indeed largely through the first-order instrumental goals. In
the regression of SWB on activity and the sumscore of first-order goals, the effect of activity
dropped considerably when the sumscore of first-order goals was entered. It did not
completely disappear, however, but given imperfections in operationalisation and
measurement, these results may safely be regarded to support SPF theory’s premise
concerning the position of the first-order goals in the instrumental hierarchy.
With regard to the second hypothesis, the curvilinear association between availability of
resources and the strength of the activity effect on well-being, this was tested both for the
number of resources from a predetermined set that were available (in whatever quantity) and
for the amount in which each of the considered resources was available. On the basis of Van
Eijk’s empirical evidence, the hypothesis of a curvilinear relation could not be accepted. It
was found, however, that the effect of activity on subjective well-being is strongest when no
or very little resources are available. The availability of some separate resources, in particular
physical functioning, was found to affect the strength of the relation between activity and
well-being significantly (for more detail see Van Eijk 1997, p. 145-158). Overall, the study of
Van Eijk does offer support for those elements of SPF theory that are reflected in her
hypotheses. The heuristic use of SPF theory again shows successful, here in concentrating on
efficient means – which may not involve activities - for reaching higher order goals.
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As to the further elaboration of SPF theory and corresponding empirical research, Van Eijk
(ibid., p. 175-178) suggests that efforts should be made to investigate the substitutability of
different (types of) activities. She argues that activities (and why would not the same hold for
resources?) can most likely be ordered according to which first-order goals they contribute to,
and that it is this ordering that will determine the substitutability of activities. A second
suggestion for the further elaboration of SPF theory is to further specify the role of 
‘characteristics of the environment’ (i.e. of objective conditions) in the relation between
activity and well-being.
The third and last study discussed here because of the central role played in it by SPF theory,
is that of Nieboer (1997). Nieboer performed a prospective study on changes in well-being of
elderly people due to serious illness or loss of their partner. She used SPF theory as the main
building block for her explanatory model, which however also includes the role of the loss
frame for relating life events (illness or loss of the partner) to changes in the level of well-
being of the elderly person. Nieboer used the framework of SPF theory to characterise the
elderly persons’ production functions: the multi-functionality of activities, the production
capacity, the available resources and the dependency of the social production functions of the
respondent on his spouse. In Nieboer’s hypotheses, these characteristics of the elderly’s social
production functions, together with the intensity of the loss-frame, formed the main predictors
for the changes in well-being after the life events under study. The life events under study
were interpreted in terms of the disturbances they entailed in the pre-event production
functions of the respondents; the two main types of disturbances being changes in care tasks
(i.e. changing restriction with regard to other activities) and loss of access to activities that the
partners used to do together).
In Nieboer’s study, the levels of the first-order instrumental goals were not used as variables,
thus they were not operationalised. She did categorise activities according to the first-order
instrumental goals they supposedly contribute to, but it is not necessary to describe the method
she used for this here (for more detail see Nieboer 1997, p. 59-61).
Concerning the extent to which the study of Nieboer provided empirical support for elements
of SPF theory proper, the author states that
“many of the findings are consistent with the social production function theory. [...] This
theory appeared to be well-equipped to address interdependencies between family members,
the effects these interdependencies have on the objective meaning of the event and,
consequently, on changes in well-being” (ibid., p. 181).
The study thus offered support for the plausibility of the ideas of SPF theory and for the
usefulness of a production function perspective for studying (changes in) people’s capacity to
attain subjective well-being. The study does not, however, offer any strict tests of the
tenability of the relations between concepts that SPF theory posits. It also does not give
suggestions for improving the conceptualisation and measurement of the core concepts.
It must be noted that Van Eijk and Nieboer applied SPF theory in much the same way as is the
objective of this study, namely as a theory predicting well-being from resources and activities
rather than as a heuristic that works the other way round (from the notion that people strife for
well-being to the identification of relevant resources and instrumental goals). The apparent
ease with which the theory lent itself to that task and the empirical support for the theory that
was found in doing so, seem to encourage the undertaking in this dissertation.
It should also be noted that the studies of Steverink, Van Eijk and Nieboer all dealt with
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research problems restricted to elderly people. It is therefore uncertain whether the empirical
evidence concerning the tenability of the basic premises of SPF theory can be generalised to
the whole (Dutch, adult) population. The tenability of these basic premises might not only
differ for age but also for cohorts. Also, when broadening the scope of research from the
elderly to include more age groups, it may be that some of the operationalisations of the first-
order goals that were found sufficiently satisfactory in the cited studies will not be satisfactory
for a more diverse population.
A last remark should be that, until now, there has not been any empirical investigation of the
actual production functions (i.e. the combinations of resources and activities) employed by
diverse categories of people, nor of what are the most relevant concrete production factors for
the different first-order goals7. Thus, SPF theory still lacks detailed knowledge about sets of
specific behaviour that lead to higher level goals.
3.4.  The conceptualisation of the universal and the first order goals: openness and
        opportunities
One problem of SPF theory is the definition and conceptualisation of the first order goals and
the universal goals. Although at a first glance most people will find no trouble in imagining
what social and physical well-being encompass nor what status, comfort, affection,
stimulation and even behavioural confirmation refer to, these concepts are at least unclear
when looking more closely.
As to the two universal goals, these are merely defined by the first-order goals that serve their
realisation. This shifts the task of specifying the definition to the lower level in the
instrumental hierarchy. Besides the fact that this is, from a theory formation-perspective, not
very elegant, it also poses a problem when trying to infer the relation of the two universal
goals with overall well-being and when trying to infer the exact meaning of ‘overall well-
being’ in the conceptual framework of SPF theory. In 3.4.1., I will explain the problems
related to the two universal goals in SPF theory.
As to the five first order instrumental goals, these are not completely clearly defined either.
When looking closely at the definitions used by Lindenberg (1984, 1986, 1993, 1996) and in
the three main applications of SPF theory that were discussed in the previous section
(Steverink 1996; Nieboer 1997; Van Eijk 1997), we find differences that should not too easily
be disregarded. Moreover, even where the different definitions of the first order goals
approximately agree, we find that at least some of the first-order goals are merely defined by
the means that generally lead to their realisation. Such definitions, of the type “goal G is what
you get from having resource R or from doing activity A”, are problematic for more than one
reason. In section 3.4.2. I will elaborate on the definitional problems concerning SPF theory’s
first-order goals, and argue for the importance of achieving a more precise conceptualisation
and, subsequently, less ambiguous definition of these concepts.
                                                
7    As an exception Tinsley & Kass (1978, 1979) must be mentioned, who investigated the fulfilment of
psychological needs through leisure activities. If we see through terminology, the psychological needs that
Tinsley & Kass distinguish can well be conceived of as instrumental goals coupled to SPF theory's first order
instrumental goals. However, their work is restricted to leisure activities, which form only a small subset of the
activities that are relevant in our perspective.
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3.4.1.   THE CONCEPTUALISATION AND DEFINITION OF SOCIAL AND PHYSICAL WELL-BEING
In quality of life studies and subjective well-being research, it is common usage to distinguish
life domains or domains of well-being. The common opinion is that overall well-being or
‘satisfaction with life as a whole’ may be disentangled into people’s enjoyment of or
satisfaction with the different domains that together constitute their life. Although there is no
complete consensus about the causality between satisfactions with or well-being in these
different life domains and overall well-being8, it seems most probable that there are causal
effects in both ways.
Beginning with the study of Andrews and Withey (1976, cf. Chapter 2 of this book), different
distinctions of life domains have been suggested. At present, seven domains are relatively
broadly accepted: material well-being; health; productivity; intimacy; safety; community
connection and emotional well-being (Cummins 1997a,b). In addition, at least three other
domains are frequently distinguished: self-esteem; religious or spiritual well-being; and
psychological health (e.g. Emmons 1999, 1992).
If we want to use SPF theory as a general theory for quality of life studies, explaining how
(differences in) well-being come about, these generally accepted ideas about what life
domains are the main constituent parts of overall well-being or satisfaction with life as whole
form the setting in which SPF theory should define and legitimate its central concepts. In that
case, the simple ‘definition’ of the two universal goals in terms of the respective first-order
instrumental goals that lead to their realisation no longer suffices. We should make clear that
and how the concepts of SPF theory cover the elements in the field of quality of life studies: it
is up to the ‘newcomer’ to explain how it relates to other conceptual frameworks in the field.
Therefore it is necessary to trace how the two universal goals in SPF theory relate to the ten
commonly accepted life domains, and, consequently, to explicate whether the concept of 
‘overall well-being’ in SPF theory is equal to the common notion of overall well-being, or
whether it is restricted to the composite of only a subset of the ten commonly recognised
domains of well-being.
Of course, it depends on the exact definition and conceptualisation of physical well-being and
social approval or social well-being, to what extent different domains of well-being are
represented therein. Above we already saw, however, that the two universal goals are not
defined very exactly.
Given the basic model of SPF theory, with its hierarchy of goals that suggests (even though it
does not explicitly claim) that physical and social well-being are the only two components of
overall well-being, it seems wise to use a rather broad preliminary conceptualisation of the
two universal goals, in order that together they cover as much as possible all ten domains of
well-being and that the ‘overall well-being’ of SPF theory deviates minimally from the way
‘overall well-being’ is conventionally used.
Using a broad interpretation of the two universal goals, it appears that all of the seven life
domains that are broadly accepted in quality of life studies (Cummins 1997a) as well as self-
esteem, are all in some way or another represented in the concept of overall well-being in SPF
theory. Most of these domains are considered intermediate goals in SPF theory, meaning that
                                                
8     The question whether the different life domains affect people’s overall assessment of the quality of their life
or rather the other way around; this discussion is usually referred to as the bottom-up or top-down debate, cf.
Scherpenzeel & Saris 1996.
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they can be seen as contributing to either social or physical well-being or both.
Material well-being and health are intermediate goals in the production of comfort and
stimulation, but also of status. With regard to material wealth, it is clear that money or assets
such as a house, a car, or a boat can contribute to one’s subjective well-being. According to
SPF-theory there are two ways in which material wealth contributes to well-being. Firstly,
wealth enhances status. Having a nice house or high income helps to distinguish oneself from
others. These so-called endowments do not require any action other than the awareness that
you have something that others don’t have. The main way in which wealth enhances well-
being, however, seems to be that it is one of the requisites for having access to many activities
(such as vacation trips or visiting a restaurant, and in fact to almost every activity that costs
money or requires assets), which can contribute to any of the five first order instrumental
goals. Money is thus an important second-order resource for activities that pertain to all higher
order instrumental goals9.
Being healthy is an important endowment for people’s level of comfort and it is a second-
order resource for the performance of other life-activities. Still, there are many other factors
which influence the extent to which an illness or impairment results in a loss of comfort or a
loss of activities. Therefore, one’s health can be seen as an endowment or resource that
influences the ability to satisfy higher level needs, but it should not be treated in the same
manner as for example our level of affection or behavioural confirmation.
Productivity is an intermediate goal for the production of  - in particular - stimulation, status
and behavioural confirmation. Paid work and other productive activities are in SPF theory
considered as first-order resources for multiple first-order goals. In SPF theory, almost any
activity can be ‘productive’, however. For the productivity domain, it will be mainly important
to what extent activities are multi functional (i.e. contribute to the realisation of more than one
first-order instrumental goal) and to what extent they combine investment in future productive
capacity with immediate production of social and physical well-being.
Intimacy and community connection lie close to the first-order goals of affection and
behavioural confirmation respectively (at least, close to the preliminary conceptualisation of
these first-order goals I give below). Social or family connections are clearly prerequisites for
the production of social well-being: it is not possible to fulfil one’s social needs without
significant others. However, different types of ties are necessary to reach the different first-
order goals. For example, affection is most easily produced through intimate or ‘attachment’
ties, whereas status is easier attainable in work relations. The intimacy domain is represented
in the theoretical framework of SPF theory at several places: part of it lies at the level of
endowments (e.g., close friends contribute to intimacy also between actual interactions), part
at the level of instrumental goals (you strive for intimacy with friends and partner, because
this increases the amount of affection you may get from them) and part at the level of second-
order resources (e.g., many activities are more enjoyable if they are shared with a person with
whom one has an intimate relation). And, of course, the contribution of the intimacy domain
to overall well-being is similar to what in the SPF framework is called the level of affection
that is realised. 
With regard to the domain of community connection, it has been argued that this domain
reflects people’s need to be useful to society (Van Nieuwenhuizen 1998). It could also be
translated in terms of the desire to experience a sense of belonging (De Vos 1998; Baumeister
                                                
9    Empirical evidence from advanced countries has shown, however, that beyond the poverty level, wealth and
income have in general a negligible effect on subjective well-being (e.g. Lane 2000; Veenhoven & Timmermans
1998; Van Bruggen 2000).
94                                                             SOCIAL PRODUCTION FUNCTION THEORY: A CLOSER LOOK
& Leary 1995). In the conceptual framework of SPF theory, community connection or
belongingness seems to be equivalent to the fulfilment of the social goals and therefore similar
to what we think of when we speak of social well-being. In particular it appears to pertain to
the level of affection and behavioural confirmation. Community connection or belongingness
is of course also a resource in the social production functions: if one would not participate in
groups, the social goals could not be realised, least of all behavioural confirmation (which can
only be produced when a person considers himself as a member of a group where certain
behavioural norms are shared).
Safety cannot be found as a separate goal in the SPF-model. It is argued that the safety need
really reflects the human tendency to avoid losses. People respond more strongly to losses
than to gains (see Lindenberg 1996; Tversky & Kahneman 1991; Nieboer 1997) and a threat
to their means of production is likely to provoke anxiety. In terms of SPF-theory, the need to
feel safe is in fact the need to protect one’s production functions and secure one’s means of
production (see also Lindenberg 1996, p. 180-181). Safety is therefore not a similar kind of
goal as comfort and affection and the like, but it could be incorporated in the theoretical
framework of SPF theory as a metagoal (cf. section 3.5.2, and Chapter 7). 
Emotional well-being seems to encompass both an agreeable level of stimulation and
affection, and possibly also agreeable levels of the other three first-order goals contribute to
emotional well-being. The concept of emotional well-being as a domain in overall well-being
is, however, not very clear and rather problematic. Although there is broad consensus in
quality of life research that overall subjective well-being consists of two components, life
satisfaction and affective state or hedonic level, it is still difficult to disentangle these two
components. Anyway it does not seem suitable then to model people’s emotional well-being
as one of domains in which their overall well-being comes about, as, in an instrumental
hierarchy, it would logically be at a higher level than e.g. the domains of productivity or
intimacy. If there is no clear definition that shows how ‘emotional well-being’ differs from
affective state, it does not seem logical to ascribe it a different place in the theoretical
framework than is ascribed to life satisfaction; thus, emotional well-being seems more aptly
conceived of as an aspect of overall subjective well-being. Lacking clear definitions of the
domains of emotional well-being and psychological health, it is not clear either to what extent
the two overlap. Therefore, the remarks made below about the relation of psychological well-
being to SPF theory may also partly apply to emotional well-being. 
Self esteem, finally, appears in SPF theory’s hierarchy of goals both at the bottom, as an
endowment, and at the top, as an element of status, behavioural confirmation and affection. In
SPF theory, all three first-order goals for social well-being have a self-evaluating component
(e.g. Lindenberg 1996). One’s levels of affection, status and behavioural confirmation are
assumed to have a self-evaluating component that results from previous approval from others
and mediate present approval from others into subjectively experienced social well-being. Self
esteem, as a domain of overall subjective well-being, may thus be considered incorporated in
the instrumental hierarchy of SPF theory.
For eight of the ten domains that are commonly distinguished in subjective well-being
research we have now seen that they are or can be covered by the elements of the hierarchy of
goals in SPF theory, at least to a large degree. Tracing the positions these domains hold in the
SPF hierarchy of goals actually clarifies in what ways they contribute to overall well-being.
However, the two remaining domains, of religious well-being and psychological health, are
less easy to relate to the theoretical framework of SPF theory.
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In a strict interpretation of SPF theory, contributions to overall well-being can only go through
social and physical well-being, as there are no other ‘paths’ to the highest level in the
hierarchy. Logically, this may mean either one of two things: (1) indeed all contributions to
overall well-being go through social or physical well-being, and there is nothing that does
contribute to overall well-being that can not be identified as one of these two universal goals;
or (2) there may be other things that do affect overall well-being which do not go through
social or physical well-being, and SPF theory does not provide predictions about these,
therefore there is a part of overall well-being that falls outside the scope of SPF theory, thus
the concept of overall well-being as it is used in SPF theory is somewhat smaller than the
concept of overall well-being as it is commonly used in quality of life research.
Whether (1) or (2) is the case is a problem that can only be empirically solved if we have valid
measures for all domains. Despite all the data that are collected to assess whether different
domains have ‘unique’ contributions to overall well-being, ‘uniqueness’ of such contributions
depends of course on how the other domains are defined and operationalised. Thus far there
have, as far as I know, been no empirical investigations in which social and physical well-
being, in the sense SPF theory uses these, are used as the main domains, so present data can
not solve the problem. Presently, a measurement instrument for the concepts at the highest
levels of the SPF-hierarchy has yet to be developed. But even if such an instrument were ready
at hand, it would still depend on the underlying conceptualisations whether there will be
domains left that do contribute to overall well-being independently after controlling for social
and physical well-being.  This problem thus amounts to a choice between two assumptions.
The assumption reflected in (1) would allow the broadest scope for SPF theory. The
assumption reflected in (2) suits a more cautious and modest approach, where the claims of
researchers in the domains that may possibly fall outside the scope of SPF theory are not
challenged, and where the question of how much there is outside of social and physical well-
being that contributes to overall well-being is left open for empirical evidence. SPF theory
proper does not give explicit direction as to which assumption should be chosen.
On the one hand, it can be argued that we should use the broadest scope in which
psychological health and religiosity are not excluded, but rather incorporated in the model.
Mental health can be seen as a stable personal resource which typically does not change much
during mid-life, that is, between the ages of 25 and 60 (see Ormel & Schaufeli 1991; Nieboer
1997), but it may also be seen as a result of solid production functions. Psychiatric illnesses
may be treated in the same manner as physical impairments. Even though the symptoms are
different, this does not necessarily imply that we need a different model of men for psychiatric
patients.  With regard to religiosity, it can be argued that the need for a consistent value-
system is incorporated in SPF-theory, because the concept of behavioural confirmation
explicitly focuses on the presence of internal and external norms as opportunities to obtain
well-being. If it is the presence of a relationship with God (or some other supernatural entity)
that seems problematic, we may argue that there are plenty of examples of one-sided
relationships (e.g., movie-stars, politicians) that are instrumental for people to obtain well-
being.
On the other hand, one may argue that the second assumption is more realistic. There may be
other things that affect overall well-being which do not go through social or physical well-
being; SPF theory does not provide predictions about these, therefore there is a part of overall
well-being that falls outside the scope of SPF theory. As a higher level goal, psychological
well-being may partly fall outside of what people can produce themselves, and therefore partly
outside the definition of overall well-being as highest goal in the SPF hierarchy of goals. This
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is not to say that psychological health is not a highly important element of overall well-being
in the broad sense, but rather that it may largely be exogenous to people’s social production
functions, and that it may also contribute to overall well-being directly, instead of only
through social well-being and physical well-being. It can be argued that SPF-theory
presupposes a minimum level of psychological health, because the basic assumptions that
people strive for physical and social well-being can not be expected to hold for people with
serious psychopathology10.
For the domain of religious well-being it is also doubtful whether its contribution to overall
well-being goes completely ‘through’ social and physical well-being. Surely, the benefits of
religious behaviour may affect overall well-being partly through social well-being and
possibly also through physical well-being. Religion may provide an individual with additional
groups in which he can participate and to which he may feel to belong, and within these
groups it is likely that beliefs, values and norms are to a large extent similar, which facilitates
the production of behavioural confirmation through norm-conforming behaviour. Religion
may also contribute to the consistency of one’s own norms, as well as the consistency between
these and the norms of others. Higher consistency implies higher yields from norm-
conforming behaviour, and thus higher efficiency of the production functions. Especially the
latter might account for much of the positive influences on well-being and life satisfaction that
people may attribute to their religious beliefs. However, all this does not preclude that there is
also a unique contribution of religion to overall subjective well-being that does not go through
social well-being or physical well-being. It may thus be wise to allow for the possibility that
some elements of overall well-being fall outside the scope of SPF theory, and that religious
well-being could be one of these.
A second argument for leaving religious well-being outside the scope of SPF theory is that this
theory is designed to deal with the hierarchical ordering of preferences and instrumental goals
in relation to universal human goals. It can be well defended that physical and social well-
being would be universal goals. But religious well-being is obviously not a universal goal:
many people do not strive for religious well-being, and can not even imagine valuing it.
Religious well-being is thus possibly an additional and independent component of overall
well-being, the weight of which may vary strongly over people and be equal to zero for some.
If we consider this to be the case, religious well-being would lie outside the overall well-being
concept in SPF theory. All religion-related activities and resources that people do use in their
social production functions, are then in this theory only investigated with regard to their role in
producing social and physical well-being. Whatever other benefits people may derive from
religion circumventing the five first-order goals for social and physical well-being, is left
open. Also left open is the relative weight of this ‘SPF-external’ religious well-being as
compared to the weight of the social and physical components in an all encompassing ‘overall
well-being’; we may only assume that this relative weight varies over people.
In this dilemma of whether SPF theory would best assume that there are no other ‘paths’ to
overall well-being than through the two universal and five first-order goals or that there may
be other elements to overall well-being that fall outside the scope of the theory, I personally
prefer the latter assumption. However, the above should have made clear that there are also
                                                
 10   The argument can even be reversed: apparently the idea that every individual does and should strive to
optimise social and physical well-being is so universally accepted (and even internalised as a norm), that, if a
person does not strive to produce these two goals, this is, in our society, considered to be psychopathological.
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grounds for holding the reverse preference; in any case, I have not found conclusive arguments
for either option.
So, where does this leave us regarding the conceptualisation of the upper two levels in SPF
theory’s hierarchy of goals? How should we understand the concept overall well-being as this
is used in SPF theory? And how broad should we define the universal goals social and
physical well-being? Should we stretch their definition so that all aspects of well-being,
including religious well-being and psychological health are duly covered? Or should we rather
strive to keep these two universal goals 'pure', which we may only do at the cost of
abandoning the pretension that ours is a complete model of how overall subjective well-being
comes about?
I find myself unable to make these decisions, for want of knowledge of the phenomenology of
subjective well-being. Of course we might take a decision based on some 'gut-feelings', but the
robustness of our theory would benefit more from grounding these decisions on empirical
evidence of how these concepts and their interrelations look like in people’s experience. If
possible, this should be explored in order to be able to come to a more precise definition, for
SPF theory, of overall-, physical-, and social well-being and the relations between these.  We
may then regard the present under-specification of these elements as an opportunity to
improve the agreement of the theoretical framework of SPF theory with both current insights
in subjective well-being studies and with phenomenological evidence.
3.4.2. THE CONCEPTUALISATION AND DEFINITION OF THE FIRST-ORDER GOALS IN SPF THEORY
It is not only the concepts at the top two levels of the hierarchy of goals that, at a closer look,
appear more problematic than at first sight. This also holds for the first order instrumental
goals, in particular for affection and behavioural confirmation. The difficulties concerning the
first-order instrumental goals partly follow from the unsolved dilemma concerning the
universal goals discussed above (this part of the difficulties are below referred to as problems
of conceptualisation), but also apart from these, there is some ground for dissatisfaction about
the definitions. Let’s start with the problems of definition.
The definitions or descriptions used for the first-order instrumental goals are not always the
same in the different publications on SPF theory. In Lindenberg (1984) we find the three first
order goals for social approval defined as follows:
“Soziale Wertschätzung, die eine Person relativ zu anderen positiv auszeichnet, nennen
wir Status, ungeachtet ob diese Auszeichnung einer bestimmten Person oder einer
Kategorie von Personen gegeben wird. [...] Wenn einer Person das Wohlergehen einer
anderen Person zum Anliegen wird, dann erhält diese andere Person “Affekt”. Technisch
gesprochen handelt es sich um abhängige Nutzenfunktionen: der Nutzen einer Person
wird ein Argument in der Nutzenfunktion der anderen. Durch manche Autoren wird diese
Wertschätzung auch “Altruismus” genannt (cf. Becker, 1976: 282 ff.). Je mehr Menschen
mein Wohlergehen zum Anliegen wird, desto mehr Affekt habe ich.[...] Eine dritte
Komponente sozialer Wertschätzung besteht aus dem Gefühl, in den Augen der anderen
auch nach eigenem Ermessen “das Richtige” zu tun oder getan zu haben. Man erfüllt die
Verhaltenserwartungen von anderen und sich selbst. [...] Durch Vorwegnahme der
Reaktion von anderen, kann man auch sich selbst dafür belohnen, “das Richtige” getan zu
haben.” (Lindenberg 1984, p. 175).
It is doubtful whether, thus defined, the three first-order goals for social approval would
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indeed cover all forms of social well-being (cf. section 3.4.1.). For example, the above
definition of affection only includes a one-way affection, namely the thing you get when
someone else cares for you. It does not include the possible contribution to well-being that is
realised by incorporating the well-being of someone else in your own utility function, even
though I believe many people would agree that caring for others can contribute to subjective
well-being in an important way.
In Lindenberg & Frey (1993) the definitions of the three first order instrumental goals for
social approval are largely similar:
“Status refers to a relative ranking (mainly based on control over scarce resources);
behavioural confirmation is the feeling of having done ‘the right thing’ in the eyes of
relevant others (including yourself). Affect11 is what Ego get from Alter if Ego and Alter
are involved in an affective relationship. A central ingredient in such a relationship is that
Ego and Alter care for each other. ‘Caring for somebody’ here means that indicators of
Ego’s utility have become goods which produce a certain amount of physical well-being
in Alter and vice versa” (Lindenberg & Frey 1993, p. 196).
No definition is given in these articles of the two first-order instrumental goals for physical
well-being, comfort and stimulation, they are merely mentioned. In Lindenberg (1996) the
first-order instrumental goals are not explicitly defined. However, Lindenberg here equates
comfort with Maslow’s ‘physiological needs’, affection with Maslow’s ‘belongingness’ and
‘love needs’, and suggests that Maslow’s ‘esteem needs’ cover both behavioural confirmation
and status.
In the above, we saw that there are considerable differences in the way the five first-order
instrumental goals were operationalised in the three main applications of SPF theory thus far.
When we then look at the definitions of the first-order instrumental goals that were used in
these studies, we find that these all differ more or less from the definitions in Lindenberg &
Frey (1993). 
For comfort, Steverink (1996, p. 19) gives the following definition:
“Voldoen aan de basisbehoeften van de mens zoals eten, drinken, rust, warmte en
beschutting, levert fysiek welbevinden op en wordt hier ‘comfort’ genoemd. Ook de
afwezigheid van pijn en ziekte, evenals van hulpbehoefte, worden als bronnen van comfort
beschouwd.”
Nieboer (1997, p. 33) deviates somewhat from this, by including in her definition of comfort
only the absence of negative stimuli:
“Comfort means the absence of deleterious stimuli (i.e., physiological discomforts such as
pain, thirst, hunger, or cold).”
By leaving out the part on satisfaction of basic needs like eating, drinking, resting et cetera,
she leaves open - at least theoretically - that someone who does not satisfy these basic needs
but lacks sensory stimuli that warn him of this may yet experience ‘comfort’. Nieboer’s
definition of comfort does also not include the absence of dependency, as does Steverink’s
definition.
Van Eijk (1997, p. 42) gives a definition that stands midway between Nieboer and Steverink:
“Comfort refers to a state where basic human needs are fulfilled, i.e., to the absence of
                                                
11    See footnote 4 of this chapter.
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physical discomfort, such as hunger, thirst, fatigue and pain.”
It need not be deemed problematic that these definitions are slightly different. It is not unusual
that in different applications of a theory the definitions of its concepts are somewhat adjusted
to better suit the particular application. However, as Lindenberg, as the author of SPF theory,
has not explicitly formulated how he defines comfort, we here have the difficulty that we
cannot assess the extent to which various definitions of comfort differ from the ‘original’
definition in SPF theory. A more important problem with the definition of comfort exists in
relation to the definition of stimulation. 
Regarding stimulation, Steverink (1996, p. 19) writes that
“fysiek welbevinden afhankelijk is van het ervaren van een plezierige hoeveelheid
stimulatie of activering.[...] Stimulatie leidt niet steeds tot fysiek welbevinden. De relatie
tussen de mate van stimulatie en fysiek welbevinden kan weergegeven worden als een
eentoppige curve: een laag stimulatieniveau (onderstimulatie) wordt als onaangenaam
ervaren terwijl ook een te hoog stimulatieniveau (overstimulatie) als onaangenaam wordt
ervaren. Alleen in dat gedeelte van de curve waarin stimulatie fysiek welbevinden oplevert,
wordt het in positieve zin als bron voor fysiek welbevinden opgevat.”
It is remarkable that Steverink describes the relation between the level of stimulation and
physical well-being as a single-peaked function, whereas we saw before that Lindenberg
(1996, p. 173) explicitly states that the idea of an optimal level of arousal is misleading:
“...suggests that there is a single peaked utility function and that the individual maximises
utility by achieving the optimal level of arousal. By contrast, the empirical evidence [...]
points in a different direction. The organism seems to receive pleasure from both a
reduction in arousal (i.e. from increasing comfort) and from an increase in arousal (i.e.
from increasing stimulation) within a large range of arousal.”
I believe that Lindenberg suggests that within ‘the pleasant range’ it is actually changes in the
level of stimulation from which one derives utility rather than stimulation per se.
Van Eijk gives a more definition-like description of stimulation:
“Stimulation refers to a state of arousal, or the extent to which an optimal level of
interesting and challenging events is experienced.” (Van Eijk 1997, p. 42)
In this definition mental stimulation is central and it is not really clear whether Van Eijk
considers physical exertion and arousal as part of stimulation as well. Nieboer (1997, p.33), in
contrast, does explicitly include the more physical aspects of arousal in her definition. She
also appears to attempt to reconcile the two opposing positions regarding the possible single-
peakedness of the utility function:
“Stimulation refers to activation which produces arousal, including mental and sensory
stimulation and physical effort. Human being seem to prefer a certain level of activation,
although prolonged levels of high activation or physical effort become unpleasant. Seen
across the full range, physical well-being and activation are related as an inverted U (Hebb,
1958, Scitovsky, 1976, Wippler, 1987).”
The various definitions differ considerably and leave us in uncertainty about what the first-
order goal stimulation in SPF theory now really does and does not encompass. A more serious
problem is that the distinction between the two first-order goals for physical well-being is not
clear either. For, if empirical evidence does indeed point out that humans need some level of
mental, sensory and physical arousal to be ‘well’, and if comfort is equated to a state in which
people’s basic physiological needs are met, it would seem logical to subsume stimulation as
one of the lower order instrumental goals for comfort, rather than regarding it as a first-order
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goal positioned beside comfort.
Status, one of the three first-order instrumental goals for social well-being, is defined by
Steverink (1996, p. 19):
“Status is sociale waardering die verkregen wordt op basis van het relatieve bezit van
schaarse goederen zoals privileges, geld, talent, macht, invloed, bepaalde soorten kennis,
luxe goederen. Hoeveel status verkregen wordt uit dit bezit hangt af van de verdeling van
deze goederen, dus status onderscheidt mensen relatief ten opzichte van elkaar - het is een
positioneel goed. Status kan gerealiseerd worden door dingen die zijn verkregen zonder
eigen moeite of kosten, zoals bijvoorbeeld een adellijke titel, maar in een westerse
samenleving wordt status meestal verkregen door wat iemand doet of verwerft (inkomen,
statusgoederen), en dit wordt vooral via het uitoefenen van een beroep bereikt.”
Both Van Eijk (1997, p. 42-43) and Nieboer (1997, p. 33) define status somewhat more
concisely, but in a very similar vein. Van Eijk puts extra emphasis on that it is the scarcity of
goods that determines their status-lending properties. All definitions agree on three important
elements: status refers to someone's relative ranking in society, it is based the control over
scarce goods, and it is multi-dimensional, that is, there are multiple goods that each may lend
status.
Of all five first-order instrumental goals that are distinguished in SPF theory, there appears to
be least confusion about the exact content of status. This may be attributed to the fact that the
concept of status is very familiar to social scientists (be it, however, that many have learnt to
think of status primarily as socio-economic status or occupational prestige, while the status-
concept in SPF theory is broader than that). It may also be that the core of the concept, the
ranking of a person as compared with other persons, is just unambiguous.
However, there are also some problematic aspects to the definition of status, in particular
regarding the questions what reference groups we should take. Does ‘status’ in the SPF
theoretical framework refer to one’s rank in the whole national society, or rather to the
reference groups a person himself chooses? It seems that the latter makes more sense when we
are interested in subjective social well-being, but there are also important practical arguments
for preferring the first (e.g. the unfeasibility of assessing for each person for all dimensions of
status which are the relevant others with whom he tends to compare himself). The problem of
reference groups and reference shift forms a complete field of research, a glance on which
convinces us that there is no easy way out of this problem. 
Another problem regarding the definition of status follows from the multidimensionality it
proposes. Should we really conceive of status as including all relative positions based on all
scarce goods? This again might lead to impracticability, for how can we assess which are all
the scarce goods? And as scarcity is the ratio of the availability and the valuation of goods,
and as people may differ in their valuation of goods, it may be the case that what is ‘scarce’
for one person is not scarce for another.
The second of the first-order goals for social approval, behavioural confirmation, is described
by Steverink (1996, p. 19-20) as:
“Het is het gevoel het ‘goede’ gedaan te hebben in de ogen van belangrijke anderen of van
jezelf. Wanneer de reactie van de ander gemakkelijk kan worden voorspeld - zoals
bijvoorbeeld door de aanwezigheid van duidelijke sociale normen - zal ook de anticipatie
van de reactie van de ander al het gevoel van waardering geven, waardoor
gedragsbevestiging ook kan worden ervaren wanneer die ander  niet aanwezig is.
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Gedragsbevestiging heeft daarom te maken met het voldoen aan verwachtingen, zowel
persoonlijke als sociale. [...] Het gaat bij gedragsbevestiging vooral om normconform
gedrag, en niet in de eerste plaats om wat iemand is als persoon, zoals bij affectie.”
Van Eijk adds a few elements in her definition of behavioural confirmation, namely that the
result or subjective experience of behavioural confirmation is a feeling of acceptance and
confirmation in one’s activities, that there is also a negative form of behavioural confirmation
that people want to avoid, and that the main contrast with status lies in the fact that status is
about distinguishing oneself from others while behavioural confirmation is about fitting in and
assimilating oneself to a social group:
“Behavioural confirmation refers to the horizontal component of social approval. Contrary
to status, it is not produced by distinguishing oneself (positively) from others, but by
behaving in accordance with the customs and norms of a group of significant others. Others
then make one feel accepted and confirmed in one’s activities. Conversely, behavioural
disconfirmation is something people want to avoid” (Van Eijk 1997, p. 43).
Nieboer (1997, p. 33) is even more concise:
“Behavioural confirmation is the feeling to have done ‘the right thing’ in the eyes of
relevant others. For example, conformity to norms is instrumental in obtaining behavioural
confirmation.”
The way in which this definition is phrased suggests, in contrast to the definitions above, that
there may be other ways of obtaining behavioural confirmation than behaving according to the
norms of relevant others. It is not clear however, which these possible alternative production
factors would be.
The main problem in the definitions of behavioural confirmation is related to the term relevant
others. It may seem trivial to point out that this term does not specify who exactly are these
‘relevant’ others, for a definition like this should be general. However, it may be argued that
the question of who are ‘relevant others’ for an individual is not unrelated to the question of
whom he receives behavioural confirmation. It seems but too plausible that anyone who more
or less consistently gives you behavioural confirmation, and thus contributes to your level of
social approval, would become a ‘relevant’ other. Is this what the definition intends to
tolerate? Or do the authors intend a more restricted set of ‘relevant others’, for example
restricting this set to ‘others’ that are important for the individual not only with regard to
obtaining behavioural confirmation but also regarding the realisation of other goals? If so, this
should be made explicit, and it should be accepted that such a definition implies that there is
always multi-functionality in the production of behavioural confirmation.
When looking at the concept of behavioural confirmation against its theoretical background,
namely Lindenberg’s (1986, 1997) sharing group theory and his ideas about the emergence of
social norms, the most natural answer to this question would be to define ‘the relevant others’
as the persons with whom one forms a sharing group. However, as most people belong to
many, partly overlapping and partly antagonist sharing groups, this answer seems to shift the
problem rather than solve it. Yet this perspective offers an important insight concerning the
question of who are the ‘relevant others’.  Sharing groups are, by definition, groups for joint
production or consumption of goods. Now according to SPF theory, all things that people
would want to produce can be categorised as forms or instrumental goals of the five first-order
instrumental goals. It then follows that ‘relevant others’ are ‘relevant’ because of their role in
the realisation of one or more of these five goals. However, the definition of behavioural
confirmation would be circular when we would allow the term ‘relevant others’ to refer to
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others that are only relevant for the realisation of behavioural confirmation. Thus, following
this line of reasoning, the ‘relevant others’ in the definition of behavioural confirmation, are
those who play a significant role in the production of the four others first-order goals.
Behavioural confirmation would then, at least in general, be a by-product of the participation
in sharing groups that serve the realisation of other goals. Yet, in theory, sharing groups may
exist whose main and only purpose is the production of behavioural confirmation. If they do,
and if the approval for behaviour that is received from members of such groups contributes to
the level of subjectively experienced behavioural confirmation just like the approval from
different others, I believe the definition of behavioural confirmation needs adjustment: the
term ‘relevant other’ can, in that case, no longer serve the purpose.
It should in any case be clear that the concept of ‘relevant others’ is problematic. From the
literature on group theory (e.g. Sherif 1966; Turner 1982; Hogg & Abrams 1988), it is known
that groups as a rule exist by the grace of outgroups or competing groups, and that groups
norms usually tend to emphasise group boundaries. This of course implies that in obtaining
behavioural confirmation for conforming to norms of a particular (group of) others, one often
automatically incurs behavioural disconfirmation of outgroup-people (at least as far as one’s
behaviour is observed by them or as far as one has internalised their behavioural norms). As,
following the definition of Van Eijk, people tend to avoid behavioural disconfirmation of
‘relevant others’, the question as to whom are one’s ‘relevant others’ becomes extra pressing. 
   
A further problem I find is that in fact behavioural confirmation is defined more by the
(main?) instruments through which it is produced, than by its own quality. That is, in the
definitions there is considerably more clarity about how behavioural confirmation comes
about (through norm conforming behaviour, although Nieboer leaves open the possibility that
there may also be other means of producing behavioural confirmation), than about what this
‘good’, once produced, is. Is the component of social well-being we call behavioural
confirmation only to be distinguished from status and affection by investigating how it has
been obtained, or is there a real difference in the phenomenology of the three different first
order goals? If so, it seems preferable to define the three first-order goals according to these
phenomenological characteristics, or at least to incorporate them more prominently in the
definitions of these goals. Especially if we want to allow for alternative production functions
leading to the realisation of the first goals (an allowance that seems warranted by the core
ideas of SPF theory) it seems more elegant to phrase the definitions of the first order goals
with minimal dependence on examples of how they are produced. 
Finally, we come to the definition of affection. Steverink (1996, p. 20) states:
“Affectie wordt verkregen wanneer twee personen om elkaar geven en elkaars welzijn
belangrijk vinden. In  tegenstelling tot gedragsbevestiging is affectie altijd persoonlijk  en
gaat het niet zozeer om de waardering van het juiste gedrag als wel om de waardering van
de persoon. Aangenomen wordt dat het in beginsel mogelijk is ook doelbewust de
voorwaarden te scheppen die naar verwachting affectie opleveren, zoals - naast het voldoen
aan verwachtingen - het geven van extra aandacht, hulp of geschenken.”
Van Eijk’s (1997, p. 43) definition of affection is largely similar, but she explicitly excludes
interdependence of well-being as an essential characteristic of the relationships in which
affection may be obtained. Other than Steverink, who’s definition actually only specifies the
means through which affection may be obtained, Van Eijk does make an attempt to describe
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the quality of ‘affection’ as a good, when she mentions ‘love’, ‘companionship’ and ‘the
feeling that someone cares about you’ as examples of what it is that people get from affective
relationships:
“[A]ffection refers to what people get when they are involved in affective relationships, for
example love, companionship, the feeling to be cared for. Contrary to behavioural
confirmation, affection refers to being accepted for who one is as a person, rather than
being evaluated on specific activities.”
The definition Nieboer (1997, p. 33) gives is again very similar to that of Van Eijk; it only
seems to slightly diverge from this in putting somewhat more weight on the closeness and
quality of the affective relationship:
“Affection is what a person gets from another person when they are involved in a close and
caring relationship (partner, friends, or family). It is the love one gets for who one is as a
person, regardless of one's assets or actions.”
In these three definitions of affection, two points need be noted. Firstly, in all three
definitions, affection is distinguished from behavioural confirmation by stressing that it is
approval of who one is rather than approval of what one does. It is not very clear, however,
how others can know ‘who one is’ other than through one’s behaviour (behaviour includes
what a person says about himself). And also, from daily experience it should be expected that
behavioural confirmation and affection are frequently received from the same persons, and
frequently at the same time as well. So, using the above definitions, it would be quite
problematic to find affection empirically. Theoretically it is the question whether ‘affection’
should really be conceptualised as whatever remains after stripping off all approval for what
one does.
The second point that deserves to be noted is the fact that all three definitions above restrict
the possible sources of affection to ‘affective relationships’. This would almost be a tautology
if the term ‘affective relationships’ were not explained as relationships in which people are
‘close’, where they care about each other and about one another’s well-being. The important
question here is whether these definitions imply that only within such close and caring
relationships one can get affection, or whether these relationships are again intended as an
example of the most common production factor for affection. The former interpretation would
mean that affection can not be obtained from strangers, in other words, that the only things
people with whom we do not have a close and caring relationship can contribute to our social
well-being are status and behavioural confirmation. This is an implication I seriously doubt,
and I believe empirical research may help to solve this problem.
Summarising the discussion of definitional problems of the first-order instrumental goals thus
far, it appears that, although for most of the five goals the essence of the concept is intuitively
clear, the precise content is not. The three authors who have applied SPF theory in empirical
research appear to have used somewhat diverging definitions, which tend to define the goals
in terms of how they may be reached.
It is important to appreciate why definitions that mainly describe a goal by the means by which
it may be reached are problematic. Such definitions collide with SPF theory’s intention to
provide more than merely a classification scheme. An essential feature of SPF theory is the
hierarchical ordering of goals linked through production functions, which is crucial for
analysing substitution effects. This feature makes sense when it is assumed that, for each
production function linking two levels in the hierarchy of goals, the ‘good’ at the output side
is of a different quality than the ‘goods’ or resources that are used as inputs. With regard to the
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levels of the universal and the first-order instrumental goals and the uppermost level of overall
subjective well-being, SPF theory claims that this is indeed the case. The assumption of
limited substitution between first order goals implies the claim that e.g. status, behavioural
confirmation and affection each are a ‘good’ that is qualitatively distinct from the various
production factors involved in their realisation. Therefore I think it crucial that this claim is
supported by the way in which the first-order instrumental goals are conceptualised and
defined.
Apparently, we have some difficulty in defining the substantive ‘goods’ that three first-order
goals for social approval represent, and for the purposes of the three applications of SPF
theory we discussed, the solution of defining these goals by the means to their realisation was
quite satisfactory. But in the long run, SPF theory would expose itself to the risk of being
discarded as merely a classification scheme, if it would not succeed in conceptualising and
defining its main theoretical concepts more independently from the means for their
production.
For working with these concepts much could be gained by a systematic exploration of the
relations between levels of these goals and the variety of means involved in producing them,
so that all these elements related to the first-order goals might be ordered according to their
different extent of ‘goal-ness’ or ‘resource-ness’.
We further saw that in some cases the distinction between two first-order goals is blurred
(comfort and stimulation) while for other goals the distinction is perhaps unrealistically
absolute (affection and behavioural confirmation). For each of the five first-order goals,
empirical evidence that would help identify the precise content and the relation to the other
goals would be welcome.  
At the start of this subsection, it was remarked that perhaps the main problem regarding the
conceptualisation of the first-order instrumental goals follows from the problems explained in
3.4.1. regarding the conceptualisation of the two universal goals and overall well-being.
If the more audacious assumptions are made that social and physical well-being are the
exhaustive components of overall subjective well-being and that there are no ‘paths’ to overall
well-being than through these, it necessarily follows that the five first-order goals in their turn
cover completely all aspects of well-being as well. This means that it should be possible to
categorise any aspect of overall subjective well-being that may be observed in any person, as
belonging to one of the five first-order instrumental goals (or to the lower levels of the
production functions that lead to these). If one chooses this ambitious assumption, it is
doubtful whether the current definitions of the first-order goals are sufficiently broad and
flexible to meet the demand that all aspects of well-being should be accommodated in them. It
would be highly desirable then to develop some classification scheme that gives a broad
overview of aspects of well-being (both from the literature and from empirical evidence) and
connects these to the first-order goals in which they are presumably reflected.
If the more cautious assumption is made that leaves open the possibility that social and
physical well-being are not exhaustive for all aspects of overall subjective well-being, our five
first-order goals need not cover all possible aspects of well-being. In this case, however, it is
no less desirable to sharpen the definitions of the five first-order goals, even if it were only to
be able to judge when a particular aspect of well-being does or does not fall inside the
framework of SPF theory.
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3.5. The necessity to further elaborate lower level goals and quality aspects of social
production functions
While solving the problems concerning the conceptualisation and definition of the universal
and the first order instrumental goals (cf. section 3.4.) appears to be important for SPF theory
per se, our aim of applying SPF theory to quality of life research entails some new demands on
the theory, which it will only be able to meet when some more problems are solved and some
more elaboration is achieved.
The main new demands appear to be the specification of the most relevant resources and
conditions for the realisation of subjective well-being and the accommodation of the dual
character of well-being, as found in Quality of Life research, within the conceptual framework
of SPF theory (i.e. representing both the affective or hedonic component of subjective well-
being and the cognitive or life-satisfaction component). In 3.5.1., the possibilities of meeting
the first demand are discussed; the second demand is considered in section 3.5.2.
3.5.1. THE SPECIFICATION OF RELEVANT RESOURCES AND CONDITIONS: ELABORATING THE
HIERARCHY’S LOWER LEVELS
As we saw in 3.2., SPF theory was originally intended as a search heuristic, that could be used
as a tool to identify actors' interests and to predict and explain their goal directed behaviour in
diverse behavioural situations. As such, SPF theory is suitably elaborated: the upper levels of
the instrumental hierarchy of goals (the universal and the first-order instrumental goals) are
specified, and the lower levels of the hierarchy are - apart from the few examples of
conventional production factors that are repeatedly given - left open. This is exactly as it
should be when we want the general model to be applicable in any historical and cultural
context, and when we feel sufficiently sure of our own insight in the behavioural situations
under study. As long as we feel reasonably sure that we understand the situation that we try to
model, including the potential behavioural alternatives of the actors and the gains and
sanctions related to these, we do not need a more specific theory or further elaborated
heuristics. In dealing with such models, it is generally not too difficult to arrive at plausible
assumptions about the relevant situational goals (and how they relate to the first-order
instrumental goals) and about the salient resources and restrictions for realising these goals.
It is a different situation, however, when we want to apply SPF theory to the core concern of
quality of life studies, that is, to the question of how subjective well-being is related to
objective living conditions, available resources and sets of behaviour.  In principle, SPF theory
encompasses the complete process in which highly concrete resources are converted into the
highly abstract ‘overall well-being’. However, whereas the theoretical framework is
elaborated12 for the highest (most abstract) levels of the instrumental hierarchy, for which it
claims to present an exhaustive list of goals, it is silent with regard to the lower, more concrete
levels. For these concrete levels of resources and activities the theory at best provides some
examples, without either the claim or the intention to be exhaustive. Indeed it would run
counter the basic notion of SPF theory to assume that the set of possible production factors, at
the most concrete level, could be delineated for all groups, all cultures, all societies and all
times. Any attempt to arrive at a reasonably 'complete' set of potential concrete production
                                                
12   Be it that the elaboration is in some respects not yet satisfactory, see section 3.4.
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factors would undoubtedly perish under the innumerability of resources and activities people
may use to further their interests. Yet, it may still be useful to investigate lower level goals
that are at least general to western cultures. 
Principally, it should not be the aim to make an inventory of most relevant concrete
production factors. Not only would there be too many, but the idea that the relevance of
production factors is equal for different individuals is in direct opposition to the notion of
substitution in SPF theory. Some resources that are quite irrelevant for the majority of the
population, because they have a superior resource for the same aim, may be of utmost
importance to the people who have no access to the superior resource (a far less extreme case
is e.g. the importance of having public transport close by for people who do and do not own a
car).
Yet, for the task of establishing the relation between subjective well-being and objective
conditions, we do need to extend and improve our knowledge about what resources and
conditions people need to realise the first-order goals for social and physical well-being.
At present, it is not clear how, and even whether, this problem can be solved, but it is clear
that without solving it, SPF theory is unlikely to help achieve progress in quality of life
studies. The best policy, therefore, might be to attempt shifting the boundary of the elaborated
part of SPF theory downward to lower levels of abstraction until the diversity of relevant
production factors becomes too much to handle. It is likely that we can go beneath the level of
the first-order instrumental goals without immediately drowning in diversity and, if so, we
will at least have approached the objective of finding out how objective conditions relate to
eventual well-being. In order to be able to shift downward the boundary of the elaborated part
of SPF theory it seems that empirical research is required. Although a theorist may be able to
think of a great many alternative ways to produce e.g. status, he will still to some extent be
biased by his own life history and position in society and overlook many of the alternatives
that people in very different circumstances might use. I believe it therefore necessary to
investigate the production functions of people from very diverse categories of the population,
so that the elaboration of the less abstract levels in SPF theory will suit a broad range of
people.  
It is, I believe, a sensible aim to attempt the refining and elaboration of the search heuristic. If
it can be reconstructed how people in very diverse situations produce social and physical well-
being, and what concrete resources and activities they use in the production, it may be possible
to derive a more refined search heuristic. If SPF theory as a heuristic tool can be elaborated
such that it helps us to recognise different types of situations and for each of these points out
to us what are the main (theoretical) factors that determine the possibilities to realise the first-
order goals there, we have in any case come closer to the situation in which we can link
subjective well-being to objective and concrete conditions.
It is important to consider at this point the implications of the above for the eventual
contribution SPF theory may make to quality of life studies or social accounting. Given the
features of this theory, what can it be expected to have to offer in terms of well-practicable
conceptual frameworks for monitoring and explaining variations in subjective well-being?
And is the potential value of this contribution sufficient to legitimise the efforts to realise it?
In order to answer these questions, we need to look again to the status quo in Quality of Life
research sketched in Chapter 2. It was discussed there that for years now there coexist
increasingly sophisticated measures for both subjective well-being and series of objective
conditions that are thought to be related to subjective well-being, but that neither kinds of
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measures is sufficiently informative in itself, while the causal relations between the two kinds
of measures are unclear. The main problem with measures of subjective well-being per se,
even when leaving aside the question whether subjective well-being should be the ultimate
criterion of ‘quality of life’, is that they do not inform policy makers and others about the
causes for differences and changes in subjective well-being. The main problem with measures
of ‘objective’ conditions per se is the reverse: without a clear causal model of how objective
conditions are related to subjective well-being, and which conditions are complements or
rather substitutes in the realisation of a high quality of life, the criterion to judge or evaluate
changes and differences in objective conditions is lacking.
What is wanting in quality of life studies as well as for policy making et cetera, is a model of
how objective conditions and subjective well-being are linked, a model from which it is
possible to derive a (sufficiently small to be practicable) set of variables representing objective
conditions, the causal relations of which to subjective well-being are explicated.
An analogy may clarify the point. In dietetics the central issue is what people should eat to
attain and maintain an optimal nutritional state. The nutritional state of a person could, in
theory at least, be monitored physiologically, which would give perfect information on the
ultimate target variable. However, this would leave the dietician empty-handed regarding the
changes that should be made in eating habits. If, in contrast, the dietician would only be
informed about his patient’s daily intake of potatoes, milk, oranges and bread, he could not do
his job either. Not only would he in the latter case want some indication of the patient's
nutritional state as an evaluative criterion, but he would also need to know all other things the
patient eats and drinks. Dieticians have therefore developed the so-called schijf van vijf: a
concise model of the five principal ingredients of a proper diet. The schijf van vijf is a model
in which diverse foods can be categorised according to which of five essential nutritients 
(protein, carbohydrate, fat, vitamins, minerals) they provide. Within the five categories, the
various foods may be substituted (almost) at will, but the total intake of each of the five
principal ingredients should be between well-established levels in order to keep healthy.
For the question of subjective well-being and its ‘ingredients’, the present practice resembles
that of a dietician who attempts to give nutritional advice on the basis of information about the
patient’s weight and height, and his daily intake of milk, oranges, potatoes and bread, without
knowing which are the essential ingredients of which at least a certain level should be
consumed and thus, without knowing which foods might be adequate substitutes for those
monitored in his present index.
According to SPF theory now, the nature of subjective well-being and its relations with
objective conditions is in a sense similar to that of nutritional health. Like in nutrition (and
even more than there), the possibilities for substitution at the most concrete level of
production factors (here: resources and activities; in nutrition: foodstuffs and drinks) are
almost unlimited, and the number of potentially relevant items greatly exceeds the maximum
of what can reasonably be monitored. Yet, so SPF theory claims, it is possible to distinguish a
number of essential ‘ingredients’ of which a minimal amount should be had, in order to
prevent subjective well-being from dropping below a certain minimum level. Crucial for these
‘ingredients’ is the claim that substitution between them is limited: for each of the first-order
instrumental goals there is a minimum level of the first-order instrumental goals that people
need to experience well-being, and only above that level substitution across first-order goals
may take place. The means to obtain a sufficient amount of each of the first-order goals are
many, however. What does this imply for the possible form which a framework of (objective)
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indicators for the conditions to attain subjective well-being could take, when we start out from
SPF theory? What should the set or system of indicators we eventually aim to develop look
like?
It appears that the analogy of the schijf van vijf also provides an example of how a meaningful
system of indicators of conditions for well-being can be constructed. Such a system would not
rely solely on a measure of subjective well-being, nor would it need to include an exhaustive
inventory of relevant resources or conditions and their potential substitutes. The representation
of the structure of subjective well-being and the possible ways of realising it in SPF theory,
suggests a system of indicators for subjective well-being that reflects the following: 1) there
are two main components to subjective well-being between which only a substitution is
possible only to a limited extent; 2) there are five more specific components of subjective
well-being, two and three for the respective main components, of which a person should have
at least a minimal amount each (thus, only above this minimal level it is possible to substitute
between these five components without incurring a loss of subjective well-being); 3) for the
realisation of the minimal levels of the five essential components of well-being, people may
employ almost any resources and activities, but (as it is likely that these potential production
factors differ for the five essential components of well-being, as the particular character of the
five components differs as well) the potential production factors may be ordered according to
which of the five essential components they particularly serve.
A system reflecting these points may be applied in assessing empirical situations as follows. It
identifies a number (it cannot be said yet how large this number will need to be, hopefully 20
to 30 indicators will suffice) of objective conditions or resources that are relevant for the level
of subjective well-being that may be realised, these objective factors being categorised into
five groups (there is no objection to certain factors appearing in more than one category).
The five groups in which the objective factors are categorised correspond with the five first-
order instrumental goals of SPF theory, such that it can be said that the factors within one
group should combinedly amount to a certain level below which the realisation of a minimal
level of the corresponding first-order goal is in jeopardy, and above which it may be said that
the objective conditions are sufficient for the potential realisation of a minimal level of that
first-order goal. The extent to which objective conditions suffice for the realisation of more
than minimal levels of the five first order goals, the five ‘essential ingredients’ for subjective
well-being, then provides the criterion upon which to judge the quality of the objective
conditions. Figure 3.2., which depicts an overturned version of SPF theory’s hierarchy of
goals, may help to clarify the system of objective indicators and their theoretical interpretation
that we would eventually like to arrive at.
If our aim is to apply SPF theory to the core problem of quality of life studies, and establish a
systematic link between indicators of objective conditions and the level subjective well-being
they make possible, the efforts to elaborate the theory in the lower levels of the hierarchy of
goals should be guided by the features of the system of indicators we wish to obtain. This task
can thus be formulated as follows: in order to prepare SPF theory for application to quality of
life studies, the lower levels of its hierarchy of goals should be elaborated such, that a list of
objective (pre)conditions can be specified for each first-order goal respectively, and that for
each group of objective (pre)conditions it is clear (a) whether each factor is located within the
individual person or in external conditions at local or larger levels; (b) how the (pre)conditions




Objective indicator I-2   conditions for realising
Objective indicator I-…            COMFORT potential to
Objective indicator I-x realise
Objective indicator II-1    PHYSICAL
Objective indicator II-2   conditions for realising  WELL-BEING
Objective indicator II-…       STIMULATION      potential to
Objective indicator II-x         realise
Objective indicator III-1      OVERALL
Objective indicator III-2   conditions for realising    SUBJECTIVE
Objective indicator III-…            STATUS    WELL-BEING
Objective indicator III-x
Objective indicator IV-1     potential to
Objective indicator IV-2   conditions for realising        realise
Objective indicator IV-…       BEHAVIOURAL       SOCIAL
Objective indicator IV-x     CONFIRMATION   WELL-BEING
Objective indicator V-1
Objective indicator V-2   conditions for realising
Objective indicator V-…          AFFECTION
Objective indicator V-x
          Figure 3.2.: Schematic representation of SPF-theory based system of indicators for well-being
In performing this task we need not, and indeed should not, attempt to go to the lowest
possible level of abstraction, as this will result in a impracticable number of potentially
relevant factors, but we should seek to move away from the still subjective level of the five
first-order goals towards the first level in the hierarchy where objective conditions can be
distinguished as production factors.   
3.5.2. THE DUAL CHARACTER OF SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING: INCORPORATING THE COGNITIVE
COMPONENT
It is well accepted in quality of life studies and subjective well-being research, that subjective
well-being encompasses two components: the affective and the cognitive component (cf.
Diener et al. 1999; Lucas, Diener & Suh 1996; see also Chapter 2). Although there is no
agreement yet on how exactly these two components interact and combine to form ‘overall
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well-being’ (it is most probable that both affect each other as well as overall well-being), there
is broad consensus that the affective and the cognitive component complement each other, and
that subjective well-being should not be reduced to either one of these.
In SPF theory, no explicit distinction is made between the affective and the cognitive
component to overall subjective well-being, and it is not immediately clear whether both
component are represented in the theoretical framework. Again, this of course depends partly
on the exact definitions of the concepts at the highest levels of the hierarchy of goals. But if
we start out from the present definitions of the various goals, it appears that SPF theory is
largely concerned with the affective component of well-being and says much less about the
cognitive component. For, presently, the first-order instrumental goals (excluding status) are
defined as ‘the feeling to have done the right thing’, ‘the feeling to be loved’, ‘a pleasant level
of arousal’, and ‘the absence of unpleasant stimuli’. These wordings suggest that what SPF
theory deals with is predominantly the affective component of well-being. Yet, if we want to
apply SPF theory to the core problems of quality of life studies, this one-sidedness is a serious
impediment. It would be highly desirable if either the definitions of the main concepts or the
conceptual framework itself could be adjusted to represent both cognitive and affective
components.
Indeed, some suggestions in that direction have already been made. In the above (section
3.4.1.) the ‘safety-need’ was relegated to the realm of metagoals, that is, it was acknowledged
that safety is probably a rather general and important human goal, even though it is a different
kind of goal than the first-order instrumental goals for subjective well-being (cf. Lindenberg
1996, p. 180-181).
Metagoals represent all goals or preferences people may hold with regard to the form and
quality of their production functions. Thus, while the goals serving the realisation of social
and physical well-being (to which the discussion in this chapter thus far has been restricted)
have to do with the level or output of production, metagoals refer to the production process13
itself, including the care for maintaining one’s production capacity. In terms of a metagoal, the
safety motive refers to the goal of protection one’s production functions and production
capacity from disturbances. Assuming that people have sought to find the most profitable
production functions given their set of behavioural alternatives, it is obvious that they have an
interest in preserving these production functions and, thus, in avoiding new restrictions or loss
of relevant resources. 
But there are more aspects of production functions that do not have a place in the basic model
of hierarchically ordered instrumental goals and may belong to the metagoals. Steverink et al.
(1994), but also Sanders (1991) clearly show that people do anticipate life events and future
changes in their production functions and production capacity, and that they often actively try
to deal with these. People make their choices according to expected future outcomes (the
RREEM-model of man, cf. Chapter 2; however, when allowing for bounded rationality neither
their perception of future outcomes nor their subsequent behaviour need be fully rational).
Thus it is possible that people choose to invest in a future outcome through behaviour that in
the short run is not very agreeable, such as studying in order to attain qualifications for the
moment in future when one will enter the labour market, or weight lifting in preparation for a
                                                
13  E.g. Carver et al. (1996) argue that the process of moving towards the fulfilment of aspirations may be more
important to well-being than the end state of goal attainment. See also Ormel et al. (1999, p. 63) on autotelic
theories of well-being, and Diener et al. (1999) for a broad overview of relevant studies.
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rowing race. This kind of investment behaviour, that typically lowers immediate hedonic well-
being, although it need not lower immediate overall well-being because of the cognitive
satisfaction it gives, is exactly the kind of behaviour that the time use approach to subjective
well-being (see section 2.3.2) is unable to deal with.
Thus, people’s cognitive capacities not only enable them to behave proactively and invest in
their future, but they also allow people to derive cognitive well-being from the knowledge that
their present hard work or present troubles will bring a reward. This assertion is fully in
keeping with the theoretical foundation of SPF theory, but yet it is not clear how these
cognitive aspects would be incorporated in the basic conceptual framework. Perhaps the
anticipated development of one’s production capacity should, like safety, somehow be
represented in the metagoals.
A further cognitive aspect of subjective well-being that is frequently paid attention to in
Quality of Life studies is the choice and effects of reference groups, or social comparison (e.g.
Diener & Fujita 1997; Lyubomirsky & Ross 1997; Buunk et al. 1990; see also Michalos’
MDT). Social comparison processes refer to the comparisons people continuously make
between their own situation (accomplishments, wealth, status, happiness, etc) and the situation
of others, and the evaluations of the differences that are observed. In (social) psychology there
has been extensive research into the choice of reference groups (with what [kind of] people
does a person compare himself), the different personality factors and situational factors that
determine whether there will be upward or downward comparison, the use people make of the
comparison information and the affective responses to either upward or downward
comparison. In SPF theory’s basic form, social comparison processes only appear in relation
to status.  As was extensively discussed above, status is a positional good, determined directly
upon the evaluation of the difference between one’s own position and that of (relevant) others.
As far as status is received from others, the term social comparison is somewhat awkward
because in psychological research it is generally used to denote intra-personal comparison of
the self vis-à-vis others, but I think that the status that a person ascribes to himself is identical
to the outcome of what is commonly called ‘social comparison’. However, there is more to
social comparison than only its contribution to status.
Social comparisons may allow people to check their affective responses to their situation by
providing an external standard, and thus contribute to the interplay between affective and
cognitive appraisals of one’s quality of life. Social comparisons also provide a person with
valuable information concerning the quality of his production functions, as well as their
potential improvement or deterioration (cf. Ybema 1994). In this sense, social comparison
processes are obviously closely related to the metagoals, namely to the pursuit of high-quality
production functions.
There may be more cognitive aspects that affect overall subjective well-being than the aspects
that I just discussed, but I believe these are the main relevant aspects. It may be the case that,
just like for the physical and social well-being goals, the actual and concrete goals people
report to strife for can appear in numerous different variations. Still, it should not be too
difficult to find out whether a particular instrumental goal serves the realisation of one or more
of the five first-order instrumental goals or whether it serves the quality of the production
functions per se.
At present, the elaboration of the metagoals in SPF theory lags behind the elaboration of the
substantial goals. In particular the inventory of metagoals and their relatedness to each other
and to the goals from the instrumental hierarchy is insufficiently elaborated. If we want to
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apply SPF theory to the field of quality of life studies, and do justice to the knowledge and
insights that exist there, I think it is time to elaborate the rudimentary notion of metagoals in
the theory, and try to accommodate in this way the insights about the cognitive components of
subjective well-being from quality of life studies.
3.6.  Conclusion and research questions for elaborating SPF theory
Although Lindenberg’s Social Production Function theory has been found a useful tool in a
number of studies, it is at least desirable that it be further elaborated in a few respects before
applying it to current problems in the field of quality of life studies.
In the foregoing sections of this chapter, three aspects or elements of SPF theory were
identified of which it can be seen a priori that some elaboration will be needed. In section 3.4.,
the conceptualisation and definition of the two universal and five first-order instrumental
goals was discussed, and I have argued that thus far the concepts have lacked clear
delineations. Although the definitions appear sufficiently clear to convey the essence of the
concepts, they leave too much room for confusion about the precise boundaries between the
first-order goals, as well as between first-order goals per se (the level) and the means by which
it may be reached (the production factors). To some extent, this unsharp delineation may be
unavoidable because of the nature of the concepts it concerns: to some extent the experience
of e.g. affection or behavioural confirmation may be in the very act of 'producing' or eliciting
it; also, just because empirically the various first-order goals do just frequently manifest
themselves together, it may be unrealistic to aim for definitions of each that completely
exclude all elements of the others. Yet, for our aims it would be highly desirable to obtain a
better view of the complete content of the first-order goals, as well as of their side boundaries
(the delineations with the other first-order goals) and of their layer boundaries (the gradual
delineations between the ‘real’ level of the first-order goals and the lower layers in the
instrumental hierarchy: the means that lead to a certain level of the first-order goals). This
problem of conceptualisation appears more pressing for the social well-being goals than for
the physical well-being goals, and given the practical limitations of this study, I will therefore
concentrate on the former. A first specific objective of this study is therefore to attain a more
complete and in-depth conceptualisation of the three first-order goals for social approval, of
the boundaries between them and between these goals and their respective production factors.
The first research question is formulated accordingly:
Q1: What are the various and distinctive aspects of ‘status’, ‘behavioural confirmation’
and ‘affection’, respectively, and how and to what extent can the level of these goals
be distinguished from the production factors that may be used to attain them? 
This research question will be explored and, as far as possible, answered to, in chapter 5.
The second point for elaboration that was identified in this chapter, concerns the system of
more or less objective indicators we would want. Indeed, a system of objective indicators
pertaining to conditions for quality of life or subjective well-being, that is based on explicit
theory about the way these indicators relate to each other and to subjective well-being, is
precisely what we found wanting in Chapter 2 (section 2.2.). The practical restrictions of this
study do not permit the complete development and testing of such a system of indicators, but
we do aim to make some steps towards that end. A second objective of this study is therefore
to develop, on the basis of an exploration of the actual social production functions of people
from diverse backgrounds and situations, a preliminary system of indicators that pertain to
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production factors and conditions for realising social well-being. Thus, like in the first
research question, this study is restricted to the social well-being component of overall well-
being. The second research question reads:
Q2: What objective information concerning the availability of production factors at the
individual level is needed in order to be able to predict (within reasonable margins)
the level of social well-being that individual can attain? 
More specifically:
Q2a: Which are the essential production factors for status, behavioural confirmation and
affection, respectively, for Dutch adults?
Q2b: What are the complementarity or substitutability relations between these production
factors?
In Chapter 6, it is considered how these research questions can be dealt with, and some
answers are proposed on the basis of the data from the exploratory study.
Finally, it was argued that both the state of the art in subjective well-being research and
previous writings on SPF theory suggest that the hierarchy of goals, that is comprised of
physical and social well-being - both largely hedonic aspects of overall well-being - , does not
represent all factors that affect overall subjective well-being. In particular with regard to the
more cognitive aspects of subjective well-being, I have argued that they are not represented in
SPF’s basic hierarchy of goals but as goals concerning the shape and quality-aspects of
people’s production functions, or ‘metagoals’. At present, we have no empirical evidence for
the relative contribution of these goals to overall subjective well-being as compared with the
contribution of the goals from SPF theory’s basic model, but previous studies on the relative
importance of hedonic and cognitive components suggest that it will by no means be
negligible. SPF theory would certainly benefit if eventually these other aspects could be dealt
with more explicitly. In order to make this possible, we need to explore the variety of goals
that may fall outside the scope of SPF theory’s basic model, and find out if and how these
goals can be modeled as metagoals. This is the third and final objective of the present study.
The third research question is formulated as follows:
Q3: What goals do people strive for that cannot be interpreted as instrumental goals in the
basic model of SPF theory, can these goals be modelled as metagoals (concerning the
quality aspects of production functions) and if so, how?   
This question is dealt with in Chapter 7, which concludes with the presentation of a
conceptual framework of metagoals.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE EXPLORATORY STUDY:
METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION
AND ANALYSIS
4.1. Introduction
In the preceding chapters, the theoretical background and framework for this study were
discussed. In the chapters 1 and 2 we were introduced to the field of subjective well-being,
quality of life and social indicators, and we saw that this field of research is in need of a
theory that can explain how objective conditions affect subjective well-being. Lindenberg’s
Social Production Function theory is a theory of how subjective well-being at the individual
level comes about, depending on the individual’s resources and constraints, and therefore
possibly this theory can be useful for quality of life studies. In Chapter 3,
SPF theory was discussed in depth, and the main respects in which it requires further
elaboration were identified. Three research questions were derived, one concerning the
conceptualisation of the three first-order goals for social well-being, the second concerning
the essential ‘ingredients’ for the realisation of these three components of social well-being
and the system of objective indicators that may be used, and the third concerning the
incorporation of cognitive aspects, or metagoals, into the theoretical framework of SPF
theory.
The present chapter discusses the methods that were used to obtain and analyse suitable data
for answering these questions. I chose an exploratory approach for the empirical study, using
qualitative data. In section 4.2. the rationale behind this approach is discussed. Section 4.3.
explicates the criteria that I applied for selecting participants and the recruitment strategies
that were used. Section 4.4. describes the data collection through focus group interviews and,
complementary, a time use study and individual interviews. In section 4.5. the methods of
analysis are discussed.
4.2. Main considerations for the research design
4.2.1. REFLECTING ON THE CHARACTER OF THE STUDY AND THE ‘PRODUCT’ IT IS TO YIELD
The aim of this study is to provide an empirical basis for refining the conceptualisations of the
first-order instrumental goals in SPF theory and for incorporating metagoals in the theoretical
framework, as well as to obtain a broad inventory of possible production functions for the
production of social well-being. This inventory should provide an overview of the production
functions that people apply and of the role of objective resources and restrictions in the
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production of well-being for Dutch adults and, consequently, provide a basis for the
development of a measurement instrument for the main relevant production factors for social
well-being.
The research questions that were formulated in Chapter 3 are exploratory: the objective is to
explore the contents of the concepts of status, behavioural confirmation and affection, to
explore the cognitive aspects of well-being (or: metagoals) and their interrelations, and to
explore the empirical variety in the resources and activities that people use in producing social
well-being. Obviously, the research design should match these objectives. It should yield data
that contain information about the various forms and guises in which people experience status,
behavioural confirmation and affection, i.e. about the various aspects that make up these
components of social well-being, and about the relation of these components with the main
relevant means to attain them.
The research questions being of a largely exploratory character means, among other things,
that it is not immediately obvious in advance what exactly the eventual ‘product’ or yield of
answering them will be. It is far less clear than with quantitative research questions by what
method the question may be answered or when, in fact, it is ‘sufficiently’ or adequately
answered. Yet some clarification may be given that may prevent mistaken expectations.
As implied in question’s formulation, the product will be an improved conceptualisation of
the first-order goals (or: components of social well-being), consisting of an identification of
their various and distinctive aspects.  What this means and why it may be valuable can be
understood on the basis of the following. The terms ‘status’, ‘behavioural confirmation’, and
‘affection’ in SPF theory each refer to some part of reality, of people’s real experience. Yet it
is not exactly clear to what part of real experience each term refers in SPF theory. The terms
are not exclusively used in SPF theory; at least ‘status’ and ‘affection’ are also used in
different conceptual frameworks. And the relation between terms (or words) and meaning (or
content) is not a simple, universal, or one-to-one relationship (cf. Quine 1980). Language is an
abstract construction developed to exchange statements about ‘reality’, and the nouns of
which a language consists are tools to be able to refer to parts of reality. But the variety of
words that we avail of always falls short of the variety of reality. Thus, the words we use in
communicating with others are in a sense category labels or multi-interpretable terms. Think,
for clarification of this notion, of the almost infinite number of different shades of, say,
yellow, that exist in reality, and of the limited number of words we have to designate these
shades. In a way, the same inadequacy and lack of subtlety of language holds for the terms we
have to designate forms of social well-being. There supposedly is an almost infinite variety of
different feelings, perceptions and experiences of social well-being, and the number of words
we have and want to use to refer to these is limited. So in SPF theory the words ‘status’ and
‘affection’ are used to refer to parts of the real experienced world which need not coincide
exactly with the parts of reality for which others have used the same words. The object of the
first research question is thus a thorough clarification of the ‘meaning’ of the terms ‘status’,
‘behavioural confirmation’, and ‘affection’ in SPF theory: to which parts the richness of
reality do they refer in our use? This is different from formulating (new) definitions. Given
the broad range of feelings and experiences of ‘people’ in general, to which the three first-
order goals should refer, any definition that is broad enough to include all it is meant to
include, would be too general and abstract to give a good sense of the concrete realities it is
meant to contain or refer to. So I will not attempt to solve to problem by formulating (new)
definitions (or in terms of informational logics: ‘intensions’) of status, behavioural
confirmation and affection. Rather I intend to chart the ‘area of reality’ that the concepts are
meant to designate (in terms of informational logics: provide relevant instances of their
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‘extentions’) by identifying their main distinctive ‘aspects’. The term ‘aspects’ refers to the
various forms which people experience and perceive each of the three components of well-
being. In other words: ‘status’ (as well as affection or behavioural confirmation) has many
‘faces’, which I call ‘aspects’. Now by identifying the main distinctive aspects of each of the
three first-order goals, the relation between the terms and their meaning or content in SPF
theory is clarified. The ‘product’ of answering the first research question is thus an overview
of the ‘extensions’ of the three first-order goals, or, in other words, an identification of the
‘faces’ or aspects of status, behavioural confirmation and affection, through which the
meaning of these concepts is explicated. The identification of the distinctive aspects of status,
behavioural confirmation and affection will aid the eventual construction of a measurement
instrument for these concepts.
Using the analogy of shades and the names of colours, this study aims to hold a prism into the
light we normally see in, by which we may distinguish the full range of shades from (ultra-)
violet through (infra)red. The main objective of doing so, is to provide the observers not only
with an overview of the whole colour-spectrum, but also with a fair image (or sense) of what
shades belong to the primary colours. Even though observing the colour-spectrum and the
variety of shades of ‘yellow’, ‘blue’ and ‘red’ does not provide the observer with a definition
of these primary colours, it will help him far better henceforth to recognise shades and
categorise them under the proper primary colour than would a scientific definition of the
colours by their range of wavelength. In this analogy, the various shades that observers will be
able to recognise and name within the range of one colour stand for the various aspects of the
first-order goals. If you look around you to see how much blue there is around you, you will -
almost unconsciously - count all the different shades, from ‘violet-blue’ and ‘lavender’ to
shades like ‘aqua’, ‘petrol’ or other greenish-blues, as ‘blue’. The ‘aspects’ of the first-order
goals relate to these goals in a similar way: although they are each somewhat different,
together they make up ones total perception of ‘status’, ‘behavioural confirmation’ or
‘affection’.
The analogy may also clarify the difficulty of defining a strict boundary between the first-
order goals. Like in the colour spectrum, where red gradually runs into orange and orange into
yellow, there may not be clear borders between the different first-order goals, yet it may well
be quite clear which of their aspects lie central in the ‘range’ of the first-order goal, and which
border on one of the other first-order goals. Some aspects of, say, affection, may be clearly
‘pure’ affection, while other aspects may contain some hints of behavioural confirmation or
status. Thus, even though at an abstract theoretical level we might formulate definitions of the
status, behavioural confirmation and affection that can be sharply distinguished, the reality to
which these concepts refer may be experienced rather like a continuum where the one kind of
social well-being flows over into the other.
As argued in section 3.4.2., one of the present problems with the conceptualisations or
definitions of the first-order goals is the entanglement of the content of the components of
well-being with the means by which they are produced. One of the objectives of this study is
to disentangle the aspects of the first-order goals and the main production factors by which
they can be realised. It may appear, however, that even when distinguishing between feelings
of well-being and objective resources and activities, the two are very closely related. People
may have learnt to equate the production of certain goals, or even the means for producing
certain goals, with the experience of these goals once produced: a kind of conditioning or
mere anticipation. Yet even if people’s experience of status, behavioural confirmation and
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affection tend to merge with having or using the means to realise these goals, the two levels
can be distinguished theoretically. The components of social well-being always consist of
‘feelings of…’, while the production factors for realising them are not feelings but actual
resources, conditions or activities.  Using once more the analogy with the colour spectrum, we
may see ‘green’ in various shades (its aspects), and we may also immediately think of green
when we are being told of a mixture of blue and yellow (or see bits of blue and yellow
combined). Yet as long as there are blue and yellow, there is not actually ‘green’: there are
only the means of making green (the - in this case essential - production factors for green).
4.2.2. MATCHING THE RESEARCH DESIGN TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Ideally, the data that are collected should also provide an overview of the broad range of
resources and activities that people may use to produce social well-being, and give insight in
the relative efficiency of these production factors and in the functional relations between these
production factors (i.e. whether they serve as complements or as substitutes).
The empirical study should, finally, yield data that contain information about people’s
preferences or goals concerning the ways in which they produce - and secure their production
of - social well-being and about the connections of these goals with each other and with the
other elements of SPF theory.
Obviously, for the main part we know but approximately what we are looking for, and thus
we’d better not restrict the scope of the data collection a priori to the aspects of social well-
being, the production factors or the metagoals that we can already think of1. For this study,
not only are there no adequate measurement instruments ready at hand, but they cannot
directly be developed either, because it is not yet clear what exactly we would want to
measure and which range of scores would be relevant. Clearly then, for answering the
research questions we need qualitative data, upon which only marginal restrictions are
imposed by the researcher concerning the contents and categories. The respondents should be
allowed to choose their own concepts, categorisations and wordings concerning the topic they
are asked, and when these data are collected, it is the researcher’s task to interpret these
idiosyncratic data and arrive at fitting concepts and conceptual frameworks.
The exploratory aims of the study ask for a design in which the representation of the whole
range of variety in the subjective experiences of social well-being and of the way it is attained
by members of the relevant population is achieved. The eventual aim of this study to
contribute to quality of life studies implies that the elaboration of SPF theory should be as
general as possible, that is, it should eventually be applicable in cross-national and cross-
cultural studies. In the present stage of the enterprise, however, I take the Dutch adult
population as the relevant population to which the theory and the inventory of production
factors that will be developed should pertain. Only later, if the objectives of this study are
realised for the Dutch adult population, it may be reasonable to investigate, in other studies,
the possibilities to generalise and extend the results to wider populations. As a research
                                                
1   If we would try to formulate a priori which aspects of well-being, which production factors and which
metagoals we deem important, we’d run a serious risk of falling into either the pitfall of ethnocentrism (as
introspection will unavoidably play a large role in hypothesizing about what matters) or that of building too
uncritically on evidence from previous applications of SPF theory, overlooking that these studies were restricted
to a specific category of the population, namely the (frail) elderly. We must take care to avoid these pitfalls in
order to arrive at a broad inventory of relevant means to and aspects of social well-being that is valid and
sensitive to the whole relevant population.
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population from the Dutch adult population, then, we need such a selection of persons that we
are likely to find both production factors and aspects of social well-being over the complete
range of their empirical manifestations.
The results from a qualitative exploratory study such as this, cannot be regarded as 'hard'
findings, they are rather empirically grounded hypotheses concerning the structure and
determinants of social well-being for Dutch adults. As such, the results of this study provide a
basis for further research. At least one follow-up is already in progress, namely the study of
Nieboer (forthcoming) in which measurement instruments, based on the results of the present
study, are developed and tested upon a representative sample of the Dutch population.
4.3. Recruitment and selection of participants for the qualitative study
4.3.1. THEORETICAL SAMPLING: SELECTION CRITERIA FOR OPTIMAL VARIATION IN
THE CASE STUDIES
For the qualitative study, I had to find a selection of participants that satisfied two conditions:
firstly, the selected participants should represent (as well as possible) the full range of
empirical variety in how Dutch adults produce and experience social well-being, and
secondly, the number of participants should be kept sufficiently small to avoid undue delay in
consequence of excessive data management and analysis. Obviously, it could not be decided
at forehand what number of participants would be ‘sufficiently small’, but I decided for an
approximate selection size of between 20 and 40 people, of which at minimum 12 should be
found fit and willing to participate in an extensive case study.
To secure optimal variation in the case studies, I chose a number of contrasts that I wanted to
be represented in the study. The choice of desired contrasts was based on both theoretical
considerations and previous empirical evidence of what variables affect people’s social
production functions and subjective (social) well-being. More specifically, three kinds of
arguments guided the specification of selection criteria. Firstly, existing empirical knowledge
should be drawn on: which background characteristics have been shown to affect either
subjective well-being2, social contacts or daily activity patterns? Secondly, some basic
theoretical assumptions should be useful to identify or predict meaningful variation between
categories of people. Which background characteristics should, according to SPF theory,
result in large differences in the production of social well-being? Thirdly, ethnocentric
imbalance in the theory and research of social production functions should be prevented or
redressed, thus priority should be given to the representation of societal groups that differ
from the typical ‘highly educated, employed, high SES scientist’.
On the basis of the three types of arguments mentioned above, I chose eight background
characteristics, which are expected to be important determinants of differences in people’s
                                                
2      Strictly speaking, only differences in activity patterns between categories of people can be interpreted as
empirical evidence for differences in the social production functions of these categories. However, where we
lack this direct evidence, also empirical findings showing that certain categories of people differ in subjective
well-being should alert us. For when - after differences in objective resources are controlled for - one category of
people scores lower on well-being than another, one possible reason is that this category utilizes the available
resources in a different way i.e. that there exists some structural difference between the social production
functions of the two categories of people.
120                                                                    METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
production functions for social well-being3, and on which I thus wanted my cases to vary: 1.
Age; 2. Gender; 3. Employment status; 4. Educational attainment; 5. Involvement in enduring
partner relationship; 6. Parenthood;
7. Ethnicity; 8. Health.
Age is the first background characteristic that is obviously an important cause of variation in
social production functions. In previous research on subjective well-being and quality of life,
age was mostly found unrelated to happiness in bivariate analyses (except in studies using the
Loneliness-scale of De Jong-Gierveld & Kamphuis (1985), where age was consistently found
to relate positively to loneliness); but when looking at interaction effects with other variables,
such as gender, health, marital status and labour market position, age seems to be an important
source of variation in the way people produce their own (social) well-being. Both in previous
studies on activity patterns (Mentzel et al. 1988; De Hart 1995; SCP 1995; Verbrugge et al.
1996) and in previous studies using SPF theory (Steverink 1996; Van Eijk 1997; Nieboer
1997) subjective well-being and social production functions were shown to be related to age.
The second background characteristic causing variation in social production functions could
be gender. Significant effects of gender were seldom found in previous research on subjective
well-being (Veenhoven 1984, p. 178), but several factors that do influence subjective well-
being, such as income, employment status and (subjective health) are gender-related, which
provides an argument to ensure the representation of both men and women in the case-studies.
Studies on activity patterns did find significant gender-effects (Van Eijk 1997, p. 88-90; Hill
1985, p. 133-176; Juster 1985a, p. 177-204; SCP 1995). Although many of the gender effects
may decrease or even disappear when controlling for some of the other background
characteristics included in our list, gender may still have an independent effect. In any case,
precisely because of strong interaction effects of gender with most of the other background
characteristics, I wanted both sexes to be represented in my case studies.
The third background characteristic is employment status. This variable has been shown to
have a strongly negative effect on subjective well-being (e.g. Edzes & Van Bruggen 1997;
Van Bruggen 1999). Being out of work is generally believed to be detrimental to quality of
life, and it clearly has a negative impact on social well-being and social participation
(Engbersen 1990; Fryer 1988, 1992; Jahoda 1986). Obviously, unemployment also more
generally influences people’s activity patterns (SCP 1995).
The next background is educational attainment. Again, significant effects of educational
attainment on both subjective well-being and activity patterns (Verkley & Stolk 1989; Ormel
1988; SCP 1995) have been found in previous research, even when controlling for
employment status, although the effects are absent at the higher income levels and seem to be
gradually declining in western nations (Veenhoven 1984, p. 198-205). In addition to the
empirical arguments for including educational attainment as a variable on which we wanted
our case studies to vary, it is also expected to be an important factor in (redressing) any
                                                
3      Indirectly, through seeking variation on these eight characteristics, I also obtained variation between my
respondents in level of subjective well-being (which, in a sense, is the dependent variable in SPF theory).
Selecting respondents directly on their level of subjective well-being, however, would have been problematic,
both for practical reasons and because I would have had to rely on conceptualisations and measures of well-being
of which I would not have been able to say to what extent they coincide with the concept of subjective well-
being in SPF theory.
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ethnocentric bias that might have slipped in during the development of SPF theory.
The fifth background characteristic is the presence of a stable partner-relationship. The
positive effect of being involved in a (enduring) relationship with a romantic partner on
practically all aspects of well-being has extensively been demonstrated in many studies
(Veenhoven 1984, p. 233-237).  Also in research on activity patterns and time use (Dow &
Juster 1985, p. 397-414; Sullivan 1996) and in studies applying SPF theory (Steverink 1996;
Van Eijk 1997; Nieboer 1997) it has been found that having a (stable) partner significantly
affects the activities people engage in, and the benefits it brings them
The sixth background variable is parenthood, for which I not only distinguished between
people who do or do not have children, but when there were children, I also sought variation
between cases where there were children living at home and cases where they were living out
of the parental home. Obviously, having children (living at home) affects one’s activity
pattern (SCP 1995), as well as the enjoyment of activities (Dow & Juster 1985, p. 397-414).
Also, one’s children may be both a source of social well-being (most importantly of affection)
and a restriction for interaction with others, thus for utilising other sources of affection.
A further background variable of interest is ethnicity, or, more precisely, whether one has
recently immigrated to the Netherlands. Although ethnic immigrants differ in many other
ways (culture, religion, social economic position, gender- and family roles) from the 'average
native Dutch person', our main interest is in this respect to see whether and how the social
production functions differ for one who has recently left behind practically all his social
network and whom, for daily social approval, largely depends on recently established,
possibly few, social relationships (a recent study of the social participation of unemployed
suggests that indeed immigrants differ from native Dutch unemployed both in their average
subjective well-being and in various forms of social participation, cf. Edzes & Van Bruggen
1997).
The eighth background variable is (perceived) health. As has been shown in several previous
studies, health can be an important restriction on people’s daily activities (Nieboer 1997; Van
Eijk 1997) and it is also significantly related to subjective well-being (Veenhoven 1984, p.
268-273). Therefore, given our aim to obtain a maximally broad inventory of possible social
production functions, some variation in the health status of our case studies is desirable.
Of course, other personal characteristics can be thought of that are also related to subjective
well-being, activity patterns or both: e.g. self-efficacy, extraversion et cetera. However, the
eight background variables I chose do not require the use of testing procedures or elaborate
measurement instruments4 and are thus more practicable as selection criteria in our study.
Also, if important variations in production functions would indeed be found for people that
differ in these background variables, it might in eventual applications of the diagnostic tools
(the system of indicators that will be developed) be desirable to have the possibility of
focussing, for selected subgroups, on these particular elements that differ from the population
at large. The possibility of doing this requires that the various categories of respondents,
                                                
4     Possibly, ‘health’ is an exception to this, depending on how it is operationalised. In the present case,
however, a simple self-rating item for state of health suffices, or we might use a rough indicator (with doubtful
validity but high practical relevance) such as entitlement to physical incapability-benefits (WAO)).
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whom one would want to ask extra questions, be easy to identify, also in large scale surveys;
the eight background variables used here could eventually be used to this aim, whereas using
assessments of e.g. self-efficacy or extraversion would pose considerable practical problems.
I did not specify (based on the background variables) detailed profiles for the participants to
be recruited. If I had wanted to represent all possible combinations of scores on the eight
selection variables, this would have led to minimally 256 different profiles; a number that by
far exceeds anything I could manage. Instead, facilitated by the incremental recruitment of
participants, I sought to
get at least, for both sexes, one working and one unemployed participant, one parent and one
childless person, one single and one espoused person, one highly and one lowly educated
person, one older and one younger person, one person in good health and one with
problematic health, and one person from an ethnic minority and one 'born Dutch'. These were
the minimal criteria I used for achieving the desired variety in case studies, beyond meeting
these criteria I of course strove to find the most interesting and varied combinations of
background variables.
4.3.2. THE PRACTICAL RECRUITMENT AND SELECTION OF PARTICIPANTS
Multiple methods were used for the targeted recruitment of participants. Firstly,
advertisements were placed in supermarkets, sports facilities, pubs, pharmacies and public
libraries to attract various kinds of people. Secondly, advertisements were distributed door-to-
door in several streets in different parts of the city of Groningen. Thirdly, chair people from
several associations, including a women’s association (NCVB), a men’s snooker club and a
gospel choir, were found willing to distribute advertisements at meetings of their groups.
Fourthly, students of a ‘HOVO’-course (modular education for older people) were approached
and asked to participate.
For attracting parents of young children, advertisements were placed at playgartens and
health-care offices. For recruiting (long-term) unemployed participants, social welfare
workers and employees of centres for social activation were found willing to provide some
addresses and introduce us to their clients. Ten participants for the focus-group discussions
were recruited in this way.
For attracting recent immigrants, the Centre for Islamic Affairs in Groningen was approached
to help us get in contact with potential participants, the parents of children visiting a club for
disadvantaged youths were approached and again social welfare workers were asked to recruit
clients from the cultural minorities who were interested to participate in the case-studies. Five
participants were recruited in this way. Finally, some participants were recruited via snowball
sampling.
The recruitment, as described above, yielded but small numbers of volunteers, which enrolled
only one by one. As I planned at most twenty case studies, this was not really a problem, but it
did mean that it was impractical to wait until, say, fifty volunteers had enrolled and then take
the most ideal selection of cases. Apart from incurring a serious time delay before the case
studies could begin, that method would have meant a large risk of losing volunteers due to
declining motivation to participate if they had to wait too long. Therefore I used a twofold
strategy. In the first place I first took whatever cases applied, and only later focussed the
recruitment and selection specifically on groups with characteristics that had remained
underrepresented thus far. In the second place I started the case studies by focus group
discussions (see section 3.3.) comprising five participants (simply in order of recruitment)
each. The information about each of the participants, collected in the group discussions, thus
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enabled me to start out with the most interesting (most different) cases for the more intensive
time-use studies. The possibly less interesting cases could thus be kept 'in stock', to be decided
on later. Initially, all recruits were thus appointed to a certain focus group. When,
subsequently, some categories of the predefined criteria for the case studies began to fill up, I
proceeded with more selective recruitment in order to fill also the still empty categories and
thus to get the desired variation in cases.
It was necessary for the aim of the qualitative study to recruit participants that are able and
willing to give extensive and detailed information about the way they produce and experience
(social) well-being - be it much or little - in their living situation. The drawback of a possible
distortion induced by overrepresentation of “extravert” people, seems impossible to evade.
This drawback does have one advantage however, as it will, in all likelihood, positively affect
the detail and sincerity of the information given.
Eventually, 31 people were recruited to participate in the focus group interviews, 12 men and
19 women, from 22 to 76 years of age (mean age 44). Further background characteristics of
the 31 respondents are reported in appendix A.
4.4. Methods of data collection: focus group discussions and time use study
4.4.1. THE FOCUS GROUP INTERVIEWS
As a first step in the qualitative study, focus group interviews were conducted, in which all
later participants of the case studies took part. These focus group discussions served a triple
aim:
1) they provided additional information on which the selection of participants for the case
studies could be based;
2) they provided a large number of statements on subjective well-being and the first-
order goals of SPF theory, which were used to answer the first research question, i.e.
the further conceptualisation of these goals and their particular manifestations in
people’s perception;
3) they provided important though incomplete information on the specific use of
production factors by the participants for the case studies.
The method of focus groups was chosen because of its appropriateness for investigating topics
that are still largely unexplored (although Merton & Kendall  (1946) claimed that moderators
in focus-groups needs ‘previous knowledge’, see Vaughn et al. 1996, p. 4), as is the case with
the social production functions people in various tracks of life use to achieve social well-
being. But most importantly, the method of focus groups is most suitable when the aim is to
obtain a broad inventory of respondents’ point of view. Other group interview procedures
often aim at consensus building or problem solving (Vaughn et al., p. 5, 6), and the use of
surveys and structured questionnaires tends to impose the point of view of the researcher
(Krueger 1994, p. 7). In general, the method of focus-groups is supposed to work because it
“taps into human tendencies” (Krueger, p. 10): while mail and telephone interviews may
suffer from an unjust assumption that individuals really know how they feel, and form their
opinions in isolation, the claimed strength of focus group interviews lies in the fact that
“people may need to listen to opinions of others before they form their own personal
viewpoints. Although some opinions may be developed quickly and held with absolute
certainty, other opinions are malleable and dynamic. Evidence from focus group interviews
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suggests that people do influence each other with their comments and in the course of a
discussion the opinions of an individual might shift” (Krueger, p. 11; see also Albrecht 1993).
This function of increasing awareness of ones own opinions and feelings is important for the
present study, as the paradigm of rational choice, in which SPF theory is embedded, does not
assume that people are aware of (all) the utility arguments in choosing their actions. It is not
assumed that people are consciously aware of their social production functions, nor even of
the fact that they are, somehow, producing social approval through what they are doing.
Therefore, in order to get some of these possibly unconscious processes to the surface, the
group interaction in discussing determinants or influences of well-being is highly desirable.
This strength of the focus group interview method may at the same time be its weakness. Just
because of the influence participants exert on each other, we may end up with less variation in
statements than would be representative of the participants’ actual views. Certain topics - in
casu certain production factors or activities - may not even come up, just because so much
attention is drawn to the - not necessarily more important - topics that happen to come up first,
leading to a distorted view of what are relevant production factors.
The remedy I used for this threat of the group process turning contraproductive, is the
following. About two weeks in advance of each planned focus group discussion, I sent the
participants of that focus group a questionnaire (appendix B) with very open questions on the
following topics: subjective well-being in general and in a number of life domains5; global
pattern of weekly activities; some of the possible benefits of the reported activities; and things
or values that the participant personally deems essential for being happy. In addition the
questionnaire included the Loneliness-scale of De Jong-Gierveld & Kamphuis (1985) and
Bradburn’s (1969) Affect Balance Scale for validation purposes, and questions on personal
background characteristics.
The participants were instructed to fill in this questionnaire and asked to return it a week
before the planned group discussion. This pre-focus-group questionnaire was intended to
evade the threat of contra productive group influence processes in two ways. First, by
carefully screening the completed questionnaires before moderating the focus group
discussion, I could draw up a list of topics for discussion that included at least all topics that
had come up as relevant in the individual answers to the questionnaires. During the focus
group discussions this list (appendix C) was used as a checklist to prevent that certain topics
would not be discussed. Also the levels of subjective well-being and domain-satisfactions
were indicated on this checklist, and when participants tended to fall in agreement with each
other regarding a positive or negative evaluation of their well-being, the moderator could
intervene by saying: “Still, some of you have given answers very much at the negative
(positive) end of the scale for this aspect of life. So there may be some less positive (negative)
aspects to this matter also. Can we also discuss some of these?” Second, the very fact that the
participants were asked to complete the questionnaire may have had a sensitising function.
                                                
5    The subjective well-being questions were designed to get some impression of possibly problematic areas of
life for the participants, without forcing or allowing the participant to ‘pin’ himself to some numerical judgment
already. Therefore we asked the participants to indicate, by putting a cross on a line ranging from ‘the worst
possible life’ to ‘the best possible life’ (an adapted form of Cantrill’s (1965) well-being question), how they at
the moment felt about their life in general, respectively the various life domains. In a pilot study conducted in
1996 among third grade sociology students, this version of the well-being item appeared less vulnerable to social
desirability bias and to people’s own norms about valuing their own life with either a score below the middle
point of the range or at the positive extreme than versions of the well-being questions asking a score on a range
from zero to ten.
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Because there was a time lag of about a week between answering the questions and discussing
the topics, the respondents - especially when they had not consciously thought about the topic
previously - had some time to form their own thoughts about it. Although not controllable,
this possibility seemed desirable.
The focus groups consisted of mostly 5 (and maximally 7) participants, who were in most
cases mutual strangers. In the literature concerning focus group research (Morgan 1988, p. 43;
Vaughn et al. 1996 p.5; Krueger 1994, p. 6), the prescribed group size is usually between 7
and 10. I decided to use somewhat smaller groups because of the broad nature of the research
topic: while, ‘traditionally’, focus groups are used mostly to investigate, say, the processes
behind people’s emotional reactions to a certain stimulus, or to explore customers preferences
and feelings about a specific kind of product, the investigation of social production functions
may in fact include about all human activities and resources. Therefore, in order to allow each
participant to express his views on at least the main constituents of his social production
functions, I had to reduce the group size. In fact, after conducting one focus group discussion
with 7 participants, I decided to maintain a maximum of 5 for the remainder of the project, as
the 7-person group proved too large to allow each participant to talk about all that he deemed
relevant.
With regard to the participants’ background, the focus groups were more or less randomly
composed, using only the following general criterion: there should be some, but not too much
difference in background characteristics of the participants per group. Some differences are
desirable, because a discussion with other respondents who are too similar in many respects
might fail to elicit differences of opinion and fail to trigger the intended process of becoming
aware of things. But too large differences between the participants, in particular large
differences in education and ability to formulate thoughts, might discourage part of the group
to speak freely. I therefore organised separate focus groups for the participants that were
recruited through institutions for social welfare, minority groups and unemployment agencies.
Eventually there were three focus groups of general composition, one group with participants
from ethnic minorities, and three groups of unemployed people. The latter three groups were
somewhat smaller in size (three or four participants) than the other groups, due to a high
dropout rate (participants not appearing on the appointed day).
In the focus group discussions, which took 2 through 3 hours per session, people were asked
to discuss factors they consider important for their own well-being or happiness. As a rule, the
focus group discussions were started by asking the participants whether they had found it
difficult to complete the questionnaire and which were the questions to which they had not
had an answer ready. Next, each of the participants was asked which determinants would
come first in their minds if they were now again asked how well they liked their present lives.
They were encouraged to elaborate on these, and other participants could freely interrupt. As
mostly the participants would start out with mentioning factors that influence their quality of
life positively, the next question would be what factors they found negatively influencing their
well-being at present. After these ‘open’ rounds, the ensuing discussion was regularly fed
with topics from the checklist. Additionally, when certain topics came up, about which
previous focus group discussions had provided statements very different from what seemed to
be the opinions in the current group, such statements were put forward for the current
participants to react on. Finally, the moderator also guarded that, though of course implicitly,
the first order goals for social approval, as stated in SPF theory, (status, behavioural
confirmation and affection) were all amply covered in the discussion. If one of these first-
order goals had not received sufficient attention already, the moderator intervened by bringing
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the topic up. In all focus group discussions I took the role of moderator.
The complete group sessions were audio- and videotaped for later transcription. The
audiotapes were used for verbal transcription, and only when it was not clear from these
which of the participants was speaking, the videotapes were used to ascertain. Each
transcribed statement could thus be given a code corresponding with the participant who gave
it. The analysis of the thus obtained transcripts is described in section 4.5.
4.4.2. COMPLEMENTARY DATA COLLECTION: TIME USE STUDY AND ADDITIONAL INDIVIDUAL
INTERVIEWS
One aim of the qualitative study is to obtain a broad inventory of possible production factors
for social approval, through reconstructing the social production functions of the participants.
But as participants may be only partially be aware of their social production functions (see
above), I decided not to rely solely on the focus group interviews, but rather use a
triangulation of methods, minimising the chance that important elements of the production
functions are missed or that overly co-operative behaviour of participants (trying to provide
information even when they are unsure about it) leads to distortions in the reconstructed social
production functions. Besides the focus group discussions I therefore used two additional
methods of data collection: time use inventories and individual in-depth interviewing. Both
were used only as complementary and supportive to the data collection via the focus group
interviews. Of course, both additional methods can be applied much more extensively than I
did and the data collected through these methods could have been analysed much more
thoroughly, with specifically tailored methods. But for the purpose of this study it sufficed to
use these data as a check upon the participant’s information from the focus group interview,
and time constraints did not allow additional analyses of the time use data with specialised
methods.
The reason for applying time use inventories is quite straightforward: as I assume that people
‘produce’ their own (social) well-being, the productive activities by which resources are
transformed into forms of social approval should show up in a systematic recording of daily
activities6.
The time use inventories that were applied were designed to provide a complete inventory of
the respondent’s activities during 7 subsequent days, including the main social aspects of
these activities and their immediate contribution to subjective well-being. Obviously, people
cannot report literally everything they do, even if they would be willing to try. In time use
research, different solutions are used, the objective of the study determining which solution
suits best. One method is the use of beepers that go off at random time intervals; when the
beeper goes off, the respondent has to report what he is doing at that exact moment, and
usually answer a number of additional questions about this activity. This method is
                                                
6       Given the definitions of status, behavioural confirmation and affection, one could argue that only the
production of behavioural confirmation should be visible in recordings of daily activities, as the other compo-
nents of social approval are not produced by what one does, but by what one has or is. I believe this objection to
be true only in a strict sense: I would argue that also the other two first order goals may become visible in time
use studies, be it rather in the form of activities where previously produced status and affection is consumed than
produced. And, for all we know, such consumptive activities might be indispensable for the preservation of once
produced status and affection (indeed for affection it will be seen in Chapter 6 that ‘spending time together’ is
one of the main production factors, while it is of course also the consumption of affection).
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particularly popular in mood research. A second method is the use of direct survey questions
in which respondents are asked either retrospective information about their time use or they
are asked to give estimates of their general activity patterns, also based on retrospection. A
third method is to have respondents fill in all their subsequent activities, including the time
they started and ended these activities. This method provides the most complete inventory of
activities, if it is indeed followed conscientiously, which is not easy. A somewhat different
method again is to ask respondents to report at regular time intervals what they have been
doing in the past interval (also additional questions about these activities can of course be
posed). This method is somewhat easier for respondents than the former one. It provides a
moderately complete inventory of activities, in which especially activities of very short
duration and activities that are so habitual that people perform them almost unconsciously
(e.g. washing your hands, closing the curtains) are likely to be underreported7. Balancing the
relevance and detail of collected data against the ease of use for respondents (and thus the
probability of not dropping out during the study), I decided to use the latter method. I first
tested whether it was feasible to let people report per 15 minutes what they had been doing, by
trying to keep such a diary for a week myself and asking two friends to try this. The interval
of 15 minutes appeared to short to keep up, so I changed this to 30 minutes, this turned out to
be a rate that respondents could deal with.
So every half hour8 respondents had to report their activity over the past interval, and it was
also asked where they were, whether they were alone, with whom they were, whether there
was a social interaction and at whose initiative, and how well they liked what they were doing
in this interval (as compared with the foregoing interval). In case of extremes or large changes
in enjoyment, respondents were asked to indicate the reasons for this. The activities were not
only reported verbally, but respondents also added an activity-code, which primarily
categorises activities into clusters of similar functional context, such as ‘paid work’, ‘house
making’, ‘child care and informal care’, ‘basic life activities’, ‘sports and recreation’. The
coding scheme for the activities was a slightly simplified version from the coding schemes
used by the SCP. I decided that besides verbal descriptions, coding of activities was desired to
ensure the interpretability of the verbal descriptions of activities. These verbal descriptions
were often very short and ambiguous, like ‘talking’, or ‘driving the car’, whereas I wanted to
be able to derive the place of the activities in people’s social production functions, thus: was
he talking to his friend or to a client at work, and was she driving her children to their music
lessons or making a tourist trip? In section 4.5. it is explained how the context-based activity
codes were used to relate the time use data to the data from the focus group interviews.
Respondents used structured forms to report their time use, each page covering six hours, four
pages per day; the complete time use diary thus consisted of 28 such pages. Appendix B
shows one page of the time use inventories, and also the main categories of the activity codes.
                                                
7      Of course, there exist many variations of these methods of collecting time use data, but for our study the
typical methods mentioned here were the main relevant alternatives. For a comparison of different modes of
collecting time use data, see Robinson (1977, 1985), or also Juster (1985b).
8        The respondents were instructed, however, to let the normal performance of their activities prevail over the
exact keeping of 30 minutes intervals in case the filling in of the time use diary would seriously interfere with or
disrupt their normal business. Thus, for activities lasting over 30 minutes and not allowing the regular interrup-
tion for filling in the diary, respondents were instructed not to abstain from these activities while participating in
the time use study, but rather to memorize what happened and fill in the diary as soon as possible afterwards for
the time intervals of that activity.
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After the seven-day time use inventory was completed, the forms were returned to me by mail
or I went by to fetch them. By that time, the transcripts of the corresponding focus group
interviews would be ready, and I could compare the time use reports with the respondent’s
statements in the transcripts. When in the time use reports any activities turned up that were
not mentioned in the focus group interview, as well as when I noted anything remarkable in
the combinations of the reported activities and the enjoyment thereof, I listed this as a topic to
be asked in an additional individual interview. After thus preparing, per respondent, a list of
remaining topics for the concluding individual interviews, I made appointments with them
and discussed these points. The information obtained in the individual interviews was
concisely written down, incidentally including verbal citations, and added to the focus group
interview transcripts of the respective respondents.
Not all participants of the focus group interviews were willing to additionally participate in
the time use study: 16 of the 31 participants started keeping a diary. Two of these dropped out
during the time use study. In appendix A the 14 remaining participants to the time use study
are described with regard to some background characteristics.
4.5. Method of analysis of the qualitative data
4.5.1. QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS: BASIC PRINCIPLES
For qualitative analyses of the kind of data I had collected, with an exploratory objective,
there are no such ready-to-use methodologies, or ‘recipes’, as for the statistical analysis of
quantitative data, where hypothesis testing is the main objective. Although there are various
enlightening methodological publications on qualitative research in the social sciences, most
of these are at best specific about the methods of data collection, and leave the methods of
analysis and interpretation largely open. Even Glaser & Strauss’ The discovery of grounded
theory (1967), although fully dedicated to the principles of qualitative analysis, provides no
concrete methods for doing this9. Still, there are many valuable insights and useful tools to be
found in Glaser and Strauss, as is also indicated by the innumerable references to it in
practically all handbooks on qualitative methods (e.g. Miles & Huberman 1994; Weitzman &
Miles 1995). It is not relevant here to fully discuss the merits and problems of the grounded
theory approach; I will just touch upon some useful notions in Glaser and Strauss (ibid.) that I
have found helpful in designing and conducting my own analyses.
The main useful tools in Glaser and Strauss (1967) that were relevant to the analyses of my
data, are the following. Firstly, Glaser and Strauss advocate what they call the constant
comparative method. This method consists of three interrelated elements: theoretical
sampling, critical experiments and structured comparisons. Together these elements represent
a focussed and systematic way of collecting and analysing or interpreting qualitative data. The
                                                
9     Partly, this lack of prescribed procedures seems to follow logically from the lack of uniformity in types of
qualitative data and, more importantly, in the objectives of qualitative research. However, I believe that it is well
possible to explicate the procedure of qualitative analysis much further than is currently done, and that, if a clear
indication is added of the particular objectives which a certain procedure is designed to meet, researchers will be
able to adjust the suggested steps of analysis according to the particularities of their own research aims. As we
will see shortly, Wester (1995) is one of the few who provide a ‘handbook’ of this kind.
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first element, theoretical sampling, is a very goal-directed way of data collection: it basically
means that the researcher first specifies his theoretical questions and expectations (e.g., of
what would be relevant variations), and then based on these, decides what data he needs to
collect to answer his questions. Of course, this procedure can be iterated when the researcher
has gained new insights that are relevant to his research questions. This very focussed way of
data collection is highly efficient, which is a great advantage, especially in the usually quite
labour-intensive qualitative research. The second element of the constant comparative
method, the critical experiment, is closely related to the idea of theoretical sampling. Critical
experiments are ‘tests’ of the ideas and theoretical hypotheses that the researcher develops
during the analyses: when I found (see also chapter 6) that ‘being busy’ can be a direct source
of status, that is, that people tend to look up to others who are busy, I hypothesised that being
busy is a generalised indicator of the amount of scarce (thus valued) capacities that people
have, and only therefore elicits status, not because being busy per se is valued. If this idea
would be correct, a person that is known to have many scarce skills (e.g. through public
performance or through the position he holds at work), would receive status irrespective of his
‘being busy’, he would possibly even get more status if he managed not to be busy. At the
other hand, a person that is known to have few valued skills, would not receive status for
being busy either, again rather the reverse. The critical experiment in this case would consist
in finding two such persons, and investigating whether my hypotheses find support.
The third element, structured comparisons, is implied by the first two elements. It means that
the analyst should on the basis of theoretical considerations and expectations decide at
forehand which would be relevant contrasts (i.e. between which cases he expects variation in
the variables and mechanisms of interest), that he should see to it that these contrast should be
present in his data, and subsequently, that he should compare the contrasting cases for all
aspects of the theoretical problem he is working on.
Secondly, Glaser and Strauss introduced the term sensitising concepts, denoting the
preliminary ideas of the researcher that constitute his way of looking at the data. There is a
false notion around that in the grounded theory approach the researcher starts out by looking
completely open at his data, but this is refuted by Glaser and Strauss’ emphasis on the use of
sensitising concepts. Indeed, as anyone who has ever attempted to open-code data without any
pre-existing notions of what one is looking for should know, the whole idea that coding
without sensitising concepts is even possible is naive. It therefore seems a sound advice to
make ones sensitising concepts explicit from the start, for two reasons. In the first place it
saves the researcher from drowning in his data. In the second place, and no less important, it
makes the coding and interpretation open to replication and to critique.
Thirdly, although they are not the only nor the first authors who use the term and the practice,
Glaser & Strauss stress the importance of memoing. Writing memo’s refers to the essential,
indispensable habit in qualitative analysis to write down any ideas or guesses about the topic,
the relation between concepts et cetera, at each stage of the research. Miles and Huberman
(1984, p.69), quoting Glaser, express the value of memoing as follows:
“Fieldwork is so fascinating, and coding usually so energy-absorbing, that you can get
preoccupied and overwhelmed with the flood of particulars (...) You forget to think, to
make deeper and more general sense of what is happening, to begin to explain it in a
conceptually coherent way. Reflective remarks, marginal remarks and pattern coding are
all a step away from the immediate toward the more general. (...) We can hardly do better
than Glaser’s (1978) definition: “[A memo is] the theorising write-up of ideas about codes
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and their relationships as they strike the analyst while coding...it can be a sentence, a
paragraph or a few pages... it exhausts the analyst’s momentary ideation based on data with
perhaps a little conceptual elaboration.” Memos are always conceptual in intent. They do
not report data, but they tie different pieces of data together in a cluster, or they show that a
particular piece of data is an instance of a general concept.”
The most important advice Miles and Huberman give with regard to memoing is to
“always give priority to memoing. When an idea strikes, STOP whatever else you are
doing and write the memo (...) Include your musings of all sorts, even the fuzzy and foggy
ones. (...) Don’t self-censor.” (ibid., p. 71).
Memoing and this piece of advice may strike the reader who has no experience in qualitative
analysis as odd, tedious and time-consuming, but during my research I learned that, though it
is indeed tedious (indeed I don’t think I have ever had such a heavy exercise in disciplined
thinking), it constitutes one of the central tools for qualitative analysis. In qualitative analysis,
results never just ‘pop up’ such as when performing computerised statistical analyses; results
only consist in the analyst’s interpretations. And, to prevent the first or most conventional or
most superficial interpretation to be adopted without carefully considering all other possible
interpretations, it is essential to follow and report each lead, each beginning of an idea about
the data. This ensures that, when rereading ones memos, all potential interpretations that have
crossed the analysts mind, receive consideration, and the best suited or most relevant (set of)
interpretation(-s) can be selected from these.
Most authors (e.g. Glaser 1978; Glaser & Strauss 1967; Wester 1984, 1995) advise to
distinguish between types of memos, as usually the stack of memos grows very fast during an
analysis. Usually it is advised to distinguish theoretical and methodical memo’s; the first
serving for ideas regarding the theory, the concepts and the relations between the concepts,
and the second type serving to report all ideas with regard to the subsequent steps in data
collection and analysis. Often, however, I found that ideas I wrote down were relevant both to
the emerging theory and to the collection of new data (the inseparability is clear when
considering theoretical sampling) or new steps in the analysis. Therefore I changed to
ordering my memos according to the level and elements of SPF theory for which they were
relevant.
Useful as the tools and advise discussed above may be, they provide but little guidance for the
inexperienced qualitative analyst. That is where, in my study, the work of Wester (1984,
1995; Peters & Wester 1995) came in to provide more structure and fill the methodological
lacunas. Wester largely conforms to Glaser and Strauss’ grounded theory approach, but he
developed this into a more concrete method, through distinguishing identifiable steps in the
analysis.
The general sequence of steps or phases in a qualitative analysis following a grounded theory
approach, according to Wester (1995, p. 52-73) would be: 1) exploration; 2) specification; 3)
reduction; and 4) integration.
The phase of exploration as described in Wester (ibid., p. 53-58) in fact largely precedes the
analysis of the qualitative data that is described in this section. Wester distinguishes two steps
within the exploration phase. The first step consists of many preparatory activities:
specification of the background of the study; construction of a preliminary conceptual
framework (i.e. choice of preliminary sensitising concepts); specification of research
questions; choice of units for analysis; and first partial data collection. The second step serves
to arrive at a formulation of preliminary concepts on the basis of the first materials, and
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consists of the following activities: transcription of the chosen research materials, open coding
of the transcripts and summarising the first impressions.
The main objective of the phase of specification is (Wester 1995, p. 58-63) to elaborate the
central concepts with maximum detail. In other words, the second phase is concerned with
achieving saturation of the main concepts. Saturation is achieved when all relevant aspects
and manifestations of the concept are represented in the analysis. In order for saturation to be
possible, complete coverage of the relevant field in the material is obviously needed; if the
researcher still lacks data about some sub-fields, he cannot be sure whether the main concepts
are saturated.
The specification phase consists of five steps. The first step serves to test the developed
preliminary concepts on new material and involves the choice, transcription and coding of
new units or new material, and the reporting of results. The second step serves to further
elaborate and classify the major central concepts, and involves the selection and structured
comparison of interview or observation segments according to main codes, and the reporting
of results. The third step serves to elaborate dimensions and indicators of the central concepts,
and involves the selection of interview segments according to sub-codes of a main concept;
comparison of these segments; identification of dimensions and dimension-poles; and the
definition of dimensions and their indicators. The fourth step serves to construct variables on
the basis of the dimensions that were identified in step 3. In this step a new level of analysis is
chosen: the analyses proceeds from the level of the concepts to the level of the units
(respondents, texts etc.). The fourth step involves the construction of summaries per
dimension per unit, comparison of segments per unit; making summaries per unit, comparison
of summaries over the units and classification of units. The fifth and last step of the
specification phase serves to investigate the interrelatedness in the classification of variables,
and involves the making and comparison of summaries per dimension per unit; identification
of the relations between variables; and reporting of and reflection on these.
The third phase in the qualitative analysis as described by Wester (ibid., p. 63-69) is called the
reduction phase. This phase concerns the identification of relations between the main
concepts, in particular the relations between the central concept and other concepts. Four steps
are distinguished in this phase of the analysis. The first step serves to identify which concepts
are central in the study at the moment, and involves an inventory of memo’s to see which
concepts are central; choice and transcription of new material; selective coding of the new
material using the developed indicators and variables, and reporting of results in memo. The
second, third and fourth steps are alternative ways to identify the core concept of the
developing theory. The second step serves to help identify the most central concept, using
summaries per unit, and involves the selection of fragments per unit which are relevant to the
central concepts; composing an overview per unit of the central concepts and their relations;
writing a memo in which the candidates for the main central concept are listed and possible
hypotheses are formulated. The third step serves to help identify the most central concept,
using all scenes from the complete material that reflect the relation between two or more of
the central concepts. This step involves the selection of fragments that reflect relations
between central concepts; composing of overviews of suggested relations; and formulation of
memo’s and hypotheses. The fourth step, which concludes the reduction phase serves to
derive interpretations from the previously made overviews, and involves an interpretative
analysis of the memo and overviews, resulting in a concluding memo with hypothesis
regarding the most central concept and its relations to other concepts. It should be noted that
not just the empirical material should be used in the reduction phase, but it is advised to also
make use of the relevant (theoretical) literature.
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The fourth and final phase as described by Wester (ibid., p. 69-72) is called the integration
phase and revolves around the integration with the central concept of all ideas that were
generated from the data (‘integrative fit’). In other words, in the fourth phase the theory
around the central concept is elaborated.
Two steps are distinguished in the integration phase. The first step serves to complete the
conceptual framework and the integration of all components of the analytic framework in the
conceptual framework, and involves systematic study of literature to support and possibly add
to the relations that were formulated; detailed reporting; and recapitulating the results to the
research questions. A memo should be written here which carefully considers whether the
materials that have been collected up this point sufficiently meet the requirements of the
definitive formulation of the research question. In the second step of the integration phase, the
definitive research question is answered through testing of the conceptual framework. This
step involves - again - collection of additional material; final coding of this material using the
final formulations of the developed variables; focussed analysis; and reporting of results.
Although the four phases described above, and the steps constituting them give the researcher
some indispensable grip on, and means for orientation in the process of the qualitative
analysis, they are not intended as an absolute or uniform ‘recipe’ for doing grounded theory
analysis. Wester explicitly encourages researchers to think critically about the objectives and
the starting point of the analysis they intend to perform, and to choose an appropriate selection
and sequence of the steps he describes (ibid., p.127,128). In the present study, I have chosen a
procedure for the analysis of the focus group and in-depth interview data that is inspired by,
yet clearly deviates from the general sequence of phases and steps. The procedure that I
incrementally developed and used to analyse my data is explained in section 4.5.3. First,
section 4.5.2. reports on a practical aspect of the qualitative analyses: the use of computerised
coding and retrieval tools.
4.5.2. COMPUTERISED CODING, RETRIEVAL AND CONCEPTUAL MODEL BUILDING: THE USE OF
ATLAS/TI
Computer technology has vastly increased the practicability of extensive and systematic
analysis of qualitative data (Weitzman & Miles 1995; Popping 1996). Various specialised
software packages have been developed for qualitative or content analysis. The basic function
that almost all of these packages share is that of a tool for coding and (selective, systematic)
retrieval of data fragments. Having the computer do these ‘secretarial’ tasks of qualitative
analysis saves not only an enormous amount of time and dull work, it consequently also
facilitates much more focussed and complicated analyses of the data. The main differences in
the presently available software for qualitative analysis of texts concern the particular tools
they offer for the more advanced methods of analysis, and the emphasis they place on various
aspects of such advanced analyses.
For the present project, the coding and retrieval options were of course indispensable, but also
a few more advanced options seemed useful, most importantly the network building tools
some software packages offer. Network building in this sense is basically just the exploration,
specification and visualisation of relations between codes (referring to theoretical concepts)
that were used in coding the data, and may be extended by distinguishing between different
logical relations, and subsequently, deriving hypotheses about the interrelations between not
directly related concepts and checking the consistency of the theoretical network. I wanted the
network building tool in order to be able to work on a representation of the internal structure
of the first order instrumental goals (status, behavioural confirmation and affection), as well as
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for deriving a conceptual network of the metagoals, the quality-aspects of social production
functions.
After exploring the possibilities of some widely used packages that offer some sort of network
building tools, such as Kwalitan, Nu*dist and Aquad, I chose to work with Atlas/ti 4.0 (Muhr
1996, 1993). The advantage of this software package is, besides it being user-friendly, that it
offers a very flexible tool for building conceptual networks. In most other packages the
network building option only allows networks that have some tree-like structure, which is
most suitable for classification schemes, while in Atlas/ti the only restriction to the shape of
the networks one builds is that the program does not allow inconsistent loops of relations
between codes. It was not likely that a tree-like structure would be adequate for representing
the way in which different quality-aspects of production functions are related to each other
and to subjective well-being, nor for the internal structure (between the different aspects) of
the first order instrumental goals. A further advantage of the Atlas/ti network building tool is
that it allows any elements of one’s working file (the hermeneutic unit) to be defined as nodes
in the conceptual network, thus it is possible to build a network in which not only concept-
codes, but also quotations and memo’s can be related to each other. This feature greatly
increases the ease of access to all information one would want to use in reporting the results of
the analyses.
In order to prepare the transcriptions of the focus-group discussions for analysis in Atlas/ti,
they were divided into segments (quotations). As a rule, the delineation of the quotations
followed the natural change of speaker: every time a respondent takes the word, a new
quotation starts, which ends at the moment another respondent or the moderator takes the
word again. In several instances I deviated from this criterion for delineating the quotations.
Firstly, when the quotation that would have resulted would have lacked sufficient information
to know what the respondent was talking about. In such instances, the quotation was extended
with as many sentences from the preceding text as the researcher deemed necessary to clarify
the statement in the specific quotation. Secondly, when the quotation that would have resulted
would be very long (e.g. over fifteen or twenty sentences) and would have contained multiple
substantive statements. In such instances, the quotation was divided into two or more smaller
quotations, according to its substantive content, as judged by the researcher. Thirdly, when the
quotation that would have resulted would have lacked any substantive content (like when a
respondent asks someone to repeat a remark that he did not hear well, or when it is just some
conversational “hum’s”), the fragment was not marked as a quotation for analysis.
This set of rules for delineating quotations in the transcripts, led to a large number of -
sometimes partly overlapping - quotations that each belonged to one respondent exclusively.
To each quotation a case number was added, referring to the person who was speaking, so
that, when storing and retrieving quotations from different focus group interviews for
analysis, it would be continually clear whose statements I dealt with.
For the first, exploratory analyses, I prepared three text bases, one for each of the first three
focus group interviews I had conducted. Each text base consisted of the complete set of
statements from all participants to that particular focus group discussion. The rationale for
keeping the statements from the same focus group into one text base was that frequently
respondents reacted to one another during the focus group interview, thus many quotations
consist of both remark and reaction of two different participants. All research questions were
first explored using only the data from these three focus group interviews (17 respondents).
The material was thus split up, so that after the first half was used for exploratory analyses,
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the second part of the data could be used for seeking confirmation of the emerging concepts
and theoretical relations. In other words, the categories and interpretations that are developed
on the first part of the material could be ‘tested’ on the other part of the data; a semi-
replication that gives some sense of the robustness of the categories and interpretations that
emerged from the analysis of the first three focus-group transcripts.
In a later stage, the remaining focus group data (respondents 18 through 31) were prepared in
the same manner. One large text base was created, containing these new quotations, that was
used for ‘testing’ the interpretations and categories that were developed.
4.5.3. ANALYSIS OF THE INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS, STEP BY STEP
STEP 1: Open coding of the material
The first step that was taken in analysing the focus-group quotations of the first 17
respondents, was open coding of the material. In the process of open coding, each quotation is
carefully read, and two types of codes are assigned to it: codes referring to predefined
(abstract) sensitising concepts, and low-abstraction codes that are very close to the wordings
of the respondent and that indicate the concrete content of the quotation.
The sensitising concepts that were formulated at forehand referred to the first-order goals for
social approval: status, behavioural confirmation and affection. A precarious balance had to
be maintained in using the theoretical concepts as sensitising concepts in open coding: I had
to describe these concepts sufficiently clear to be able to assign the adequate code to
quotations, yet refrain from imposing a too heavy a priori bias that would distort the eventual
results. To mitigate the problematic nature of this step (how can the reader know whether all
the things that she distils out of the data are not simply first put in there by herself?) I
explicated the clues that I used to decide on assigning the codes for the sensitising concepts to
a quotation.
The sensitising concept status was initially defined very vaguely as the feeling to do or be
able to do something special, receiving compliments, respect or admiration, or the feeling of
distinguishing oneself from others.
The sensitising concept behavioural confirmation was described vaguely as receiving
approval for one’s behaviour, the feeling of belonging to a group or community, feeling
accepted there, or a feeling of shared behavioural norms and values.
The sensitising concept affection was initially described as caring about someone or being
cared for by someone, feeling one’s own well-being is affected by the well-being of the other,
or the reciprocity of feelings being more relevant than actual behaviour.
Using the broadly described sensitising concepts, the quotations of the first 17 respondents
were open-coded. Each quotation was carefully read, after which one or more of the main
codes (i.e. codes referring to the sensitising concepts status, behavioural confirmation and
affection) were assigned to it if the descriptions fitted the content of the quotation (no main
code was assigned if none of the descriptions were relevant). Additionally, one or several key
words of low abstraction were assigned that reflected the (non-abstract) substantive content of
the quotation. These low abstraction keywords are also called the sub-codes in the following.
In the beginning of the process of open coding, the list of keywords that were assigned grew
fast, almost each quotation requiring a new keyword. Gradually, however, fewer and fewer
new key words needed to be introduced: after a certain amount of coding most new quotations
could be adequately characterised by one of the already used keywords. This is an indication
that the open coding reaches the stage of saturation (cf. Wester 1995, e.g. p.45, 58): if all
statements of a new respondent about his social well-being and his social production functions
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can be adequately coded with existing keywords, these keywords probably cover the main
important aspects of social production functions and their product.10
Codes text segment
• AFFECTION
• AFF-7: interdependency of well-being
• AFF-7b: loss of control over own well-
being




• ACT-17: visiting parents
• ACT-12: being there/spending time
together
• ACT-25: comforting someone
Frank: “Of course it is sad that my father
is gone, and I do miss him, but what hurts
most is to see how badly my mother
misses him. And that is something you
cannot help. You cannot relieve her pain
of missing him.
And, like you say, it feels good to comfort
her a bit by being there a few times a
week, but at the same time, these past two
years since my father died, it is not
enough…Not adequate for really
comforting her”.
 Figure 4.1.:  Example of text segment with codes referring to main concepts and concrete content
The decision when sufficient saturation is achieved remains somewhat arbitrary of course, as
it will always be possible to find people and instances that deviate from the devised list of
keywords. But when the researcher has ensured sufficient variation in the relevant main
variables through the selection of material (based on theoretical expectations), the saturation
criterion and pragmatic considerations help decide when to proceed to the next step in the
analysis. In the case of this study, I found saturation increasing from respondent 12 onward,
and becoming almost complete around respondent 15. Because of the fact that respondents 11
through 17 participated in the same focus group, I decided to use the material of these first 17
respondents for the exploratory analysis, and preserve the materials of the other respondents
for confirmation.
STEP 2: Exploratory analysis of the aspects of the first-order goals
The open coding having been completed, the next step was an inspection of the preliminary
list of quotations for each of the sensitising concepts (each of the first-order goals, status,
behavioural confirmation, and affection). First inspection revealed the necessity of a much
more precise categorisation of the quotations, as in the initial set of quotations for each of the
first-order goals different types of statements were present, some of which were irrelevant to
the analytical questions of the following steps. For example, the quotations contained both
statements about the respondents’ own level and production of the first-order goals, and about
                                                
10       Note, however, that this saturation-indication assumes a representative mix of cases in the exploration-
sample: if in the cases used for the open coding some relevant variables are not represented, the criterion for
saturation is not valid. In the present study, there was a slight bias or lack of representativity in the cases used for
open coding, because the first 17 respondents have on average a higher SES than later respondents. This bias
seems not to be very serious, however, as three of the first 17 respondents have low levels of education and three
are unemployed. In testing the categories and interpretations from the exploratory analyses on the data from later
respondents, I found that saturation had not been complete for the concrete production factors that people use,
but that regarding the conceptualisation of the first-order goals, the metagoals, and contexts and mechanisms, the
codes and categories developed on the basis of the first 17 respondents were adequate and sufficient.
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the level and production of the first-order goals by others or in general. For the exploratory
analysis of the theoretical concepts, where the concepts are the units of analysis, all these
quotations could be retained. But for later steps in the analysis, where the focus shifts to the
respondents as the units of analysis, the statements about others would have to be removed.
In this phase of the analysis, the first question was which aspects of the theoretical concepts
could be discerned in the qualitative material. As explained under step 1, the assignment of
quotations to first-order goals was performed on the basis of broadly and generally formulated
criteria. This means that, for every quotation under each of the first-order goal labels, at least
one of the broad descriptions of a sensitising concept applied to it. But this does not mean that
the broad descriptions really touch the essence of the theoretical concept, and even less that
they sufficiently represent the main different aspects these concepts may have. So the second
step in the analysis investigates what the empirical instances of the theoretical concepts reveal
about the essence and aspects of these concepts.
In the following explanation of the procedure I will take status as an example; the procedure
followed for the other two first-order goals are identical.
In order to answer this question, first a list of sub-codes that co-occurred with the main code
‘status’ was created. This list did not provide easy answers to the question however, as many
of the sub-codes referred to production factors rather than to aspects of status, and also, due to
the fact that sometimes two main codes were assigned to one quotation, not all sub-codes on
the lists were necessarily related to the status-concept or the production of status. So, I tried a
different approach. All quotations assigned to the main code ‘status’ were thoroughly re-read,
and for each quotation the decisive clue for assigning the code ‘status’ to it was marked.
Sometimes this could be achieved by simply underlining the words that signalled relevance to
status, sometimes a short remark was made in the margins explaining what characteristic of
the statement I had interpreted as the link to status.
After in fact having recoded the quotations in this way, the underlined fragments and the
remarks in the margins were listed and compared with each other. It appeared that only a
moderate amount of different ‘clues’ (about 30) accounted for all (159) status-quotations,
while several of the 30 clues were almost synonyms. To check whether possibly synonymous
clues indeed could be brought under one heading, the quotations to which they referred were
compared, and the clues were either merged when apparently meaning the same thing, or, if
not, their formulation was sharpened in order to express more clearly their different
connotations. This resulted in a list of 18 clues, for which in a further comparison of the
relevant quotations the possible interrelations were explored. This was done by comparing, for
each combination of clues, the quotations to which either one or both clues were assigned, and
carefully registrating any statement about the relation between the clues. For most
combinations of clues only a few statements regarding their possible interrelation were
available, which of course meant that I had to be reticent concerning the possibility to
generalise the findings. Still, the available statements generally agreed on the existence, type
and direction of possible relations between aspects of status. Complementary to the qualitative
data, I used existing literature to check or validate emerging ideas and conjectures about the
aspects and causation of status (and likewise for affection and behavioural confirmation). The
resulting ideas about the aspects of the first-order instrumental goals, as well as the clues and
the information provided by the material about their meaning and possible interrelations were
then described in a reflective memo, and summarised in a graphical representation using the
Atlas/ti network building tool.
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The exploration of the aspects of the first-order instrumental goals was concluded by the
formulation of a new list of sub-codes on the basis of the reflective memo. Then a check was
performed to make sure that all status-quotations from the exploration material (the first 17
respondents) could be adequately coded using only the codes from this list, which appeared to
work well. In a later phase of the analyses, I used this code list in testing the results of the
exploratory analyses on the remaining data, from respondents 18 through 31.
STEP 3: Exploratory analysis of the fields for the production of the first-order goals
In this step, the data from the first 17 respondents were used to derive a classification of the
so-called empirical fields where the production of the first-order goals can take place. In terms
of the grounded theory approach (Wester 1995; Glaser & Strauss 1967), fields are classes of
empirical situations for which theoretical or sensitising concepts are elaborated (or grounded).
Examples of fields in this sense could be classrooms, hospitals, families et cetera.
Usually, in studies applying a grounded theory approach, only one field is considered, or at
least only one field at a time. In the present study, however, an undetermined number of fields
needs to be investigated in order to get a more or less complete view of people’s social
production functions. For it follows directly from SPF theory that all activities a person
performs are relevant for his social and physical well-being, thus all fields where he
participates may be relevant. In order to be able to elaborate the sensitising concepts for all the
relevant fields, i.e. in order to develop sensitive and relevant specifications for all fields (the
field-related concepts, Wester 1995, p. 52, 57), I first needed a reasonably complete list of the
fields that should be considered.
The procedure I used to derive that list was quite straightforward: for each of the first-order
goals separately, all assigned quotations were re-read, and for every quotation a detailed note
was made about the context to which the statement referred. After doing this for all quotations
for a first-order goal, there resulted a detailed list of all the contexts the respondents had
referred to when talking about their social production functions.
The separate lists for the first-order goals were then re-arranged until all entries were logically
grouped together, and summarising labels were given to all clusters of entries. Of course, the
arranging of the detailed contexts could be done in different manners, and subjectivity in
choosing a certain ordering was inevitable. However, as can be seen in Chapter 6, where the
eventual classification of fields is presented, the detailed contexts were arranged in such a way
that the resulting classification of fields strongly resembles the different contexts that most
people are probably used to distinguish, as it reflects the way most activities and relations in
contemporary Dutch society are institutionalised.
The separate classification of contexts for the three different first-order goals led to highly
similar results, which is not surprising, because at least some degree of multi-functionality
could be expected for all fields. The three resulting classifications could thus easily be merged
into one classification of fields, in which all entries from each of the lists of contexts for the
three first-order goals could be categorised11.
From this step in the exploratory analysis, I derived the expectation (or hypothesis) that the
classification of fields I arrived at is adequate to represent all contexts from which people get
social well-being.  This expectation was ‘tested’ in the later analysis of the data from the
remaining respondents, leading to the corroboration of this ‘hypothesis’ that the proposed
                                                
11       Naturally, some of the fields in the classification bear more significance for one first-order goal than for the
others. The ‘private domain - personal relations’ - field will generally be of more importance for affection than
for status, while for the field ‘public domain - productive activities’ the reverse is likely to hold.
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classification of fields also represents all the relevant contexts for the production of social
approval of other than the first 17 respondents12.
STEP 4: Exploratory analysis of the production factors for the first-order goals
After having identified the fields for the production of social well-being (in step 3) and having
elaborated the conceptualisation of the three first-order goals (in step 2), it was now possible
to proceed to the next step in the exploratory analysis: the identification of production factors
per first-order goal per field of production. This of course is essential in view of the core
concern of quality of life studies (cf. Chapter 2): relating subjective well-being with the
objective factors that affect it. This fourth step is in fact the inventory of how people produce
social well-being, as it investigates which activities and resources are used to produce the
three forms of social well-being; which activities serve several or just one of the first-order
goals; which fields are more or less important to the realisation of the specific first-order
goals; and, following from this, which activities and resources are generally relevant, so that
they should be included in an investigation of the realisation of social well-being.
The same focus-group data from the first 17 respondents were again used for the identification
of production factors and production activities per first-order goal per field.
The procedure was straightforward: as both a code for the corresponding first-order
instrumental goal(s) and a code for the relevant field(s) of production were now assigned to
every quotation in the data, Atlas/ti was used to retrieve al quotations for each combination of
the six fields and three first-order goals subsequently. These quotations were then searched for
production factors, that is, for indications that certain resources and activities serve the
production of the corresponding first-order goal. These production factors were then listed for
each ‘field of production’-‘first-order goal’ combination. Obviously, this procedure resulted in
an inventory of production factors by fields by goals that was both incomplete (given the
unlimited number of potential production factors, it would be impossible even with a far
larger number of respondents to obtain an exhaustive inventory), and unmanageable (because
the number of production factors it contained was far too large to translate directly into
indicators).
To deal with this, the separate production factors that had been identified had to be brought
back, by moving to a somewhat higher level of abstraction, to a smaller number of factors,
and then, for each  ‘field of production’-‘first-order goal’ combination, the lists of these
somewhat more abstract production factors had to be completed. The first part of this
endeavour was of course a matter of interpretation and theorising instead of data analysis. For
the second part of the task, the completion of the lists of production factors, however, the data
did provide important clues. I compared each cell of the matrix of first-order goals by fields of
production first with the other cells in the same row, and second, with the other cells in the
same column. Thus, the production factors mentioned in e.g. the cell for the realisation of
status in the field of personal relationships, were at the one hand compared with the
production factors that in other fields had been found to be applied in the production of status,
and at the other hand with the production factors that had been found to be applied for the
production of behavioural confirmation and affection in the field of personal relationships. In
comparing the production factors for the same first-order goal in other fields, the question was
                                                
12       As implied in footnote 10 of this chapter, this corroboration by the data from respondents 18 through 31 may
be considered an even stronger indication of the robustness of the results because of the differences in
background characteristics between these later respondents and the first 17 respondents, on whose reported social
production functions the exploratory analyses rely.
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always whether a production factor (or an equivalent of it) that had been found in one field
could also - at least in theory - serve the production of the same first-order goal in other fields.
Production factors for which this seemed at least theoretically possible were then added to the
list of production factors for that first-order goal in other fields.
In comparing the production factors for the other first-order goals in the same field, I every
time considered whether the specific production factor in a particular cell could also serve the
production of the other first-order goals in that same field, and if so, what characteristics or
aspects of the production factor would determine whether status, behavioural confirmation or
affection be realised. In this way I sought to make explicit, for each production factor that
played a role in the production of more than one first-order goal, what are its relevant aspects
for each of the three distinguished first-order goals for social well-being.
STEP 5: Exploratory analysis of goals concerning form and quality of production functions
For the conceptualisation of the relevant aspects of the quality and form of social production
functions (the metagoals), I used a largely similar procedure as for the first-order instrumental
goals. In the first step, the open coding of the data, the set of sensitising concepts I could use
for these goals was - in contrast to that for the first-order goals for social approval - not
complete, as thus far in SPF theory only scattered and not exhaustive suggestions about
metagoals are found. Previous writings on SPF theory suggested metagoals or quality aspects
such as safety, efficiency, and consistency. These were therefore used as sensitising concepts,
but additionally I also assigned codes to any quotations that appeared to refer to some sort of
cognitive goal or other type of aspect that could not directly be subsumed under one of the
first-order instrumental goals. After having thus coded all data from the first 17 respondents, I
re-read all quotations per code that I used, and wrote memo’s about all the different aspects
and possible goals that the data seemed to suggest, and the possible relations of these aspects
to each other and to the existing theoretical framework of SPF theory. While re-examining all
these preliminary distinguished aspects, it appeared that some could be merged (as they
referred to the same aspect) while other codes needed to be further refined or split. Eventually,
through reading and rereading the quotations and the various interpretative memo’s, I arrived
at the formulation of a hypothetical conceptual framework for the cognitive aspects or quality
aspects of social production functions. This framework mirrored the existing theoretical
framework of SPF theory in representing also an instrumental hierarchy, but this one
depicting the instrumental ordering of metagoals. The instrumentality relations that appeared
to exist between various metagoals (or quality aspects) allowed me to organise the more than
thirty different aspects into two main (abstract) aspects of the quality of social production
functions. Having thus organised these newly developed theoretical concepts, I subsequently
used the remaining data (respondents 18 through 31) to validate these results.
4.5.4. ANALYSES OF THE COMPLEMENTARY DATA
Complementary to the focus group data, data were also collected via time use studies and
additional individual interviews. As explained before, these additional data were not collected
in order to get to know different things about the respondents than through the focus group
interviews, but rather to complete the information they gave in the focus groups and the
preliminary written questionnaires. Looking from a different angle in this case was not aimed
at getting a different perspective but just to prevent overlooking relevant information.
The diaries resulting from the time use studies were primarily screened for possibly relevant
(with regard to the respondent’s social production functions) activities that had not been
discussed in the focus group interviews. As the total number of different activities that were
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reported was huge, I had to apply some selection criterion for which activities to give
attention to. As a rule, I made notes of all activities (a) that were not discussed in the focus
group interview, yet appeared to be either a regularly recurring element of the respondent’s
production functions, or a source of large changes in mood and affective well-being, or both;
or (b) that appeared to influence the respondent’s mood or affective well-being in a manner or
direction contradicting the information given about it in the focus group interview.
These activities were listed as items for the subsequent individual interview about the time use
diary.
Besides this primary use of the time use data, they were also used as material for drawing up
the inventory of main production factors (resources and activities!) per first-order goal per
field of production. In order to get a more extensive inventory of relevant production activities
per field of production, the activities recorded by the respondents in their time use diaries
were categorised in the six fields of production that were identified in step 3 of the analysis of
the focus group data (see section 4.5.3.). As mentioned previously, for all the activities that
respondents recorded while participating in the time-use study, the context of the activity was
also registered by means of the first digit of the activity code. This context that is registered, is
conceptually synonymous to the fields for the production of the first order goals13. Although
the exact ordering and categorisation of the different contexts does not match the ordering that
was developed for the fields, the basic idea according to which both provide a context to
separate activities is the same. Both fields and contexts-codes reflect the general way in which
contemporary Dutch (Western) society is organised, i.e. the main recognisable
institutionalised forms in which people live and act and spend their time. By categorising
activities, according to their context-codes in the time use study, to the (more or less)
corresponding fields for the production of the first order goals, a considerable number of
concrete production factors could be added to the preliminary inventory of production factors
per goal per field. Of course, only after further theoretical consideration and checking of my
interpretations in the subsequent individual interviews, the tentative categorisation was either
accepted or adjusted.
The additional individual interviews with the participants of the time use studies were all
different, tailored closely to the issues that were found incompletely covered in the initial
focus group interviews and preliminary questionnaires or that emerged as potentially relevant
from the time use studies. The information obtained in these complementary individual
interviews was used for the qualitative analyses in one or two ways. One way in which the
complementary information was used, was help the interpretation of the focus group data,
where statements were ambiguous and allowed alternative interpretations, of which I was
uncertain which to choose. In some cases the complementary data were also used in a second
                                                
13     Obviously, in collecting the time-use data, standard categories were used for the registration of activity-
contexts, because the time use studies were performed partly simultaneous with the (later) focus groups, and
largely prior to the analyses of the focus-group data. Yet, linking the context-codes from the time-use data to the
fields that were defined in step 3 of the analysis of the focus-group data turned out to be very straightforward.
The contexts that were used in collecting the time-use data are ordered as follows:
0- paid work; 1- housekeeping, including gardening and odd jobs; 2- child care and child raising 3- shopping; 4-
personal needs; 5-education, courses; 6- religious participation, action-groups, neighbourhood councils, political
parties etc.; 7- social and cultural life; 8- sports and active recreation; 9- use of media: radio, tv, PC, reading.
Each of these contexts is further subdivided into detailed categories indicating the type of activity, plus the type
of social interaction (if involved), allowing to find equivalent categories in the time use data for practically all of
the sub-fields of the ordering of fields.
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way: if they contained new information which added something substantial (i.e. more than a
support for interpretation) to the focus group data, the respondents’ statements were
transcribed and added to the original focus group data of that respondent, to be analysed just
like the focus group transcripts.
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CHAPTER FIVE
RESULTS OF THE EXPLORATORY




In the chapter on SPF theory, it was argued that the definitions and conceptualisations of the
three first order goals for social well-being are unsatisfactory: they are in some respects vague
and ambiguous, they partly define the goals by the means that may be used for their
realisation, and, although the differences between the core meaning of the three goals may be
clear enough, the precise boundaries between one goal and the other are not (cf. section
3.4.2.). Based on these arguments, the first of the research questions that were derived was
What are the various and distinctive aspects of ‘status’, ‘behavioural confirmation’
and ‘affection’, respectively, and how and to what extent can the level of these goals
be distinguished from the production factors that may be used to attain them?
In 4.2.1., some thoughts regarding the nature of the operation of conceptualising were
expounded. In the case of this study, the relation between concept and the reality it refers to
may be understood by analogy to the names of the primary colours and the range of shades
subsumed under these. For answering the first research question, which the present chapter
reports on, this analogy implies the following. A prism was used to decompose ‘social well-
being’ as we normally see and experience it, into the full spectrum of colours it encompasses.
For each of the three first-order goals for social well-being at a time, we then inspect the part
of the spectrum to which it refers, considering and naming each of the recognisable shades
that are subsumed under it. These shades are named the aspects of the first-order goals: the
faces by which we can see them. The operation of conceptualising the first-order goals should
thus be understood as the studying of the shades or faces by which they become apparent in
reality. It may well be that, like the colours in the spectrum of light, the boundaries between
the first-order goals are fluent in reality. Rather than imposing a definition that sets a strict
(but with bare eyes indiscernible) boundary, such as by defining at what wavelength (orange-)
red is distinguished from (orange-) yellow, the first-order goals are in this chapter ‘defined’
or rather conceptualised by means of their aspects. And it is granted that some aspects may lie
close to the border where the one first-order goals flows over into the other. The
disentanglement of the first-order goals proper and the means for realising them, answers to
the same analogy: the aspects (shades) we perceive are the first-order goals proper. But in
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producing the first-order goals (the colours or one of their shades) the very shades that are part
of them may be used also as ingredients for mixing, like one may use one shade of blue
(which in itself is blue) to mix it with white in order to produce ‘baby-blue’.
This chapter reports the results of the exploratory study of the aspects of the status,
behavioural confirmation and affection. A general description of the method that was used for
analysing the qualitative data can be found in 4.5. More particulars concerning the analyses
are occasionally reported in this chapter, where relevant. The results presented in this chapter
are first and foremost derived from the qualitative data: the focus group interviews and case
studies that I conducted. However, both before and during the data collection and analyses and
afterwards, existing literature relating to the concepts of status, behavioural confirmation and
affection of course influenced the emerging conceptualisations that are presented in this
chapter. Given the vast amount of literature that touches on one or more of our central
concepts, and the emphasis we chose to place on the ‘grounded theory-like’ elaboration of
these concepts, I only conducted a limited and marginal literature study. After completing the
analyses and interpreting the results, it is of course desirable to compare and try to relate these
results to main insights from the literature. To a limited extent I did so, and where relevant,
the results of this confrontation of my findings with the relevant literature are reported in this
chapter as well.
The concepts of ‘status’, ‘behavioural confirmation’ and ‘affection’ and their respective
aspects are consequently reported on in the sections 5.2. through 5.4. Each of these sections
starts out with a concise restatement of the problems in the conceptualisation of the particular
first-order goal that were identified in Chapter 3, followed by an exploration of the relevant
and distinctive aspects of the concept.
Subsequently, in each section some attention is given to the problem of who are the ‘relevant
others’ for the particular first-order goal, to the role of self-approval as a complement to the
approval of others, and to some miscellaneous issues that emerged from the data. Each section
is concluded by a graphical representation of the elaborated concept, that summarises the
foregoing insights, and by the formulation of implications for the eventual development of
measurement instruments for the subjective level of the first-order goal in question. In section
5.5. follows the conclusion.
The results I present in this chapter are frequently illustrated with quotations from the focus
group interviews. Obviously, as these interviews were conducted in Dutch, the quotations had
to be translated before inserting them in this chapter. I have tried to translate the quotations in
such a way that the English version optimally confers what the respondent was trying to say.
This meant that frequently I decided not to translate the original quotations literally, because
that would not have expressed in the best way what the respondent intended. Generally, the
meaning of quotations only becomes clear in the context of the discussion, sometimes it is
even impossible to deduce from an isolated quotation what its subject is. Therefore, I give free
translations, in which I often add some context information in the quotations to help the reader
understand what the respondent is talking about.  
5.2. Status: a further elaboration and conceptualisation
5.2.1. PRESENT AMBIGUITIES IN THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF STATUS
In Chapter 3, the concept of status as one of the three first-order instrumental goals in people’s
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production functions for social well-being, was introduced. The definition Lindenberg gives of
the concept is that “[s]tatus refers to a relative ranking, mainly based on control over scarce
resources” (Lindenberg & Frey 1993, p. 196). The other authors who have thus far used SPF
theory defined status in a largely similar vein, though sometimes in different wordings (cf.
section 3.4.2., p. 20). In all applications of SPF theory thus far, we find agreement that ‘status’
refers to someone’s relative ranking in society, that it is based on the control over scarce
goods, and that it is multidimensional, that is, that there are multiple goods that each may lend
status.
It was asserted in Chapter 3 that concerning the exact content of the concept of status there is
less unclarity or confusion than about the exact content of behavioural confirmation and
affection. Thus, the exploration of its content in the analysis of the focus group data is neither
expected nor intended to lead to completely new insights regarding the content of ‘status’.
Yet, there are three respects in which the exploratory analyses may help to improve the
conceptualisation of status as a first-order goal in SPF theory.
In the first place, although we know quite well what exactly we mean by ‘status’, this need not
imply that the forms in which status may present itself in people’s experience can easily be
identified or recognized. There is reason to suspect that status, as a component of subjective
social well-being, may often appear in disguise in people’s experience, for in many spheres of
life there exists a taboo on wanting and enjoying to be better than others. It may be perfectly
alright to strive for status and be competitive in sports or even in one’s work (although the
acceptance of the latter varies with the sector one work in), but to acknowledge openly that
you feel good about having more friends than others, or being more intelligent, attractive,
etcetera, will most likely elicit outright social disapproval. This taboo on feeling better than
others is not only likely to cause social desirability problems when asking people about it; it
will often be so much internalised that people have learned not to be conscious of their status
in very direct terms but only in euphemistic, more acceptable terms that disguise the true “I
am better than they and I enjoy it”-nature of the feeling.  
In the second place, the positional character of status1 raises the question of what is (are) the
relevant reference group(s). Is the level of subjectively experienced status (that’s what ‘status’
in the framework of SPF theory refers to) determined by one’s ranking in society as a whole,
or rather by one’s ranking in a smaller social environment, and if so, how should the relevant
environment be delineated? Or is the subjectively experienced level of status a composite of a
person’s rankings in all different social settings in which he participates?
In the third place, the supposed multidimensionality of status raises the question whether
status can be obtained on the basis of one’s control over all scarce goods. If scarcity is not the
decisive or the only criterion for which goods may yield status, what other criteria should we
look at? But if scarcity is the only criterion, how should we assess which goods are scarce?
Scarcity depends on both the availability and valuation of a good. Both characteristics may
differ over different categories of people, thus what is scarce for certain people need not be so
for others. How do such ambiguities affect the experienced status? Obviously, the answer to
these questions is intertwined with the answers to the first two points.
5.2.2. ASPECTS OF ‘STATUS’ AS THE FIRST COMPONENT OF SOCIAL WELL-BEING
The conceptualisation of the three first-order goals for social well-being, as reported in this
chapter, includes the exploration of the content of these concepts, i.e. the variety of elements
                                                
1    For further reading on the notion of positional goods, see Hirsch 1976.
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that they cover, the internal structure of the concept, i.e. the interrelations between and
clustering of the elements it covers2, and, following these, the identification of the main
aspects of these rather abstract goals.
It should be remembered that SPF theory claims that all forms or manifestations of social
approval, or all contributions to social well-being can be subsumed under either the first-order
goal of status, behavioural confirmation or affection. It follows from this claim that the
conceptualisations of the three first-order goals for social well-being should be such that,
indeed, all forms of social well-being or social approval can be categorized under one of these.
The procedure followed here, of asking participants to tell about their well-being in general,
about what they like and enjoy and what they dislike, is geared to result in conceptualisations
of status, behavioural confirmation and affection that together cover all possible forms of
social well-being.
As for status, it was already indicated above that one of the objectives in exploring the aspects
and content of this first-order goal, was to find out how people talk and think about status
indirectly, that is, in more socially accepted terms than plain ‘status’. Formulated differently, I
wanted to take stock of the main relevant aspects (in the literal sense) of status as a first-order
instrumental goal and component to social well-being, that is, explore its phenomenology. Of
course, as with all results I present in this chapter, it should be understood that the inventory
of ways in which people talk about their perceived status cannot be assumed to be exhaustive.
Yet, I believe the inventory is useful in two ways: firstly, the indirect ways of talking about
status can be used in formulating questionnaire items that are likely to elicit adequate answers
despite the taboo on striving for and valuing status; secondly, the different subjective aspects
of status give us a better understanding of the content of this first-order goal in SPF theory,
and will thus help in drawing the distinctions between status and the two other components of
social well-being.
Method of exploring the aspects of status / dimensional analysis
In the qualitative study, all respondents were asked about their subjectively experienced status,
using a variety of differently formulated open questions.  Firstly, in the questionnaire all
respondents filled in at home before participating in the focus group interviews, they were
asked “are there things that you do, that bring you the regard, respect or admiration of others?”
and “are there things that you do for other purposes, but that, unintended, bring you the regard,
respect or admiration of other people?”3. Most respondents initially responded to the first
question by stating that they do not strive for respect or admiration, and do not do particular
things to get it. This supports the expectation that there exists a taboo on the pursuit of status.
Yet, almost all reported one or more activities in answer to the second question. In the focus
group interviews, participants were asked to tell about things they like and are satisfied with in
their life and about things they do not like and are not satisfied with. These are the two most
                                                
2     The investigation of the interrelations between and clustering of the elements or aspects of the first-order
goals is probably best understood as a theoretical dimensional analysis, analoguous to the primarily statistical
technique of factor analysis. 
3     Preceding these and other resource-related items, the respondents had first been asked to rate their own lives
on several dimensions, one of which being ‘achievement’. For the complete pre-focus group questionnaire, see
Appendix C.
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general questions, with which the discussions were started, and they often triggered responses
that could be related to4 either the production of status (or behavioural confirmation or
affection) or its subjective experience. Later, in the course of each focus group discussion, I
asked the participants about endowments and material resources, as well as about the activities
or skills they had mentioned in the questionnaire they had filled in at home. I also asked the
participants more specifically about things that people sometimes compliment them for, about
things they are proud of, things they can do better than others, special skills that others envy or
admire etcetera. Of course also the negative was asked: things that make others look down
upon them, things that they feel ashamed of or that make them feel ‘unworthy’ and feelings of
being less than others.
These questions (or rather: triggers) correspond with the main aspects of status in its
definitions thus far, which I had decided to use as ‘sensitising concepts’: ‘distinguishing
oneself from others’, ‘doing or being able to do something special’, and ‘receiving
compliments or admiration’. These three aspects were used as sensitising concepts also in
coding the text fragments from the transcriptions. This obviously effected that all statements
which were triggered by one of the questions mentioned above were initially attributed the
code ‘status’, but occasionally also other statements, which were not triggered in one of the
above mentioned ways, fitted one or more of these three aspects of the sensitising concept,
and therefore these were also coded as ‘status’.
In the focus group discussions the respondents used very many different wordings for positive
and negative feelings, states of being and aspects of social well-being. All of these expressions
and statements had to be categorised as belonging to one of the three first-order goals (see
section 5.1.). The set of statements that I categorised as forms or aspects of status consisted of
over 90 statements, almost all in slightly different wordings. However, we need not
distinguish that many different aspects of status: often the differences in wording between
statements were but slight, and thus many of the statements could be clustered as referring to
the same aspect of status. This clustering is a process of interpretation, which can be
conceived of as the qualitative counterpart of quantitative factor analysis. Even though,
essentially, the act of interpretation (seeing, recognising the similarity in meaning of two
different statements) cannot be explained in terms of a replicable procedure, the use of Atlas/ti
and its conceptual network building tool (see also section 4.5.2.) allowed to perform a
systematic check on the internal consistency of the conceptual network one develops when
reducing different statements to single concepts. For the large majority of statements, I had
before starting the analysis of the concepts of status, behavioural confirmation and affection,
specified some logical relations to other emerging concepts (the codes used in open coding),
on the basis of the direct content of the statement. Thus, if a respondent told about a negative
experience at the local welfare agency and said that the officer  “just did not take him
seriously, for he did not listen to the respondents own view of his problems and did not heed
the solutions he proposed himself when deciding what should be done”, I had specified a
positive logical relation between the emerging codes of ‘be taken seriously’, ‘opinion listened
to / valued’, ‘autonomy over self’, and a negative relation with ‘dependency’. When later, in
the interpretation of the many different wordings of aspects of status, I considered two
different statements to refer to the same aspect of status, I checked, using Atlas for selective
                                                
4     In the course of this section it will become clear whether and how statements were decided to be related to
status or not; see also chapter 4 section 4.5.3.
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retrieval, the consistency of the various relations I had specified for the terms in these two
statements. Only when the two concrete terms I wanted to merge into one more abstract aspect
had identical or easily compatible relations to other terms or concepts, I accepted my
interpretation directly. When one or more of the relations with other terms or concepts that
were specified for the two statements differed, I reconsidered my interpretation and tried to
find out which differences or nuances I had overlooked. In such cases, I sometimes decided
not to merge the two statements into one more abstract aspect after all, or to specify a different
unifying term, but at other times I decided to retain my original interpretation as the
differences between the two statements with regard to their relations to other concepts
appeared not really relevant after all.
Results: the aspects of status
After clustering the statements with closely similar meaning, six different aspects or forms in
which status may be manifested remained: being taken seriously or being treated respectfully;
being independent or autonomous; being powerful or influential; self realisation; performing
better than others; and being known for one’s achievements, skills or assets. Each of these
aspects can be conceived of as a dimension on which people (perceive to) have a certain
position; these dimensions are depicted in figure 5.1. as the aspects that together constitute the
status-component of subjective social well-being.
As to the first dimension, being taken seriously versus not being taken seriously or being
disregarded, this refers to a situation like the one sketched above: people generally want
others to heed their wishes, suggestions, opinions or questions, and they experience negative
affect or a decrease in social well-being when others either make fun of them and their
opinions or just pay no attention and act as if the person weren’t there. While most people say
that in general they neither seek nor value status (“people need not look up to me, I would not
even want them to” or  “I do not want to go round impressing people or acting important”), it
appears that in our culture it is okay, and even considered normal and healthy to want to be
taken seriously. Yet, as is easily seen, the question of whether one’s opinions are heeded or
disregarded and joked about is clearly a matter of one’s relative ranking, and thus an instance
or aspect of status. The following quotation illustrates this to some extent:
Greetje Brink (female, age 68): “When I was 12 years old I had to quit school and had to
start helping in the housekeeping. My brothers were allowed to stay in school, but I was
just a girl, and it did not matter that I really wanted to go to school and learn things. And
now, I am not stupid, but I never had a chance to learn much, and you just notice that they
do not quite treat you as an equal. Friday night we were with my brother, he has a degree in
psychology, and they live and behave in a different way. And when I mention my regret
that I could not study, they simply say, “oh, come on, why don’t you look at people who are
worse off than you”. And I find that a bromide. They just don’t really listen to me…”5
Both in existing literature (e.g. Garfinkel 1984) and in conventional thinking about status, it is
frequently considered to be related to or to be reflected in the respect with which one is treated
by others. In the qualitative data that I used for this study, I have not found direct references to
being treated respectfully as an aspect of subjectively experienced status. In a qualitative,
exploratory study like this, however, not finding something in one’s data does not mean that
                                                
5      See Appendix A for background characteristics of the respondents.
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the thing is not there in reality. If there are good reasons to assume the empirical prevalence of
some phenomenon, this assumption should be held on to, despite a lack of evidence in the
data6. In this case, it is very likely that the way one is treated - or perceives to be treated - by
others, be they acquaintances or strangers, has a direct impact on the level of status one
experiences. Being treated respectfully boils down to others taking care that they give you
what is due to you, that is, others being careful to acknowledge and give you what you are
entitled to7.  That others take you seriously and heed your wishes and opinions is part of the
respect with which they treat you; it is a particular - and rather crucial- form of respect.
The first dimension of status may therefore be renamed more generally as being treated
respectfully, which should be taken to include at least the aspect of being taken seriously.
The second dimension of status that I distinguish is that of being autonomous and independent
versus being dependent and lacking autonomy. This is also an aspect of one’s relative ranking
that is not subject to the cultural taboo on status in general. It appears to be a culturally highly
valued good to be independent and autonomous, and most people experience a severe decrease
in social well-being when they become one-sidedly dependent upon others and lose autonomy.
Of course, no one is completely independent and autonomous, and what is a ‘normal’ degree
of autonomy and independence varies between age groups and also, to some extent between
the sexes, and it appears to be the deviation from this ‘normal’ degree of dependence that
causes experiences of high or low status.
Irene van der Wal (female, age 59): “My mother is quite old now, and gradually loses many
of her physical capacities for daily functioning. And it is hard to see that, because it makes
her feel inferior. “I can’t be myself anymore” she says. That sense of being someone to
reckon with. She says  “I am nobody now, merely someone who needs to be given care.”
That is loneliness, I think. Not being able to function as you used to.”
Irene: “When my youngest daughter left the house, I fell in a void. Now I am all right
again, but what a depression that was! I suddenly realised that I had no job, I had no
purpose. My husband went to work early each morning, he earned our living and there I
was, sitting at home, waiting for the household money to be put in my hand. I felt so
terrible. What I needed was to have a job of my own, I had worked before my marriage too
and I always enjoyed it. Why wouldn’t I be able to earn my own money, even if it were just
a little something. But to earn it myself, to prove myself again...”
Mirthe Ganzevoort (female, age 26): “I am unemployed at the moment, and what I find the
worst about it is that you are being dependent on the social welfare office. Every month you
have to send in a report about what jobs you applied for and what you earned on small odd
jobs. When you’re too late they sanction you. I have a small cleaning job for a few hours a
week, and everything I earn I have to turn in. But most of all, every month when I post that
form, I still have the feeling: yes, of course all those people have to do this, but I am not
one of them, I don’t belong to that kind of people! I do not want to belong to the group of
                                                
6    Of course, if one’s data contain contra-evidence, it is a different case.
7     Your entitlement to a certain level of respect may be regarded as the ‘stock’-component of status, which
determines the respect others are due to give you, constituting (part of) the ‘flow’-component. See section 5.2.3.
 150 RESULTS 1: THE ASPECTS OF THE FIRST-ORDER GOALS
people that need unemployment benefits. I feel very strongly about that.”
Hylkje Brouwer (female, age 26): “I have always done a lot of things purely for myself, I
particularly wanted to do those things that my parents did not encourage or support, and
then it is really great when people indeed admire you: “how cool that you did that!” These
are the things I am really proud of, precisely because I did them all by myself.”
 
The third dimension of status concerns the power or influence one perceives to exert over
others. This dimension is in a sense an extended and surpassing form of the second
dimension, which refers to the control one has over oneself, but yet it appears that it is of a
sufficiently different quality to be treated as a separate dimension. In people’s perception the
control one has over oneself and the control one has over others are two fundamentally
different things; to name but one strong difference, the first agrees with the general norms and
ideals in the dominant Dutch culture, while the second is subject to the aforementioned taboo
on status. Yet incidentally people do reveal that they like power and influence:
Gloria Pareman (female, age 57): “When you are just a member of a neighbourhood
council or some other voluntary organization, participating has few advantages. You
probably put in quite some time and energy, but only to ends that others have decided on.
That is why I volunteered to get on the board. Once you are a member of the board, or
rather, the executive committee, you have influence. Then it is you who decides what is to
be done, who is to do it, and how. And people listen to you, and accept that you make
decisions, because you are in that position.”   
An other important difference in the subjective experience of this dimension of status and that
of being in control of oneself, is that the effect of autonomy and independence on subjective
well-being appears to occur mainly at the negative pole of that dimension, while the having
power or influence over others seems to become significant only at the positive side of the
dimension. Thus, having much power over others seems to affect subjective social well-being
positively, but a low position on the former appears to have a far more dramatic, negative
effect on subjective well-being. One respondent stated explicitly that autonomy is more
important to him than having power over others:
Edwin Eijkhof (male, age 67): “Having a high position, as manager or supervisor, does not
make you happy because it is a high position. But it does bring you freedom, freedom from
what others want. When you are in a firm you may accept a subordinate position, with poor
salary, and let others dictate what you are to do. But you can also try to obtain an executive
position, not just because of the higher income, but also because it gives you the freedom to
develop yourself.”
The fourth dimension of status that I found is the already mentioned self realisation: to what
extent has one realised one’s potential or does one fall short of what could have been
achieved. Here the reference point is not in society or in one’s social network, it rather is the
best potential self. The following quotation illustrates both the aspiration to do well in
comparison to others (the fifth dimension, see below) as the aspiration to become the best
potential self:
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Barbara van Kesteren: “When you are in school you want to manifest yourself in a positive
way in your class, you want to graduate with good grades, you want to secure access to the
best university study, or when you go and seek a job, you want to get the nicest and most
prestigious position. You aim to get the best of it. But also for yourself personally, say
when you get a child, you have a personal goal and intention to become the best mother you
can be...These may be very abstract goals, I find it hard to explain, but I think that is how it
works...”
The fifth dimension of status that I distinguish is most similar to the original definition of
status: one’s performance as compared to that of others.
Johan Berghuis: “There is a whole lot of things that I might like to do, that I might enjoy
learning. But if I do not feel quite sure from the start that I will be able to do well, that is,
that others may be impressed, I just don’t find it worthwhile to try. You see, one has to be
selective anyway, for there are so many things one might do...so I find it rather logical to
choose those things that you may be able to do better than others.”
Anneke de Wit: “There is nothing that I am particularly good at. My husband, and my
brothers and sisters, they all have certain hobbies that they are good at, but I can never
show them something that I made or something. And I do not feel worthless because of
that, but... Sometimes I wish that I had a musical gift, that I could play organ or some other
instrument, so that the others would admire that. But still, I also have things that I feel I do
well: because I do not have such hobbies, I have much more time for my mother, to visit
her, give her attention and care for her. And she sometimes says, that of all her children I
am the one that does most for her.”
This dimension is similar in character to the fourth dimension, but just as was the case with
the second and third dimension, here again distinguishing oneself from others is much more
subject to the taboo on status than doing well in comparison with one’s own potential, which
is generally valued in dominant Dutch cultural norms. In contrast to what was reported above
about the differences between the second and the third dimension, I have found no reason to
assume that the fourth and fifth dimensions differ in importance for subjective social well-
being.
The sixth dimension of status that I find useful to distinguish is the extent to which one’s
achievements, assets, or skills are acknowledged. This dimension may be either conceived of
as a separate dimension or as a special case of the fifth dimension, to which it is obviously
related. Although being acknowledged for special skills, achievements or assets is almost
identical to ‘outperforming others’, there is a difference, namely that this last dimension refers
to the status yielding endowments a person has. This is for example the case when a person is
retired but still derives status from his former occupational achievements:
Simon Goudsmid (male, age 69): “I have retired from work since a couple of years. And I
do not miss it; for now I can do all the things that I never had the time for. Occasionally I
still meet former business partners or clients, and it is satisfying to notice how they still
respect me. They do not treat me like an old retired person at all, they still see me as that
business consultant who did that or that job so well, and who built his own firm from
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nothing. One does not necessarily lose one’s position when retiring.” 
Whether status is received for one’s immediate actions and performance or for one’s
endowments appears to make a difference in the subjective experience of status. For one thing,
the very fact that one’s endowments are relatively stable over time, suggests that adaptation
may occur: it is likely that people adapt their standards of comparison, and thus their reference
groups, to stable and enduring circumstances, so that only global status is still based on these
endowments, but local status is insensitive to them. An other difference between the
subjective experience of status based on general acknowledgement of one’s skills and
achievements and of status based on immediate performance is the perceived security or threat
of one’s ranking. In case of acknowledged skills, assets or achievements, people are likely to
perceive their status as far more secure than when it is based on their immediate performance.
Depending on how an interviewer formulates his questions, he may either tap his respondent’s
immediate, transient level of perceived status, or the more stable, acknowledged form. If one
wants to obtain a complete assessment of a respondent’s subjectively experienced status, it
thus seems advisable to make a distinction between the fifth and the sixth dimension and to
include both in one’s questions. A nice example of the simultaneous existence of transient and
stable status (the fifth and the sixth dimension) is found in the following quotation:
Cobie Strating: “Gradually I have found out that I am really good at organizing things. I
always organize a lot of things for the club, and it is quite self-evident by now that when
something has to be done or arranged, they turn to me. And ten years ago, I was far more
insecure, and I always wanted to get approval or confirmation that I had done well. And
still, I notice that I am quite sensitive to compliments for what I organized. Because
sometimes I get home thinking ‘they didn’t say anything to me about how I did it’, and then
I sit there feeling gloomy, feeling that perhaps things did not go very well. But then I
realize that they do not have to compliment me every single time, I do not need to be patted
on the shoulder always. I know that I do well...but still I am sensitive to approval and
compliments.”
5.2.3. THE ‘RELEVANT OTHERS’, SELF RANKING, AND FURTHER ISSUES
Who are the ‘relevant others’?
One of the questions regarding status that we started out with concerned the choice of
reference groups. With whom do people compare themselves to arrive at some self ranking?
And when status is received from other people, on what comparison with what people is that
status based? The data from my exploratory study are not adequate to answer these questions
with any claim to general tenability. Yet, some tentative ideas that emerged during the data
collection and analyses may be formulated here.
In the first place, it appears that in people’s own perception of the status they enjoy, their
global status is of no more (and frequently less) importance than their local status. Global
status is what is conventionally meant by and measured as ‘status’, namely one’s ranking on
visible dimensions such as occupational prestige, income, et cetera, as compared to the whole
Dutch (or other national) population.
Local status is confined to smaller reference groups: the people a person lives and works with,
but also the group he was born in and the people of roughly similar ranking in dimensions
relevant to him.
The global status of a PhD-student, for example, would by the conventional measures of
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income, level of education and occupational prestige, respectively, be low, high or moderate.
But his local status depends on the educational level, job and income of his parents and
siblings, as well as on, say, his prestige and social role among colleagues, his relative delay in
finishing his dissertation, his command of advanced research techniques and his hobbies and
achievements outside the work sphere.
In the focus groups, when respondents talked about status, in particular when they talked
about their own perceived status, they rarely referred to a global ranking, and almost
invariably chose as reference groups their family, their colleagues and other people that either
belong to their social network or have a similar global status:
Johan Berghuis: “No, I do not feel like I have achieved something special. That is, of
course, I had a good job, a good income, and some average person would probably think
that I had a successful career. But I did no better than my brother or sister, and also my
fellow students that I still have contact with, they just had similar careers. So I think I did
about average, or only slightly better.”
Hetty Stubbe (female, age 30): “I am very satisfied with what I have achieved, and with my
position in society. Of course, there are also people who have fancy jobs and great incomes
or expensive houses, but I would not even want that. When I just look at the education that
my parents had, and how they started in life, and I compare that to my own position... Why,
I am only thirty years now, and I have a husband, two sons, we have our own house, not a
big one, but it is our own, and we have a car...I think that is quite something. And I believe
that what I have now, is what most people would call ‘success’.”
In the focus group discussions, when respondents talked about their own perceived status,
several implicitly told that, for a part, they cognitively manipulate their reference groups,
sometimes consciously, but more often unconsciously.
Johan Berghuis: “The activities I prefer doing are things that pose a challenge to me but
that I yet feel confident about that I will succeed. I’ll not let myself be challenged to do
something I may fail in.” 
Frank Zuidema, when asked whether he enjoys and strives for a coaching role amongst his
colleagues at work: “Oh yes, I do like to have a certain position as coach or adviser for my
colleagues, as someone who is there for them if they need to talk, or want a sound
opinion...Yes, sure. But I would not like the manager to set me apart then, and give it some
official status, absolutely not. For then it is no good anymore.”
Cobie Strating: “I find the neighbourhood that one lives in very important. That is... Well,
my neighbourhood is not at all ‘chique’ or so, its just very plain, normal, decent people
living there. I would never want to live in an ‘uppish’ or high-class neighbourhood, I would
not feel at ease there.”
In neither of these quotations it is explicitly said that the respondent wants a reference group
in which his relative ranking is at least not one of the lowest. In the first quotation, Johan
almost explicitly says that he avoids situations in which he may turn out less capable than
others: by only engaging in activities that he knows he will succeed in, he makes sure that he
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will always do at least moderately well in comparison to others that do the same things.
In the second quotation, Frank seems to say that, as long as his present colleagues are formally
his equals, it feels good to have some special position amongst them. This may perhaps be
interpreted as saying that, as long as his colleagues are his proper reference group, it pays to
have this coaching role, because it yield some relative ranking, thus status. Yet, if his special
role would be formalised, his present colleagues would not be his proper reference groups
anymore, and in that way the basis for his status amongst them would be lost.
In the third quotation, Cobie clearly shows to weigh her position relative to others in her
neighbourhood more heavily than global status, for the latter would increase if she lived in a
high-class neighbourhood.  It should be noted that this quotation, and the interpretation
thereof, reveal a tension between the maximisation of global status and the maximisation of
local status; a tension that I think is inherent in the relation between global and local status.
The active manipulation of reference groups is, of course, not unknown in the literature. In
particular  ‘choosing the right pond’ (Frank 1985), as a mechanism to increase one’s local
status and, thus, one’s subjectively experienced status, is illustrative for this type of
manipulation of reference groups. The distinction and the inherent tension between global and
local status is also found in Frank (ibid.).      
Self ranking
One searchlight for finding possible instances of status in the data was the receiving of
compliments or admiration. In analysing the quotations that were categorized as ‘status’, I
found that this aspect was not, in general, adequate. When a compliment or other token of
admiration is received, there is, as a rule, status at stake. But status in the form of compliments
or admiration received from others is but a part of the status a person experiences. It appears
that the experienced level of status consists of two components. The status received from
others is one component, self evaluation - in the case of status: self ranking - is the other (in
Lindenberg 1996 the idea that status would consist of these two components was already
proposed; the evidence from the present study supports this claim).
While the status received from others is always based upon some comparison between a
person’s skills or achievements and those of others, self ranking can be based on either such a
comparison with others or a comparison with what the person wants to be or knows to be
capable of. For self ranking there is thus one more possible reference point: the (best) potential
self. A nice example is found in the following statement of Cobie Strating, who responds to
the moderator’s remark that it seems quite impressive how actively she is involved in
voluntary work:
“Well, I do voluntary work for a local political party, I am responsible for the portfolio of
social affairs and labour policy. That is something I’m just very much interested in. But - I
would have been able to do that work also when I would have had a paid job. If had had a
paid job, I would just do this voluntary work all the same...”
It should be noted that recognising the role of the comparison of one’s actual with one’s best
potential self in the self ranking-component of status brings in the notions of self realisation
and realisation of one’s potential in the SPF framework. Self realisation or realisation of one’s
potential is considered by some authors (amongst which of course Maslow 1970, but also
Michalos 1991) to be central to quality of life. In empirical research, the degree of realisation
of one’s potential is generally found to be positively related to other positive or desirable
states, such as autonomy, vitality, openness to one’s own experiences, empathic capacity, self-
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esteem et cetera (see e.g. Sheldon & Kasser 1995, for several further references). In our
framework its role is confined to being an ingredient of self ranking as component of status,
and being a likely ingredient to self-rewarded behavioural confirmation.
Self ranking and status received from others are not two fully independent components to
subjectively experienced status. The literature (for example Goffman 1971 [1959]) and the
data suggest that self ranking is to some extent related to the status that is received from
others:
Hylkje Brouwer: “I feel proud that I have lived in Paris for one year, that I speak French
fluently, that I play electrical guitar in a band... I feel also proud that I worked as a youth
welfare worker for a few years and that I really did a good job then. I think it is good when
you can feel proud about what you do. That is good. I don’t think that’s arrogant, it is okay.
Especially when you’ve had to fight hard for these things, like I had to. And then, of
course, it is indeed good to find that other people respect and value the things you do too. If
other people respect or admire these things, that really supports and boosts your
appreciation of yourself.”
Conny van Ooij (female, age 27): “When someone from another firm, with whom you have
worked together, tells your boss that he liked working with you, and that you did a good
job, I really like that. And I also like my colleagues to hear that then. That is, well
obviously you are just very proud of it. And then, well, normally I am not very self assured
and I often feel uncertain whether I am doing well, and it feels good when someone
reassures you. [...] It works two ways: it is good for my own self respect and it boosts my
self-assurance, but also I simply enjoy it. And I enjoy it too when others get to know about
it, yes.”
The second quotation also suggests that there exists a dependency between the two
components with regard to the weight they are given: when a person’s self ranking is insecure,
he may weigh the ranking others attribute to him more heavily than when his self ranking is
firm and stable. It seems likely too that a person whose self ranking is insecure will actually
seek status from others more than someone with a solid self ranking.
Cobie Strating: “Oh yes, I am quite sensitive to such things. Perhaps that is because, as a
kid, I never got any approval or compliments from my parents. But everyone needs
approval. So what I noticed later, is that I tend to play the clown when I am in a group. You
get a lot of attention then.”
Hylkje Brouwer: “Yes, when your parents never praised you much when you were young,
you stay more dependent on praise from others even when you grow up, I know that from
my own experience. I just notice that I am more sensitive than others for that. That I more
often feel I need to prove myself. Or do something special, something different than
everyone else does. That is just the way of dealing with that lack of self-confidence.”
The self ranking component to status, when compared to the component of status received
from others, does not only have an additional reference point in the ‘best potential self’, there
are also differences in the (quality of) information that is available for ranking the person and
his achievements. As to the information about external reference points, there is no reason to
expect systematic differences in the quality of information that others or the person himself
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avails of. There is a systematic difference, however, in information about the extent to which a
particular performance or achievement should really be attributed to the person himself, or
rather to circumstance.
Ascription versus achievement, or: are endowments valued as much as achievements?
The relevance of this question of how much of a person’s skills, performance or assets are
obtained through his own effort and merit and how much of it has just fallen upon him by
lucky chance, is closely related to the conventional distinction between societies where status
is mainly based upon ascription versus achievement-focussed societies. The data of this study,
though they are severely restricted because of the small number of people interviewed, suggest
that the generally hypothesized trend in society, from ascription to achievement, also works at
small scale: in judging and ranking each other as well as themselves, people appear to weigh
self-achieved skills or assets heavier than endowments. The following quotations may
illustrate this:
Simon Goudsmid: “About 15 years ago, a nephew of my wife lost his job when his
firm downsized. That man works in the office furnishing branch, and that is quite some
business, all over the world. When losing his job he moved to Bahrain, and started his
own business. And by now this has developed into an international firm, with also a
large department in the Netherlands. That boy took his lot into his own hands and was
willing to take the risk. I think he was lucky to have the right conditions and
personality, but still, he is the one who jumped onto the bus when it came by...”
Greetje Brink: “ In the past, at least in the kind of place where I grew up, people used
to judge you merely by the family you came from, by your father’s occupation. “Oh,
she is just the daughter of so-and-so”, they would say, or, for the sons of the doctor,
they would have deep respect, just like that. And it is good that nowadays people look
much more at what you have done yourself, at your own behaviour and capacities.
They have to, of course, for no-one can keep track anymore of what family someone
comes from, but it is so much better to judge people by their own deeds. It gives you
more freedom to escape from a situation you couldn’t help.”
As regards the distinction between self ranking and status given by others, it was already
mentioned that there may exist information asymmetry between the self and others,
concerning the extent to which a certain achievement was the person’s own doing. Given that
achievements seem to be valued higher than endowments, it is probable that others would
reward a person with less status if they knew that his achievements were merely lucky chance.
Usually, though, others can less easily assess the extent to which achievements should be
attributed to the person’s skill and effort or to chance than the person him- or herself.
Yasmin Rais (female, age 40): “When Dutch people hear me talking, and when they
hear that I am a nurse, they probably think not much of that. But I know how hard I
had to fight for learning to speak Dutch like this, and how hard I had to fight to get into
the nursing school. When I see what my starting position was, and where I am now, I
know I have achieved more than folks may think.”
Scarcity
In several statements it appeared that ‘being able to do something special’ is not a sufficiently
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specific indication for what elicits status: the approval or admiration people may get for their
‘special’ activities or skills depends on the demand for these activities or skills, that is, on
their scarcity. For example, one participant told us:
Cobie Strating: “Voluntary work is not inferior to having a paid job. You see, if all
voluntary work in the Netherlands would not be done anymore, we would really be in
trouble. For society voluntary work has a very important function, it is indispensable.
For the volunteers themselves, but just as much for the people they ‘serve’. Therefore,
doing paid work is not more important or valuable than voluntary work, not in my
view.”
And Gloria Pareman:
“I also do various other activities. My hobby is decorating cakes. That’s a very precise
job, very delicate. Hours, days, sometimes months you work on one cake or on the
design of it, say for a wedding cake. And to finish that so very delicately, yes, that is
something only very few people can do. I sometimes do cakes for acquaintances, but
more often for people who have heard somehow that I do this thing. It’s an American
thing, but in our Antillean culture it is also popular. And when someone hears that
somebody wants a cake, and they have heard of me, then they call me. People know
that I do it well. But I don’t do it for free, I ask money for it. Because they want that
cake and there’s only few people who can do a nice one.”
Of course, this scarcity-relatedness of status was already part of its initial definition, but
apparently it also exists in people’s perception and experience.
When first reading the statements that were coded as relevant for status, it struck me that in
several statements it appeared that status can not only be obtained through scarce activities or
scarce skills, but also through combining skills or activities that are not particularly scarce in
themselves, but the combination of which is scarce or uncommon, such as doing voluntary
work, while also holding a paid job and being a house maker. All three tasks are valued,
certainly, but none of these is in itself so special or scarce that it is likely to yield much status
(at least, when the paid job that is concerned is of average occupational status). Yet, the fact
that someone manages to combine all three often elicits admiration or status.
At second thought, however, I came to believe that it is not really the combination of skills or
activities in itself that elicits admiration. Rather, combining such skills or activities may serve
as an indicator of some quality or skill that others cannot directly observe, such as being
productive and energetic, and capable of dealing with pressure and conflicting demands. I
believe that what elicits admiration and status are in fact these ‘latent’ qualities, which are
signalled by certain activity patterns. It seems possible, though, that some particular
combinations of activities or skills have gained independence of the initially supposed latent
qualities they may indicate, and are now admired as such. This may e.g. be the case for
working mothers who manage to play with their children, bake cookies and attend school
festivities:
Anneke de Wit: “When I see some of these women, like my neighbours and one of my
daughters, I cannot understand how they manage. Children, a job, a house to keep
clean, a husband to care for... I mean, well, I could have done paid work if I had
wanted to when I was their age, but only if I had not had my man and children to care
for, and the housekeeping to do. I just couldn’t have managed. And I know that many
of these women nowadays who try to combine everything at once, they can’t really
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manage either: they give but little attention to the children and never play with them,
or they let their husbands iron their own shirts, or they let neglect house and garden...
But there are also those women who seem to manage everything at once: they have a
job and a house and children, and even if they have a high job, they find the time to do
all kind of nice things with their kids: read to them, take them places, do creative
things... I just can’t imagine, but they really must be so energetic or talented to do all
that...” 
Not only scarce skills can elicit status, also the possession of scarce material goods or assets
can serve that role. In conventional conceptualisations of status as social-economic status,
income or wealth are generally included as material predictors or indicators of status. In the
focus group interviews, it appeared that indeed people’s financial situation plays an important
role in the status they receive from others and attribute to themselves:
Simon Goudsmid: “I feel proud that I have had a very successful career. I built my own
firm, and did very, very well financially. I am not ashamed to say that for many years I
have been able to pay over two hundred thousand guilders per year in income-taxes,
and thus make a considerable contribution to the common good.”
Sometimes also other material assets were mentioned, like having an expensive car, or
showing off with wearing fancy clothes or jewels, but such assets seem to be - at least for the
largest part - but different indicators for one’s financial situation. 
‘Being busy’: a generalized indicator of scarce skills
In the focus groups, it emerged that many people tend to view ‘being busy’ as something
related to high status. Partly, being busy may indicate being productive and energetic
(although it may just as well be the result of a lack of planning and managing skills). Partly,
and probably more importantly, it conveys a signal that the busy person, or her skills, are in
high demand, for she is wanted almost at several places at the same time: obviously there is
more demand for the things she can do than there are people who can do it. This, of course, is
the exact meaning of the adjective ‘scarce’ in the initial definitions of status. ‘Being busy’
may thus be considered as a generalized indicator of scarce skills. As such, it is not an aspect
of the status concept proper, but rather a production factor for status. Therefore, I will
postpone the further discussion of ‘being busy’ as something that frequently elicits status to
the next chapter, in which the main relevant production factors for social well-being are
discussed.
5.2.4. GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE CONCEPT OF STATUS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
        DEVELOPMENT OF A MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENT
In conclusion to this section, the concept of status as it emerged from the exploratory analyses
may be depicted as follows (figure 5.1). The implications of this conceptualisation for the
measurement of status can be summarized accordingly:
• When asking respondents about their (or someone else’s) level of status, different
formulations should be used alongside, so that the six main aspects of subjective status
are represented. The measurement should thus include items referring to the extent to
which the respondent feels to be taken seriously; the extent to which he perceives to be
autonomous and independent; the extent to which he exerts power or influence over
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others; the extent to which he has succeeded in realizing his potential; the extent to
which he performs better than others; and the extent to which he is acknowledged for
his skills, assets or achievements;
• For each of these dimensions, the ideal measurement instrument would include both
items that refer to the respondent’s self ranking and items that refer to the status the
respondent feels to be given by others;
• For each of the dimensions, a measurement instrument should ideally include items
that refer to the comparison with others as well as items that refer to comparison with
the respondent’s ‘best potential self’.
STATUS
the sense of...
being taken seriously / treated respectfully  ----------------------------- not being taken seriously
being independent / autonomous ---------------------------- being dependent / lacking autonomy
self realisation ----------------------------------------- lagging behind one's potential or aspirations
outperforming others ---------------------------------------------------- being outperformed by others
having power / influence ------------------------------ being less powerful / influential than others
being acknowledged for achievements, skills, assets ---- acknowledged for lack of skills etc.
status given by others self-ranking
comparison with external others comparison with best potential self
scarce skills , scarce achievements, scarce material goods
Figure 5.1.: Graphical representation of the aspects and determinants of the status concept
5.3. Behavioural confirmation: a further elaboration and conceptualisation
5.3.1. PRESENT AMBIGUITIES IN THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF ‘BEHAVIOURAL CONFIRMATION’
In this section, the concept of behavioural confirmation, the second component of social well-
being or first-order goal for social well-being according to SPF theory, is further elaborated
and explored on the basis of the data from the qualitative study. In chapter 3, section 3.4.2., I
have pointed out some ambiguities and problems in the definitions that were used for the
concept of behavioural confirmation thus far. The shared elements in the definition of
behavioural confirmation which the varying definitions of different authors have in common,
are that behavioural confirmation follows from, or is the feeling of, doing the ‘right’ thing in
the eyes of ‘relevant’ others (cf. the definition of behavioural confirmation given in
Lindenberg & Frey 1993, p. 196). The main problems or ambiguities that were identified in
section 3.4.2. were (a) the problem of determining who is the ‘relevant other’, and (b) the fact
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that the concept is defined by the means that produce it, rather than by its own quality
(although Van Eijk’s [1997, p. 43] definition of the concept includes the statement that, if
behaving in accordance with the norms of a group of significant others, “[o]thers then make
one feel accepted and confirmed in one’s activities” - my italics).
In order to elaborate and improve the conceptualisation of behavioural confirmation, a similar
procedure was followed as that explained in the previous section for status. In 5.3.2. I present
the aspects of behavioural confirmation that emerged from the qualitative dimensional
analysis of the respondents’ statements concerning behavioural confirmation. In 5.3.3. I give
attention to the issues of the relevant others, self approval and some further concerns, and in
5.3.4. the presented findings are summarized in a graphical representation of the concept of
behavioural confirmation as it emerges from the qualitative data, and the main implications
for the eventual development of a measurement instrument are formulated.
5.3.2. ASPECTS OF ‘BEHAVIOURAL CONFIRMATION’ AS THE SECOND COMPONENT OF SOCIAL
       WELL-BEING
In what terms do people think and talk about behavioural confirmation? How does this
component of social well-being manifest itself in people’s experience? What are the essential
and distinctive aspects of this component of social well-being, that lend themselves to be
asked after in an eventual questionnaire?
For behavioural confirmation, there is no reason to expect that people will think and talk about
it in a somewhat disguised way, as was the case with status. Yet, it is very unlikely that people
will use the term behavioural confirmation for this kind of social well-being or social
approval, and therefore it is still important to explore the terms that they do use.
In coding the transcripts of the focus group interviews, I started out with three general ‘search
lights’ that I believed would help me recognize statements in which respondents mention
forms of well-being that might be reckoned as instances of behavioural confirmation: getting
approval for one’s behaviour; feeling to belong to a group, a sense of belonging and being
accepted; and a sense of shared norms and values. Coding the focus group transcripts with the
help of these three searchlights, I first categorized over hundred statements as referring in
some way to an instance or aspect of behavioural confirmation.
Respondents in the focus group discussions used various different terms and wordings when
they talked about feelings and experiences that I categorized as ‘behavioural confirmation’
(rather than ‘affection’ or ‘status’). As was explained in the previous section about the aspects
of status, I clustered the terms that were closely similar, until six main aspects of behavioural
confirmation remained. These six aspects are: doing good things; doing things well; being a
good person; being useful; contributing to a common cause or a common good; and - what I
called - functional belonging.
Just like the aspects of ‘status’ reported in section 5.2.2., these six aspects of behavioural
confirmation can be interpreted as dimensions on which people perceive to take a certain
position. The first dimension would be to do the right things versus doing ‘wrong’ or ‘bad’
things. This dimension primarily refers to the choices one makes about what to do and what
not. 
Hylkje Brouwer: “My parents never approved of the things I chose to do. They had
rather seen me choose a different kind of occupation, follow a different education... I
worked as a social worker in a youth penitentiary. They neither approve of the other
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things I do, like playing in a band, and my stay in Paris. But for myself I feel I have
made the right choices, I always consider whether something is okay and right, and
other people regularly tell me that the things I do are good.”
The second dimension is to do the things one does well, versus doing one’s things ‘bad’ or
‘sloppy’. It is not difficult to imagine empirical examples of this dimension, and several
statements from the focus interview transcripts bear on it. For example:
Anneke de Wit: “I find it important to do the housekeeping well. When cleaning, I
always try to do it very meticulously, and also in other things I try to do it to the
standards that I was taught. When I see how some other people do their so-called
housekeeping...Why, even after they have cleaned you can just see the dirt.”
Gloria Pareman: “Now I am appointed as supervisor of the volunteers of our
foundation. I have to supervise some 15 volunteers. And I just want them to deliver
good work. I accept no shirking or sloppiness. I just do not accept it, and fire them
immediately when I see it. For others depend on how they work, and they should just
put in the same amount of effort and diligence as when it would be a paid job.”       
     
The third dimension refers to the coagulated or generalized form of behavioural confirmation:
the feeling of being a good person versus being a bad person. A good illustration is found in
the following statement:
Hylkje Brouwer: “My parents never approved of the things I did, and of the choices I
made. I just did not live up to their expectations. My sister did, she is the perfect
daughter: properly married, after two years pregnant, goes to church twice a week...
And of course I love them, and I know they do love me too, but I think loving should
also include acceptation and respect for who one is and wants to be. And it is rather
hard to hear them complain “why have you turned out to be like this”. But still, I have
a strong sense that I am okay, that I am a good person, because through the years I
have always had good friends who valued the things I did and gave me the
confirmation my parents withheld. Because I had sufficient other people around me,
who told me what I did was okay and that I did it well, I just came to know myself,
know what I want and what is good and bad according to my own norms and values.”
The fourth, fifth and sixth aspects are closely similar and may be either considered to
represent three probably highly correlated dimensions or to represent one common
dimension8. Being useful, contributing to a common cause and being part of a functional
entity may be aspects of behavioural confirmation that trigger somewhat different reactions
from respondents, but theoretically they are not clearly distinct (to a lesser extent the same of
course holds for the first three aspects of behavioural confirmation). Being useful is a more
general feeling than the feeling to contribute to a common cause; the latter feeling will only
occur in situations when there is an explicit and clear ‘goal’, while the first can more easily
occur in situations where the ‘goals’ are implicit and vague. An example of an instance in
which behavioural confirmation (in this case: self approval) is derived from contributing to a
clear and explicit goal is found in the following statement:
                                                
8     When operationalising these dimensions, this question may be decided empirically.
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Rosa Boogert: “I am involved in the client council that works on behalf of the clients
of the social welfare office in this town. All my fellow members of that council are
unemployed too, but we all have some education or knowledge that we can use on
behalf of the goals of the client council. It is so important to fight for the position of
the unemployed, and to help improve regulations and procedures. I find it very
important to do this. After all, being clients ourselves, who would know better, from
own experience, what should be changed in the system? It is important to do that, and I
know I can make a worthwhile contribution. Together with the others we may really
redress some of the wrongs in the system and the procedures the social welfare office
employs.”
The next statement, in contrast, does not refer to any explicit common cause or clear goal. I
think statements of this kind are better considered as instances of a general feeling of ‘being
useful’:
Yoesoef Benadi: “I have no work. I am a foreigner, do not speak Dutch. My education
in Somalia is not recognised here. I go to the employment lady every week, begging
her to give me work. I want to work. I can work, I am healthy and strong…Why can I
not do something like everybody? Now I only baby-sit sometimes, but that is not work.
I am a man, it is not good that I just sit and wait and rot. Maybe I will return to
Somalia. I will be more poor there, and life is hard, but it is harder to sit here and
nobody needing me, no chance to use my strength and energy for something...”
The aspect of ‘being part of a functional entity’ refers to the extent to which a person
experiences a mutual dependency with others in the realisation of some objective, each one’s
functioning and performance allowing the other to function (the most adequate term I can
think of here is ‘organic functional dependency’, suggesting that both one’s own performance
and that of others is subservient to the group’s functioning):
Frank Zuidema: “It is a good feeling when, say, at work you see that things are running
smoothly, everything is going well, and you know that it is partly because of you that it
just goes well. Nobody needs to tell me so, and I would not even want people to stop
and think about who is contributing what, who is better or does more... No, just to
have things running smoothly and being part of that, that is how I like my work to
be...”
5.3.3. THE ‘RELEVANT OTHERS’, SELF APPROVAL, AND FURTHER ISSUES
One point I noted in the respondents’ statements regarding behavioural confirmation, is the
importance of the word ‘feeling’ in the definition of behavioural confirmation: it denotes the
feeling to have done the right thing (see the various definitions of the concept that have been
used thus far, section 3.4.2.). The reason for emphasizing that it is the feeling that constitutes
this component of social well-being, is that this implies that signals of others, that you have
done the right thing, do not automatically contribute to one’s level of behavioural
confirmation, but that between the signal and the level there is a translation-step. The ‘feeling
to have done the right thing in the eyes of relevant others’ is not necessarily a direct reflection
of the signals received from others; these signals may be selected and weighted. Although the
data from this study are not suited to investigate how the selection and weighing of signals of
behavioural approval from others takes place, the data do suggest at least three issues that play
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a role in determining the outcome of this process. These three issues are: the question of
whether the other person is indeed a ‘relevant’ or ‘significant’ other; the consistency of the
signals received from others with one’s own evaluation of one’s behaviour; and the extent to
which the evaluation of one’s behaviour by the other is perceived to be critical and objective.
These three issues are discussed below, followed by some further issues that came up during
the analysis of the focus group transcripts. 
Who are the ‘relevant others’?
In 3.4.2. I have argued that the term ‘relevant others’ in the definition of behavioural
confirmation probably refers to the people who play a significant role in our realization of the
other four first-order instrumental goals according to SPF theory, that is, to the people whom
we need to produce and to get comfort, stimulation, status and affection. In the data from the
focus group interviews it appears that the people from whom the respondents receive
behavioural confirmation can, indeed, for the largest part be categorized as people who are
important for their production of one or more of the other four first-order instrumental goals.
There are many statements in which we find behavioural confirmation given by persons who
are important for the respondents’ production of comfort and stimulation, as is generally the
case with colleagues at work:
Simon Goudsmid: “In your job, it is a matter of course that there is a sort of interplay
with your colleagues, interaction... There are briefings and changing shifts, there are
phone calls, and consultations. For myself, my work has always been a real satisfying
way of social existence...I thoroughly enjoyed it.”
And it is neither difficult to find instances where the behavioural confirmation a respondent
receives is given by persons who are important in his or her production of status or affection:
Kees Nagelkerke: “My parents have for 17, 18 years witnessed how I spent my life on
alcohol. Several times, even a few years, we did not have any contact. They strongly
disapproved of my life right then, and their only way of showing that was by refusing
contact...And when I had a good period, we did have contact again, and also when I
had to be treated in the hospital. But every time there came a new deterioration, that
caused a new pause in our relation...”
Hetty Stubbe: “I do not mind being a housewife at all! It was my own choice to stop
working, so that I could give all my time and attention to my two little boys. It gives
me much satisfaction to take care of them and to do the housekeeping. And when I
have put some extra effort into cooking the meal, they need not give me a compliment
for that, it is enough satisfaction for me to see them enjoy the meal with good
appetite... ”
Gloria Pareman: “I am doing volunteer work in our neighbourhood council. So many
people see you and know your position. And when they then see how you act in
council meetings, and like the way you speak out when there is a problem, they come
to you more and more. As soon as they see you’re a person who can take
responsibility, people start asking you to do a many more other things too...”
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In contrast to the argument in section 3.4.2., that the ‘relevant other’ that can give behavioural
(dis-) confirmation should not be relevant solely because he gives behavioural confirmation
(as that would make the definition a circular one), the data seem to suggest that such instances
do occur incidentally. However, it seems that these instances are seldom ‘pure’: mostly when
behavioural confirmation is received from someone who is not ‘relevant’ for one’s other first-
order goals, it just co-occurs with a larger or smaller amount of self approval on the basis of
internalised norms, and the other person appears merely to give extra salience to these norms:
Kees Nagelkerke: “In my volunteer job I have a colleague who has been begging for
months to be transferred to my team. And when he finally could try for a few times, he
did not show up on the days he had to work. So he was dismissed, he was told they did
not want him back. I think that was a right decision. As for me, I’d find it all right if
they would be even stricter. That’s because I regard this volunteer work as a regular
commitment, where you have to show up and keep appointments just like in a regular
job. When I have to start at a quarter to nine, I just have to start at a quarter to nine.
And if others, like that guy, start being sloppy, they devaluate our work too. They
should take the work serious, for then they also take serious what I am doing.”
Cobie Strating: “These elderly people, who live in the same block as I do, they lead a
highly structured life. At this time they cook, at that time they do their grocery
shopping, on that day the car is to be washed...So you know exactly: oh, Mr. Van der
Plas and his wife are going to do that today; all according to fixed schemes. So they
find me very chaotic. They also say that to me: “well, we can clearly see that you’re
not married, for you are so undependable, then you are there, then you do that
again...”[...] And they cannot understand that in the summer I sometimes have dinner
at eight or even later, because people should have dinner at six, shouldn’t they? But
that is their world, and it is not mine.”
Rutger van Woerden (male, age 22): “Sometimes when I do my shopping Saturday
afternoon, and I’m in the Albert Heijn or V&D or some other store, I like to act very
politely, say, by keeping open the doors for some lady, or by helping someone who
drops something because he has already some heavy bags... And then such a person
usually reacts very nicely, sometimes a bit surprised, but in general they clearly
appreciate. And yes, that makes me feel good.”
On the basis of these data, I think the claim that the ‘relevant others’ from whom behavioural
confirmation may be received are those persons who have a significant role in the realization
of other first-order goals, is well tenable. It should be noted that this claim implies that, as a
rule, there is multifunctionality in the production of behavioural confirmation.
Self approval
From what our respondents told about approval they receive for their actions and their feelings
of ‘doing the right thing’, it clearly appears desirable to distinguish two components of
behavioural confirmation: the confirmation of one’s behaviour that is received from others
and that which is received from oneself, the self approval9. Distinguishing these two
                                                
9    For empirical evidence of self-approval contributing to happiness, cf. Carlson & Miller 1987 who found that
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components is the more important because it appears to be quite common that they differ
considerably, both only in the amount of approval that is received but even in the sign of it:
positive approval from others may co-occur with self-disapproval and vice versa. Sometimes
others give more approval for one’s behaviour than oneself would:
Bram Kooistra (male, age 29): “Last year I worked on a ship. The shipmaster always
corrected me when I did things the wrong way. Just in the daily work, I mean. But a
few times we have also had a good talk together, just in the evening, over a beer... And
at those occasions he told me to my surprise that he was quite content with how I
worked, that I did quite a lot of things well... I felt amazed and relieved. Because when
you only receive corrections, you start to think you are good for nothing. I had really
wondered sometimes whether I shouldn’t better leave... But apparently the skipper
thought my work okay, after all...”
Cobie Strating: “I receive disability benefits, I have been declared unfit for the labour
market. So I should not feel guilty or ashamed that I am not working. But sometimes,
when I receive the monthly benefits, I think “again a month that I did nothing to earn
this”. That really troubles me, that money coming in without I doing anything to earn
it. I have been raised, I come from a religious, a Calvinistic milieu, to see one’s work
as meaningful, as a calling. You know, “Thou shallt inhabit and work this earth”, so
put in all effort, no matter what’s your job...So, it troubles me, even though according
to the law and regulations it is all right.”
In other cases the individual himself approves of what he is doing, even though others do not
or in a lesser degree:
Bram Kooistra: “I think people will judge me differently when I find a paid job. That
finally I would do ‘real’work. They say it constantly: “when will you apply for a job
again?” And then I myself think ‘why can’t you leave me alone! I am doing good
things, you know, I am being useful right now’.” 
Bram: “At my voluntary job - I give computer courses for long-term unemployed just
like myself - there are quite a lot of volunteers who really know a lot about computers.
And they start to behave terribly arrogant. They use a lot of difficult technical terms,
just to impress the students. The average beginner, who knows nothing of computers is
really impressed then, and thinks they are quite something. But I... I am proud of
myself that I know I can explain things well to people who have never touched a
computer before. I avoid all difficult technical words and use may examples to clarify
what I mean. And then the students may regard me as simple and far less an expert
than the others, but at least they understand the thing when they go home.”
Kees Nagelkerke: “A few years ago I have moved out of my old neighbourhood
because, eh, I just had these unbearable neighbours there. I feel much better in my
present neighbourhood. This is because...well, I lived eight years in my old
neighbourhood, and six of these eight years I drank far too much...was an alcoholic. As
long as that lasted, I got along with my neighbours well, we had a good time, but of
                                                                                                                                                        
those who follow norms, the conscientious, are happier than others.
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course there were also frequent annoyances and inconvenience. And when I quit
drinking, they disliked it, so... they constantly tried to get me to drink, to go along with
them. When they failed to do so, they just did not accept me anymore. So that is why I
moved out of there. And now I live nice and quiet, no more people harassing me to
have a drink.”
Clearly, thus, the two components of behavioural confirmation can differ with regard to
concrete behaviours; they may even differ widely. So, how do these two components interact
and combine into the overall level of subjectively experienced behavioural confirmation? The
data of this study do not permit answering this question, beyond saying that most probably the
extent to which the other is regarded as a relevant other and the extent to which the other’s
judgement is regarded to be critical and objective will give the other’s approval a larger
weight compared to the self approval.
Weight of approval depends on objectivity and informedness of judgement
The third issue concerning the selection and weighing of signals of approval from others is
that of the perceived objectivity and criticalness with which the other judges one’s behaviour.
It seems that the more critical and objective one thinks to be judged, the more weight one
attaches to the (dis-) approval that is given. This need not surprise us, for the notion of
objectivity refers to a judgement that ‘others in general’ would agree with. Thus, when
someone gives us approval on the basis of an objective evaluation of our actions, we may
imagine that people in general judge us that favourably, and thus we may take the approval we
get for general approval. In contrast, when we receive approval from someone that we know
does not judge us critically and objectively, say, from someone ‘close’, no matter how happy
we are to have pleased this one person, we cannot interpret this signal as an indication of
general approval. It seems that the criticalness and objectivity with which people perceive to
be judged, depend mainly on two things. In the first place, as I already mentioned, the
affective closeness between the giver and the receiver of approval is generally negatively
related to the objectivity of judgement:
Annette de Hoog (female, age 58): “I am a housewife, but since some ten years I also
have my own hobbies and voluntary activities. I find it very important to have
activities outside the sphere of your own family. What I mean is, it is almost a matter
of course that you function well at home, and of course it does make you happy when
you feel you do, but outside, beyond the circle of your own family, the demands on
you are perhaps higher, and people are more critical in judging how you function. And
when you then hear, perhaps through the grapevine, that they think you do a good job,
it is somehow more solid, more meaningful. It gives you the idea that you can make a
valuable contribution, not just as a mother and a housewife, but also otherwise...”
In the second place, the extent to which the person who judges one’s behaviour and gives
approval is capable of judging the particular kind of performance, is generally positively
related to the weight that is given to his approval:
Bram Kooistra: “At our last work meeting, one of my colleagues told me he thought I
do a good job. He said that he had seen me at work, and he was quite positive about it.
Yeah, that was something I liked to hear. I know that the students appreciate my work,
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but to hear it from a colleague... It is different. Because he does the same work, he
knows how it is and what it requires, it is more telling... Yeah, I find it more positive
somehow.”
Stock and flow: the stable and the transient components of behavioural confirmation
Before turning to the last part of this section, in which the different aspects of the concept of
behavioural confirmation are discussed, one more issue need be mentioned. The data from the
focus group interviews suggest that - just like for status and, as we will see below, affection -
the subjectively experienced level of behavioural confirmation cannot only be distinguished in
a self approval component and a component of approval received from relevant others, but it
also appears to consist of a relatively stable and a more transient component, which may most
aptly be designated as the stock, respectively the flow component. This of course is in line
with Heady and Wearing (1989, 1991) and also corresponds closely with general insights from
the psychology of moods and emotions (e.g. Cacioppo et al. 1999; Russell & Barrett 1999):
how people feel at a particular moment is generally the combined outcome of a relatively
stable mood component and more transient affects. On the basis of the general insights
regarding the interplay between mood and affect, it seems safe to assume that the stock and
the flow components of the subjective level of behavioural confirmation are interrelated in a
similar manner: most likely the total input of transient signals of approval a person receives
gradually shapes the stock or basic feeling of behavioural confirmation, of ‘being a good
person, who does things well’, while in turn the stock component, the extent to which a person
is used to think of himself as doing and being ‘good’ is likely to affect the absorption of
positive signals concerning one’s behaviour positively.
In the focus group discussions, it appeared that approving signals from others may condense
into a general feeling that one does good things, which may in turn condense into a sense of
being a ‘good person’. This is most clearly illustrated with the words of Hylkje Brouwer, of
whom a similar statement was already presented in the above:
“Even though I regret that my parents do not approve of my life and the things I do,
even though I know that they are disappointed in me, I also know that I am a good
person. My friends, and also other people frequently let me know that they think the
things I do are okay... my colleagues at work tell me they value how I do my job and
that they like to work with me... Overall, I get sufficient positive feedback of people to
make me know I am all right, that the choices I make are good and that I am a good
person.”
5.3.4.    GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE CONCEPT OF BEHAVIOURAL CONFIRMATION, AND
          IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENT
This conceptualisation of behavioural confirmation (see figure 5.2.), implies that if the
concept is to be operationalised in order to allow standardized measurement of levels of
behavioural confirmation through, say, written or telephone questionnaires, the measurement
instrument should include:
• items for each of the six aspects or dimensions;
• for each dimension both items that refer to the approval received from others and items
tapping self-approval;
• for both the approval received from others and the self approval on each dimension of
behavioural confirmation, items that tap transient behavioural confirmation (the flow-
 168 RESULTS 1: THE ASPECTS OF THE FIRST-ORDER GOALS




doing good things  ---------------------------------------------- doing bad things
doing one's things well  ------------------------------ doing one's things poorly
being a good person ----------------------------------------- being a bad person
being useful --------------------------------------------------------- being a burden
contributing to a common cause ------- not contributing to common cause
functional belonging ---------------------- being no part of a functional entity
behavioural confirmation
 given by others
self-rewarded
behavioural confirmation
evaluation of behaviour according
to norms of others
evaluation of behaviour according
to one's own norms
contributing to one's group
Figure 5.2.: Graphical representation of the aspects and determinants of behavioural confirmation




stock & flow stock & flow
Before turning to the conceptualisation of the third first-order goal, affection, we may now
make one remark concerning the boundary between the first two first-order goals for social
well-being. Part of the task in answering the first research question is the clarification of the
boundaries between the three first-order goals. In the data from the focus group interviews it
was apparent that, no matter how sharply one would try to define status and behavioural
confirmation, there remain many empirical instances that may be reckoned to refer to both. At
least I could not find a watertight criterion for disentangling both forms of social approval in
all cases. What I did find a very practicable rule of thumb, however, was this. Whereas status
is essentially about distinguishing oneself from others, behavioural confirmation, as it is
conceptualised here, is essentially about forming a functional entity with others, about
belonging to some more-person entity, for which it is more important to make the ‘entity’ run
smoothly than to distinguish oneself from the other members. Essential for behavioural
confirmation seems thus that it is the social well-being that is realised by making one’s own
performance or achievements subservient to the goals of one’s group10.
                                                
10    Of course, examples where, even according to this criterion, status and behavioural confirmation can hardly
be distinguished empirically, are easily conceived. E.g. when a key player in a soccer team gives an excellent
pass, he is likely to receive and experience both status for his individual performance and behavioural -
confirmation for contributing to his team’s victory. The difference between the two forms of social approval can
be seen theoretically, but empirically it can hardly be disentangled.
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5.4. Affection: a further elaboration and conceptualisation
5.4.1. PRESENT AMBIGUITIES IN THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF AFFECTION
In his preface to The Psychology of Love (1988), Zick Rubin states that 
“Love had always been one thing - maybe the only thing - that seemed safely beyond
the research scientist’s ever-extending grasp. “So far as love or affection is
concerned”, Harry Harlow declared in his presidential address to the American
Psychological Association in 1958, “psychologists have failed in their mission. The
little we know about love does not transcend simple observation, and the little we
write about it has been written better by poets and novelists.” Since poets and novelists
had always been notoriously contradictory about love, defining it as everything from ‘a
spirit all compact of fire’ to ‘a state of perpetual anaesthesia’, this was a pretty serious
indictment.” 
Although Rubin then proceeds to argue that in the last two decades the situation has changed
and psychologists have made progress in investigating and understanding both attachment and
romantic love, the quote yet strongly presses the near impossibility of conceptualising or
defining love or affection, and warns against any pretensions regarding the conceptualisation
of affection that is proposed in this section.
In this section, we turn to the third of SPF theory’s first-order goals for social well-being:
affection. Affection is described by Lindenberg and Frey (1993, p.196) as:
“Affect is what Ego gets from Alter if Ego and Alter are involved in an affective
relationship. A central ingredient in such a relationship is that Ego and Alter care for
each other. ‘Caring for somebody’ here means that indicators of Ego’s utility have
become goods which produce a certain amount of physical well-being in Alter and vice
versa.”
As we saw in section 3.4.2., affection has been defined in later applications of SPF theory
(Nieboer 1997, p. 33; Van Eijk 1997, p. 43; and Steverink 1996, p. 19-20) as the approval you
get for what you are, rather than for what you do, or as the things you get when people care
about and love you, and have an intimate relation with you.
Close examination of these definitions, led to the identification of two major difficulties or
unclarities concerning the concept of affection. In the first place, I have argued that the
emphasis on affection being given on the basis of what one ‘is’, in contrast to behavioural
confirmation which one gets for what one ‘does’, is problematic. How can people know who
you are but through your behaviour, the choice you make and what you tell them about this
(which is also behaviour)? Moreover, as it must be expected that behavioural confirmation
and affection are frequently received from the same person(s), and frequently simultaneously,
it would be problematic to detect affection empirically using these definitions. We must
expect affection and behavioural confirmation to be found simultaneously in many or most
cases. If we would maintain the criterion of ‘approval for what you are instead of what you
do’, we should label as affection only those instances where there exists a positively valued
relationship between two persons that does not include approval for each other’s behaviour.
This would imply the exclusion of many, and possibly the most ‘normal’ cases of affection.
The only way of avoiding this problem, is to arrive at a conceptualisation of affection by
which we are able to recognize it, no matter if there is also behavioural confirmation or not. If
it would be possible to define or even describe affection by its own quality instead of by the
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basis on which it may be given, this would give more solid ground for empirical
measurements of affection.
In the second place, the definitions of affection used by the authors mentioned above, restrict
the possible sources of affection to ‘affective relationships’. This would imply that affection
cannot be obtained from strangers or mere acquaintances, thus, that people with whom we do
not have a close and caring relationship can only contribute to our social well-being by giving
status or behavioural confirmation. It is worth investigating whether this implication is
adequate or whether the concept of affection should be defined differently, in order to allow
for forms of affection that can be exchanged between people outside close and caring
relationships. In the following subsection I present the aspects of affection that could be
identified on the basis of the qualitative data. The identification of these aspects will help to a
better understanding of the affection component of social well-being, with which we can
subsequently explore whether it seems tenable to assume that affection is only produced and
exchanged in close and caring relationships, or whether it can also be found with people who
have no such relationship.
It is necessary, before turning to the exploration of the concept of affection as it is used in SPF
theory, to clarify how the use of this term in SPF theory, as in this book, diverges from its
common use in the literature on love and attachment. According to SPF theory, all forms of
and contributions to social well-being can be categorized as either status, behavioural
confirmation or affection. This implies that these three concepts each should cover all
contributions to social well-being that fall outside the scope of the other two. In the following
subsections of 5.4., we will see how this works out for the contents of ‘affection’ in SPF
theory. It is however clear that ‘affection’ as it is used in this book is a different and more
encompassing concept than ‘affection’ in its conventional meaning in the literature. Usually,
theorists about love, affection, attachment and similar emotions use the term love as the
overarching concept. Within this container-concept they usually distinguish several varieties
or species of ‘love’. Berscheid (1988, p. 364-366) discusses a scheme consisting of four
species of love, proposed by Lewis (1960), which is built on classical Greek distinctions of
love and which appears to correspond closely to the dimensions that are usually found in
factor analytic empirical studies of love. The four species of love, that together constitute the
container-concept ‘love’, according to this scheme are:
1. Agape: disinterested, altruistic or ‘Christian’ love, Maslow’s ‘B-love’, love that
consists of the intention of furthering the welfare and survival of the other without
thought of receiving some reward from the other in return;
2. Affection: what is also called ‘attachment’ (cf. Bowlby, e.g. 1973): primarily consisting
of proximity-seeking and proximity-maintenance, and requiring familiarity with the
other;
3. Philias: friendship, or ‘pragmatic love’, based on ‘the expectation and / or receipt of
concrete rewards from another in the course of interaction with them, with a quid pro
quo giving of rewards in return; expressions of admiration, support, and the attribution
of positive qualities to the other’;
4. Eros: romantic love, the definitive behavioural events of which have to do with sexual
desire. (Berscheid 1988, p. 364-365).
Although there are several objections to be made against this four-species scheme of love, no
better alternatives appear to have been proposed thus far. In any case, it is clear that our use of
the term ‘affection’ diverges from the use of concepts by Lewis and Berscheid. What we name
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affection appears to coincide roughly with their container-concept love. In their terminology,
‘affection’ is one of the species of love, i.e. it is one of the narrower elements of the larger
class, while in our conceptual framework affection is the overarching class of which ‘love’ is
(as will be argued in 5.4.2.) one of the aspects.
The above also makes clear that, although in the conventional use of the concepts, affection
and attachment may be equated (they are used to refer to the same subclass of ‘love’), they
should not be equated in the conceptual framework of SPF theory, as ‘affection’ there refers to
the overall class of phenomena of which attachment and love are but elements. The
exploration of the aspects of affection in 5.4.2. and the discussion of several further issues
concerning this concept in 5.4.3. will clarify this point. 
5.4.2. ASPECTS OF ‘AFFECTION’ AS THE THIRD COMPONENT OF SOCIAL WELL-BEING
For the first categorization of the statements of respondents as referring to either status,
behavioural confirmation, or affection (or to none of these three at all), I used four ‘search
lights’, i.e. four elements that had in previous studies been considered characteristic of
affection. I considered it likely that a statement was about affection when:
1) it referred to ‘caring about someone’ or being cared about by someone;
2) it revealed dependency of the respondents well-being on the well-being of someone
else, thus when there are ‘interdependent utility functions’;
3) it referred to a situation or relationship in which reciprocity of feeling is essential and
weighs more heavily than concrete behaviours;
4) it revealed a willingness to make unilateral transfers of goods, i.e. when it referred to a
relationship in which a person is willing to give resources or effort or time to the other
without expecting or wanting something particular in return.
Using these sensitising elements as search lights, the transcripts from the focus group
discussions were screened for instances of affection, which resulted in a set of more than 150
statements that could be used to explore the content of this third component of social well-
being.
Generally, affection appears to be inversely related to loneliness, a concept that is equally hard
to define yet easily recognizable for most people. I believe most people would describe
loneliness as ‘missing or lacking important personal relations’, and that affection may be
considered as the thing lonely people miss11. But even saying this does not really clarify the
concept. For if affection refers to ‘having important personal relationships’, what is
‘important’? Without further elaboration of the concept, such a simple ‘definition’ seems to be
circular. Therefore, let us look what aspects of affection could be found.
All statements that, in open coding, had been labelled as ‘possibly affection’, were reread, and
one or more keywords were attached that expressed in more concrete terms than ‘affection’
what the statement was about. As keyword I sometimes used a word that was taken directly
from the respective statement, sometimes I paraphrased and summarized the statement into
one or a few words myself. After doing this for all statements that possibly referred to
‘affection’, there were 32 more or less different terms and keywords that were thought to
                                                
11    This notion is consistent with the way Steverink (1996) treated affection: she used the (inverse) Loneliness-
scale of De Jong-Gierveld & Kamphuis (1985) to operationalise the level of this first-order instrumental goal.
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reflect the aspects of affection that had surfaced in the focus group interviews. As some
keywords were highly similar, this number could be reduced to 9 aspects of affection: (1)
liking; (2) emotional trust, acceptance, safety; (3) communicating at an ‘existential’ level; (4)
empathy; (5) interdependency of well-being; (6) reciprocity of feelings towards each other; 
(7) physical attraction; (8) willingness for unilateral transfers; (9) love.
Liking refers to the feeling of appreciating the other person. It should not, I believe, be
conceptualised as ‘love to a lesser extent’, that is, the aspects liking and love are not properly
conceived of as different points or parts of a single dimension; they are qualitatively different.
You may like a person more or less, but it is not so that ‘liking much’ at some point flows
over continuously into ‘loving’. If you like a person very much, this may develop into loving
him, but then the feeling not only becomes ‘more’, it also changes in quality. While liking is
in general consciously based on particular characteristics or behavioural habits, loving can less
easily be accounted for by reference to specific traits or characteristics of the person. The love
between parent and child, for example, is often independent of the extent to which they like
each other, and the question whether they would like each other’s personality at all if they had
not happened to be parent and child. Also when we look at the negative poles of these aspects,
there appears to be a difference: whereas the opposite of liking is disliking - a similar but
negative feeling - the opposite of love is, I think, not hate, but rather indifference and
complete lack of interest. Therefore the two are considered to be separate aspects of affection.
There is broad consensus in the literature on the distinct quality of (romantic) loving and
liking, that is, on these being different emotions rather than different intensities of one single
emotion:
“First, it seems quite clear that more and more liking for another does not, in the end,
lead to romantic love; more and more liking just leads to a lot of liking. Liking for
another - whether affection or philias (friendship - AvB) in form - and romantic love
are not different points of quantitative intensity on the same dimension; the two are
different tracks altogether. [...] Second, the probability that romantic love is a different
animal from the other varieties of love as argued for by the fact that some of the
conditions that are conducive to the development of, say, philias are not conducive to
the development of romantic love and may even be detrimental to it.” (Berscheid,
1988, p. 369).
In the focus group discussions many instances surfaced both of liking others and of being
liked oneself:
Simon Goudsmid: “Just this morning, when I arrived here at the train station and
waited at the bus stand, I started a chat with a young man who stood waiting there too.
And he reacted with such enthusiasm, saying that he liked being addressed so
spontaneously. He told me how sorry he often feels that people in these parts of the
Netherlands are generally so tight, so little extrovert. I’ll probably never meet that man
again, but I felt he really liked me. Just like that, spontaneously. Things like that can
really make me feel happy.”
Johan Berghuis: “If you mean the things that make me feel good, that make me feel
happy, I find it much more important that I like the people that I meet and have to deal
with, then whether they like me. That is, how would it help me if someone likes me if I
can not stand that person? No, to find out that those people that you have to deal with
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are nice, that you find them pleasant and okay, and that you like them is much more
important for me. If you find that the people around you are nice, you can feel at ease,
you feel socially in place, you feel that you could have good contacts with the people
around you...”
Both seem to contribute to - what I would consider to be – people’s experienced level of
affection (see also section 5.4.3., below).
Emotional trust, acceptance and safety is the second aspect I distinguish. This aspect refers to
the extent to which you feel you can show your thoughts, moods, and emotions to the other
without being hurt, rejected or taken advantage of. Acceptance is essential in this: that, even if
something you say or do would be a thing the other does not like or agree with, this would not
affect the relationship. Some respondents talked about having someone who acts as a
‘sounding board’, meaning someone to whom they could say anything that was on their minds,
things which they would not normally express to others.
Cobie Strating:  “When my father died 18 years ago, it deeply affected me. I was
almost thirty then, and I knew he was going to die soon, for he had severe heart
problems. And when he was gone, I felt a great void: my sounding board was not there
any more...”
This aspect of affection appears to be related to Goffman’s (1971) concept of a backstage, a
social situation where people can drop their ‘masks’ and can stop their impression
management for a moment. 
Communication at an ‘existential’ level, the third aspect of affection that is distinguished here,
refers to what respondents frequently named ‘really talking’. It means the actual exchange of
thoughts and ideas about serious and important things. In the interviews, it appeared that this
type of communication is both an aspect or element of affection and something that may lead
to establishing and developing an affective relationship.
Irene van der Wal:  “I have worked as a volunteer some time, for our church. This
voluntary work consisted of visiting elderly members in our community. And I found
out that there were several of these elderly persons that I liked very much. Even now
that I quit the voluntary job, I still visit some of these people. They captured my
interest. When talking with them, I find so much wisdom in such an old lady...I always
feel that through these talks, exchanging thoughts about serious things, I can mean
something for them, and they for me. They confirm me in being a human being...”
Together with the third aspect of affection, emotional trust and acceptance, this aspect is likely
to bring about also the feeling of being known as a person (and knowing the other as a person)
that is something respondents repeatedly mentioned as one of the elements of affection. Here,
I subsume this aspect under the aspect ‘existential communication’.
Empathy is the fourth aspect distinguished here. It refers to the ability to put oneself into the
other’s position, and to imagine how he perceives and experiences this. This aspect is distinct
from the next aspect, the interdependency of each other’s well-being, which refers to the
extent to which the pain or pleasure of the one elicits pain respectively pleasure in the other.
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Annette de Hoog: “When something is wrong with my children, I am sad and worried
too. I can’t help that, even though I know it does not help them when I sit crying. And
it is the same when they are happy: then I am happy too.”
While one may understand that something is painful or pleasurable for the other, this need not
necessarily imply that this also causes a decrease or increase in one’s own well-being. In
reverse, one may not be able to understand exactly why the other is happy or crying or upset,
and yet experience an effect on one’s own well-being.
The sixth aspect of affection is reciprocity of feelings towards each other. This should not be
confused with the interdependency of well-being, for this sixth aspect is not about feeling glad
or sad with the other, but about feeling the same things for each other. Both from the focus
group interviews and - for most people - from introspection, it is clear that for our level of
affection it matters quite a lot whether the person who likes or loves us is someone whom we
dislike, like or love. But also in finer nuances the reciprocity of the feelings people have
towards each other seems to be positively related to the affection they experience. Even when
two people love each other, it seems probable that they derive more well-being from that fact
when they feel they love each other in a similar way, say, because they understand each
other’s moods, or because they communicate well, or because they care about the same things,
or because they feel physical attraction. If A receives affection from B because B is physically
attracted to A, while A cares about B because of the intimate and confidential talks they can
have, I expect A, and probably B as well, to derive less well-being from their relationship than
if both would feel about each other in the same way.
Rutger van Woerden: “What made us split up, the mother of my daughters and me,
was not so much the drugs, but rather the different ideas that we had about our
relationship. I cared for her because I thought she was okay to be with, I could have
lots of fun with her, and that was what made me feel I would like her as a partner. But
she had quite different ideas about being partners. She said she loved me because she
liked to talk with me, you know, these emotional talks, and because I am a good father
for our daughters. But I do not always feel like having such ‘deep’ talks, and I wanted
her to like me for other things than just for being a great dad.”
Another example of the importance of reciprocity or similarity of feelings towards each other
is provided in the story of Anneke de Wit (see later, in section 5.4.3., under ‘the relation
between affection and behavioural confirmation’). She relates how hard or even impossible it
was for her mother to accept that her youngest son did not want to see her or come to her
birthdays anymore. Clearly his refusal caused intense distress, an incapacity to deal with or
understand this disparity of feelings towards each other, which is most clearly expressed in the
mother’s words: “But I still love him!”
Physical attraction and touching is the seventh aspect of affection. This aspect, like the
others, is not necessarily present in all affective relationships. However, again like the other
aspects, it seems that people generally seek to find this aspect of affection in at least one or
few of their relations to other people. It also seems that there exist differences between people
in the weight they attach to this aspect; it is not clear though what these differences should be
attributed to: whether they are merely an inborn character trait, or whether they are also
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affected by present and previous experiences regarding affection and physical contact. It
should be noted that in this aspect, affection touches with, and perhaps even flows over into
physical well-being. Yet the crucial difference between ‘mere’ physical well-being and the
physical aspect of affection, is that the latter is always first and foremost a signal that
expresses feelings of love, liking or empathy, while for the first the physical touching in itself
is more relevant than the feelings of the other person (as when, say, getting a massage).
Physical contact as an aspect of affection is first and foremost a specific form of
communication that both presupposes and strengthens feelings of being close to someone else.
Barend van der Weijde: “You may think it odd that I tell you this, but I feel it is highly
relevant for the subject of social well-being; as for overall well-being, for that matter. I
want to say that for my well-being it is really important that I have a very good sexual
relationship with my wife. One of the great things of being a pensioner is that you also
have more time and occasion to do some cuddling during the daytime. It is no longer
something you can only do at night. My wife and I have sex almost every day. Or,
well, of course when you get older it cannot always be ‘sex’ in the sense that younger
people mostly think of. But it is so good just to lie beside one another, holding each
other. I feel so rich, so satisfied then. Having my wife so near.”
Willingness for unilateral transfers is the eighth aspect of affection. In a sense it is the logical
consequence of interdependency of well-being, that one does not feel one has to be
compensated for what one gives to and does for the other: through adding to the other’s well-
being, one’s own well-being also increases.
Edwin Eijkhof: “My wife loves to play bridge. At Thursday evenings, we always play
bridge with the same people. And frankly, I do not like it much myself. If it were only
for me, I’d know many more pleasant ways to spend my evening. But it is so nice to
see my wife enjoying herself, that makes up for everything. So I never tell her I don’t
like to go. Although bridging itself is not my favourite, it is nice to do my wife that
pleasure, even though she does not really know I do it for her sake.”
Love, finally, is the ninth aspect of affection that I distinguish. It is also the most difficult to
describe or define. It appears to me that the eight foregoing aspects of affection are all highly
important for one’s social well-being, and they are all in some way related to what people use
to call love, yet even when all eight coincide, I am not sure that there will always be love. In
contrast, I believe people can experience love even in a relationship in which but few of the
foregoing eight aspects of affection are present. Therefore, and because respondents repeatedly
stressed that love was essential for their overall happiness (but failed to explain what love then
exactly means), I think it should be included as a separate aspect.
Lidia Roodwijn (female, age 64): “But still, even liking someone a lot, trusting him,
caring about someone and perhaps even being, you know, physically attracted to him
or to her, is not yet the same as ‘love’. I think it is not. Love is
something…autonomous or so, it follows its own logic and is not automatically a
consequence of all these other things. I mean real love… the love that is a source of
inspiration… I believe that a person that has never felt that kind of love has somehow
never really lived. I had such love twice in my live, and even though it is years past
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now, it still is the most important thing for me…”
When studying affection empirically, and measuring the level of it, researchers can decide
themselves whether in a particular study it makes sense to distinguish love as a separate aspect
of affection.
5.4.3. THE ‘RELEVANT OTHERS’, SELF-AFFECTION, AND FURTHER ISSUES
The relevant others: can affection also be obtained outside close and caring relationships?
In the beginning of this section I have questioned whether affection is necessarily restricted to
exchanges in close and caring relationships. If one accepts the conceptualisation of affection
as developed above, and thus accepts that the nine aspects that I have identified there
distinguish affection from other forms of social approval, it is not difficult to find instances of
affection for and from people with whom there is no close and caring relationship. Evidence
of this could also be found in the data.
One respondent, for example, told about a formal meeting which she attended for her work,
where suddenly halfway the dull agenda, she met the eye of someone across the table, an
employee from another firm, whom she had not met before. And for some reason both my
respondent and this other person started to giggle and a moment later both were weak with
laughter. My respondent explained this by saying that they were just feeling the same thing at
the same moment and they knew it, and she added that she had thoroughly enjoyed this burst
of merriment. Although most people will not intuitively associate an incident like this with
‘affection’, I believe that the shared feeling when their eyes met and when they were laughing,
is a mixture of stimulation and affection. Stimulation of course, because of the arousal it
produces (and the subsequent tension reduction), but I believe the social component should
not be underestimated.
Another example, that is somewhat similar but probably more convincing, is that of the
respondent who had sat in the local bus, when it stopped and a woman with a young and very
cute baby stepped in. My respondent told that he had met the eye of another passenger and that
they had smiled at each other when they saw that they were both endeared by the sight of this
baby. In this case the enjoyment of knowing that you and the other both share the same feeling
is not a matter of stimulation, here it is clearer that there is affection: shared feelings that
diminish the perceived distance between oneself and a stranger.
A third example, which is very different, is that of a respondent who told me that she always
watches a particular soap on TV, and strongly feels for the personages playing in it. She
dislikes the ‘bad guys’, feels sorry for the heroine who is cheated on, and is sincerely worried
that certain intrigues will turn out wrong. She even told that watching the soap makes her feel
less lonely. In this case, the personages in the soap-series are not exactly what we would
normally refer to as ‘strangers’, because they are not real people and because my respondent
knows a lot of intimate details about these personages. However, the main point seems to be
that we can neither say that my respondent has a ‘close and caring relationship’ with these
personages, and yet the involvement in their virtual lives provides my respondent with a real
sense of affection (as conceptualised in the above).
From personal experience and introspection, most readers will easily be able to come up with
similar examples.
  
Affection for oneself: self affection
In the two previous sections, on the conceptualisation of status and behavioural confirmation,
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it was argued that both these first-order instrumental goals consist of two components: one
component that is formed by the status or approval received from others, and one component
formed by - respectively - self ranking and self approval. It appears adequate to assume a
similar two-component structure for the concept of affection: besides the affection we give to
and receive from others, there is also a component of affection that we feel for ourselves. I
will refer to this component as self affection.
It is common notion that there exists something like self love, as a form of liking,
understanding and being at ease with oneself, and that people differ in their level of self
affection. One respondent mentioned such conventional wisdom:
Annette de Hoog: “You can not love someone else until you have learned to love
yourself. That’s what they have said to me too. And I believe many people think that is
true. But it cost me a long time before I could even accept myself, and only very
slowly I have come to regard myself as someone worthwhile…”
The mental representation of affection as ‘having’ people around: the metaphor of the onion
Besides what respondents told about the aspects, the phenomenology of ‘affection’, several
respondents used some metaphors when speaking of affection. What I found remarkable in
these, is that many respondents referred to a metaphor of concentric circles around themselves,
in which other people are placed according to the extent of ‘closeness’ that exists, to express
how they perceived affection, or rather, their affective relationships:
Frank Zuidema: “The most important ‘source’ of my well-being is my family. My two
sons and my wife, these are the most precious people for me. The most precious thing
in my life. And further, well, then around that there comes the family that I come from,
my parents and brother and sisters, that is the next thing, and then further...outside that,
it is just the people that I meet on my way...”
Johan Berghuis: “People do not often take me in confidence, and nor do I with them.
As I see it, when people are getting more close to you... I have some sort of fence
around me, that clearly says: to this point and no further. And some people I allow
beyond that, but only a few... my wife. Not even my daughters can always come that
close. And with the people in the outer circles, acquaintances etcetera, I really like to
meet them and exchange some information, but they need not get closer.”
Annette de Hoog: “You just draw a circle, and inside it is your family, around it there
are other relatives and beyond that there are others. Those outside, they are the
critics...”
A fitting metaphor for this model of concentric circles is found in the skin-structure of an
onion, and the criterion for positioning relevant others in the ‘skins’ of the onion is the
emotional closeness that exists between them and Ego. Yasmin Rais actually named her
affective relationships by that term:
“I have good contact with my neighbours, but they are not really precious to me. I
always think it is like an onion: you know, the skins an onion has. These neighbours
can only get to the second outer skin, no further. Who are in the most inner skin? My
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husband. And my son. One skin further to the outside there is my family. My sister and
brother-in-law. I do not tell them everything, like I do to my husband and son. But we
are rather close though.”12
It seems plausible to expect that it makes a difference for one’s level of well-being whether,
say, one realizes all nine aspects of affection with just one or two persons, or whether one
realizes the same number of aspects via a larger number of relationships, each providing but
one or two aspects of affection13. Given our conceptualisation of affection, and the
suggestions for its operationalisation (see section 5.4.4., below), this difference need not
become visible in the subjective level of affection. I rather expect it to affect the overall
subjective level of social well-being, through the quality of one’s production functions, in
particular through the efficiency in production.
The efficiency, and more in general, the quality of production functions is extensively
discussed in Chapter 7; therefore this issue is given no further attention here.
Subjective affection consists both by what is received and by what is given
It should be noted that the formulation of the expected determinants of the level of affection
includes both the giving and the receiving of affection. As for status and behavioural
confirmation, the other two components of social well-being, these consist only of what one
receives from others and oneself, and do not increase through giving status and behavioural
confirmation to others. One’s level of affection, in contrast, appears to increase both from
receiving and from giving affection to others. 
In section 5.4.2, above, this issue was already touched upon in the discussion of the first
aspect of affection, liking. It was seen there, and illustrated with quotes from the focus group
discussions, that both being liked by others and liking others oneself may contribute positively
to one’s subjective level of affection. Although the issue was not repeated for each of the other
aspects of affection anew, I think it should be considered to hold for all nine aspects of
affection that I have distinguished.
The relation between affection and behavioural confirmation
It became apparent in the focus group discussions that describing affection as ‘approval for
what you are instead of what you do’ is not always adequate. Affection appears not to be
completely unrelated to behavioural confirmation in practice.
If you like the things a person does you can - but need not necessarily - also like him as a
person. Research on the emergence of friendships (the choice of friends, e.g. Zeggelink 1993)
                                                
12     The practical implications of this notion of an onion-like structure of affection (such as for the development
of a measurement instrument) are not immediately clear. The data from this study do not give guidance on that
point. As far as can be guessed on the basis of the interviews, however, the level of affection that a person
experiences depends on two factors combinedly: the number of relations with ‘others’, weighed by their
proximity (in which ‘skin of the onion’ are they located?) and the number of aspects of affection that are present
in the total of relations with others. Probably, these factors are not independent, and it requires a different kind of
study to find out how they should be measured and weighted empirically.
13      In reality, the latter extreme of the contrast will probably occur but seldom, as many of the nine aspects of
affection are unlikely to be realized in complete absence of the other aspects. But it is likely that there exists
considerable variation in both the number of affective relationships people have and - probably related to that - in
the intensity or completeness of these relationships.
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suggests that similarities between persons in the activities they do, increases the likelihood
that they will become friends. A statement of Hylkje Brouwer may illustrate this:
“As my parents did not approve of the things I wanted to do, and of the choices I
made, I rely more on my friends for that. I have a lot of friends, who do the same kind
of things as I like to do, friends that I met when working in the youth penitentiary, too.
You know, when people are involved in the same things as you are, they understand
you better, and it is just easier to have good contacts.”
If you like someone, as a rule you want him to approve of your behaviour. Of course, in terms
of production functions, it is more efficient if, through one relationship, you can realize both
affection and behavioural confirmation; and besides, in the previous section we have seen that
behavioural confirmation is the approval you get from relevant others, which already suggests
that these may also be the people you get affection from:
Kees Nagelkerke: “When I was drinking, I mean when I was still an alcoholic, the
worst thing was knowing that I caused my parents grief. To know that they found it
wrong how I lived... Of course I also wanted to stop drinking for myself, but also
because I wanted to change my life so that my parents could approve of it. And since I
quit drinking, our contact has become so much better again, it feels good now.”
It seems that behavioural confirmation can be produced without affection, say when you
obtain it from people with whom you have a purely business-like relationship or to whom you
stand in a certain status-relationship, but the data provide no evidence of instances where
affection is completely without behavioural confirmation, or completely independent of it.
There are of course instances where two persons who have an affective relationship
disapprove of the behaviour of the other, but the data suggest that such instances are perceived
to be problematic, that people in such situations experience stress and incongruence, as is the
case between Anneke de Wit and her younger brother:
“In my family, it is so odd. I am the eldest of seven children, and I think I live exactly
according to the norms of my parents, because that is how I am raised. And five of the
other children do so too. But my youngest brother, he is so different... He moved to
Amsterdam, and two years ago he even broke all contacts with the whole family. Even
with my mother: he did not go to her funeral. And I just can’t understand how that can
be. We always loved him, and my parents both adored him, all through his growing
up... How can he now act like this? A few years ago, when my mother was still alive,
she had her eightieth birthday and she wanted my brother to come too. And he refused
to come. And we tried to make her accept that, because there was nothing we could do
about it, but she just could not accept it. So, despite that she had Parkinson’s disease
and could hardly walk or write anymore, she managed to walk to my father’s study to
find some paper, and she tried to write him a letter, begging him to come. One of the
other brothers happened to come by and saw that she did this. So she just couldn’t
accept that her son wanted to do other things...”
Affection and the control over one’s own production of well-being
There is one more point regarding affection as it is conceptualised here that should be
mentioned. This point concerns the relation between the production of affection and the
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control one has over one’s own production of well-being. The interdependency of well-being
that usually is part of affective relationships has as implication that one partly looses control
over what happens with one’s well-being. In terms of metagoals, this has to be judged as a
negative side-effect, as the quality of one’s production function is regarded to be positively
related to the agency or the extent to which one has the production of one’s well-being in
one’s own hands. The fact that with affection it is almost unavoidable to lose part of this
control, also means that the more one’s social well-being depends on the affection component,
as compared to the status component and the behavioural confirmation component, the lower
the overall control over one’s production of well-being. Thus, a person is more vulnerable and
dependent on things beyond his own control, when the relative importance of affection in his
total social well-being is larger.
5.4.4. GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE CONCEPT OF AFFECTION, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
THE  DEVELOPMENT OF A MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENT
In figure 5.3., the resulting conceptualisation of affection is presented graphically.
others feeling these aspects towards youfeeling these aspects towards others
AFFECTION
having people around you that provide you with a sense of...
liking / being liked ------------------------------------------------------- disliking / being disliked
emotional trust, acceptance, safety ---------------------------- distrust, rejection, insecurity
communicating at existential level ------------------------------------- no real communication
empathy--------------------------------------------------- inability to imagine the othe'rsfeelings
interdependency of well-being ------------------------- non- or inversely related well-being
reciprocity of feelings for eachother --------------- nonreciprocal feelings / inconsistency
physical attraction / physical harmony ---- physical aversion / lack of physical harmony
willingness for unilateral transfers -------- dominance of self-gain orientation
love ------------------------------------------------- indifference
Figure 5.3.: Graphical representation of the aspects of affection
feeling these aspects towards oneself
From this conceptualisation of affection, a number of implications can be derived for the
eventual empirical measurement of people’s subjective level of affection. A measurement
instrument for subjective levels of affection should:
• include items for each of the nine aspects of affection that were identified in section
5.4.2., in order to be able to assess to what extent each of these aspects is realized for a
respondent;
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• include items that assess the number of people14 from whom the respondent receives
affection in the form of each of the nine aspects;
• include items that assess the number of people to whom the respondent gives affection
in the form of each of the nine aspects of this component of social well-being;
• be constructed such that, combined, the items provide information regarding the
intensity of the affective relationships between the respondent and the people from
which he gets affection (intensity being conceived of as the number of aspects of
affection that are realised within a dyadic relationship);
• include items (or an existing scale) that measure the level of self affection, that is, the
extent to which the respondent likes and loves himself.  
5.5. Conclusion
In this chapter the aspects of the three first-order instrumental goals for social well-being have
been explored. Starting out from the original definitions of these three components of social
well-being according to SPF theory, all forms and instances of social well-being that emerged
in the focus group discussions were classified as belonging to one (or sometimes two) of these
three components, following which the content of each of the first order goals was
reconsidered. For each of the three components of social well-being, the most relevant aspects
were identified. These aspects should ideally be represented in measurement instruments when
one intends to systematically investigate the subjective level of status, behavioural
confirmation and affection of respondents empirically.
It has become clear on the basis of the qualitative data that it is useful for each of the three
components of social well-being, to distinguish between the status, behavioural confirmation
and affection that is received from others and from oneself. The self-rewarded elements of
these forms of social approval have been named self ranking, self approval and self affection.
Although quantitative research is needed to establish the potential variation between people’s
subjective level of social approval that is received from others and the level of social approval
they have for themselves, it seems that in many cases - though of course depending on one’s
research interests - it is useful to assess both elements separately.
The conceptualisations of status, behavioural confirmation and affection, as they emerged
from the analyses of the qualitative data do of course not diverge drastically from their
original definitions. And as I have explained in the introduction to this chapter, it has not been
my objective to arrive at new definitions of these three components of social well-being, but
rather to get a better grasp on the parts of reality that they refer to. By identifying and
considering the respective aspects of the three first-order goals, I think we have learnt more
about them and their content than we could have by seeking more precise definitions.
Moreover, having seen the main aspects (or: the most important and familiar faces) by which
these components of social well-being present themselves to our perception, we are likely to
perceive and recognise these aspects far more easily when we look for social well-being, even
                                                
14     From the findings about the aspects of affection described in this chapter, there is no direct reason for
wanting the number of people from whom one receives or whom one gives affection included in a measurement
instrument for affection. It is only obvious that it matters whether there are any people (one or more) or none
(zero). The argument for wanting to go beyond such a mere dichotomy runs ahead of Chapter 7 of this book. It is
derived from the metagoals that matter for the level of social well-being that can be attained: for the stability and
security of one’s production of affection having more than one person as source of the nine aspects of affection is
a manner of risk spreading. 
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if the aspects take on context-specific looks.
For status and behavioural confirmation, there is indeed no reason to adapt the existing
definitions; the analyses reported in this chapter just contribute to the conceptualisation of
what these definitions contain. For affection, the results reported in section 5.4. do give reason
to adapt the definition. It was argued that for at least some aspects of affection, the existence
of a ‘close and caring relationship’ is no prerequisite. If the conceptualisation of affection as
proposed in this chapter is accepted, it appears better to define affection as ‘the feeling to have
others close, either emotionally, physically or both; affection includes feelings of liking,
loving, understanding, empathy, communication and trust, the interdependency of well-being,
and willingness for unilateral transfers’.
By exploring at some length the range of instances and forms of social well-being that each of
the three first order instrumental goals covers, a better sense was also gained as to the
differences and boundaries or border areas between these goals.
CHAPTER SIX
RESULTS OF THE EXPLORATORY
STUDY II: INVENTORY OF
PRODUCTION FACTORS FOR SOCIAL
WELL-BEING
6.1. Introduction
After having gained a better conceptualisation of the three components of social well-being
according to Social Production Function theory (Chapter 5), we are now ready to turn to the
problem of identifying the common factors in the idiosyncratic means that people may use to
realise status, behavioural confirmation and affection. One basic notion in SPF theory is that
people may employ an almost unlimited number of combinations of activities and resources in
order to produce their own well-being. Yet, as we saw in Chapter 2 (e.g. when discussing the
Basic Needs approach of Stewart et al.), it is only through establishing a theoretical and
empirical link between, at the one hand, a more or less limited set of objective conditions or
available resources, and at the other hand, levels of social and overall well-being, that SPF
theory may contribute to the field of Quality of Life studies. Therefore we should try to find
some way to abstract from all too idiosyncratic production factors and find more general
‘classes’ or ‘kinds’ of production factors that may be translated into a practicable set of
indicators for the objective conditions (or available resources) affecting levels of social well-
being.
In section 3.6. the second research question was formulated as
What objective information concerning the availability of production factors at the
individual level is needed in order to be able to predict (within reasonable margins) the
level of social well-being that individual can attain?
This research question was further specified in two subquestions:
1) Which are the essential production factors for status, behavioural confirmation and
affection, respectively?
2) What are the complementarity and substitutability relations between these production
factors?
This chapter reports the results of the exploratory qualitative study regarding these research
questions. First, in section 6.2., it is explained why I found it useful to start the inventory and
analysis of production factors for social well-being by identifying a number of empirical fields
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(i.e. contexts) in which people’s production of well-being takes place. In this same section, the
six fields that I have identified on the basis of the qualitative study are introduced and
discussed.
Next, in section 6.3., the typical production factors that are relevant in these six fields are
presented for each of the three first-order instrumental goals for social well-being
subsequently. These results are summarised and systematised in a matrix of the most relevant
production factors per goal and field of production.
In section 6.4., I discuss what substitutability and complementarity relations appear to exist
between the main production factors that were identified in 6.3. The discussion of these
functional relations between production factors must remain hypothetical in character; only
quantitative study can corroborate the tentative hypotheses concerning these interrelations.
The chapter ends with a general conclusion, in 6.5., regarding the extent to which the research
questions could be answered in this study.
6.2. Fields in which social well-being is produced
For our eventual aim of finding a way to relate objective living conditions of people to their
levels of social and overall subjective well-being, the practically all-encompassing character
of SPF theory is a point in its favour, but at the same time probably its most serious handicap.
On the one hand, this all-encompassing character of SPF theory is one of its
recommendations, as it fits the theory very closely to concrete experienced reality, and as it
enables the theorist to explain a large range of empirical phenomena through interpreting the
observed behaviour as rational actions in the realisation of one of the first-order goals for
well-being. On the other hand, however, the absence of limitations to the range of activities
and resources that may contribute to the eventual production of well-being in one of its forms,
poses a serious problem if we want to draw up a list of ‘objective conditions or resources’ that
would predict the attainable level of well-being and the respective levels of its components
(the first-order instrumental goals in SPF theory) that may be attained.
For making the inventory of ‘main relevant’ production factors in the data from the qualitative
study, I had to find a way to deal with this problem. Merely summarising all activities and
material resources that respondents mentioned by seeking a degree of abstraction (which
respondents usually tend to do themselves also when talking about production) would not
have been satisfactory, because the degree of abstraction would be arbitrary and, moreover, I
wanted a systematic inventory, requiring that implicit notions of categories or rules for
abstraction be made explicit. If a categorisation system could be found with which the
unlimited number of entries in the inventory of production factors could be ordered, these
categories might eventually also provide an approach for condensing the highly concrete
production factors into somewhat more abstract and overarching ‘objective conditions’ such
as might be related to attainable levels of well-being.
The most sensible approach1 to arrive at a categorisation system for all production factors that
might be found, not only in my data but also more general in empirical research, appeared to
                                                          
1     In a first attempt to inventory and categorise all production factors I found in my data, I have tried to
categorise the production factors per first-order goal (the well-known trio: status, behavioural confirmation and
affection). This proved not to solve the problem. Per category / first-order goal there remained too many
production factors which appeared to be too heterogeneous to reduce them on the basis of common features to
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be the identification of distinct contexts in which the well-being producing activities take
place. This approach was partly inspired by the convention in applications of the grounded
theory approach to define empirical fields, within which emerging concepts have particular
meaning and relevance (Glaser & Strauss 1967).
I expected that the meaning of particular (classes of) production factors and the way they
contribute to the three components of social well-being would differ depending on the
empirical field in which the productive behaviour is set. Therefore I listed the distinct settings
in which the production of status, behavioural confirmation and affection reported by
respondents took place. The three resulting lists partly overlapped, with in total over fifty
different settings. Next I clustered these fields into a smaller number of appealing, easy-to-
handle general fields. Eventually, I have decided on a set of six fields that appear to have a
universal relevance, at least for Dutch society, and that applies equally to the production of
status, behavioural confirmation and affection. These six fields closely fit general
classifications of activities in which people themselves seem to think about what they do.
Three fields are located in the private domain, the other three in the public domain.
One remark should be made to prevent misunderstanding. The fields that I distinguish here are
abstract categories of functional contexts in which people act and produce well-being. They
are in that respect fundamentally different from categories of concrete locations or settings.
They also differ from what Feld (1981; 1982) calls foci of activities. Feld (1981, p. 1016)
defines a focus of activity as “a social, psychological, legal, or physical entity around which
joint activities are organized (e.g., workplaces, voluntary organizations, hangouts, families,
etc.)” In this concept of foci, functional contexts and actual physical settings or places are
confused. Feld does not choose a consequent perspective from which different foci of activity
may be distinguished. This hinders the making of an exhaustive list of (mutually exclusive)
foci. Therefore I decided not to follow Feld’s concept of foci, but to define the fields for the
production of social (and physical) well-being from the more systematic perspective of
functional contexts.
Sometimes categories of functional contexts may coincide more or less closely with actual
locations or settings (‘geographical contexts’). For example, our fourth field, the field of
productive activities in the public domain, which includes the functional contexts of formal
paid and unpaid work and schooling, apparently coincides with the corresponding clear, actual
settings of the work organisation and the school. However, such incidental correspondence
with easily identified actual settings should not induce one to mistake our categorisation
system as based on categories of actual settings. For example, within the actual setting of the
school or the classroom, some behaviours or resources used in the production of well-being
should according to our classification of fields of production be classified as part of the field
of personal relationships in the private domain rather than that of the field of productive
activities in the public domain. We may imagine two classmates being close friends, and
having some conversation or exchange of affectionate nonverbal signals during the lessons.
This behaviour is, from a social production function perspective, better categorised as a
production activity within the private domain (i.c. the field of personal relationships) than as a
production activity belonging to the school setting.
                                                                                                                                                                                     
more abstract factors. Also, as many production factors are multi functional, the categories discriminated -
insufficiently; a problem that I was unable to solve until I found another way to categorise production factors.
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It is our present aim to find a way to reduce the potentially limitless inventory of production
factors for social well-being to a more practicable list of abstract production factors, which
each represent multiple concrete production factors that are functional equivalents. The
example above shows that, given our present aim, the use of abstract categories of functional
contexts is to be preferred above the use of categories of actual locations or settings like
Feld’s ‘foci’.
As indicated above, I developed a classification scheme for all contexts in which people may
produce well-being, which consists of six fields of production, three in the private domain and
three in the public domain.
 Table 6.1.: Six fields in which well-being is produced
 Private domain 1. productive activities e.g. self-care, housekeeping
2. personal relationships e.g. partner, family, friends
3. recreation and discretionary activities e.g. sports, hobbies, going out
Public domain 4. productive activities e.g. (un)paid work, schooling
5. citizenship: legal rights and obligations e.g. tax-paying, traffic rules
6. non-institutionalised interactions e.g. in the street, in shops
1. Productive activities in the private domain
The first field of the six that I have distinguished covers all contexts of productive activities in
private settings. It includes important classes of informal production, such as housekeeping,
odd jobs and maintenance, child raising, self care, and informal care giving to others. What all
these contexts have in common, from our perspective, is that the grounds on which one can
obtain status or behavioural confirmation from these types of productive activities in the
private domain are rather similar, while also the production factors that may be used in such
contexts overlap substantially. The field of productive activities in the private domain
coincides largely with what are, in the literature on time use studies, sometimes referred to as
‘obligatory activities’. To some extent these activities are necessary for individual or
collective survival, but more importantly (and probably based on that), these activities are
subject to strong social norms by which members of society are more or less ‘obliged’ to
perform these productive tasks.
Although the actual activities belonging to this field often take place in the presence of, or on
behalf of one’s personal relations, the obligatory character and subjection to productivity
norms clearly distinguish this field, as a separate field for the production of social well-being,
from the field of personal relationships (see below).
For activities in the contexts of child care or child raising, for example, the distinction from
the field of personal relationships may seem unclear. The relevant criterion, however, is
always whether the particular production activity or resource pertains to the relationship
proper (in which case it belongs to field 2) or to the caregiving to the other person, the care for
the physical well-being and healthy development of the care-receiver (in which case it belongs
to field 1).
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2. Personal relationships in the private domain
This field covers all functional contexts of production, maintenance and consumption of
personal relationships. The personal relationships that people have provide a context in which
status, behavioural confirmation and affection may be produced or lost.
Having certain bonds or relationships and having relationships with particular others is a
source of status; the way one behaves in one’s personal relationships and the choices one
makes regarding these relationships form a potential source of behavioural confirmation from
both people within and outside the personal network; and of course it is for a large part within
personal relationships that affection is brought forth. The contexts respondents mentioned that
were categorised within this first field of production include, amongst others, one’s partner-
relationship, neighbourship, parent-child relations, siblingship, friendship, and acquaintance.
Personal relationships need thus not necessarily be intimate relationships. With some of one’s
personal relations there may exist also functional bonds, like when a friend is also a colleague,
or when a couple runs a firm together, or - very commonly - when members of a family or
household not only share an emotional bond but also engage in informal productive activities,
like child raising and informal care giving. Such multiple bonds imply multi-functionality in
one’s social production functions. It also means that some of the interactions with one’s
personal relations would, in our conceptual framework, belong to other fields than that of the
personal relationships in the private domain. Summarising, this first field refers to all contexts
or situations where the production, maintenance or consumption of personal relationship is the
prime functional objective.
3. Recreation and discretionary activities
This field covers all contexts of activity and production in the private domain of a primarily
recreational and discretionary character. It thus includes all settings in which the main aim is
the individual’s recreation rather than the performance of productive private tasks or the
maintenance, production or consumption of personal relationships. Examples of classes of
activities that are categorised in this field are, of course, hobbies, and sports (if not primarily
undertaken to maintain fit, in which case it is rather a self care activity which belongs in field
1). But also passive leisure, like watching TV or simply doing nothing belong to it, as well as
other discretionary activities such as church-going, participation in discussion groups or
various courses. All contexts that can be categorised in this third field have in common that
there are certain similarities in the production factors that may be used to obtain status,
affection or behavioural confirmation in these contexts, which distinguishes these production
factors from those that are relevant in other fields for producing social well-being. In the next
section, 6.3., where the main relevant production factors for each of the three first-order
instrumental goals are presented per field, this will become clear.
4. Productive activities in the public domain
This fourth field for individual production of social well-being covers all contexts of
productive efforts in the public sphere. These contexts mainly contain paid work and
voluntary work, and schooling. Intuitively, paid and voluntary work fit in logically in this
category of functional contexts, whereas for schooling this is less obvious. However, when
schooling is regarded in its function of qualification for the labour market, I find its
categorisation with paid and voluntary work in this field is well defendable. The main reason
for distinguishing this field for the production of social well-being and delineating it as I have
done (to include paid and unpaid work and schooling as its three main sorts of contexts) is
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found in the objective to arrive at a useful categorisation scheme for production factors for
social well-being. As I have found that the main relevant production factors for status,
behavioural confirmation and status in the contexts of paid and unpaid work and schooling
reveal strong similarity in a number of features, there was good reason to identify these
contexts as belonging to one field.
Some confusion may arise concerning the proper categorization of doing unpaid jobs within
clubs or associations that belong to the field of private recreation. I have chosen to categorise
such instances in field 3 when occasional unpaid jobs are concerned (like being organiser of a
jubilee of the chess-club, or taking the monthly turn as bartender at the club) within
organizations in which one participates as an ordinary member too. All other voluntary jobs
are considered to belong in field 4.
5. Citizenship: legal and bureaucratic rights and obligations in the public domain
This fifth field for individual production of social well-being covers all contexts in which
people primarily deal with the bureaucratic regime and the general rights and obligations
connected with citizenship. Mirroring the personal relationships in the second field, it covers
people’s formal relationships to ‘society’. It includes all contexts in which the contact with
and rules of formal ‘bureaucratic’ offices affect the realisation of  (social) well-being.
These contexts include, for example, the bureaucratic regime faced by the unemployed who
receive social benefits (the work test etcetera), rehabilitation programs for ex-delinquents, the
tax system that applies to all income earners, the requirements for obtaining the Dutch
nationality, but also the traffic rules when driving on public roads, regulations regarding the
disposal of waste (separating recyclable from other waste) and more such homely rights and
obligations of (Dutch) citizenship.
6. Non-institutionalised interactions in the public domain
This sixth and last field in which individual production of well-being can be found covers all
contexts in the public domain that lie outside laws and regulations of citizenships as well as
outside the contexts of work and schooling. The most typical context belonging to this field
may be interaction with strangers in the street, in shops or in public transport. But also indirect
contact and communications with other people (outside one’s personal relations) and with
society at large, such as take place through public media, belong to this field. As will be seen
in section 6.3., even watching soap-series on TV, and reading the readers-columns in
newspapers or magazines can serve the production of behavioural confirmation and affection,
by means of the relations it creates with the impersonal public or with - sometimes virtual -
public figures. Contexts of this sort are also categorised in this sixth field for the production of
well-being. Summarising, the sixth field includes all ‘chance’, unorganised interactions with
strangers, but also the indirect perception of others through (interactive) media like talk
shows, journals and the like. This field is in particular relevant with regard to the influence on
well-being of the prevailing general norms and culture in ones extended living context and of
being part of ‘society at large’.
It should be noted that the categorisation that I have chosen, the six fields of production
described above, is by no means the only possible categorisation, nor is it necessarily ‘the
best’. Whether it is a good and useful categorisation depends on one’s aims, and for the
present aims - making a practicable inventory of main relevant production factors for social
well-being - I have found the categorisation described above very useful. Not only did it
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provide much help in making a systematic inventory of concrete production factors and
distilling from these a set of distinctive production factors at a higher level of abstraction, it
also proved to be highly practicable in steering the collection of data, as the six fields (in
particular the first four of these) appeared to fit neatly the intuitive domains in which people
tend to regard their own lives.
Collecting data on available production factors for each field subsequently provides a focus
that allows respondents to inventory step-wise all the production factors that they use. That is,
it appeared easy to ask people after their activities and resources per field, which was a
delineation they could easily apply. Per field, people can apparently oversee their own
activities and resources quite well, while when asking them about all their activities and
resources at once, the terrain would have been too large and heterogeneous to obtain a
complete inventory. Of course, the success of using the different fields in this way to guide the
interviewing of respondents, depends for a large part on the extent to which the delineation of
the field is intuitively clear to people and fits the domains which they are used to distinguish
in their own perception of their life. Judged by these criteria, the six fields distinguished in
this section were found satisfactory.
6.3.   Identification of main production factors per first-order instrumental goal
6.3.1. PRODUCTION FACTORS PER FIRST-ORDER GOAL PER FIELD OF PRODUCTION: A MATRIX
       OF FIELDS AND GOALS
Building on the classification of contexts for the production of well-being (more specifically:
of the three first-order goals), it is now possible to proceed systematically in making an
inventory of the most prevalent and relevant production factors per field per goal.
In analysing the transcripts of the focus group interviews, I had found it impracticable to draw
up comprehensive inventories of production factors for each of the three first-order
instrumental goals, because of the very large number of different concrete production factors I
found even in the thirty-one cases in my qualitative study. Moreover, the concrete production
factors that I categorised under a first-order goal differed from each other in so many different
ways, that initially I could not find a good (systematic) way of reducing them by abstraction to
a smaller set of factors. This is where the distinction of different fields of production comes
in: the notion from grounded theory that abstract concepts may relate to different empirical
phenomena in different ‘fields’ of reality, or relate to them in different ways, had led me to
believe that it would make sense to explore and elaborate the production factors for social
well-being separately for different fields of reality.
The systematic inventory of production factors for social well-being that resulted, can be
represented as a matrix. This matrix consists of three columns, corresponding to the three
first-order instrumental goals for social approval, and six rows, corresponding to the six fields
described in section 6.2. in which the individual production of social well-being takes place
(see Table 6.2.).
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     Table 6.2.: Matrix of production factors per first-order goal by field of production
Each of the cells of this matrix contains a number of entries referring to the main relevant
production factors for the corresponding component of social well-being in the corresponding
field of production. It can be seen that per column, that is, per first-order instrumental goal,
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the production factors in the different cells show considerable resemblance. For example, it
can be seen that in most fields of production ‘independence from others’ is relevant for the
realisation of status, that ‘time spent together’ is a central production factor for affection in all
fields of production, and that ‘avoidance of costs to others’ and the presence of applicable
norms are relevant for the production of behavioural confirmation in all six fields of
production. To a lesser extent this also holds for the production factors in the rows of the
matrix: although different features of resources and activities matter for the production of the
three different components of social well-being, there are usually a few typical production
factors (activities and resources) that are relevant in a field of production. For example, in the
field of personal relationships the number of personal relations a person maintains plays a role
in the production of each of the three forms of social well-being; in the field of public
productive activities, job or occupation and schooling matter - though in different ways - for
all three first-order goals, et cetera. In general, the production factors per goal per field of
production can be seen to include production factors (or: lower order instrumental goals) at
different ‘levels’ in the SPF hierarchy of goals.
Each cell of the matrix (Table 6.2.) contains different ‘kinds’ of production factors: concrete
activities (such as talking, doing one’s work, making choices, participating in recreational
activities); more or less endogenous environmental factors (such as the resources the
individual possesses, for example money, acquaintances, job or career, educational
credentials, et cetera); largely exogenous environmental factors (such as the existence, clarity
and consistency of prevailing norms in the individual’s social environment); and relatively
stable skills and personality characteristics (such as social or relational skills; extraversion).
In the cells of the matrix these different kinds of production factors are roughly presented in
this order. The ‘common factors’ per row of the matrix (i.e. per field of production) seem to
be located mainly at the level of concrete activities and resources. The ‘common factors’ per
column of the matrix (i.e. per first-order instrumental goal) seem to be located rather in more
general characteristics of activities and in the kind of skills or environmental conditions that
matter.
All cells together (that is, the complete matrix) provide a systematic and comprehensive tool
for assessing the available production factors of respondents in empirical research. It is useful
now to take a look at the production factors proper, for each cell of the matrix in Table 6.2.
subsequently. In fact, the matrix provides a summary of the production factors described in
section 6.3.2. It should be remembered that the term ‘production factors’ covers both
production activities and resources, the latter including not only material resources but also
skills and nonmaterial conditions.
6.3.2. PRODUCTION FACTORS FOR STATUS, PER FIELD OF PRODUCTION
By the productive activities or ‘obligatory’ activities one performs in the private domain, one may
gain or lose status. People may attribute status to you and pay you respect if they perceive that your
self-care, housekeeping, child raising or informal care giving are performed excellently. But they may
also look down upon you when your appearance is uncared-for, when they notice that your house is
untidy or not well cleaned, when it appears that you cannot manage to provide informal care to your
ageing parents, or when your children are ill-mannered. The main production factors to attain status in
the field of productive or obligatory activities in the private domain are:
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• the demand for and employability of one’s skills as indicated in the extent to which one
is busy doing productive activities in the private domain. Being busy can be seen as an
indicator of one’s indispensability, of being irreplaceable by others in the productive
activities one performs;
• the visible results of one’s private productive activities, in particular distinguishing
oneself from others in one’s personal appearance and in the neatness and maintenance
of one’s house and garden. This visible output indicates both one’s skills, one’s efforts
and one’s standards regarding private productive activities;
• the extent to which one is self supporting or independent in one’s private productive
activities;
• the level and scarcity of one’s skills regarding private productive activities.
People may obtain or produce status on the basis of the personal relationships they have. A
person can be admired because of the number of people with whom he is acquainted. One may
also be taken more seriously because of having certain type of relationships (e.g. having a
spouse or having children), or be slighted because one lacks certain kinds of relationships (the
proverbial ‘old spinster’). Whereas these first two factors refer to having relationships, status
can also derive from the person(s) with whom one has a relationship. It often appears that the
‘lustre’ of the people one knows (or the homeliness or mediocrity of them) rubs off on oneself.
If you are befriended with, say, Pieter van den Hoogenband, or if you are dating a popular
actress, this is likely to raise your status far beyond what you would get for merely having ‘a’
friend or ‘a’ girlfriend. On the other hand, even popular sayings imply that having personal
relationships with low-status people pulls yourself down to their level: “Who keeps company
with the wolf will learn to howl”, “If you play with fire you get burnt” and “He that touches
pitch shall be defiled”. Even kids at school are fully conscious of the fact that if you are
friends with the most popular classmate, the others will respect you, which they will not if you
are friends with the ‘losers’.
Summarising, the main relevant production factors for status in the field of personal
relationships are:
• the number of personal relationships, in which two thresholds seem to be relevant for
realizing status, namely the zero-one threshold (having relationships or not) and some
less well-marked threshold between having an average or ‘normal’ number of
relationships and having a remarkably large number of friends and acquaintances. The
zero-one threshold seems particularly relevant with regard to specific categories of
relationships, such as partner or children. Three indicators are suggested to assess this
factor, namely ‘having a partner’, having children, and ‘number of friends, relatives
and acquaintances’;
• the character or type of personal relationships. Two things appear to play a role here.
Firstly, the intensity of relationships, which may be reflected in their formal status (e.g.
whether one is legally married to his partner). Secondly, the achievement aspect of
relationships (e.g. having parents and siblings is no personal achievement, whereas
having a partner or children may be considered as such. The achievement aspect is also
stronger in having friends than in having relatives). Suggested indicators for assessing
this production factor are simply ‘marital status’, ‘parenthood’, and - again - the
‘number of friends’;
• the status of the persons with whom one has a personal relationship, in which being
befriended or related to high-status persons yields more status than being befriended or
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related to low-status persons. For this production factor no straightforward or obvious
indicators are at hand. Depending on the method of data collection, researchers may
decide to use different indicators to assess the status of respondents’ personal relations.
People may get status on the basis of their hobbies and recreational activities. If you’re a good
basketball-player, people who know about that may look up to you because of it. But not only
through excelling in your hobbies you may get status, also through the type of recreational
activities that you engage in, you may distinguish yourself from others and produce status.
This may be the case when you engage in ‘high culture’ activities, like going to museums or to
theatre plays, but also when your recreational activities are considered difficult (e.g. playing
the violin), trendy (bungee-jumping, or - in the mid 90’s - in-line skating), expensive (going
on a holiday to Tibet) of exclusive (playing golf).  Of course, the more visible one’s
discretionary activities and the achievements in one’s hobbies are for others, the more status
these activities and achievements may yield. Even if others cannot assess very well what you
do for recreation and how good you are at it, the extent to which they perceive you to be active
and busy in this field of activities may function as an indicator for energy and for varied
interests and abilities. Of course, if people can distinguish themselves from others positively
in their recreation and discretionary activities, it is also possible to distinguish oneself from
others negatively. This may not only occur in similar but opposite ways as the ones just
mentioned, but it can also occur through lack of independence from others concerning
recreational activities. Dependency on others, either for finding a pastime, for deciding ‘what
shall I do’, or for executing planned activities, is likely to lower one’s status, whereas
independence from others and autonomy will yield respect.
Summarising, four production factors are central for the realisation of status in the field of
recreation or discretionary activities in the private domain:
• being busy: as an indicator of one’s active and energetic character and varied interests
and abilities, and of one’s ability to use one’s time well;
• the visibility of ones distinction from others in one’s recreational or discretionary
activities, such as through cultural participation (visiting concerts, theatre, lectures
etc), one’s style of consumption, but also through performing for public (e.g.
participating in sports tournaments, giving shows, concerts and expositions etcetera);
• the extent to which one is self supporting or independent in one’s recreational or
discretionary activities;
• the level and scarcity of one’s skills and resources regarding recreational or
discretionary activities, such as excellence in sports, hobbies or arts, but also one’s
general education and ones available financial resources.
Status can be produced through one’s productive activities in the public domain. In fact, it is
usually the status produced here that conventional status- research (as well as common
speech) refers to. As a rule, when ‘status’ appears as a variable in social research, it denotes
the status attributed to people on the basis of their occupation, their educational achievements
and their income. Productive activities in the public domain include paid and voluntary work,
and formal schooling. A number of factors are relevant for the amount of status that can be
realized in this field. In the first place, the level and scarcity of one’s skills are relevant factors
for the realization of status in this field. The level and scarcity of one’s skills is reflected in
such conventional indicators of status as having a job, the level of one’s job, the prestige of
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the type of work one does, one’s income, and one’s educational achievements (or the level and
type of schooling one follows and one’s results at school).
Besides these factors that are since long used as indicators of status, there are also other
factors which are relevant for the respect and status people attribute to you on the basis of your
public productive activities. ‘Being busy’ (the epidemic ‘disease’ of the mid-1990's), appears
to function as a status symbol. Full agenda’s and overloaded time schedules can be used to
impress people. They suggest that you are important and irreplaceable, that your skills,
experience and knowledge are scarce and in high demand, and that you’re an active, energetic
person. Even if this suggestion is not fully justified, ‘being busy’ appears to have become an
autonomous source of status.
The career that you have made may also bring you status and respect from others, apart from
your present income and occupation. That is, people may evaluate your achievements in
schooling and in the labour market with reference to your starting position. The manager of a
supermarket who once started, after his lower vocational training, as a cleaning help in the
warehouse, may get more status from others because of the great advance he has made, than a
piano teacher who completed higher secondary education before she went to the conservatory
and who never advanced beyond the level that she started out at.
Another factor that is relevant for the realization of status in this field is power or influence. In
the large majority of jobs there exist formal and informal hierarchical relations between
oneself and one’s superiors or subordinates or one’s clients. The extent to which one is able to
exert influence over others or over the affairs of the organization in general contributes to
one’s status, while the extent to which one is subjected to the authority of others affects one’s
status negatively. Job autonomy is one of the manifestations of this factor: if you are highly
autonomous in your job, if you are ‘your own boss’, people will look up to you more than they
would merely on the basis of your occupation itself.
Finally, being able to earn your own living, and to find and hold your own job, is a rather basic
factor for producing status in the field of public productive activities. Thus, people working in
e.g. sheltered workshops are likely to receive less status from others than people employed
through the open labour market.
Five main production factors for status in the field of productive activities in the public
domain are distinguished:
• being busy: as an indicator of one’s importance and indispensability, of being
irreplaceable by others in the productive activities one performs, and of one’s active
and energetic character;
• the visibility of one’s achievements and position, both with regard to educational
achievements and to occupational position and career;
• the extent to which one is able to exert influence, both over one’s own productive
activities and work (job autonomy) and over (the work of) others or the organization;
• the extent to which one is self supporting or independent in earning a living;
• the level and scarcity of one’s skills and resources regarding productive activities in
the public domain, in particular as reflected in one’s occupation, job level and career,
in having a paid job at all, in doing (specific types of) voluntary work, in one’s
income, and in one’s educational achievements (type and level).
A more formally based status is that which is produced in the field of citizenship, of people’s
legal or otherwise formalized rights and obligations. All individuals in modern society are
subject to a variety of rules, formal classifications, obligations and regulations. One’s legal or
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bureaucratic classifications are one of the sources for status, as they suggest a relative rank
compared to others. If you are independent from social security benefits and need not make
use of any form of social allowance, this gives you a higher status than people who cannot
claim independence from social security. When you are forced to rely on social security
benefits or become in other ways subject to formal controlling agencies (as, say, when you are
in a rehabilitation program) it is not only the loss of independence from these forms of support
that lowers your status, but you also lose part of your autonomy. Over certain parts of your
behaviour, such as financial transactions, you are no longer allowed to decide on your own,
while you also have to give account for behaviours that normally belongs to a person’s
autonomy (as when you have to prove to a reemployment agent that you have sent the minimal
number of job applications in the past month). This loss of autonomy is a second factor that
may lower your status, both in the eyes of others and in your own, when you become a ‘client’
of social security or other bureaucratic controlling agencies.
Most bureaucratic agencies that you may get to deal with, use formal classifications of clients.
Employment agencies in the Netherlands, since the mid-1990's categorize the unemployed in
their client system as belonging to either of four ‘phases’; ‘phase 1'-clients being those with
good reemployment chances and little need for assistance in finding a job, and ‘phase 4'-
clients being those with practically zero reemployment chances in the short run and usually an
extensive complex of (psychosocial) problems. Obviously, such categories can have
stigmatising effects, and all people who know how you are categorized and know the meaning
of the categories, will attribute high or low status to you accordingly. A different example is
the classifications by rehabilitation agencies, or the A-status or B-status given to political
refugees and other applicants for immigration.
Finally, even if you have never come to deal directly with particular bureaucratic agencies in
our society, you are subject to Dutch law, which regulates all citizens’ extent of legal
competence. Legal competence refers to the right to act and contract, the right to get your
driving license and drive, the right to vote, the right to marry, the right to decide over medical
treatments on your own person, etcetera. Whether one has the rights to do all these things or
not, is a factor in one’s self ranking as well as in the extent to which you are taken seriously by
others.
Summarising, four production factors for status are distinguished in the field of citizenship
and formal rights and obligations:
• autonomy: freedom from formal controlling agencies, i.e. autonomy over one’s
behaviour. In fact this means not being deprived of normal autonomy;
• independence from social security and financial or other forms of support;
• the extent of legal competence, which refers to the right to act and contract, the right to
drive and vote etcetera: rights that are usually associated with adulthood (and in some
ages or societies with gender);
• one’s formal classification by bureaucratic organizations.
The sixth and final field in which status can be produced is the field of non-institutionalised
interactions in the public domain. People may realize status by driving around in a
conspicuously expensive convertible car or wearing exclusive designer clothing. In doing so
they may increase their self ranking, but also strangers, accidental passers-by, may attribute
status to them on the basis of such conspicuous consumption.
Not only what one wears or what one has may elicit status in the context of non-
institutionalised interactions in the public domain. Also one’s own social manners and
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demeanour may cause others (be it strangers or people from inside one’s social network) to
look up to or look down upon one. If you show through your manner to feel perfectly at ease
in a classy environment, others may look up to you because of that, while if you appear uneasy
and clumsy there it may lower your status. Besides your own social manners and demeanour,
also the demeanour of others towards you is a factor that may contribute to the realization of
status. If people see others treat you with reference and respect, they may take this as a signal
of your due status, and treat you likewise. If, in contrast, people see that others do not take you
seriously, this may lower your relative position in their eyes.
The fourth production factor for status in the field of non-institutionalised interactions in the
public domain is management of comparison. Obviously, it depends on the qualities
(performance, appearances, etcetera) of the company one is in, what one’s relative ranking in
that situation is. So by selecting those situations where your own qualities are likely to be
somewhat higher than those of the others, you secure a high relative ranking and thus a high
local status. This strategy is what Frank (1985) has aptly called ‘choosing the right pond’ (see
also Chapter 5, section 5.2). However, you may also produce status by being seen ‘in the right
company’. Above it was already argued that the status of your relations tends to shine off on
yourself. It is thus not at forehand clear how one should select the optimal company to be seen
in. In general it seems that it can contribute to your status to be seen ‘in the right places’ or
‘with the right people’, but that it must be avoided to stand out negatively in such settings.
The four production factors for status in the field of non-institutionalised interactions in the
public domain are thus:
• the degree to which one visibly distinguishes oneself from others through conspicuous
consumption. Obviously one’s financial and cultural resources form the relevant
restrictions here;
• the choice of reference groups or the management of comparison: both self-rewarded
status and the status attributed by others may be affected in this way;
• one’s own social manners and demeanour;
• the way one is treated by others.
6.3.3. PRODUCTION FACTORS FOR BEHAVIOURAL CONFIRMATION, PER FIELD OF PRODUCTION
People can obtain behavioural confirmation from others by means of what they do and how
they behave in the field of productive or obligatory activities in the private domain. The
productive activities in this domain are generally beneficial not only for oneself, but also for
others. In other words, as a rule there are positive externalities of productive activities in the
private domain. This is the main reason why people’s behaviour in this field is subject to the
approval or disapproval of others. These ‘others’ can be the direct recipients of the productive
activities, such as one’s family that benefits from good housekeeping and one’s relatives that
benefit from informal care giving, but they may also be people beyond that set of direct
beneficiaries. For example, anyone who hears of how you took care of your neighbour when
she had a broken leg may give you behavioural confirmation for that. Also self approval may
be produced through your private productive activities, as when you feel you did a proper job
of cleaning the house. And of course, there may be very immediate though unspoken (dis-)
approval in the reactions of others to your appearance, which indicates to some extent your
adherence to norms regarding self-care. Five general factors can be used to summarise the
concrete production factors for behavioural confirmation in the field of productive activities in
the private domain:
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• the norm-conformity of one’s choice of private productive activities including the
choices regarding the division of tasks in the household and the decisions of how to
balance private and public productive activities. These choices can be more or less
conform the norms of relevant others;
• the behaviour within one’s private productive activities: in particular the contributions
one makes to ‘the larger whole’ (one’s household, one’s relatives, to neighbourhood,
to the maintenance of norms regarding private productive activities in society), and the
avoidance of costs for others. The main norm in this field appears to be that one
contributes according to one’s capacity (not, as in the other fields, that one contributes
at least as much as one receives). Thus, children who help their parents with some
household chores may receive much approval even though their contribution may be
trivial and may even create more work than if the parent had done the chore alone.
One’s contribution may also take the form of maintenance of norms regarding
housekeeping, child raising, self-care, informal care giving etcetera, as when the
importance of particular standards is stressed;
• the extent to which one’s behaviour is actually open to judgment: this depends on the
visibility of one’s behaviour for others (house maintenance or care giving may be more
visible to others than self-care or housekeeping: the latter two may only be noticed in
case of bad performance);
• the norms regarding private productive activities held by relevant others (e.g. one’s
colleagues at work and one’s relatives) and by oneself. There may exist norms
regarding the choice of productive activities (the feminist norms regarding women’s
choices for housekeeping and child raising versus the then conventional norms
regarding women’s proper tasks offer an interesting example); norms regarding the
division of tasks; and norms regarding the performance of the chosen activities
(standards). Most important are the existence, the clarity, and the congruence of such
norms;
• one’s productive skills.
People may also obtain behavioural confirmation on the basis of the personal relationships
they have and how they behave within these relationships. This behavioural confirmation need
not be given by the personal relations themselves, but may also be received from others,
outside the personal network, who approve of one’s behaviour regarding one’s personal
relationships. For example, when you put your arm around your mother in public, anonymous
passers-by may signal appreciation, while people overhearing you gossiping about your
friends may even directly reprove you.
Four main production factors for realizing behavioural confirmation in the field of personal
relationship can be distinguished:
• the norm-conformity of the choice of personal relationships. The decision with whom
one maintains personal relationships can be more or less in accordance with the norms
of others, and therefore elicit more or less approval;
• the behaviour within one’s personal relationships. What in particular matters here is
the contributions one makes to the maintenance and growth of the relations one has,
and the avoidance of imposing costs on the other, i.e. of asking or expecting more of
the other than one contributes oneself. The main thing is the balance between giving
(contributing) and taking. For the production of behavioural confirmation the optimal
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balance seems to be to contribute slightly more than one receives or expects the other
to contribute;
• the norms regarding choice of and behaviour in personal relationships held by
relevant others and by oneself. Most important here are the existence of such norms,
their clarity and the congruence or consistency between the norms one faces;
• one’s social or relational skills. Various skills seem relevant as resources for the
production of behavioural confirmation in the field of personal relationships, e.g.
empathy, listening, expressing oneself in such a way that others do not easily
misunderstand one’s intentions, etcetera.
People may approve or disapprove of your choices of hobbies or recreational activities. For
example, if you spend most of your discretionary time watching MTV or hanging around in
cafes, most people will probably give you little behavioural confirmation, while, if you would
spend your discretionary time reading French literature, or gardening or training for a
triathlon, this would get you a lot of approval. Not only your choices regarding what you do
are factors in the production of behavioural confirmation, also how you do the things you do.
Just like in the first two fields, what is crucial for realizing behavioural confirmation is the
balance between contributing and receiving, thus the extent to which you can contribute to the
enjoyment of others and avoid imposing ‘costs’ on them. In order to get the approval for your
behaviour that it is worth, it is necessary that others actually perceive it or get to judge it in
another way. All these factors are more or less under your own control. There are two more
factors for which this is not the case but which are rather given conditions in any concrete
situation: firstly, the presence of clear and congruent norms regarding choice of and behaviour
in recreational activities, and, secondly, the relevant social and activity-specific skill that one
has.
The five main production factors for behavioural confirmation in the field of discretionary
activities in the private domain are thus:
• the norm-conformity of one’s choice of recreational activities: the decision what to do
in one’s free time can be more or less conform the norms of relevant others;
• the behaviour within one’s recreational or discretionary activities: in particular the
contributions one makes to the group or organization these activities take place in, and
the avoidance of imposing ‘costs’ on others. The main thing here is the balance
between giving (contributing) and taking, for behavioural confirmation the optimal
balance seems to be to contribute slightly more than one takes or expects the other to
contribute. This depends of course partly on one’s command over relevant social and
activity-specific skills. One’s contribution may also take the form of maintenance or
preservation of group norms;
• the extent to which one’s behaviour is actually open to judgment: this depends on the
visibility of one’s behaviour for other, and on the objectivity and discrimination of the
person(s) who do judge the behaviour and reward it with more or less approval;
• the norms regarding choice of and behaviour in recreational activities held by
relevant others (e.g. from one’s private relationships), by the persons one interacts with
in the recreational and discretionary activity,  and by oneself. Most important are the
existence, the clarity, and the congruence of such norms;
• one’s command over relevant social and activity-specific skills.
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An important field for the production of behavioural confirmation is the field of public
productive activities. The five production factors that are most relevant here, are analogous to
those that were distinguished for the production of behavioural confirmation in the first three
fields. In the first place, people may approve more or less of your choices regarding schooling
and work. The decision whether and for how many hours you want to do paid or voluntary
work and the type of work or schooling that you choose are evaluated by others against their
norms. Choosing not to do any paid or voluntary work is against dominant norms and will
elicit considerable disapproval (negative behavioural confirmation). Choosing to work as a
salesman in a sex-shop will in most social circles not yield much behavioural confirmation,
nor will working as an engineer on the development of ultra modern weapons. If, in contrast,
you choose to work as a nurse for a humanitarian help organization, or as an engineer on the
development of ecological production of appliances, your choice of work may bring you the
approval of others. The relevant factor in these examples is the extent to which one’s work or
education serves society at large, thus the external effects of one’s productive activities, or the
contribution one makes to society as opposed to the costs one’s work imposes on society.
Not only what you do matters, but also how you do it. If you cooperate well with your
colleagues, if you do your job well, if you help your colleagues when needed, and if you show
yourself a nice and pleasant team-mate, this will earn you the behavioural confirmation of
others. Provided, of course, that the others are indeed aware of your good performance, that
this is open to their judgment. Finally, in order to get approval for your choice of job or
schooling and for your performance at work or at school, the existence of norms is a
prerequisite. And if relevant norms exist, their clarity and consistency is a further factor that
affects the possibilities for realizing behavioural confirmation.
Summarising, the main production factors for behavioural confirmation in the field of public
productive activities are:
• the norm-conformity of one’s choice of public productive activities: the decision
whether and for how many hours one participates in paid or voluntary work can be
more or less conform the norms of relevant others, and so is the choice of the type of
work or education: the extent to which one’s paid or voluntary work forms a
contribution to larger society, or is a related to societal ‘goods’ is positively related to
the amount of behavioural confirmation that can be got through doing this work.
Certain types of work, such as in health care, education, social activation et cetera,
have a stronger link to public benefits than other types of work, such as commerce
etcetera. In general, this will be reflected in the behavioural confirmation from others
and from oneself;
• the behaviour within one’s public productive activities: in particular the contributions
one makes to the work group or organization these activities take place in, and the
avoidance of imposing ‘costs’ on others. This depends of course partly on one’s
command over relevant specific work skills. Contributions may take the form of hard
work and high performance as well as contributions to the working atmosphere. A very
strong way to realize behavioural confirmation in one’s work group is to let the group
or work interest overrule one’s own direct interest in particular instances;
• the extent to which one’s behaviour is actually open to judgment: this depends on the
visibility of one’s behaviour for others, the accountability of results on one’s
performance, and thus also one’s job autonomy, and on the objectivity and
discrimination of the person(s) who judge the work performance;
• the norms regarding adequate behaviour and performance in one’s work
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• one’s relevant productive skills for one’s work or education: these do not only include
general skills and endowments like intelligence, but also more specific skills that may
be used to perform better in one’s specific job.
One’s level of behavioural confirmation is further affected by the approval or disapproval of
others that is obtained through one’s position and behaviour in the field of citizens’ rights and
obligations. In the first place, your behaviour and attitude towards the formal institutions of
the social system and towards broadly accepted obligations can elicit more or less approval. If
you contribute to the functioning of the bureaucratic institutions of the state and other
institutions of the social system, as for example by means of paying taxes and voting in
elections, you may receive both approval from others and from yourself. A further factor in
realizing the approval of others as well as self approval may be to avoid imposing costs or
burdens on society or on the social system (in particular: avoiding the use of social security
and welfare). If you are forced to fall back upon social security, you may experience a loss of
behavioural confirmation from others as well as from yourself.
As soon as you get to deal with bureaucratic institutions the observance of rules and
regulations is important for the production of behavioural confirmation of those who observe
it. Accurate adherence to regulations for job seeking when you are unemployed is likely to
elicit behavioural confirmation from your reemployment counsellor. Neglecting or trespassing
the rules laid by controlling agencies, say when you are under financial supervision when you
have debts to pay off, will be met with disapproval and a loss of behavioural confirmation.
If you behave in accordance with rules and regulations, others can only reward this with
behavioural confirmation to the extent that they are informed about it. So they either must
directly observe or experience your behaviour or its consequences, or it must be reported to
them by yourself or others.
Finally, the possibility to realize behavioural confirmation in the field of citizens’ obligations
depends strongly on the clarity, consistency and congruence of prevailing norms and
regulations. Per definition, rules, regulations and / or norms exist in this field (cf. the existence
of norms as a relevant production factor for behavioural confirmation in other fields). But if
regulations are ambiguous or unclear, it is far more difficult and risky to produce behavioural
confirmation through conformity, than when they are clear and unambiguous. Furthermore, if
the rules and norms of formal institutions coincide with each other and with the norms in
one’s informal social network, this allows for much more efficient production of behavioural
confirmation than if there is incongruence between different norms. If your friends reject the
dominant norm that all healthy adults should work for a living, and are hostile towards
employment agencies, you can hardly realize behavioural confirmation either by conforming
to their norms or by active job seeking as the employment agency orders you to do.
The following four factors are thus proposed as the main production factors for behavioural
confirmation in the field of legal rights and obligations or ‘citizenship’:
• the norm-conformity of one’s behaviour towards the bureaucratic (formal) institutions
of the social system, consisting of (a) the extent to which one contributes to the
functioning of bureaucratic society and citizenship (in particular through paying taxes
and voting); and (b) the extent to which one avoids imposing costs on society and the
social system (in particular avoiding the use of social security and welfare). Of course
having paid work and the required skills to acquire this are prerequisite;
• the norm-conformity of one’s behaviour within bureaucratic institutions: in particular
the extent to which one observes the rules and regulations;
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• the extent to which one’s behaviour is actually open to judgment: the extent to which
relevant others and the bureaucratic agents one deals are informed about one’s
behaviour;
• the unambiguity of norms and regulations regarding the use of and behaviour within
formal institutions of the social system: the extent to which the norms held by relevant
others (oneself, one’s private relationships and the agents and officers one deals with)
are clear, consistent and congruent.
Besides the five fields already discussed, where behavioural confirmation may be produced,
there is also the field of non-institutionalised interactions in the public domain. In non-
institutionalised interactions in the public domain, say, interactions with strangers in the street,
approval or disapproval may be gained, depending mainly on four factors. Firstly, your
behaviour in chance interactions in public will be evaluated according to prevailing norms,
which may differ per society and within a particular society, per setting. As a rule, however,
norms regarding behaviour in public prohibit making trouble, disturbing and causing
inconveniences to others, and prescribe that you should give help to others when this is called
for. The norm of not disturbing or interfering with others may also be formulated as a norm
about keeping the right or proper distance to others, both by figure of speech and literally.
Of course, one can only realize behavioural confirmation in this field if one goes to public
places and, while there, does not avoid interaction with others altogether. And of course one
should know and understand prevailing norms about behaviour in public places. If these
norms are clear and homogeneous (in public places all subgroups of the population may be
present, thus the homogeneity of norms is not obvious, but varies with the cultural
homogeneity of the population), you are more secure about what behaviour will produce
approval of others than if norms are heterogeneous and ambiguous. Of course, here again, the
choice of where one goes in public is highly important, i.e. whether one only goes in places
where one knows and understands the rules for public behaviour or whether one ventures in
situations where one is not familiar with the culture and norms.
Finally, it demands certain social skills to realize behavioural confirmation through one’s
behaviour in public, the most important of which appear to be a sufficient measure of civility
and self respect.
Summarising, the production factors for behavioural confirmation in the field of non-
institutionalised interactions in public are:
• the norm-conformity of one’s behaviour in public places: avoiding causing trouble,
helping others in case of need, and maintaining the ‘right’ distance to strangers;
• the extent to which one actually exposes oneself to judgment: whether one ventures in
public places at all, whether one goes there alone or together with relevant others, the
extent to which one seeks or avoids social interaction in public;
• the norms regarding behaviour in public: the clarity, consistency and homogeneity of
public norms (e.g. in case of multicultural societies);
• one’s knowledge and understanding of the dominant culture and of (sub)cultural
norms;
• one’s social skills.
6.3.4. PRODUCTION FACTORS FOR AFFECTION, PER FIELD OF PRODUCTION
Affection can be produced through one’s productive activities in the private domain affection.
Simply by spending time together while doing housekeeping chores, or in interaction with
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your children ‘while raising them’ affection may be realized. The closer and more intimate
one then is to the other in the time spent together, be it physically (as in care giving when the
other is ill) or psychologically (as in child care) the more this will contribute to the production
of affection. Of course, certain preconditions need to be present if one is to produce affection
in this field: only if one has a partner or house mates, children, or other caretakers, will the
activities in this field yield affection. The same holds, to some extent, for having a house(-
hold) and a garden, these are also resources that, if there, give the opportunity for private
productive activities and thus for the production of affection. Further, the productive activities
in the private domain may constitute important investments in one’s future production
capacity for affection. In raising one’s children, one may invest in the future affective relation
with them. In informal care giving, but also in plain housekeeping one may invest in the
continuation of present partner-relations. And self care may form a contribution to the
maintenance of an attractive appearance, which is relevant for the chance of attracting physical
proximity and of getting hugged.
Five production factors are thus central to the realization of affection in the field of productive
activities in the private domain:
• spending time together with others in the course of performing private productive
activities;
• the extent of sharing and proximity in one’s private productive activities: in particular
the amount of physical contact and intimacy involved;
• keeping attractive through self-care: to increase the likelihood that others may want to
be with you and hug or hold you;
• the presence of the preconditions for realizing of affection in the field of private
productive activities: having a partner, a household, children and caretakers;
• investment in future realization of affection. E.g. in case of child raising, the extent to
which one teaches one’s child(-ren) to maintain relationships should be considered an
investment in the future realization of affection.
In the field of personal relationships, people may, as we saw above, produce status and
behavioural confirmation, but the most obvious form of well-being that may be produced in
this field is affection. In chapter 5, section 5.4, I have argued that the production of affection is
not restricted to ‘close and caring relationships’; it can also occur in one-shot interactions
between mutual strangers. However, for several of the aspects of affection described in 5.4.,
the context of a personal relationship is at least a facilitating condition. Personal relationships,
be it between neighbours, between relatives of between lovers, usually provide at least some
necessary preconditions for the emergence and expansion of various aspects of affection. For
example, the existence of a neighbour-relation, with the background information on each other
implied, may create sufficient confidence for talking about somewhat personal affairs. When
the neighbours find that this self-exposure is not taken advantage of, they may gradually come
to confide in each other more and more.
When speaking of production factors that may yield affection in the field of personal
relationships, the focus is on the resources and behaviour regarding one’s personal
relationships that help to get affection. The five main production factors for affection within
the field of personal relationship that I distinguish are:
• spending time together with the persons one has these relationships with. Physical
proximity and mobility are facilitating factors or preconditions for spending time
together; these can be partly substitutes but also partly complements. In case of having
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a partner or children with whom one lives together, spending time together is almost
automatically given. This production factor can thus appear either as a production
activity (‘spending time together’) or as a resource (‘time spent together’), or both;
• the amount of sharing and being known in one’s personal relationships. More
specifically, we should think here of the amount of emotional sharing through self-
exposure, and of the shared ‘history’ which may be indicated by the durability or ‘age’
of the personal relationships;
• the exchange of relational signals, like keeping in touch by phone or letters, giving
gifts etcetera. By exchanging gifts and relational signals, one produces not only direct
instances of affection-exchange, but one also affirms that the relationship still exists
and that one desires it to continue; one may redefine the ‘value’ and character of the
relationship, and one invests in the expected future benefits of this relationship, as
each gift - material or immaterial - is more or less subject to norms of (delayed)
reciprocity, and thus creates a ‘credit slip’;
• the number of personal relationships. The more personal relationships one has, the
more ‘material’ one has to realize all the different aspects of affection identified in
5.4.;
• one’s relational skills, in particular empathy, extroversion, and self-respect. These
skills facilitate the successful establishment of affectionate personal relationships, and
are important in expanding personal relationships into more intimate, strong and rich
relationships.
The contexts of recreational and other discretionary activities also offer possibilities for the
production of affection. In one’s recreational activities, one may meet others who engage in
the same activity. The activity being discretionary, it may be assumed that there is a similarity
in tastes or interests with these other persons, which provides a basis for liking and talking. In
reverse, the way you choose to spend your discretionary time, the hobbies and activities that
you engage in, are also telling about yourself: there is a measure of self-exposure in the choice
of discretionary activities. Again, this self-exposure appears to be a relevant factor for the
realization of affection. Some recreational activities reveal more of one’s inner self than other
activities. When you participate in a debating club, the other participants are likely to get to
know more about your character and your views than when your hobby is swimming, an
essentially solitary sport during which the opportunity for social talks is limited.
Perhaps less obvious than the previous point about psychological contact, I think that also the
extent of physical contact is relevant for the realization of affection. If your hobby involves
frequent physical contact or close physical proximity, as is the case in, say, combat sports,
rugby, ballroom dancing, or going to the movies (sitting close besides one another), this offers
more favourable conditions for the realization of (aspects of) affection than when your
hobbies are solitary (e.g. collecting post stamps) or involve no physical contact and proximity
(e.g. fishing, reading, making music, playing tennis).
Not only the solitary or social character of the activity one engages in determines the extent to
which one gets known and gets to know others; also the regularity of the activity pattern plays
a role. If your hobby is fishing, and you fish at the same spot for years, always on the
Wednesday afternoon, you will probably get to know the other solitary fishing guys who come
there quite well. While if you like dancing and go to a different place to dance every time,
sometimes on Thursday nights, sometimes on Fridays and sometimes in the weekend, the
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conditions to develop an affectionate relationship with any of your dancing partners, are weak
despite the character of the activity.
Even if the kind of activities one engages in provide good conditions for the realization of
affection, much depends still on one’s own social or relational skills. If you are not extrovert
and little empathic, it is likely that you will be able to produce less affection while visiting a
concert or attending church meetings than others who are more empathic and extrovert.
Summarising, four production factors are central to the realization of affection in the field of
recreation and discretionary activities in the private domain:
• spending time together with others in one’s recreational or discretionary activities, i.e.
the extent to which one’s activities in this field are of a social character. Also the total
available time for one’s recreational activities is a resource here;
• the extent to which one knows and is known by the persons with whom time is shared
in one’s recreational or discretionary activities. Important here are the similarity in
activities of one’s existing friends: do they engage in the same kind of activities, at the
same times and places; and the extent to which one’s activity pattern involves
regularly repeated interaction with the same others;
• the amount of self-exposure involved in one’s recreational or discretionary activities,
which refers to both psychological and physical contact and proximity;
• one’s relational skills, in particular extroversion, empathy and self-respect.
Affection may also be produced in the field of public productive activities. Production factors
for affection in this field are activities and resources that belong to the field of paid and
voluntary work and education, that lead to the realization of affection of whosoever. If,
through the performance of one’s job, one wins the sympathy and love of someone who is not
part of the work context, this still is a case of affection produced in the field of public
productive activities.
Affection may grow by merely spending time together. As Lewis describes in The Four Loves
(1960), the peculiarities of the people you meet every day may first irritate you, but in many
cases we gradually get used to them, and find some day that we have even grown fond of
them. As many people spend a considerable part of the day on public productive activities
(e.g. a paid job), the extent to which they spend these hours together with others (colleagues,
clients) becomes an important factor in the realization of affection. Of course, it also matters
what happens during the hours spent together: if you work with a number of colleagues in the
same room, but your work does not demand or allow much interaction, the time spent together
offers less opportunity for realizing affection than if your work demands frequent consultation
of colleagues, or if you work in a day-care centre for children.
Next, the more overlap or contact exists between the people you meet at work and the people
you meet in other contexts, the higher the possibility that what you do at work (or in school)
has an effect on the opinion that these people from other contexts have of you, and on the
affection they give you.  Likewise, the higher the durability of your relations with colleagues
and clients, the better they will get to know you. This is also a relevant factor for the
possibilities of realizing affection. Finally, you of course need social or relational skills in
order to realize affection. The main important skills for the realization of affection in this field
appear to be extroversion, empathy and self-respect.
There are thus five main production factors distinguished for the production of affection in the
field of public productive activities:
CHAPTER 6                    205
• spending time together with others in one’s public productive activities, i.e. the extent
to which one’s activities in this field are solitary or not. In paid or voluntary work time
may be spent together with either clients or colleagues;
• the intensity of the time spent together: with clients, the intensity is higher when
physical or mental care is given than when e.g. orders are discussed and with
colleagues the intensity is higher when collaborating or exchanging advice than when
merely working alongside in the same place;
• the amount of self-exposure involved in one’s public productive activities: in certain
occupations (or types of education or voluntary work), one reveals more of oneself
than in other types of work or education. Even the mere choice of occupation may be a
form of self-exposure towards others that can serve to realize affection;
• the extent to which one knows and is known by the persons with whom time is shared
in one’s public productive activities: this depends on the durability of relations with
colleagues and clients;
• one’s relational skills, in particular extroversion, empathy and self-respect.
The fifth field of production, the field of citizens’ rights and obligations, provides little
opportunity for realizing affection. Yet also in the settings belonging to this field, affection
may spring up. Attachments may grow between clients of bureaucratic agencies and the agents
that counsel them. The chances that it does, depend, as in other fields, on the time you spend
with counsellors or other agents, on the self-exposure that your position in the relation with
the bureaucratic institution entails, on the durability of client-agent relations (is it always the
same agent that you deal with, or do you get to deal with different agents every time), and on
your social skills which enable you to cope with your client-position in ways that are more or
less successful in eliciting the liking and personal interest of the agents you deal with.
It should be stressed that the claim that affection may be realized in settings of this type is not
too far-fetched. In one of the focus group interviews, Gerda Passies told about her ‘case
manager’ at the local social welfare office:
“I have had other case managers before. And they just never really listen to what you are
telling them, they just regard you as a number. But this new guy, who is my case manager
since almost a year now, he really looks at you, tries to understand your position, gives
you the feeling that he is sincerely interested in your side of things. I always get such a
good feeling when I have had an appointment with him. I find understanding and
sympathy. It does one good, to experience such a case manager, for a change. And he is a
nice guy too”
There is one more factor in the field of citizens’ rights and obligations that is relevant for the
production of affection, namely legislation. The legal factor includes two elements: personal
legal competence and general marriage and divorce laws. If a person wants to marry his or her
partner in order to increase, improve or ensure the production of affection, one’s legal
competence, or, more specifically, the right to marry becomes a relevant production factor.
General laws and regulations concerning marriage, divorce and adoption may also affect a
person’s possibilities for producing affection: if laws are permissive and flexible, there are
fewer obstructions to the optimisation of one’s production functions for affection than if
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prevailing laws are severely restrictive2. Summarising, the following factors in the field of
citizens’ rights are relevant for the production of affection:
• the extent to which one’s position in the social system involves spending time with
agents or officers of bureaucratic institutions (receiving regular coaching or
counselling from social workers, rehabilitation workers, reemployment offices);
• the extent to which one’s position and behaviour within the bureaucratic institutions
involves self-exposure towards the agents of the bureaucratic institutions (e.g. when
one receives coaching or counselling involving more personal, emotional or revealing
matters of one’s life);
• the extent to which one knows and is known by the agents with whom one deals: this
depends on the durability of relations with colleagues and clients;
• one’s relational skills, in particular extroversion, empathy and self-respect;
• laws regarding marriage and divorce and also adoption, and one’s legal competence.
The sixth and final field in which people may realise social well-being, is the field of non-
institutionalised interactions in the public domain. As I have argued in chapter 5, section 5.4.,
the production of affection is not restricted to ‘close and caring relationships’; affection may
be realized in anonymous interactions in the public domain too.
Just like in the other fields, spending time with people is an important factor for the
production of affection. Here, spending time with people means spending time in public
places, and taking time for people one meets there. Also important is again the amount of self-
exposure. Whether you engage in casual chat with others in public, and how much personal
opinions or personal information you are willing to expose, are important factors in the
eventual amount of affection you may produce in this field. In public places, however, you
may meet people who are different in many respects from the people in your personal social
network, and the people you meet in recreation and work. In public places like shops, public
transport and on the streets, cultural and ethnic subgroups are more likely to meet than in other
settings. One of the prerequisites for affection being empathic understanding, it is obvious that
the degree of cultural homogeneity or cultural congruence (at least, some degree of knowledge
and understanding of other subcultures) between the people in public places is a relevant
factor for the production of affection in public interactions. Equally obvious is that your social
skills are important resources if you are to derive affection from people with whom you are
not involved in a close personal relationship, and which may even remain anonymous.
Finally, there is a form of interaction with ‘the public’ or ‘people in society at large’ which
does not take place in public places, but which does belong to this field of contexts. This form
is ‘mass communication’, a largely one-way form of interaction, in which you yourself remain
anonymous, while the other(s) may or may not remain so. You may realize affection by sitting
at home and watching your favourite soap series: if you feel sympathy for the personages in
the soap, and if you feel for them in what happens to them, this may discard feelings of
loneliness and isolation. Instead of watching a soap opera, you may also watch talk shows or
listen to serious discussions about certain topics. Hearing the opinions and ideas of others in
this way, may give you a sense of affective belongingness:
                                                          
2    As an example one may think of the recent change of law in the Netherlands, by which homosexual couples
can now legally marry. The long struggle that people have fought to achieve this change of law may indicate the
relevance of such legal rights for people’s social well-being.
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Simon Goudsmid: “People are nice, they feel and think like me. There’s a good many
nice people in this society”.
It may also, in contrast, make you feel isolated, out of place with the people in your society:
Annette de Hoog: “I do not feel at home in our society anymore. I just do not understand
these people that you see and hear talking on TV. They are so different from me, the way
they look at things is so alien to me. I just don’t understand them.  I do not think I like
people much, nowadays”.
Summarising, in the field of non-institutionalised interactions in the public domain, I
distinguish five main relevant production factors for affection:
• the extent to which one spends time in public and takes time for people one meets
there. This of course implies going out, venturing in public places; it requires some
discretion over one’s time too;
• the extent of self-exposure in public places, most importantly whether one engages in
or initiates casual chat;
• the possibilities for emphatic understanding, as determined by the degree of cultural
homogeneity or congruence and cultural understanding or knowledge of other
subcultures;
• (exposure to) mass communication involving emotion and intimate concerns, such as
TV soap series (cf. Argyle 1987), talk shows, or columns for personal questions and
advice in printed media;
• one’s social skills, most important here seem to be extroversion and empathy.
All main production factors that have been discussed in this section are represented in the
cells of the matrix of production factors by first-order goals by field of production, Table 6.2.
Although this is still a large number of factors, the systematic inventory and classification
allows for at least some overview as well as for guidance if a researcher would want to
investigate the relevant conditions for the realization of status, behavioural conformation or
affection in any specific context.
In the next section, 6.4., I will discuss whether the systematic inventory of production factors
for social well-being achieved in this subsection, does also help to specify the functional
interrelations between production factors.
6.4. Substitutability and complementarity of the main production factors for
       social well-being
The main relevant production factors per field per first-order goal that were identified in
section 6.3. can only be used as indicators for people’s possibilities to produce social well-
being if the functional relations that exist between these production factors are specified
correctly and consequently dealt with duly. It would be pointless to collect data on the
availability for respondents of all the production factors shown in the matrix in Table 6.1., if
they were next treated either as completely isolated indicators of chances to produce social
well-being, or as simply coordinate factors that can be summed to obtain an indication of the
favourableness of conditions. In Chapter 2, it was argued that one of the recurring problems in
most studies using objective indicators for quality of life is that no attention is given to the
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existence of functional substitutes, nor to complementarity of certain objective resources. If it
is our ambition to make some contribution to quality of life research by linking the use of
indicators for objective conditions to a theory and measurement of how these are related to
subjective (social) well-being, we surely cannot neglect the functional relations between the
production factors we propose to use as objective indicators.
The systematic inventory of production factors for the three first-order instrumental goals,
presented in section 6.3., suggests three general of hypotheses about the interrelations between
the production factors it contains.
In the first place, it should be expected that production factors in different fields for the same
first-order instrumental goal are to some extent functional substitutes. If a person lacks the
means to realise behavioural confirmation in the field of recreation and discretionary
activities, she may seek substitution in her work and in her private productive activities. If a
person has a large number of friends at his sporting club, with whom the interaction is usually
warm and affective, this may to some extent make up for the fact that he does not have a
girlfriend at the moment.
In the second place, it should be expected that, as a rule, the different types of production
factors within each cell of the matrix of production factors per goal per field (that is, for each
specific goal-field combination) are complementary, at least to some extent. When we look at
Table 6.2., we see for example that in each field of production, the production factors for
behavioural confirmation include factors that refer to one’s choices what to do; one’s
subsequent enactment of this choice (how one behaves); the existence of relevant behavioural
norms; the visibility of one’s behaviour for relevant others; and the command of relevant
skills. These production factors lie on different levels in the SPF hierarchy of goals and, as
argued in section 6.3.1., are different in kind. I believe that, as a rule, the exogenous
environmental conditions, the skills and personality traits, the resources and the activities that
are mentioned as relevant production factors for a certain first-order goal in a certain field of
production, are functional complements. To use a simple metaphor: in order to bake a cookie,
one cannot do without any of the different kinds of production factors: raw ingredients (flour,
butter, sugar etc.); kitchen tools (bowl, mixer); an oven, and activities (mixing, kneading,
heating the oven, etc.). Without having the necessary skills, one cannot realise behavioural
confirmation for the adequate performance of one’s chosen activities. Without the existence of
relevant norms, there is neither a basis for others to evaluate one’s behaviour, nor does one
have any guidance as to how one should behave at all. So, to a large extent, the production
factors within each cell of the matrix of goals and fields are functional complements.
In the third place, Social Production Function theory itself assumes that, if we take overall
social well-being as outcome measure, the three first-order goals for social well-being are (at
least as soon as each component exceeds a certain minimum level) substitutes themselves.
This of course implies that, given that a person’s levels of status, behavioural confirmation
and affection exceed the minimum level for well-being, the production factors for these
different goals within a certain field of production are functional substitutes too. However,
they are less close substitutes than those within a goal; therefore people will first seek to
substitute for the same first order goal between different fields of production and only if that
fails, turn to substitution between goals.
Admittedly, these three general hypotheses are far from exhaustive for all possible
combinations of production factors. For example, it is likely that the production factors for the
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three first-order instrumental goals within each single field of production are functionally
related also. For some combinations of production factors for different goals within one field,
a complementarity relation seems most plausible. For example, if one would lack (most of)
the production factors for behavioural confirmation in the field of non-institutionalised
interactions in public, it is hardly likely that spending time with others and self-exposure
would lead to the production of affection in such settings.
But there are also combinations of production factors for different goals within one field of
production for which the assumption of complementarity is not plausible.
Summarising, it appears that the systematic inventory of production factors per first-order goal
per field of production helps the specification of the functional relations between production
factors. These functional relations can, however, only be specified in a general and
hypothetical mode. In order to be more precise about the functional relations between different
production functions, further empirical research is required.
6.5. Conclusion
In this chapter, the second research question was taken up:
What objective information concerning the availability of production factors at the
individual level is needed in order to be able to predict (within reasonable margins) the
level of social well-being that individual can attain?
The main relevant production factors for status, behavioural confirmation and affection were
explored. Starting out from the qualitative data obtained in the focus group discussions, I
developed a system of six fields of production, in which all contexts in which people may
produce either of the three components of social well-being can be categorised. This
categorisation of fields for the production of social well-being allowed a systematic inventory
of the main relevant production factors, evidence for which was found both in the focus group
data and through theoretical reasoning. With this inventory of production factors, the first
subquestion of research question 2:
Which are the essential production factors for status, behavioural confirmation and
affection, respectively, for Dutch adults?
is answered in a tentative mode.
Not surprisingly, it appeared that the essential production factors differ for each of the three
first-order instrumental goals, while per goal several (characteristics of) production factors
were seen to be constant over the six different fields of production (see Table 6.2.). Also, there
appeared to be some common features of the main relevant production factors for the three
first-order goals for each of the distinguished fields of production. Further it was seen that the
‘sets’ of main production factors per goal per field consist, as a rule, of different ‘kinds’ of
production factors (or ‘lower order instrumental goals at different levels of the SPF hierarchy
of goals).
In short, the yields of exploring the first subquestion of research question 2 are:
• a systematic and broad (in theory all-encompassing) inventory of the main relevant
production factors for status, behavioural confirmation and affection. The level of
abstraction that was used to achieve an ‘all-encompassing’ inventory of production
factors without drowning in the unlimited mass of concrete activities, resources and
(im-)material environmental conditions, lies between the highly concrete terms in
which people daily perceive and talk about activities and resources, and the quite
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abstract and general terms in which assumedly relevant production factors were thus
far referred to in SPF theory;
• a systematic heuristics for charting, in non-exploratory empirical studies, the main
production factors available to, or used by, respondents. This systematic heuristics
consists of asking respondents for each of the six fields of production consecutively
about the available or used production factors, preferably ordered according to the
different kinds of production factors, such as exogenous environmental conditions,
personality traits and skills, more concrete resources, and productive activities. It is
claimed here that by structuring the empirical investigation of individuals’ production
factors according to the six fields of production, facilitates correct and complete
responses.
In section 6.4., I took up the second subquestion of research question 2:
What are the complementarity and substitutability relations between these production
factors?
Lacking adequate empirical data, the answer proposed to this question could only be tentative.
I have proposed a set of hypotheses about the functional relations between the main
production factors for social well-being, based on the notions behind the matrix of production
factors per goal per field. 
It is expected that the different kinds of production factors for a certain first-order goal within
a certain field of production are, as a rule, functional complements, while the production
factors in the different fields of production, for each of the first-order goals, are generally
functional substitutes.
Besides these functional relations between the main production factors for social well-being,
the assumption of limited substitutability between the three first-order instrumental goals for
social well-being in SPF theory suggests some further complementarity and substitutability
relations between production factors from different fields of production and / or for different
first-order goals. These complementarity and substitutability relations, however, are
conditional upon certain threshold levels of status, behavioural confirmation and affection,
which are not (and are not expected soon to be) specified empirically. As yet, it is therefore
hard to say how this latter category of functional relations between production factors should
be reckoned with in interpreting people’s possibilities for realising social well-being on the
basis of the production factors available to them. The hypothesised functional relations
between production factors for each of the first-order goals from different fields, and between
production factors for one goal within a certain field of production, however, seem to provide
a rough but solid guidance for interpreting people’s available production factors in terms of
the levels of social well-being that may be attained.
Still, I think it desirable to test these hypotheses about the complementarity and
substitutability relations between production factors for social well-being empirically in a later
study.
CHAPTER SEVEN
QUALITY ASPECTS OF SOCIAL
PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS:
METAGOALS IN THE PRODUCTION OF
SOCIAL WELL-BEING
7.1. Introduction
In the chapters 5 and 6, an empirically grounded elaboration of some elementary parts of the
hierarchy of goals in Social Production Function theory was presented. In chapter 5 I have
proposed a more thorough conceptualisation of the three first-order instrumental goals for social
well-being, including an inventory of aspects that should be taken into account when assessing
levels of these goals empirically. In chapter 6 I have presented a general inventory of the main
production factors for these goals, as well as a systematic approach to investigating these
production factors.
As we have seen in chapter 3, however, the elaboration of parts of the SPF hierarchy of goals that
are already in there, is not sufficient to accommodate existing insights concerning the structure
and causes of ‘happiness’, ‘life satisfaction’ or ‘overall subjective well-being’. The basic
theoretical framework of SPF theory does cover the affective part of subjective well-being, in the
explicitly elaborated hierarchy of goals that consists of social and physical well-being as universal
goals and comfort, stimulation, status, behavioural confirmation and affection as first-order
instrumental goals. There are, however, no equally explicit elements in the basic model of SPF
theory that could accommodate the cognitive components of overall subjective well-being, which,
as we have seen in Chapter 2, boil down to three main categories, namely the cognitive
components that are associated with social comparison, with goal attainment, and with
anticipation and recollection of one's situation at different times than the present.
Lindenberg (e.g. 1996; 2001a,b) has repeatedly stressed that in addition to the substantional goals
people for (social and physical well-being and the instrumental goals), attention should also be
paid to procedural or so-called ‘metagoals’: goals concerning the quality of people’s social
production functions or the ways in which they produce social and physical well-being. In section
3.5.2. I have argued that these ‘metagoals’ may prove to cover the cognitive component of overall
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subjective well-being adequately. Whether in fact they do depends of course on how this category
‘metagoals’ is filled in. Lindenberg (ibid.) has suggested a number of metagoals that appear to be
quite convincing, but as yet there has been little empirical research on these metagoals nor on the
exhaustiveness of the suggested set of metagoals.
Before trying to assess the extent to which the metagoals in SPF theory may cover the cognitive
component of subjective well-being, it is thus desirable to explore the metagoals people strife for
empirically. What cognitive aspects of social production functions are relevant for the resulting
level of overall subjective well-being? Is the set of metagoals that Lindenberg (1996) suggests
exhaustive, or does the present empirical study give reason to extend this set with additional or
more specific metagoals? In the present chapter an answer is sought to the last research question
that was formulated in section 3.6.:
What goals that cannot be interpreted as instrumental goals in the basic model of SPF theory
do people strive for, can these goals be modelled as metagoals (concerning the qualities of
production functions) and if so, to what extent do they accommodate the cognitive component
of overall subjective well-being?   
This research question can be split up into three subquestions:
1. What are the metagoals in people’s production of social and physical well-being?
2. How are these metagoals related to each other, i.e. can they be modelled in an
instrumental hierarchy?
3. To what extent may we consider the cognitive component of well-being as it is known from
the literature to be represented in the (hierarchy of) metagoals in SPF theory that is now
specified?
The first two subquestions necessarily leave aside the overarching objective of this study, the
exploration of the potential of SPF theory as a quality of life theory, for the time and concentrate
on SPF theory proper: the further specification of its conceptual framework in relation to
observed empirical reality. Only after answering the first two subquestions, we are in the
condition to meet the third, which returns to the adequacy of SPF theory to deal with the central
issues of quality of life studies.
The first subquestion concerns the specification of the content of the abstract term ‘metagoals’. In
section 7.2., I discuss the present state of knowledge and theorising as regards metagoals in SPF
theory. Lindenberg’s (1996, 2001a,b) notions about the metagoals are discussed there, leading to
the formulation of a conceptual framework that is taken as the point of departure for search for
additional and more specific metagoals in my empirical data.
In the qualitative study, I have collected extensive qualitative data on people’s goals, motivations
and preferences concerning social well-being and the production thereof. In chapter 5 I have
reported how from these data the empirical manifestations and aspects of the three first-order
goals for social well-being have been distilled. In section 7.3., we will find out what further goals,
motivations and preferences , that do not fit as instrumental goals for social or physical well-
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being, could be discerned in our data and whether these preferences and goals fit into the
conceptual framework as metagoals.
The second subquestion concerns the way in which goals pertaining to the quality of people’s
social production functions are interrelated. More specifically, the question is asked whether they
can be modelled in an hierarchy like the substantive goals in SPF theory. In section 7.4. an answer
to this second subquestion is proposed for the set of metagoals or ‘quality aspects of social
production functions’1 that resulted from the analyses in sections 7.2. and 7.3.
The third subquestion leads us back from a sole focus on SPF theory to a point of view that
allows inspection of its position vis-à-vis other approaches and the existing body of knowledge in
quality of life studies. In section 7.5. it will be asked to what extent the (hierarchy of) metagoals
in SPF theory that is now specified, accommodates the main elements of the cognitive component
of overall subjective well-being as it is known in the literature. This question requires a concise
review of the main cognitive aspects of subjective well-being known from the literature and other
quality-of-life research, and a confrontation of these cognitive components with the metagoals
that are identified in section 7.3.
Section 7.6., finally, presents a recapitulation of what this chapter has yielded in terms of SPF
theory proper and in terms of the investigation of its suitability as a quality of life theory.
Concluding this chapter, the robustness of the yields and the possible implications of flaws in the
research method are concisely discussed.
7.2.  A conceptual framework relating metagoals to the production of well-being
The basic model of SPF theory (Lindenberg 1986; Lindenberg & Frey 1993) did not explicitly
acknowledge any other goals directing and motivating people’s behaviour than goals that are
instrumental for, or contribute to the production of the five first-order instrumental goals:
comfort, stimulation, status, behavioural confirmation and affection. SPF theory is strictly a
theory of substantial goals. However, being firmly located within the framework of rational
choice theory, SPF theory is automatically linked to a specific behavioural theory. This
behavioural theory does not posit any particular substantial goals, but it assumes a universal
striving of people to maximise utility (cf. Lindenberg 1996). It is this assumption from the
behavioural theory underneath SPF theory that has led Lindenberg to suggest that besides the
instrumental goals for physical and social well-being, people are also likely to hold preferences
concerning the form and quality of their production functions; these preferences they referred to
as ‘metagoals’.
Lindenberg (1996; 2001a,b) suggests that, in addition to the hierarchy of substantial goals in SPF
theory, there also is a different type of goals people strife for, namely goals that are instrumental
                                                
1    The terms ‘metagoals’ and ‘quality aspects of social production functions’ are used in exactly the same meaning.
Although the term ‘quality aspects of social production functions’ is more adequate and precise than the term ‘metagoals’
for what we mean by it, I will in the remainder of this chapter as a rule use the term ‘metagoals’ for reasons of brevity.
 214                     METAGOALS IN THE PRODUCTION OF WELL-BEING
to achieving and maintaining the ‘quality’ of social production functions. These goals are referred
to as metagoals.
People are not only interested in what they produce – social and physical well-being – but also in
how they produce it and how the yields of production are distributed over time. Lindenberg
(1996, p. 175-178) proposes seven metagoals: maximisation of utility or well-being; efficiency;
multifunctionality; consistency; time perspective; limited vulnerability and variety. These seven
goals seem to belong to different levels of an (eventual) instrumental hierarchy of metagoals.
Although Lindenberg (1996) does not explicitly place these seven preliminary metagoals in an
instrumental hierarchy, in the discussion that follows I will attempt to reconstruct the implicitly
suggested instrumental relations between these seven goals.
Lindenberg (1996) starts out from the assumption that people strife to maximise well-being. From
this assumption it follows quite logically that people will want to produce well-being as
efficiently as possible: well-being is maximised through achieving the lowest possible cost-
benefit ratio in production. Efficiency is thus proposed as a general, universal metagoal.
One important means to achieve efficiency in the production of well-being that Lindenberg calls
attention to the use of multifunctional activities. He mentions sports and love making as examples
of activities that usually yield social and physical well-being at the same time. In terms of
efficiency it is quite obvious that people, if they can choose between activities that yield only one
form of well-being, say stimulation, or activities that, in addition to stimulation, provide one or
more other forms well-being as well, they will choose the latter. This is simply a matter of
reducing the cost-benefit ratio2.
Besides multifunctionality, consistency is a second metagoal that appears to be instrumental for
increasing the efficiency of social production functions. Consistency refers to the interrelatedness
of a persons’ social production functions: the extent to which the ways and contexts in which a
person produces one form of well-being are consistent and compatible with the prevalent norms
in the contexts where he produces other goals. For example: do a person’s recreative activities
and friends ‘suit’ the norms in his professional context? Are his occupation and the way he
spends his Sundays consistent with the religious norms of his wife and parents? Inconsistency
between production functions may lead to additional production costs in the form of social
disapproval, from others or oneself.
Lindenberg (1996) also points to the mitigating effects of people’s time perspective on the main
motive of maximising well-being. People do not only care about their present well-being, they
also want to insure that they will be well off in the future. Often, this leads people to invest in
future well-being or future production capacity, usually at the cost of immediate maximisation of
well-being. In deciding about investments, people also consider anticipated life events (Sanders
1991). Clearly, people have to balance the immediate maximisation of well-being and their
investments to achieve maximal well-being in the future. There exists an extensive literature on
the problems and complexities involved in this issue (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky’s Prospect
                                                
2    Possibly, multifunctionality is also instrumental to the maximisation of well-being when it is not just simply a
matter of getting additional benefits from one’s productive efforts. The assumption of limited substitutability of the
five first-order goals for subjective well-being suggests that a minimal level of all five goals is required for overall
subjective well-being. This may imply that, apart from the improvement of the cost-benefit ratio of production,
multifunctionality may also be instrumental to overall well-being by helping to preserve the minimal levels of all five
instrumental goals for social and physical well-being during production. 
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Theory, 1979; Loewenstein’s work on time discounting, e.g. Loewenstein & Elster 1992, etc). For
now it suffices to note that within the overarching motive to maximise well-being two partly
competing goals may be distinguished, namely the goals to increase immediate efficiency and the
goal to ensure a positive development of well-being and productive capacity for the future. In
fact, the very notion of production functions presupposes a time perspective. However, in the
context of metagoals, the role of people’s time perspective is more specific and may more
adequately be indicated as the metagoal to achieve an optimal development of productive capacity
over time.
The last two metagoals that Lindenberg (1996) proposes are directly related to people’s
productive capacity over time. One of these is the goal to avoid or limit vulnerability. If one’s
social production functions depend strongly upon one or few production factors, a minor change
in external conditions may cause a large disruption of one’s production of well-being. That is the
reason that people may prefer ‘variety’, i.e. social production functions consisting of and
depending on a much broader and more varied set of production factors. ‘Variety’ would thus be a
lower order metagoal that is instrumental for decreasing the vulnerability of one’s social
production functions. Both the goal to avoid or limit vulnerability and the instrumental goal of
variety in one’s social production functions may in concrete situations conflict with immediate
efficiency: in many cases immediate efficiency may be maximised by specialisation in production
(e.g. in the case of women choosing to be a ‘fulltime mother’, workaholics, or people who neglect
all other things when they have just fallen in love) but such specialisation  increases the
vulnerability of their social production functions (what happens when the child leaves, or the
one’s employer goes bankrupt, or the infatuation ends?). This example illustrates the potential
conflict between efficiency and the optimal development of productive capacity over time.
Because of the potential conflict between these two general metagoals, I will consider them as
parallel goals in the eventual instrumental hierarchy of metagoals.
   
Recently, Lindenberg (2001a) has suggested that instead of using the assumption of utility
maximisation it may be more adequate to assume that people generally strife to improve their
condition. Improving one’s condition then means to do better than before - i.e. improvement of
one’s condition compared to oneself in a previous time interval - or to do better than some others
with whom one compares oneself. There are several good arguments for preferring the
assumption of a universal goal to improve one’s condition over the earlier assumption of utility
maximisation (cf Lindenberg 2001a). In the remainder of this chapter I will therefore, in
accordance with Lindenberg (ibid.), assume that the motive to improve one’s condition is the
single overarching goal under which both the hierarchy of substantial or ‘hedonic’ goals (aimed at
improvement of one’s subjective well-being) and the hierarchy of metagoals (aimed at improving
one’s productivity and productive capacity) can be subsumed.   
Summarising, both the hierarchy of substantial goals and the (hierarchy of) metagoals can be
conceived as driven by the overarching motive to improve one’s condition. The hierarchy of
metagoals can be conceived to consist of two branches: one branch of metagoals contributing to
the general universal metagoal of efficiency  and one branch of metagoals contributing to the
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development of productive capacity over time. This conceptual framework can be represented as
follows (Figure 7.1):
The qualitative data are used to investigate whether more metagoals appear to be general enough
to want inclusion in the still tentative instrumental hierarchy of metagoals in this conceptual
framework.
In the next section, I present the goals and preferences that respondents in the exploratory study
reported which do not belong to the basic SPF hierarchy of goals, and discuss whether and how
these appear to be instances or particular translations of the two universal metagoals, ‘efficiency’
and ‘development of productive capacity over time’.
7.3.  Besides the realisation of social and physical well-being: what do people strife for?
In the exploratory analysis I have taken stock of the characteristics of the way of production of
status, behavioural confirmation and affection that emerged from the interviews as being possibly
relevant.
In the phase of open coding, I have - among other things - given codes to the statements of
respondents that refer to characteristics of the way in which they produce social or physical well-
being or to the preferences they have regarding how they organise their life, their activity pattern
and behaviour. It is a practical impossibility to code statements without imposing at least some
measure of interpretation rooted in the conceptual framework in one’s mind. In this particular
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statements that did not refer to goals or preferences at the other. This distinction could not be
based simply on whether respondents themselves explicitly present a statement as referring to a
goal or preference, for in the majority of cases they do not, and when asking them specifically
about goals and preferences, one is likely to elicit only a small and rather haphazard selection of
respondents’ actual set of goals and preferences in response. Therefore, I had to judge all
statements from the qualitative data myself, as to whether they involved goals or preferences.
After thus distinguishing between statements that did and statements that did not refer to goals or
preferences, the former set was distinguished further into a set referring to goals that were clearly
instrumental to the realisation of one or more of SPF theory’s first-order instrumental goals, and a
set of miscellaneous goals and preferences. For deciding which statements belonged to the first
subset, the elaborated conceptualisation of the first-order goals for social well-being (cf. Chapter
5) was taken as a guideline, together with the easier to apply criterion of statements referring to
ways of reaching physical well-being. 
Thus, from all statements in the initial data set I have only excluded those statements that either
directly refer to one of the first-order instrumental goals (comfort, stimulation, status, behavioural
confirmation or affection) or that refer directly to a concrete production factor (resources and
activities such as, say, paid work, sports, practical support, siblings, gardening etc). In a few
cases, statements or terms that I judged to refer to a first-order instrumental goal or to a concrete
production factor, appeared yet to allow an interpretation that would relate them to the quality of
social production functions as well. Sometimes this was suggested directly by the way in which
respondents formulated these goals (e.g. “It is also important how you organise your life, for
instance, I think your life is better if ...”), while in other instances I believed the interpretation of a
statement in terms of (aspects of) first-order instrumental goals or production factors did not quite
exhaust the full meaning of it. These statements were therefore not excluded from the set of
potential metagoals, and will thus also be scrutinised below.
1.   Agency / being in control
2.   Self realisation
3.   Religion / ideology
4.   Certainty of results / risk avoidance
5.   Taking up challenges
6.   Having a clear goal
7.   Independence
8.   Simpleness
9.   Honesty
10. Hope and expectation (time horizons)
11. Having and maintaining norms and
values
12. Avoiding moral (norm-) conflict
13. Balancing variation and predictability
14. Making investments
15. Avoiding vulnerability
16. Having ‘sleeping’ resources                          
17. Harmony / well-structured production functions
18. Single activity production function
19. Using a multi-activity strategy
20. Multifunctionality
21. Instrumentality
22. Managing social comparisons
23. Being busy
24. Safety / protection against criminality
25. Giving account to others / being accountable
26. Consciousness of SWB and its components
Table 7.1. Goals and preferences reported by respondents that fall outside the basic SPF model
All statements referring to goals or preferences that could not be categorised unambiguously as
(only) instrumental for the realisation of social or physical well-being, were thus classified as
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potential ‘metagoals’. The list of different goals and preferences in this set is presented in Table
7.1. For the sake of concise presentation, I have given interpretative codes to all statements about
(potential) metagoals, which may be considered as preliminary designations of the metagoals or
qualities of social production functions these statements refer to.
Some of the items in table 7.1. resemble general values or virtues, while others have a more
instrumental or technical character. Some refer primarily to the individual himself, and others
refer rather to the individual’s place among others. In order to get a better comprehension of the
goals or preferences regarding the production functions proper that underlie the items in table
7.1., I will now discuss each of them, presenting some of the typical statements which they were
used to code. What goals and considerations did respondents report in the interviews that have led
me to distinguish the 26 items from table 7.1.? And, given the two general metagoals, efficiency
and the development of productive capacity over time, that form the sensitising concepts for this
analysis, which items should be accepted as metagoals and which not?
1.  Agency / being in control
In the interviews, respondents frequently referred to the extent to which they perceive to be in
control of their own doings, in control of what happens and of the level of well-being that they
realise. Being in control of one’s doings and of one’s production of well-being, or, in a different
term, the agency aspect of the production of well-being appeared an important theme in many
statements.
Johan Berghuis: “The most important thing for me is being independent, financially and
otherwise. Being in control and responsible for your own well-being. That you are free to
decide how to spend your money, no matter whether that is little or much.”
Related to this, it appears that, as a rule, people like to perceive causality, thus they like to
experience a causal relation between what they do and subsequent events or states of well-being.
Loss of control over one’s fate or loss of the causal relation between one’s own doings and
subsequent changes in well-being are perceived as severe problems which people will do much to
escape.
Edwin Eijkhof: “When I received unemployment benefits and had to report to the local welfare
office every week, I felt humiliated. I had always been used to take care of myself and then I
had to go there and beg for help. It is not their fault, but I was inhibited and obstructed at every
side. I wanted to start again, to begin my own business. But I got no chance whatever, because
as soon as I tried to set some steps towards that, they reacted: ‘Oh you are not available for the
labour market right now?’ And the benefits were stopped at once. That made it impossible for
me to get started. Highly frustrating. So I resigned and accepted the first suitable employee-job
and I did not start my own business.”
Cobie Strating: “When will there be a stable period once more? When will there be a situation
in which a clear and definite decision is made by the institutions? A situation from which I can
move on at last and begin to build up my life again? Because now I just can’t undertake
anything. Because each year something different happens, rules are changed, temporary
CHAPTER 7         219
decisions reversed, regulations adapted. When I want to enter a course, get some schooling:
‘Oh no, no use, I’d better wait, because they may change the rules again next year’. It is a
chaotic and unstable life I have right now.”  
Cobie feels to have lost the control over her own life, and feels that this impedes the
(re)construction of her social production functions she desires.
The theme of agency and being in control of one’s own level of well-being also emerged in the
interviews in relation to having affective relationships. Some respondents suggested that parents,
for whom the level of social well-being they can realise strongly depends on the affection, time,
care and support they get from their children, may feel out of control of their own life. This is
even exacerbated by the interdependency of well-being that characterises many affective
relationships (cf. section 5.4.).
Irene van der Wal: “When we got children, I stopped working to be a full-time mother. I lived
for that. But when my children left the home I really hit my face in the mirror. What now? I
had a very hard time. And now we hardly see them, they could as well live at the other side of
the country as just ten kilometres from our house, because they are so busy. When you see or
speak them it is hurried: ‘all well dad, all well mum? Yeah, we will come some time soon, but
we are so busy.’ We have so much less contact than I should want so very much.”
Annette de Hoog: “I can’t really be happy if one of my children is having problems. No matter
how well things are for me, it always troubles me that my son has little chance of ever getting a
good job.”
In a similar vein, having a partner, however productive in the realisation of the diverse substantial
goals, implies a partial loss of control over one’s life:
Conny van Ooij: “My partner has been out of work for a while and that has been tough on both
of us. Mostly because you are waiting for something, you don’t know how long you’ll have to
wait, even though you are confident that he will find a job eventually. But till that time you
can’t get on with your life: you cannot yet seek and buy a house because if he will find a job
elsewhere we would have to move again. That was what I hated most about it, being unable to
plan things. You just have to... I am getting the age that you should seriously consider whether
you want to have children...And we just had to postpone all such decisions. That’s worse than
having little money.”
One’s neighbours and neighbourhood are frequently mentioned too as factors beyond one’s own
control that do affect the realisation of social well-being:
Frank Zuidema: “When my neighbour suggested to make a volleyball-court of the grass court
in front of our houses, and start a neighbourhood volleyball-competition, and when he wanted
my son and me in his team. I did not like that at all. In such cases you just cannot say no, to
keep relations fine, but I was not happy about it. I like to decide such things for myself, and in
this situation I felt I couldn’t.”
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Hetty Stubbe: “When you live in a small village there is strong social control. It can become
really oppressive, the way they control you. You feel you lose all your privacy. Sometimes
when I sit all back in our sitting room, my neighbour walks by and waves her hand. And I
don’t like that, not when I am sitting all back in the room: she just looks in intently to see
where I am and what I am doing.”
Of course people do have control over the neighbours they live amongst, in the sense that they can
move away, but the costs of ‘exit’ in this sense are of course considerable.
Some respondents mentioned the taking on of financial obligations as a deed by which one may
stealthily lose autonomy and control over one’s own production functions. Overall, it appears that
the factors or situations that may pose a threat to one’s control over one’s own production
functions are those which one can only escape from at high costs.
There is one exemption from this rule, which appeared in the data. The control of one’s own life
can also be restricted by the ‘shadow of the past’, which it is also difficult to escape. Prejudices
and patterns of interaction based upon a person’s past way of living may severely restrict his set
of behavioural alternatives. Some respondents even mentioned the escape from the ‘shadow of
the past’ as one of the main benefits of moving to a new town:
Mirthe Ganzevoort: “You never lose the stigma people give you when you are young. Only
when you move to a very new place. I moved from the small village in the south of the
Netherlands to Groningen, and then I could make a brand new start.”
Greetje Brink: “When my husband had to find another job, having to give up farming because
of problems with his back, it meant we had to move to the city. It felt like being released from
all these prejudices from the past. In our new place, no one knew me, I could do whatever I
wanted without being talked about. Now, when I visit my old neighbourhood again, I feel I
never want to go back. There I am still ‘that daughter of Smith’. And once someone said to me
in a tone of amazement: ‘weren’t you that shy girl of Smith’s?’ I said, yes, and you would not
have guessed, eh? Years ago I may have been shy. But that’s how it goes: you get a stigma and
it sticks to you a lifetime.”
Agency or being in control of one’s own life can obviously contribute to the efficiency of one’s
social production functions as well as to the realisation of growth and stability of productive
capacity over time (cf. Campbell 1981 who already found that internal locus of control is a main
contributor to SWB). It is instrumental, almost a prerequisite to these general quality dimensions,
and thus should be included as a lower order metagoal. 
2.   Self realisation
In the interviews and the questionnaire, respondents frequently mentioned the realisation,
exploration and development of their own potential, their talents and capacities as goals or as
important aspects of their life. It appears that norms prescribing self realisation are broadly
recognised: people feel it as a normative duty to develop their talents and put them to use.
Consider this dialogue between Cobie and Frank:
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Cobie Strating: “You say that paid work is not ‘it’ for you. But then I want to ask...Each man
has of course been given talents and capacities. And now you work only 12 hours per
week....don’t you feel the urge to develop your talents and capacities and employ them in
society? To do something with your potential? Should not everybody try to do so?”
Frank Zuidema: “I think I do use my talents. I also have been raised somewhat religiously, so
that idea of not hiding your light under the bushel...No, I believe that in the things I do, my job
and other things I do, I sufficiently use my talents and exploit my capacities.”
This norm appears, by the way, to be closely related to the norm, signalled below where the role
of religion or ideology is discussed, to contribute to society according to one’s potential. Some
respondents appeared hardly able to make a distinction between self realisation and making a
career:
Irene van der Wal: “What I needed was simply to have a job. What I felt was: why can’t I earn
something myself, even if it be but a dime, but to realise myself...!”
Others, who have chosen not to pursue a career in paid work, however, clearly distinguish
between the two, and report that they do strife for self realisation:
Barbara van Kesteren: “For me, the main goal is very general. Although its concrete form is
influenced and affected by the time in which you live and your own age, the general goal is to
be something valuable, to be able to be ‘someone’ for others. It is an abstract goal, it does not
translate simply in obtaining a better position or better salary, but in finding a way to become
valuable… finding what you can be.”
Not surprising, education is seen frequently mentioned as an important means to develop one’s
talents and abilities. More importantly, respondents suggest that getting to know and developing
one’s own talents and capacities can contribute to finding the most efficient ways of realising
social well-being, both in the form of social approval from others as in the form of the stable part
of self-approval.
Cobie Strating: “Getting older I found out what my talents are. I am on the organising
committee of a singles club, and I have found out that organising things is my main talent. The
things I organised work out perfectly. When I was younger I felt much more need to keep
things under control. Very tense about how exactly things should run. While now, when
something unexpected happens, I enjoy it, because I feel confident that I can handle it. And
when I have organised something, and someone tells me that I did a good job, I get home very
satisfied and happy.”
The interview data further suggest that self realisation is positively related to agency:
Hylkje Brouwer: “My whole life, all the things I wanted to do, were not so extreme, but in my
parents’ eyes they were. They disapproved of it. But that just stimulated me to find my own
way and to do so on my own. Meeting these counterforces just gave me much strength, and the
drive to realise my own talents.” 
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It appears that, through exploring and developing one’s gifts and talents, it may become
increasingly clear ‘who one is and what one can do’, which is a prerequisite for feeling in control
of one’s life (and sometimes for actually getting control over things). Reversely, for self
realisation to occur, it requires some extent of freedom to make one’s own choices and some
extent of control over one’s own life:
Johan Berghuis: “A good thing of our present society is the opportunities it offers to people to
develop their potential to the full. Everyone has access to good education, no matter what
background they come from.”
Edwin Eijkhof: “When you work in a firm and you have a low position, you are told what to
do and what not. But when you succeed in obtaining a management position, you not only get
a better salary, but you also have better opportunity for developing yourself and realising your
potential.”
Irene van der Wal used the Dutch term ‘jezelf waar maken’ when she talked about self realisation
(see her quote above). Although literally the same as the English term, the meaning of these
words in Dutch language are exactly revealing what it is all about: self realisation means realising
one’s potential, both for oneself and in relation to others, but it also means, literally, making your
self into a reality, not remaining as a reflection of others, but clarifying the boundaries between
oneself and the others:
Simon Goudsmid: “For me the aspect of individuation is very important. Self realisation, the
philosophy of Jung. I would not have made it without that. The first two floors of the ‘house’
that was there when my parents delivered me to the adult world, I have been able to restore,
but by now I have added six more floors to that, new ones. This opened many ways for me.”    
Self realisation is thus seen to be instrumental to both efficiency and to one’s production potential
over time. Therefore, it should be included as an instrumental metagoal of social production
functions.
3.  Religion / ideology
Respondents frequently mentioned things that ‘give meaning’ to their life, that provide them with
‘real purport’ or a ‘real goal’. In short, they reported that their beliefs and convictions about life,
whether religious or not, played an important role in their well-being. Many respondents
associated ‘meaning in life’ with doing paid or voluntary work. This seems to derive from a
broadly held idea that meaning in life can be found in meaning something for others, in being
needed and useful to society. In the Calvinistic tradition, the mission to ‘inhabit and work the
earth’ is essential to people’s meaning in life, and it obviously inspires the great value that is
attached to (paid) work in this tradition.
Cobie Strating: “What really bothers me is the idea, when I receive my social benefits each
month, that I think: ‘one more month that I did not do a thing to earn this’. That is the worst of
it, getting that money without having earned it, society just does not need your help. I was
raised in a Calvinistic tradition. Work provides meaning to life. You know: ‘thou shall inhabit
and work the earth’. So you have to find something worthwhile to put in your best efforts, no
matter what kind of work it is.”
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Several respondents, however, emphatically locate ‘meaning’ not in (paid) work, but rather in
abstract terms like ‘being able to mean something for others’:
Anneke de Wit: “Giving informal care to your mother is also useful and gives meaning to your
life. You help her, but you also benefit yourself, because it feels good and meaningful.”
or, much more concrete, in e.g. contributing to environmental preservation:
Annette de Hoog: “Buying ‘Fair Trade’ clothing, and chemical-free vegetables and so on,
sometimes makes me feel really happy, because in this way I can help to preserve nature and
contribute to the long-term chances of the earth.”
Some statements also suggested that religious beliefs and convictions, if they encompass some
ideas or perspectives concerning the future of the earth and the human race or about life after
death, may extent people’s time perspective beyond their own lifetime. A similar extension of
one’s time perspective may result from beliefs that involve a strong sense of connectedness with
others. Extension of one’s time perspective beyond the own lifetime may be comforting in some
situations, and it may justify all sorts of investments in the future of which the pay-off in the
individual’s own lifetime is precarious.
Adherence to a religion or ideology appears to be a relevant metagoal that is instrumental to the
realisation of both general quality dimensions: it may contribute to efficiency through enhancing
the consistency in one’s social production functions, and it may contribute to perceived
development of productive capacity over time through providing a perspective of life after death
or through extending one’s time horizon beyond the own life time.
  
4.   Certainty of results: risk avoidance
Whereas the previous goals (1. through 3.) were reported by practically all respondents, only
about half of the respondents explicitly mentioned a conscious desire to have certainty about the
results of what they do. This suggests that having certainty about the results of activities is more
important for some people than for others. Certainty about the results of what one does should be
understood to refer to risk avoidance, or abstaining from activities with uncertain success.
For example, Frank Zuidema tells us that he does not like skating at the indoor oval. As he does
not feel sure whether he will round the curves without falling, he fears that other skaters might
make fun of him, and therefore he avoids the situation. For Anneke de Wit, risk avoidance
appears to be an important and general operative goal:
Anneke: “What determines the quality of my life is in the first place order. Just having things
going as usual. No unexpected things. And I like, I really like to know exactly what is going to
happen. I am not an adventurous person. I do not need...eh...I have never been on a plane; I do
not need to go abroad on holidays. We have been going to the very same summerhouse for
years, and I am very happy with that. And I really don’t like doing things of which I cannot
oversee how they will turn out.”
In the case of Anneke de Wit, it might seem that the desire to have certainty about outcomes
follows from the fact that, overall, she has little control over her own production functions and
that her production functions are highly vulnerable and precarious, providing hardly any
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opportunities for substitution in case of need. However, there were also respondents who
controlled their own life to a high extent, who reported high levels of well-being and stable
production functions, who yet reported to prefer certainty about the results of actions over more
risky activities:
Johan Berghuis: “I find an activity satisfying if it presents a certain challenge, yet such that I
know I will succeed. I do not let myself be challenged to do things that I am not sure I am up
to. So what I like is doing things that are new, that you have not done before, but that I know I
can do. That is crucial, for I’m not going to start something that may lead to failure.
Constructing something, making things. And then the moment that it is finished, that it
actually works...That is the moment that your environment shows admiration. Something like
that should be part of it, or I won’t take up a challenge.”
Annette de Hoog: “If someone asks you to take up a volunteer job, to join some committee,
then I consider whether it sounds like something useful or fun and whether I think I can do it. I
must feel confident that I am up to it. If I think I can do it, I go for it.”
In general, the respondents’ life stories suggest that some extent of certainty about the results of
activities is important for all. Even respondents who have taken daring and risky steps in their
life, incurring considerable uncertainty, appeared to have done so only in the certainty of some
part of the result. For example, Barbara van Kesteren, whose husband was offered a good job at
the other side of the country, had to decide whether she wanted to give up her job and the vicinity
of her family and friends to move with her husband to a tiny village where she knew no one and
had no chance of finding a job. In deciding to move with her husband, she accepted a
considerable uncertainty about the consequences. But, as another respondent remarked:             
“It wasn’t a leap in the dark. You did go to something new and unknown, but you took along
an important certainty: you took along your husband.”
Both on the basis of the qualitative study and of insights from the literature concerning loss
aversion and choice behaviour under risk (e.g. Tversky & Kahneman 1991), it seems clear that
risk avoidance or the desire for certainty of results belongs, being instrumental to both main
metagoals, to the specific lower order instrumental metagoals. It may be more or less salient,
depending on the vulnerability of one’s production functions and the expected difficulty of
substitution if negative outcomes occur. 
5.   Taking up challenges
This goal is the counterpart of the previous goal. It presents the preference most people have at
times for trying new things, trying ones strength against new, challenging tasks, attempting
possibly advantageous or profitable new activities, et cetera. Per definition, the outcome of the
attempt is uncertain here, if one succeeds there may be an attractive reward, but one may as well
fail the challenge.
Respondents, when talking about taking up challenges as a goal or preference, usually emphasise
the importance of keeping a good balance between this risk taking and risk avoidance:
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Mirthe Ganzevoort: “Among the main important factors for a high quality of life I would
reckon both stability and adventure. It is difficult to keep these balanced. You just need a
stable base. And you may find your stable base in different things than those in which you seek
the adventure. You may seek adventure in your job by taking on free-lance assignments, while
making sure that your private life provides the stability that you also need, for example in the
form of being settled in marriage and parenthood or whatever. And I think both aspects should
be balanced, at least for me.”
What further emerges from the respondents’ statements, is the enjoyment they find in taking up
challenges - which may be considered a way of realising stimulation and possibly also
behavioural confirmation -, its relation to self realisation and the exploration of one’s own
potential, and related to that, the function it performs in checking possibilities for improving
one’s production functions. 
Barbara van Kesteren: “I love a challenge. And that may be anything from presiding a
conflictuous meeting to ironing a fancy shirt. My mother has taught me in detail how to iron
such delicate clothes, and when it turns out neatly - for usually I have no patience - I feel very
satisfied. But I really enjoy the more important things too. Say, when you have fought for two
years to preserve some facility for your   community, and you have to meet all sorts of
bureaucracies that put up resistance, and when then finally you do succeed after all... I get a
kick out of that which gives me loads of energy for months. I find that delicious!”
Annette de Hoog: “I think, when people ask you to do something, like organising things or
being on a board of some organisation, you should not refuse too easily. Not just because you
may do something useful, but also... how else can you find out what you can do, when you just
shrink back from tasks that scare you? You may be very talented for something and never
come to know it.”
Johan Berghuis: “I now know which things I should not try to do. I mean, if you know you’re
no good at it, why should you spill effort on it? I know I’m no good at any ball games. So I
don’t play tennis. I have tried all these things when I was younger, just to see if I could do it. I
wanted to know.”
For the realisation of both main metagoals it may thus sometimes be necessary or worthwhile to
take up challenges; as it may lead to the discovery of more profitable ways of producing well-
being. It may become worthwhile or necessary to take a challenge mainly in two kinds of
situations. Firstly, when one has little to lose, the potential gains that may result when accepting
the challenge may make it advisable to do so. Secondly, when one is instead highly secure, having
a high level of well-being with strong and stable production functions and a safe stock of
production factors, taking up challenges may be worthwhile because the costs that one risks in
case of failing the challenge are subjectively small, while the potential benefits are relatively
higher. Thus, ‘taking up challenges’ appears to be a situationally salient instrumental metagoal for
both main metagoals.
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6.   Having a clear goal
As a rule, people appear to feel unhappy when they lack a sense of purpose. Respondents in
majority spontaneously mentioned ‘having a clear goal’ as one of the main prerequisites for
happiness. When the goal is abstract, like ‘being a good person’, ‘contributing to the happiness of
others’, or ‘achieving the best I can’, it may better be understood as part of - what I have named
above - endorsing religious or ideological convictions about life. But when the goal is clear and
concrete, having it per se appears to affect the quality of people’s social production functions, as
well as the way they go about producing their own (social) well-being. One of the functions of
having some concrete goal is the framing it presents for all one’s doings. If one has some goal,
even the activities that do not contribute to its realisation gain an interpretation, as being leisure, a
moment for oneself, for relaxation. Having a concrete goal thus provides structure to people’s
perception of their own productive activities.
Irene van der Wal: “When my children left home, I got severely depressed. I had no job. My
husband went to work early each morning to come back in the evening, earning our living. I
did not need to do a thing, the money we needed was just handed to me, so there I was. It was
horrible. All those months.... After my husband left for his work, I waved him goodbye, and
then I lay down on the couch. Lying on the couch. I could lie there till 12 o’ clock or later.
Paralysed by lack of purpose. Hating myself.”
Mirthe Ganzevoort: “You just need a goal. That is also why I hope to get that job. If I get it,
there is something to look forward to again, something to prepare for and to put effort in.
Something to direct my thoughts and my doings.”
Only one of the 31 persons I interviewed, Mike Bos, did not think having concrete goals or a
sense of purpose in necessary to achieve well-being. This young man, that emphatically stated not
to have any goals whatsoever for himself, reported to be more than moderately happy and
satisfied with his life. But in this Mike seems to be an exception.
In fact, the general notion of production functions in SPF theory almost appears to imply that
people consciously pursue concrete goals. By and large, I think SPF theory indeed presupposes
that people act in pursuit of concrete (instrumental) goals, but it should be stressed that the theory
does not claim individual super-rationality: much of people’s behaviour may not be consciously
goal-directed, and be only changed or terminated when the individual perceives that what he does
runs counter his - may be somewhat vaguely conscious - interests.  
In the eventual hierarchy of metagoals that is presented later in this chapter, having clear or
concrete goals will be included as an instrumental metagoal, serving both the main metagoal of
efficiency through enhancing the multifunctionality of production functions and avoidance of
moral conflict, and - in a more general fashion – a positive development of productive capacity
over time. 
7.   Independence / moral freedom to act
In the interviews, several times there surfaced a subject which I have - inadequately, I fear -
labelled as ‘(in)dependence’. The cargo that goes under this label, is the mechanism that if a
person knows that what he does and does not do affects the well-being of others, this awareness
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poses moral restrictions to his freedom to act. Of course, this mechanism is a basic mechanism in
the production of self approval (the self-rewarded component of behavioural confirmation) and is
in that sense nothing new. What makes it of interest to the topic of this chapter, is that people’s
production functions as a whole appear to differ in the extent to which the moral freedom to act is
restricted by interdependency of production functions. And the overall extent of (in)dependence
appears to be an aspect of the quality of social production functions. Respondents speak about
their experiences with this mechanism in diverse ways:
Conny van Ooij: “At Christmas, we usually go to my parents. My sisters come too, with their
families. But I am very anxious that it does not become a habit or tradition. Because if it does,
you can hardly decide to do something different for once without disappointing your parents.
So we always keep it very open and vague when we will come, and how long we will stay.”
Cobie Strating: “My sister lives on her own for twenty years now, but all of these years she has
spent every weekend at my mother’s. She has her own house, but all the summer holidays she
spends with my mother, Easter, Christmas... always with our mother. I sometimes think, and
say to her: this is not healthy, what you are doing, you should lead your own life, have a life of
your own. And then she says: ‘No, as long as our mother lives I will spend my time with her,
because I feel I should. It would grief her if I would let my own pleasures prevail’. And in this
way, a tension builds between my sister and me, because she suggests that if I would spend my
weekends at my mother’s too, it wouldn’t be necessary for her to do so every week. So she lays
a claim on my freedom, just by expressing herself as she does.”
Yasmin Rais: “My husband and my son know that I take care of them, so they count on that.
And therefore of course I will not just join a sports club if the trainings are around dinner time,
nor will I just go shopping in the afternoon if I feel like it ... not if there are still things to do
for my men. I feel responsible for them, and it would not be fun anyway to do things for my
own pleasure if I knew it would cause them trouble.”
Independence in the sense of feeling free to act as one pleases without feeling restricted by
expectations of others appears to be a relevant lower order metagoal, which can clearly be
instrumental to the realisation of efficiency in production. It may be conceived of as a particular
form of agency and being in control; which implies that in the eventual hierarchy of metagoals it
belongs at a lower level than agency, as the levels in the hierarchy correspond both with
instrumentality relations and with the degree of generality or specificity of metagoals.
Feeling free to act as one pleases without being restricted by expectations of others may in some
cases also contribute to achieving stability or growth of productive capacity over time, but there is
no such clear instrumentality relation to this general metagoal as to efficiency. Freedom to act
without feeling restricted by expectations of others will probably become a salient metagoal
mostly in situations where an individual feels severely restricted in his choice of action by such
expectations of other people, that is, where such expectations are many and restrictive and where
the individual is either dependent on the others for behavioural confirmation or experiences
interdependency of well-being (as in close affective relationships).   
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8.   Simpleness
In the interviews, some respondents stated that they would want their life, and all their way of
being, to be simple and straightforward. They stated that they believe that people who are able to
remain plain and simple can achieve a kind of happiness and quality of life that is lost to people
with more complex social production functions:
Irene van der Wal: “Close to our house there lives a couple of about forty, with a daughter of
fifteen. They have never been abroad yet. When we went to Portugal last year, that man of
forty asked me which countries we would traverse in order to get there. When I said that we
would drive through Belgium, France and Spain, he could hardly believe it. That is how these
people live. Pure, good people. They have the keys to our house, they water the plants when
we’re not there. That family is, as far as we can judge, so completely happy. I have told my
husband that this is something we have not seen for years. These people do not see beyond the
end of their nose, almost literally, and they are so satisfied and happy. I do not believe that
there is ever such tension or stress in that house. Always friendly and plain.”
It seems to me, however, that this idea that simplicity or being plain is a quality that is positively
related to happiness for a large part relies on superficial perception, and perhaps also on envious
comparison with one’s own situation of which one knows all complexity. Leading a plain and
simple life may seem desirable to a person who is tired of the troubles and complexities in his
own life, but it is doubtful whether such simple, plain and uncomplicated life really exist and, if
so, whether persons who live more complicated life could ever change to a more simple state of
being themselves. It can be imagined that under specific circumstances a person’s could de-
complicate his life and thereby achieve an improvement of his well-being, such as via increased
certainty of rewards, increased clarity and consistency of goals, et cetera. Yet, being plain or
simple appears to be only instrumental to the quality of production functions under indeed highly
specific circumstances, to be so only via several more general qualities of production functions
that will be included in the hierarchy of metagoals anyhow. Therefore I decide against inclusion
of ‘simpleness’ as a separate metagoal in the instrumental hierarchy that will be presented below.
9.   Honesty
A general value that was mentioned by a few respondents as a factor that they think may improve
the quality of one’s social production functions (the quality of one’s way of living and the amount
of well-being that may be realised), is honesty.
If one can, without sanctioning or loss of social or self approval, be open and honest in and about
the various activities in one’s life, this is indeed likely to facilitate a higher level of well-being
than if such honesty and openness is not possible. It seems to me, however, that this is just a
different label for the quality of consistency, which will be discussed below: if the different
activities in an individual’s life, and the norms and values of the various people with whom he
interacts or is connected are at odds, certain activities by which the individual get approval from
some people, would invoke the disapproval of others, if they knew about it. Honesty and
transparency would in such cases inform all parts of one’s network about the things one does in
other parts, and thereby invoke a loss of social approval and well-being. Being able to be honest
and transparent without such a loss of well-being does, I think, mean that there is consistency (i.e.
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absence of moral conflict) or even multifunctionality in one’s social production functions, and, as
we will see below, these indeed are important metagoals. 
The respondents who talked about honesty, however, appear to have simply meant the virtue or
value of honesty as something that deserves and elicits social approval in itself. In that sense,
honesty is ‘merely’ a value or norm, and observing it is a productive ‘activity’ for realising
behavioural confirmation.
10. Hope and anticipation or savouring
Above, we have already discussed the role of having a clear and concrete goal, and the role of
having certain (religious) convictions about life. Having hope, and savouring anticipated future
events is closely related to these potential aspects of the quality of social production functions. If
someone lacks hope or perspective in some area of life he deems important, he may experience
sadness or depression and unhappiness.
Cobie Strating: “Formally, I still have to apply for jobs, but doing so makes me more and more
unhappy. Because, let’s face it, I am forty-five years old, and every employer will reject me,
because I am simply too old.”
Frank Zuidema: “Enjoying my life has much to do with anticipation. Doing nice things and
looking forward to this. Reading about some good play or manifestation or concert, and then
planning to go there. Not immediately, it may even be in a few months. That anticipation, yes,
I like that. It keeps me going.”
Annette de Hoog: “Sometimes I have the feeling that the youth has such different values and
goals than we had. It can make me feel very worried and depressed, thinking the world and the
youth will come to no good. Thinking about the future, I see it all dark. But last month I asked
the youth in the confirmation classes that I teach, to describe their future. What they expect,
what they hope and dream of. And then it came out that they simply hope for health, a job and
a partner, may be children. Very classical, in fact exactly what we dreamt of when we were
young. That gave me so much hope again, so much more confidence that the world will yet
turn out all right...”
Hope thus appears to be important for subjective well-being, and to inspire efforts for the future
even at times when the immediate perspectives seem discouraging. If one has hope, the savouring
of the anticipated positive event may both increase the immediate subjective well-being and
stimulate continued efforts for bringing about the hoped-for event. ‘Savouring of anticipated
events’ is in fact implied in the assumption of people being forward looking and expecting (e.g.
Lindenberg 2001a) and also in Prospect Theory ( Kahneman & Tversky 1979). But in connection
with having hope, savouring anticipated events may gain additional meaning as a motivating
factor in adverse conditions.
It seems helpful to distinguish between ‘hope’ as the reflection of all improving aspects – which
is, in fact, anticipation – and ‘hope’ as expectation or optimism without rational foundation,
which is hope in the true meaning of the term. The latter kind of hope may be considered as a
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relevant instrumental metagoal, which mainly serves the higher metagoal of realising stability or
growth of productive capacity over time. 
11. Having and maintaining norms and values
Practically all respondents talked about the role of norms and values in the realisation of social
well-being, and several proposed that keeping norms and values is essential for ‘the quality of
how you get well-being’ or ‘the quality of how you organise your life’. Overall, respondents
considered the existence of norms as a prerequisite for social well-being, although in case there is
a conflict or discrepancy between the norms of different people around you or between the norms
of others and of yourself, the effect on your level of well-being may be ambiguous. Although
respondents thus mentioned the existence of norms as one of the important factors or values that
characterise a good life, we have seen in Chapter 6 that the existence of norms is one of the
general relevant production factors for behavioural confirmation and self approval. In
reconsidering the respondents’ statements with the research questions of the present chapter as
searchlights, I have found no additional role or function of the presence of norms that would
support presenting it as a possible metagoal. 
12. Avoiding moral conflict / consistency
Whereas the presence of norms and values should be simply regarded as a production factor for
behavioural confirmation, avoidance of moral conflict may properly be regarded as a metagoal;
absence of moral conflict as a positive quality of social production functions. Some people may
succeed quite well in avoiding moral conflicts in their life, but probably the majority of people
face moral conflicts that they cannot evade. 
Hylkje Brouwer: “My parents disapprove of the things that I want to do, of how I want to live
my life. I can’t change that. But what I can do is make sure to find good friends who share my
views on life, and who approve of what I do. My friends are very important for me. In my daily
life they are far more important than my parents. So I do feel happy and valued, and the
conflict between how I live and the ideals of my parents weighs less heavily; it has moved to
the margins of my life.”
Johan Berghuis: “It is just a fact that I’d feel less happy if I lived in a neighbourhood with
many unemployed or ethnic minorities. They have different ideas about how one should live
and behave. So by choosing where you want to live, in a careful way, you may avoid a lot of
conflicts and irritation. People feel best in an environment of people who have the same ideas
about how one must behave towards others.”
Irene van der Wal: “We, people of around 50, come from such a different world, so different
from what it is today. That may sound niggling, but it is just the way it is. Yesterday on TV I
heard an interview with Leen Pfrommer, the skating coach, who resigned from his function.
He said: ‘I do not feel at home anymore in the world of my pupils, so I can’t be a good coach
for them no more’. He said: ‘I come from a totally different world of norms and values’. That
words really made me realise: yes, that is exactly how I feel. I don’t feel at home anymore, we
are side-tracked.”
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Cobie Strating: “What matters is how you deal with it. When my father was dying, he was in
the hospital, he told my sister and me that he wanted us to promise that we would always take
very good care of my mother.  My sister promised. And then he wanted me to promise too, so I
said ‘yes of course, dad, we will’. But to what lengths must I go to keep that promise, how
must I deal with that?”
Structuring one’s life, one’s social production functions such that moral conflicts are minimised
or even completely avoided is clearly instrumental to the realisation of efficiency in production.
We may then speak of consistency in the individual’s social production functions3. This is likely
to become salient as an instrumental metagoal especially when a person experiences a high degree
of moral conflict in his social production functions, either between different activities or settings
he engages in, or between the norms of different people he deals with within the same setting or
activity, or between the norms that guide the approval he gets from others and his own norms.
13. Balancing variation and predictability
In the interviews, some respondents mentioned the balance that is achieved between variation and
predictability or stability as an important metagoal:
Frank Zuidema: “I really love variation. Of course, there needs to be some stable basis, like
your relation with your partner, and knowing that all is well with your children. But if that is
there, I like variation, and unpredictable events happening.”
Close consideration of this and similar statements of respondents, however, led me to conclude
that for some part this goal coincides with the balance that is achieved between taking risks or
taking up challenges (discussed under 5.) and risk avoidance or certainty of results (discussed
under 4.), while the remainder just refers to the substantial goal of stimulation in SPF theory’s
basic hierarchy of goals. There thus seems to be no ground to consider the balancing of variation
and predictability as a potential metagoal.
14. Making investments
My respondents appeared to be aware of the desirability or necessity to invest in their future well-
being, or rather: in future possibilities to achieve or maintain well-being. Most respondents
explained some of their activities and choices by referring to the investment character thereof;
many respondents also stated that, if in the total of one’s activities there is no provision for future
times, this is ‘stupid’ or unwise. There appeared to be general consensus that they derived more
satisfaction from activities that they know to be an investment in their future well-being than from
activities that will decrease their future capacity to realise well-being. Thus, discounting of future
well-being consequences of present activities appeared to be a common phenomenon.
                                                
3      Lindenberg (2001b) uses the term ‘identity formation’ to denote a way of improving the quality of one’s social
production functions that is closely related to the metagoals that I have named ‘consistency’ and ‘self realisation’. 
Because of the many connotations of the term ‘identity formation’ in social psychology and because in this Chapter
my objective is to disentangle metagoals rather than merge them into more complex concepts, I prefer to continue
using ‘consistency’ and ‘self realisation’ as two separate metagoals.
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Cobie Strating: “When I had my first long period of illness, and I lost my job, I realised that I
had to keep on doing things, participate in something, make sure I would not get isolated.
Because that easily happens in such a situation, and once it is a fact, it is so much harder to
change it again...”
Cobie: “There is more for me than just my mother and sister. Even though they say that we
should cling to each other, because it’s just the three of us left now. But I do not want to seek
everything from them. Because, if my mother passes away, I would be left empty handed. And
sometimes I try to warn my sister that it is stupid of her to spend all her time with my mother. I
say: ‘when mama dies, what friends do you have?’ ”
Hylkje Brouwer: “I quit smoking because I knew it is bad. Not that I had any health problems
already, but just to prevent that one day I would have respiration problems or cancer because
of those cigarettes. Stopping was difficult, but it gave me a good feeling because I knew it was
for my own good.”
Leonie de Zeeuw: “The first time after I had left my ex-husband was very tough. There have
been times when I felt ‘why have I left him, because now it is even tougher for me and for
Sarah, my daughter, then when we still lived with him.’ But then I’d force myself to think of
how we would be in one or two years, and how much happier we’d be without him than with
him. Knowing what we were fighting for made the troubles less hard, and I am so glad now
that I went through all those difficulties to get a better life.”
In fact, one should not be surprised at the awareness people show concerning investment
behaviour. Assuming people to be rational, forward-looking utility seekers, it is just what we
should expect to find. Moreover, it is our common experience that we frequently do things that at
the moment merely cost effort or money or whatever, in order to attain some desired future
outcome. It then seems strange not to expect other people to be as rational and conscious of their
own deeds and the probable consequences thereof.
Making investments is clearly instrumental to the realisation of stability or growth of productive
capacity over time, and as such it will be included in the hierarchy of metagoals later in this
chapter. Unlike some other instrumental metagoals, making investments is not only relevant
under specific circumstances (although under some circumstances a person can spend a larger
share of his efforts on investment activities than in other circumstances), it rather is a generally
salient instrumental metagoal.
15. Avoiding vulnerability
Several statements of the respondents revealed that they consciously seek to decrease or limit the
vulnerability of their social production functions. This goal was already proposed by Lindenberg
(1996, see section 7.2), but since it came up in the interviews so clearly, it is worthwhile to
illustrate it here with two exemplary statements. As far as people are aware of it, they strive to
construct their social production functions in such a way that they are least easily disrupted, that
they are least vulnerable.
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Barend van der Weijde: “When you reach a certain age, you begin to realise that it is important
to have a roof over one’s head, that we live in a country where there is sufficient food, but also
that we have freedom to make our own decisions. And to have friends, not that you must see
them everyday, but to know they are there. Relatives, health. These are important aspects for
my quality of life. Because if these things aren’t there, you’re at risk. If then something
happens...”
Annette de Hoog: “Having people you care about makes you vulnerable, makes your happiness
precarious. The happiness of your children is so important for yourself. Our son is unemployed
at the moment, and that destroys your own happiness. And nothing you can do about it.[ ...] In
that respect the modern two-earner couples may be less vulnerable, because they have many
things besides their children from which they get their happiness.”
The vulnerability of social production functions depends on a number of factors. Among these are
the extent to which one is in control (discussed under 1), the extent to which one’s activities have
an investment character (see under 14), the extent to which one has ‘sleeping resources’ (see
below, under 16), one’s time horizon, et cetera. The goal of avoiding vulnerability is thus a more
general goal than these factors on which it depends. In the hierarchy of metagoals that will be
proposed below it should be placed as a specific metagoal serving the realisation of stability or
growth of productive capacity over time, being itself served again by still lower instrumental
metagoals such as the three just mentioned.
16. Having ‘sleeping’ resources                          
A quite strategic goal that was reported by some of my respondents, is what I have called the
keeping of ‘sleeping’ resources. Or, as one respondent expressed himself: one should have a
‘back up power unit’ on which one can fall back in case of emergency.
Cobie Strating: “There is more for me than just my mother and sister. For if my mother passes
away, I’d be left empty-handed. That is why I find it so important to have friends in one’s life.
And also other relatives, nieces and so on, to keep in touch. So when I’d fall ill, there are
people there for me. I think that is very valuable, for there may come periods in your life that
you dearly need your relatives and friends.”
Frank Zuidema: “I don’t want to get close to my neighbours or so, but of course I do want
friendly relations. I just do not want these social obligations, yet of course I would help them in
case of need. And I am sure they will help me if I ever really need them. But we do not pay
social visits or so.”
Gerda Passies: “Being divorced and unemployed, with two children is sometimes difficult.
Financially, I mean. And although my parents are always willing to give or lend me some
money, I have never yet turned to them. I prefer to manage on my own, even though that
means that sometimes I have to deny my daughter something she fancies, or that I have to
accept unpleasant jobs at unpleasant hours. Still, knowing that if I really need it, my parents are
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there and wanting to help out, is of course very comforting. I need not worry as I would if they
would not be there in the background.”
Having sleeping resources appears to be an instrumental metagoal reducing the vulnerability of
the (continuous) production of social well-being and thus contributing to the stability of well-
being over time. It appears to be - almost by mere logic - a metagoal that is salient under all
conditions, not - like so many other instrumental metagoals - one that becomes salient only when
threats actually arise. Having sleeping resources also creates a precondition that allows people to
take up challenges (see under 5.).  
17. Harmony / well-structured production functions
The term ‘harmony’ was used several times by respondents when they were asked what factors
determine the quality of their life, the quality of their production functions. On careful
consideration of the statements in which respondents used this term, it appeared that by and large
they referred simply to having well-structured production functions. What these respondents said
was in fact nothing else than that, besides the level of social and physical well-being that is
realised at a particular moment, the metagoals in general are also important for one’s quality of
life. These statements thus support the notion of this chapter, that people do have metagoals
besides the substantial (hedonic) goals in the basic SPF hierarchy. As far as something else was
implied in the respondents statements about ‘harmony’, this referred to the absence or avoidance
of (moral) conflicts, a matter that has been duly discussed under 12. Thus, the term ‘harmony’
does not represent any further specific metagoal.
18. Single activity production function
In the interviews as well as in the time use study, it appeared that there is considerable variation
between respondents in the variety of activities that constitute their social production functions.
Of course, when investigating people’s activity patterns in detail, all people daily perform
innumerable different activities, from putting off the alarm clock in the morning and brushing
one’s teeth to locking the front door at night before going to bed. When we concentrate on the
activities that people report as really meaningful or as important sources of well-being, however,
it appears that there are people for whom but one or few activities are really central for their well-
being, while there are also people whose production of well-being is distributed over a much
larger number of different activities. In terms of Chapter 6, it may also be said that people differ
in the number of fields of production in which they are involved. Some people seem to prefer a
concentration of production functions in one or few activities or fields of production (others
prefer the opposite, see under 19.). The usual argument for such preference is that concentration
on a restricted number of activities promotes optimal performance of these activities. Some
respondents referred to being a full-time housewife instead of having a paid job besides one’s
housekeeping tasks. Others referred to not having many other activities besides their paid job, or
to concentrating on one hobby instead of doing several activities alternatingly.
Anneke de Wit: “There is enough to do for a housewife. I never did anything besides my
housekeeping. My father in law lived with us for sixteen years, so at noon he and the children
had to eat, and in the evening I had to prepare dinner for my husband, so I cooked twice a day.
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And took care of the children. I always say that if I had to do it over again, I would do it
exactly the same way. I could not do anything besides it. When I now see the housekeeping of
my children, who have two earner families, they just don’t clean anything. Not really clean, I
mean. Of course I do not blame them, for they don’t have the time. But if you want to do the
housekeeping well, it is a fulltime occupation.”
Johan Berghuis: “I had my job, my career, and my wife took care of the children. And I liked it
that way, I have never regretted it. When you just know that all is marching well at home, you
do not need to worry yourself about it, and it gives you the opportunity to make a success of
your work. And my wife and children profited from the income I earned.”
Leonie de Zeeuw: “My hobby is painting. It takes a lot of practising to learn to paint well and
to improve your technique. There have been times when I thought I wanted to do some sports
too, and to read novels, play an instrument, et cetera, but eventually I realised that by trying to
do everything I would never get any better either in sports or music or in painting. So I quit all
those other things, and now painting is my only hobby. And I like it this way, because now I
can concentrate on one thing and become better at it.”
Apparently, adopting a production strategy that concentrates on a single or only a few production
activities may be instrumental to the realisation of both quality dimensions of social production
functions: efficiency and stability or growth of productive capacity over time. It can take this
effect via several instrumental metagoals at a higher level in the hierarchy than itself: via
investments, via the avoidance of moral conflicts, and via the provision of a clear goal. I will
therefore include ‘concentrating on small number of productive activities’, i.e. ‘specialisation’, as
a lower order instrumental metagoal. Using this strategy is however but one possible option; as
will be seen directly below, people may as well pursue the opposite strategy to their profit.
19. Using a multi-activity strategy
Whereas some people (see under 18.) choose to concentrate their production of well-being in one
or a few main activities, others appear to prefer just the reverse. Several respondents stated that
they like to engage in a considerable variety of activities and fields of production; in other words,
they prefer to spread their production of well-being over a considerable number of activities and
settings:
Frank Zuidema: “That is why I have deliberately chosen to work only part-time. I have a 30%
job. There is more to life than just working. Of course, when you have a family there needs to
be some guaranteed income, and I make sure that is there, or partly, for my wife also earns a
part. But what I really experience now, is that I have room, or opportunity, to do other things.
To bring in variation. I now have the time for that. Suppose I would have a normal job,
then...then I would only have the evenings to do all other things I want to do.”
Barbara van Kesteren: “I would never accept being only a housewife. Of course some people
choose such a life, but I have always chosen to do a lot of other things alongside, to have other
functions and roles too. I have had jobs, and I have devoted an enormous lot of time and
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energy in political parties and movements. I would never have accepted it if someone would
have told me to choose either the one or the other. And it is not because of the income, for
that’s negligible, but all this activity makes me intensely happy. Its just not imaginable that I
would spend my whole day washing and cleaning and ironing...even though I do these things
all the same.”
Nannie Doosje: “I work as assistant-accountant. And although I am a woman in a men’s world
there, it is obvious that our clients put much trust in me. But still I often feel frustrated because
I am not paid as much as others and I’m not given the opportunities to advance that they get,
only because when I was young I did not get a certain certificate. But that frustration is not a
serious problem, because I only work there half time, and the other half of my days I do
volunteer work. And that gives such complete satisfaction. So the partial frustration in my job
is compensated for by my volunteer work in the women liberation movement and the labour
union and the church. And my family.” 
Besides the quotes that are presented as examples, the statements of respondent 1 that I presented
earlier, about wanting to spend time with friends and acquaintances too instead of concentrating
solely on her mother and sister, may also illustrate the point.
The quote of Nannie Doosje suggests that compensating for shortcomings of the one activity by
taking up other activities may be a reason why some people prefer to spread their production of
well-being over multiple activities while others, as we saw above, rather concentrate on one or
few activities.
It seems plausible be that concentrating on one or few activities (specialisation) is only a
preferable strategy in terms of resulting levels of well-being if those few activities are highly
multifunctional and entail little or no stress and frustration. It seems that it is not so much a trade-
off that exists between multi- or single-activity production functions, but that it is rather a
strategic decision over how many activities one needs to distribute one’s time and energy in order
to realise optimal levels of the different components of well-being. These are not new insights; in
section 7.2. ‘variety’ was already presented as an instrumental or lower order metagoal proposed
by Lindenberg (1996) that would contribute to lowering the vulnerability of social production
functions. ‘Dividing production efforts over multiple activities’ or ‘variety’ is thus a lower order
instrumental metagoal that may contribute to both efficiency and to a desirable development of
productive capacity over time. This contribution may take effect via the higher order instrumental
metagoals of taking up challenges; finding hope (the more activities and settings one is involved
in, the more likely it is that even if in many settings conditions are adverse, there remains good
ground for hope regarding some other line of activity); making investments, avoiding of
vulnerability and building up sleeping resources. It depends on the individuals’ specific resources
and the prevailing circumstances whether a single- or a multi-activity strategy will be most
profitable.
20. Multifunctionality
One goal or preference that people widely hold with regard to their social production functions is
that the activities therein be multifunctional. Multifunctionality is a quality of activities that has
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already been mentioned several times, both in this paragraph and in the literature on SPF theory.
It has repeatedly been suggested as a metagoal in social production functions. In the interview
data, evidence that respondents prefer (more) multifunctional activities over less multifunctional
activities abounds.
Rosa Boogert: “Of course many things are just more fun, more worthwhile when you have
someone, some people to share it with. Like when I prepare dinner, it is just for me. And I do
like cooking, and experimenting with new recipes, but it is hardly worth the trouble when there
is no one but yourself to enjoy it. When you have a partner, who says that it is delicious, and
who praises your cooking, and with whom you can eat dinner in a nice and romantic sphere, or
even when you just eat it with a friend, having an interesting conversation meantime, it is
simply more worth while.”
Hylkje Brouwer: “I am not such a sports person. Even though it would be good for me, I just
do not have the discipline to go to fitness class or have a run regularly. Because it is just for my
health if I do it, I do not really enjoy all that jumping and hopping. The only way for me to get
myself to do sports is when I arrange with a friend or a couple of friends to go together. Then I
have more reasons to go, not just for fitness, and then I am much less inclined to do something
else instead.”
Kees Nagelkerke: “This volunteer job as a computer teacher is so good, it one of the best
things that could have happened to me. You know, I like the work, it helps me to get new
contacts again, with people outside the alcoholic scene. It also helps me to get over my
shyness, and to qualify myself for a real job in this line of work some time. And it provides me
with structure in my days, which is very important when I have a difficult period staying off
the alcohol... And it is satisfying because you can really help people, and they often show it
too, that they are grateful for your help.”  
Per definition, when an activity is multifunctional, it serves the realisation of more than one of the
five first-order instrumental goals in SPF theory. The more multifunctional an activity is, the
more of the first-order goals it contributes to. It is obvious that the more multifunctional activities
there are in your social production functions and the more multifunctional of each these activities
is, the higher the resulting level of overall well-being will be, given the input of resources.
Multifunctionality is thus instrumental to the realisation of efficiency in production.
21. Instrumentality
In the interviews, several respondents mentioned instrumentality of activities as a relevant goal or
quality of the way they organise their life. They expressed themselves in phrases such as: the
things you do should lead to something, should have some result or serve a certain goal.
It seems superfluous, however, to consider ‘instrumentality’ as a separate metagoal. The assertion
that activities and efforts should lead to some desired result in order to be worthwhile, is inherent
in the basic notions of SPF theory and the behavioural theory it rests on4.
                                                
4      So is agency, but agency has a distinct contribution to efficiency and the development of productive capacity over
time. It would be tautological to consider ‘instrumentality’ as an instrumental metagoal; for agency this is not the
 238                     METAGOALS IN THE PRODUCTION OF WELL-BEING
22. Managing social comparisons
The role of social comparison in relation to the realisation of well-being appears to be ambiguous.
From the respondents’ statements we can make out two distinct functions of social comparison in
the realisation of well-being, each with different consequences for what may, in certain situations,
be the best strategy in comparing oneself with others to optimise one’s production of well-being. 
One function of social comparison is that it provides more or less objective information
concerning one’s position or achievements in relation to what is ‘normal’ and what is optimally
feasible. In analogy to production processes of firms, this function of social comparison may be
interpreted as the providing of relevant (strategic) business information.
Anneke de Wit: “I think it necessary that my husband would get more physical exercise,
because his condition is not good. Mine is better at least. But may be my condition is not good
either. It is hard to know such things. I would like to have that tested somehow, to know if my
physical strength and fitness is like the average person of my age, or that it really needs
working on. Just to know that for myself, to have some objective standard. But we are no
sports people, so you do not know such things.”
This first function of social comparison is different from the second, which is to provide a basis
for self ranking (and ranking by others) and thus serves the realisation of status. This is a function
which itself does not belong to this chapter about metagoals. However, the choice of with whom
an individual compares himself is relevant to both functions, and the compromise or trade-off that
is achieved between these two different functions of social comparison is a metagoal. A tension
will in many cases exist between the goals of collecting optimal objective and complete ‘business
information’ and the goal of realising status. For the latter positive outcome of comparing one’s
own position to that of others is necessary, which demands that one should seek reference groups
that, on average, have lower ranking than oneself. In other words: the pursuit of status demands
selective social comparison, looking to people who do worse than oneself rather than to those
who have done better. Such selective downward comparison is, however, of limited value from
the perspective of the objective indications one needs to find out if one achieves well and if one
can achieve better (cf. Ybema 1994). Downward comparison directs one’s attention away from
examples of how much better one might do. It may lead a person to believe he does as well as
anyone may, thus incapacitating a potentially powerful source of stimuli to strife for
improvement. For the quality of one’s social production functions as a whole it seems thus
important that non-selective and objective information concerning one’s achievements as
compared to others is sought, even though this may lead to less favourable outcomes of the
individual’s self ranking then when he ‘chooses the right pond’ (cf. Frank 1985).
Rosa Boogert: “When I still had a job, I went on holidays twice a year. I love travelling. Now
that my income is so much lower, I just can’t afford to go on holidays. Last summer I felt
really upset about that, because all the people around me went abroad and I just sat here,
looking at the Dutch rain. And of course I should look to people who are worse off than me,
for many are. I would feel much less self pity then. But on the other side...it is good to be
                                                                                                                                                             
case.
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realistic, and if I shut my eyes for what I miss by being unemployed, I might become satisfied
with it and stop trying to get a job...”
In its function of providing ‘business information’, social comparison is clearly important for
guarding the quality of social production functions. This may best be modelled by including both
‘managing business information’ and ‘managing social comparison’ as instrumental metagoals;
the latter one level below and instrumental to the former. Adequate management of ‘business
information’ is thus an instrumental metagoal that contributes to both efficiency and stability or
growth of productive capacity over time. In principle, it may be salient under all circumstances,
but it seems plausible that its salience grows in situations of uncertainty, say when large changes
occur in a person’s social production functions, or when one is still inexperienced in the activities
one is undertaking.
23. Being busy
In Chapter 6, we have seen that ‘being busy’ is widely perceived to indicate status, because of the
scarcity of skills it suggest, leading us to include ‘being busy’ as one of the generally relevant
production factors for status. The reason for yet discussing ‘being busy’ here again as a
potentially relevant concept with regard to the quality of people’s social production functions, is
found in the respondents’ statements on this subject.
The level of activity of one’s life, or the proportion of one’s time during which one is busy and
engaged in various activities, was believed by several respondents to be an important factor in
achieving a high level of well-being or quality of life:
Irene van der Wal: “I have the impression that the happy people, are usually those people who
are very active. Those who participate in all kinds of things, who are always busy, and who
have a finger in every pie. These are the people with a satisfying, wholesome life...”
The relation between being busy and happiness that is suggested in the above statement might
well be spurious, however, as the people who are very busy, doing many things and having their
days filled to the brim are generally those who have many skills and resources, and who have
found pleasant ways to exploit these.
Carol Groothuis: “That is how it is with my brother. He works in a supermarket and it is just as
if it is his hobby instead of his job. These days, he spends some sixty hours a week working
there. He is so interested in everything that goes on there, and it also comes to him so easily.
And then when I compare this to my half-time job as a postman, those twenty hours a week are
sometimes so hard to get through, because, even though it’s an easy job and I have much
experience, it does not suit my capabilities and my university degree. So it does not satisfy me,
and that does not get better when I’d work thirty or forty hours, instead of just twenty.”
Not all respondents agree that having a full agenda and being very active contributes to quality of
life. Probably, the ideal level of activity depends partly on the multifunctionality of one’s
activities, and perhaps on personality traits. It seems also plausible that the level of activity that is
‘ideal’ varies with the relative contribution of each of the first-order instrumental goals to a
person’s overall social well-being. If a person’s overall well-being relies relatively strongly on the
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affection he realises, being busy and having a tight time schedule is likely to be more negative
(remember the importance of ‘having time’ in the production of affection, Ch. 6) than if the
largest component in a person’s social well-being is the status he realises (remember that ‘being
busy’ in itself may yield status, see Ch. 6). 
In the hierarchy of metagoals and corresponding production factors, the level of activity cannot be
given one particular place. Still, although it can not be said in general what level of activity is
optimal for the quality of people’s social production functions, the level of activity seems to be a
relevant, though difficult to interpret, quality-aspect of social production functions. I believe the
concept to be most useful and relevant for characterising actual production functions that may be
observed in empirical research
An additional remark must be made concerning the activity level or, in different terms, the
management of time restrictions. From the respondents’ stories, it appeared that time is relatively
often the most scarce production factor, thus probably often the decisive factor in the design of
people’s social production functions (cf. Van Bruggen, 2000, p. 177). Managing time restrictions
in itself is not a metagoal; but the subjective experience of time pressure appears to indicate a lack
of efficiency. The most obvious form of inefficiency that may result in a perceived time shortage
is a lack of multifunctionality of activities, which can be exacerbated by the restricted discretion
people have concerning the amount of time they want to spend on an activity. This holds in
particular for informal care tasks within the family, and for paid work. Although the latter is one
of the most multifunctional activities we know (ibid.), there always remain goals that paid work
does not (sufficiently) realise. Combined with the fact that the choice for a paid job is rather a
dichotomous choice than a choice from a continuum of alternatives - if one wants to do paid
work, one has but little discretion as to the number of hours worked - doing paid work may easily
lead to a subjective time shortage. Summarising: managing time restrictions should not be
included as a metagoal in the hierarchy that will be developed later in this chapter, but a feeling of
time pressure does indicate suboptimal quality of social production functions.
24. Safety / protection against criminality
In answer to the question of what aspects of their life respondents felt important for their well-
being and the way they can realise it, several mentioned safety from (criminal) infringements on
one’s person and one’s goods. Examples given by respondents included personal (un-)safety in
public places - in particular for women, in lonely places and after dark - and (un-)safety from
burglary or vandalism.
Yasmin Rais: “I wish it were safer here for a woman to go somewhere. At night I mean. We
live in a nice and decent neighbourhood, but at the other side of our street there is a park. And
at night it is dark, and unsafe, there are all sorts of ... dangerous people around there. So I
never go out after dark.  The newspapers always tell about assaults and rape... It is an awful
idea. Sometimes I feel nostalgia when I think about my youth, when you could just sit outside
on a beautiful night, walking around and looking at the stars. Now you are crazy when you’d
do that.”
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Hylkje Brouwer: “I love living in the city, I left the village where I grew up as soon as I
graduated from high school. I’d never go back. But there are also one or two drawbacks of city
life. Criminality. Creeps.  I am always scared and nervous when I get back from work at night,
or after going out. I ride my bike home as hard as I can, even though I am not a particularly
fearful person. But there are so many creeps carrying some weapon... So that lack of safety is
really a drawback of living here.”
Barend van der Weijde: “We live in an apartment at the second floor of the flat. We have a
central entrance, locked by an electronic door. So people first have to ring a bell and get a
resident to open that door, in order to get to the stairs. It’s just pure necessity to have such a
system. Otherwise you never know when you get home what you will find. We know several
people who have been victim of a burglary. And it is just awful, they feel completely unsafe
and vulnerable for months, and some of them have lost very precious belongings. Not just a
collection of old coins, but also an antique clock that had been their grandmother’s. And so
much was simply vandalised: a painting, a souvenir vase, some handworks from their children
when they were young...”
  
The first two statements seem, at first thought, to represent merely a particular restriction of one’s
behavioural alternatives, or rather, a particular kind of risk attached to some behavioural
alternatives. The third statement seems to represent something similar to what we have above
called the vulnerability of one’s social production functions, or, alternatively, loss aversion, or the
general desire to gather and secure resources that may be used later.
It yet seems useful to consider ‘safety’, in this specific sense (thus different from the more general
non-vulnerability), as a specific precondition for the realisation of high-quality social production
functions as well, because it affects the perception of risks and thus the risks one is willing to
take. When people feel unsafe, they will hardly deviate from the most secure and certain course of
action, even though other actions are probably more profitable, be it also more hazardous. When
people feel more safe from all sorts of (criminal) infringements on their person or goods, they are
likely to be more willing to try the less certain and secure courses of action, if they may yield
better outcomes, because the perceived risk of such courses is lower. Thus, feeling safe is a
precondition that may contribute to both general dimensions of the quality of social production
functions. It will generally facilitate a higher quality of social production functions and higher
resulting levels of well-being. But, as it is hardly a condition that individuals can bring about
through their own deeds, I think it should not be modelled as an instrumental metagoal itself
(although seeking a safe environment might at a very low order be modelled as an instrumental
goal for limiting vulnerability).  
25. Giving account to others / being accountable
Several respondents spoke about situations in which they have to give account of their doings to
others, and how they feel about that. Generally, it seems that people prefer not to be obliged to
give account of what they do and don’t. To some extent, this is a specific aspect of what I have
named ‘agency’ or ‘being in control’. Of course, the evaluation of being accountable to others
depends strongly on the extent to which the norms of the other coincide with one’s own norms
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(cf. the avoidance of moral conflict, discussed under 12.): when one is accountable to someone
whose norms are inconsistent with one’s own, being accountable is valued far more negatively
than when there is consistency of norms.
In the latter case, having to give account of one’s behaviour may as a rule yield behavioural
confirmation, and thus add to one’s level of overall social well-being.
In the data I have found that respondents signal two societal developments in opposite directions
with regard to the accountability people have towards others. At the one hand, most respondents
agree that in the present society people have more freedom in how they behave and what they do
than, say, 50 or 100 years ago:
Simon Goudsmid: “I believe that thirty years ago being out of work was much harder to cope
with than it is now. Nowadays there are so many alternative ways of making oneself useful,
like helping in a refugee centre...Thirty years ago such things were much more difficult. Social
judgements were different. Then, the norms and the organisation of society demanded that you
did paid work when you were between twenty and sixty years. And that is changing, it seems.”
At the other hand, respondents point out that they feel that nowadays one is called to give account
of what one contributes to society much more. Do you contribute according to your capacity?
Annette de Hoog: “It seems to be the norm that everybody should be busy. ‘What do you do?’
is the usual first question people ask you.  And when I say I am a housewife, they immediately
ask ‘yes, but what else do you do?’ That is what I mean: people ask you to give account of
whether you do enough for society.” 
I do not wish to suggest that these developments in society really take place, nor do I want to
hypothesise about their generality. But if the developments signalled in the above statements are
actually taking place, we may rephrase their meaning as a decrease of prescriptions as to what
exactly people should or should not do, and how they should behave, accompanied by an
increasing weight to the norm that one should contribute according to ones capacity to the
economy or to society in general. 
After thorough rereading of the statements referring to being accountable to others for one’s acts,
I decided, however, that they do not contribute anything substantial to ‘agency’ as a metagoal. Not
wanting to be accountable to others should thus be considered as a specific instance of having
agency or being in control of one’s own production behaviour. 
26. Consciousness of SWB and its components
In the interviews, it appeared that some respondents are largely unaware of their own social
production functions and their level of social well-being, while others have clear ideas and
perceptions of how much of the different components of social well-being they realise, and how
these components of well-being result from their own behaviour. Previous to the interviews I had
expected that in particular those people who have low levels of certain components of well-being
would be acutely aware of this and of what they lack to repair this. During the interviews it
appeared, however, that the awareness of one’s well-being and the components and causes thereof
is frequently raised when one has - once - experienced an abrupt or large loss of well-being, such
as respondent 1 who lost her job due to an episode of psychiatric inmate-ship, or the same
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respondent losing her father, or respondent 2 who, after a period of sudden health problems, is
now much more consciously planning her days and activities in order to be able to retain her
active and busy way of life.
It also appeared that the extent to which one is conscious of one’s goals and resources in the
production of social well-being is related to ‘consistency’, i.e. the avoidance of moral conflicts in
one’s production of well-being.  Some respondents reported that in their social normative
environment the pursuit of social approval, and doing things with the objective to gain affection,
is disapproved of.
Frank Zuidema: “When you asked about prestige and status...these are terms that I don’t use,
so I can’t give you any reasonable answers about that. Yes, it is true that I want to be liked, I
admit that, but that is something different that wanting to be part of a group, to belong, or to be
looked up to... That is all so big, so...self-interested.”
Johan Berghuis: “I don’t know whether I do things to get approval. I don’t think I do. I just go
my own way. It would feel odd to do something in order that an other may approve of you, it
seems dishonest.” 
Where such norms are dominant, a high level of consciousness of one’s own well-being and of
one’s social production functions is inconsistent with the main norms that govern the realisation
of approval from others and oneself. In such situations, the efficiency of social production
functions is necessarily low.
The opposite situation appeared to exist too: some respondents stated that in their social
environment the dominant norms are to live consciously and to work on the quality of your own
life and well-being. For them, a high level of consciousness of their social production functions
and the results thereof is positive and efficient:
Kees Nagelkerke: “After all these years that I have just spilled by being an alcoholic, I now
feel that I have taken my life in my own hands. I have quit drinking, and now I am responsible
to make something of the rest of my life. I feel really positive about my life now, and it feels
good to work at it, to build up the parts that are still lacking. I started that volunteer job also
because I hoped to find new friends there, friends who would do me good. And that is what
they tell you also, the social workers that coach you: you must work on it, seek out ways to get
good friends and build up a good life.”
Furthermore, being conscious of one’s social production functions and level of well-being is of
course a different form of the ‘business information’ (see under 22. ‘managing social
comparison’) people need in order to design their social production functions optimally.
Consciousness of one’s level of well-being and one’s social production functions may thus be
considered as a lower order instrumental metagoal that contributes to the quality of the production
functions under specific conditions (if prevailing norms do not condemn the conscious pursuit of
well-being, and when reconsideration or change of production functions is desirable), and this
contribution may be modelled as taking affect via the more general metagoals of managing
‘business information’.
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7.4. Incorporating the metagoals in the SPF framework
In the foregoing section, all preferences and goals reported by the respondents in our qualitative
study, which could not be categorised directly as instances of the substantial goals from SPF
theory’s basic model, have been discussed. In that analytical discussion, 14 of the initial set of 26
‘miscellaneous’ goals were identified as instrumental metagoals, contributing to the two main
categories of metagoals, efficiency and development of productive capacity over time. In the
discussion, it became increasingly clear that the best way to model the various instrumental and
often situation-specific metagoals in relation to the highly abstract general metagoals, might be
analogous to the hierarchy of goals that constitutes SPF theory’s basic model for the substantial
goals.
Table 7.2. shows the 17 instrumental metagoals that were identified, and summarises to which of
the two main universal metagoals they contribute.
Instrumental metagoal or quality              contributes to.........
    development of             
 productive capacity     efficiency
Agency / being in control            +                                   +
Self realisation            +                                   +
Religion / ideology            +                                   +
Risk avoidance            +                                   +
Taking up challenges            +                                   +
Having clear and concrete goals            +                                   +
Freedom to act without restricting expectations                                                  +
Having hope            +
Consistency / avoidance of moral conflict                                                  +
Making investments            +
Avoiding vulnerability            +
Having sleeping resources            +
Concentrating on few productive activities: specialisation            +                                   +
Dividing production efforts over multiple activities: variety            +                                   +
Multifunctionality of production factors                                                 +
Managing social comparisons            +                                   +
Consciousness SWB and social production functions            +                                   +
Table 7.2. List of instrumental metagoals and the higher-order goals to which they contribute
Based on the discussion in section 7.3. of the mechanisms involved in the operation of the
metagoals, we may now proceed to fill in the preliminary conceptual framework of metagoals that
was presented in Figure 7.1. Guided by the results of the qualitative study and our interpretation
thereof, a hierarchy of higher and lower order metagoals (i.e. of general and more specific
instrumental metagoals) is now proposed which is to be interpreted in a similar fashion as the
hierarchy of (substantial) goals in the basic model of SPF theory. It does not present an alternative
or a competing hierarchy of goals to SPF theory's hierarchy of social- and physical well-being
goals, but it is a complementary hierarchy in a different dimension of reality, which is concerned
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with the cognitive components of overall well-being rather than with the affective components
thereof.
Figure 7.2. represents the further filled-in hierarchy of metagoals. It contains the same metagoals
as the preliminary hierarchy of Figure 7.1. that we started out with, but in addition, the











 Religion /  ideology
 Freedom to act
 without restricting
 expectations
   Having hope
   Having sleeping
   resources
 Overarching motive:
Two hierarchies of goals:
Two universal metagoals:
Figure 7.2.: The filled-in hierarchy of metagoals for the individual production of well-being
General instrumental metagoals




 avoidance of moral
 conflict
  Limiting vulnerability /
  loss avoidance
 Making investments
 Risk avoidance
 Taking up challenges
 Having clear/concrete goals
 Managing social comparison
 Consciousness of SWB and of
 one's social prod. functions
  Specialisation-strategy
  Multiple activity strategy :  variety
More specific instrumental
metagoals (second order) :
Lower order instrumental metagoals
or production strategies :
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7.5. Metagoals and the cognitive component of subjective well-being: to what extent do
they overlap?
Stepping back again from the sole ‘microscopic’ concentration on the (hierarchy of) metagoals in
SPF theory, to consider the broader objective inspiring it, I will in this section discuss to what
extent the hierarchy of metagoals which was elaborated above, accommodates the cognitive
component of subjective well-being. It was already mentioned several times before that the ‘state
of the art’ in quality of life studies distinguishes two components of overall subjective well-being:
an affective and a cognitive component. Diener et al. (1999, p. 277) state that
“subjective well-being is a broad category of phenomena that includes people’s emotional
responses, domain satisfactions, and global judgements of life satisfaction. [...] Moods and
emotions, which together are labelled “affect”, represent people’s on-line evaluations of the
events that occur in their life. [...] In addition to studying affective reactions, SWB researchers
are interested in cognitive evaluations of life satisfaction. Andrews and Withey (1976) found
that life satisfaction formed a separate factor from the two major types of affect; and Lucas,
Diener and Suh (1996) used multitrait-multimethod analyses to show that pleasant affect,
unpleasant affect, and life satisfaction were separable constructs. [...] Few existing theories
attempt to explain why variables differentially relate to the separate components of SWB.”
The affective component of SWB (which itself should be distinguished into a negative and a
positive component) is the component that the basic model of SPF theory with its two general
goals of social and physical well-being, represents. Although only in a minimal fashion, the above
quote does give some definition of what the affective component of SWB is. However, the
cognitive component of SWB, though emphatically recognised, is not in any way described or
defined; not only in Diener et al. (1999), but also in all other major writings on subjective well-
being research it remains rather vague what the contents of this component are. What we may
infer from the above quote is that the cognitive component covers the life- and domain
satisfactions of people, and that it concerns a more global judgement than the immediate ‘on-line’
reactions that people experience.
Later in their overview of three decades of subjective well-being research, Diener et al. (ibid.)
discuss the main empirical findings concerning the relations of diverse variables with the
components of SWB. The contents of the cognitive component of well-being are perhaps revealed
best by the way it is related to these variables: other mental phenomena and processes. In the
review of Diener et al., the cognitive component of SWB appears to be closely related to three
kinds of mental phenomena.
The first kind of mental process that is closely related to the cognitive component of SWB, is that
of social comparison. Wood (1996, p. 520) has defined social comparison as “the process of
thinking about information about one or more other people in relation to the self”. In general,
reactions to social comparisons may involve a variety of responses: behavioural, affective and
cognitive (Diener et al. 1999, p. 282). In the framework of SPF theory, we assume the affective
responses to social comparisons to be reflected in (fluctuations in) the level of status that one
experiences and in the level of self-approval and self-liking. What Diener et al. refer to as
‘behavioural responses’, are what in terms of SPF theory might be referred to as ‘the continuation
CHAPTER 7         247
or adjustment of production activities in response to processing ‘business information’’. The
‘cognitive responses’ to social comparisons then constitute, I think, part of the cognitive
component of SWB. It is not too difficult to imagine what such cognitive responses may involve:
satisfaction and confidence about one’s production functions and productive capacities and
possibly optimistic expectations about the future at seeing that one does better than the person(s)
to whom one compared oneself; incremental goal setting (allowing for repeated evaluation of
one’s progress towards those goals) and, possibly, concrete planning of activities and strategies
that one sees to be effective for others, in response to comparing oneself with someone who does
better than oneself5.       
Taking the above to be an adequate interpretation of the social comparison element in the
cognitive component of SWB, it appears that all its facets are covered by the metagoals that were
eventually distinguished in the previous sections of this chapter. The mental process of social
comparison as it is found in the literature may in several ways be related to the metagoals of self
realisation, taking up challenges, having clear and concrete goals, having hope, making
investments, (recognising and) avoiding vulnerability, consciousness of SWB and of one’s social
production functions and - obviously - managing business information and managing social
comparisons. I find that the dissection of what is generally referred to as ‘social comparison’ in all
these more specific and subtly different processes provides a better insight in the complicated and
often unequivocal effects of social comparison on immediate SWB. Thinking or theorising and
explaining in terms of the various metagoals proposed here, rather than from the general
(container) concept of ‘social comparison’, reveals much more of the individual’s agency in
achieving SWB and of the cognitive and productive processes through which this is achieved.  It
must be noted, though, that the content and functionality of the various metagoals that appear to
incorporate some of the ways in which social comparison affects SWB, are not restricted to these
effects of social comparison. Thus, from one point of view the metagoals proposed in this chapter
are less general, more specific than a concept like ‘social comparison’, but at the same time they
are also more general, and encompass more than the effects of social comparison alone. To
understand this seeming inconsistency it must be pointed out that the metagoals we work with and
a concept like ‘social comparison’ belong to different ways of catching complex reality in
conceptual abstractions. They belong to different ‘languages’, one might say. ‘Social comparison’
is a concept that belongs to a way of catching reality in classes of behavioural actions, of ‘things
one can do’. The metagoals, in contrast, belong to a language that attempts to catch reality in
terms of productive functionality, in terms of production steps and processes. Which language
one prefers is to a certain extent a matter of taste, but I think the language of the metagoals allows
more clarity and precision in explaining processes and explaining outcomes.     
The second kind of mental phenomenon Diener et al. (ibid.) report to be closely related
empirically to the cognitive component of SWB is the phenomenon that people hold, and act in
accordance with, diverse aspirations. In Chapter 2 we have already discussed Michalos’ (1985)
Multiple Discrepancies Theory that suggests that subjective well-being is inversely related to the
                                                
5    Responses of this kind are also observed and described by Ybema (1994). For a detailed account of the mental
responses to social comparison, the reader is referred to that study or to the section on social comparisons in the cited
review of Diener et al. (1999).
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discrepancies between one’s aspirations and one’s actual situation. Several empirical studies have
shown that not one’s aspiration level as such (i.e. high or low aspirations) predict SWB, but rather
the fit between one’s level of aspiration and what one may realistically achieve (e.g. Emmons &
Diener 1985; Emmons 1992; Diener & Fujita 1995).
Furthermore, the (positive) effect of holding aspirations and having goals on the individual’s
SWB is affected by the internal and external consistency of the goals and aspirations that one has.
Goals can coincide more or less with general human needs or with a person’s individual motives
and other goals (internal consistency), and with the values of the culture and subculture to which
the individual belongs (external consistency).
The more an individual’s goals are in accordance with his motives and needs, the larger the
positive effect of having and attaining these goals on SWB (cf. Kasser & Ryan 1993; Brunstein et
al. 1998; Cantor & Sanderson 1999). Similarly, the better the fit between an individual’s goals
and the goals valued by his social environment, the larger the contribution to SWB (Cantor &
Sanderson 1999). In SPF terminology, this is a matter of consistency and avoidance of moral
conflict. It must be noted, however, that it is not clear whether it is mainly for the affective or for
the cognitive component of SWB that the internal and external consistency of the goals is
relevant.
As regards the relation between holding realistic aspirations and the metagoals identified in this
chapter, I think we may again safely claim that the metagoals fully cover the relevant facets of this
second element of the cognitive component of SWB, and moreover exceed them, both in content
and in detail of functional explanation. Out of the set of metagoals presented in Table 7.2., most
seem related in some way with holding aspirations. The ones that seem to be most directly
associated with ‘holding (realistic) aspirations’ are agency, having clear and concrete goals,
having hope, making investments, dividing production efforts over multiple activities or - in
contrast - concentrating on small number of productive activities, managing business information
and managing social comparisons, and consciousness of SWB and of ones social production
functions.
The last of the three kinds of mental phenomena that appears to relate closely to the cognitive
component of SWB (Diener et al. 1999, p. 285) is a general desire of moving towards goals or
moving towards one’s aspirations6. The essence of this third mental phenomenon is not that one
has particular goals or aspiration levels, but rather the experience of progress towards the
realisation of one’s goals, and the structure that this intended movement towards one’s goals
provides for one’s whole daily living.
Several theorists, such as Csikszentmihalyi (1990) or Carver et al. (1996) suggest “that the
process of moving towards one’s aspirations may be more important to well-being than the end
                                                
6    In fact, the distinction between the second and the third kind of mental process that I make here deviates from the
distinction Diener et al. (1999, p. 283-285) make. They distinguish between holding and moving towards aspirations
at the one hand, and having and striving to realise goals at the other hand. In my view, it is not clear, however, what
the essential distinction is between goals and aspirations (especially as Diener et al. do count rather concrete matters
as money and fame to be (extrinsic) aspirations too). I therefore prefer to make a distinction that I think is far more
substantial between holding aspirations, that is, having anchors or reference points which provide orientation, and - at
the other hand - the process and experience of moving towards one’s goals and aspirations, that is, the experience of
progress.
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state of goal attainment” (Diener et al. 1999, p. 283), which would imply that as long as people
perceive to advance towards their goals at adequate pace, their satisfaction may be high even
when their current situation is far removed from their aspirations. This suggestion agrees
remarkably well with the views about human nature from which SPF theory starts out, i.e. the
notion that people are rational, goal oriented, forward looking ‘producers’ that actively plan and
design their own life and ways of achieving SWB. For the positive effects of goal achievement or
progress towards goals, the degree of commitment to these goals has been shown to have a
substantial mediating effect (e.g. Brunstein 1993; Oishi et al. 1999).
Other theorists put more emphasis on the structure provided by the perception of progressing
towards one’s goals and on the extension of one’s time horizon by means of moving towards
goals:
“Commitment to a set of goals provides a sense of personal agency and a sense of structure
and meaning to daily life. Furthermore, commitment to goals may help individuals cope with
various problems in daily life and hence maintain personal as well as social well-being in times
of adversity” (Diener et al., ibid., p. 284).  
When we confront this third element of the cognitive component of well-being with the
metagoals that was arrived at in this chapter, I dare claim that all the ways in which and the
mechanisms through which moving towards goals may contribute to the cognitive component of
SWB are encompassed in the proposed theoretical framework of metagoals. As remarked above,
the general notion that progressing towards one’s goals is a basic human desire, which if fulfilled
will enhance (cognitive) well-being or life satisfaction, perfectly accords with the behavioural
theory underneath SPF theory and its hierarchy of metagoals. But the overlap of the metagoals
and this third element of cognitive SWB is not restricted to this general notion. At a more detailed
level, the suggested ways in which moving towards goals might contribute to SWB, can be seen
to be all encompassed in the diverse metagoals listed in Table 7.2. The diverse ways and
mechanisms through which progressing towards goals may affect cognitive well-being and the
relevant conditions for it to do so, seem to be covered in particular by the metagoals of agency,
self realisation, taking up challenges, having clear and concrete goals, making investments,
dividing production efforts over multiple activities or concentrating on a small number of
productive activities, multifunctionality of production factors and consciousness of SWB and
production functions.   
Overall, it appears that the contents and meaning of what in the literature is referred to as the
cognitive component of SWB may be summarised as the effects of three kinds of mental
processes on life satisfaction and SWB. Confronting these three ‘elements’ of the cognitive
component of well-being with the set of metagoals that was arrived at in the exploratory study
reported earlier in this chapter, it appears that the metagoals fully cover the cognitive component
of SWB, and that they are even more encompassing than the three elements of cognitive well-
being I distilled from the review of Diener et al. (1999). The distinctions between the different
metagoals are also at a higher level of detail than the distinctions one finds in the literature
concerning the elements of the cognitive component of SWB, which justifies the claim that using
 250                     METAGOALS IN THE PRODUCTION OF WELL-BEING
the instrumental hierarchy of metagoals as a theoretical framework for cognitive well-being
allows better and more detailed - thus more understandable - explanations.
7.6. Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that, besides the substantive goals in the basic model of SPF theory
(comfort, stimulation, status, behavioural confirmation and affection, and the instrumental goals
serving these), there is also another category of goals on which the level of overall well-being
people experience depends.
From the behavioural theory underlying SPF theory, a few highly abstract goals can be deduced,
which are not so much competing goals to those of social and physical well-being, but
complementary goals in a different dimension of people's experience. In section 7.2, we have
reasoned about what goals would follow from the behavioural theory on which SPF theory is
built, and in section 7.3. we have investigated and discussed the variety of possible goals that
emerged in the qualitative interviews in this study.
It appeared that practically all potential goals and preferences that our respondents had mentioned
in the interviews could quite straightforwardly be identified as belonging either to one or more of
the abstract goals derived, in section 7.2., from the behavioural theory, or as manifestations of the
already known substantial goals in SPF theory's basic model.
The criterion that we thus chose for deciding whether some goal is a metagoal or quality of social
production functions or not, was whether the ‘goal’ in question presents a specific instance or is
instrumental to the realisation of any of the goals that follow directly from the behavioural theory
upon which SPF theory rests.
It should be noted that all miscellaneous goals that we have found in the qualitative study could
indeed be categorised as either specific instances or instruments for the achievement of the
general goals derived from the behavioural assumptions, or as specific instances or instrumental
goals for the realisation of substantive goals leading to social and physical well-being. There were
no ‘left-overs’ that could not be interpreted in either way.
I have modelled and approached the metagoals and qualities of social production functions that
were identified in a fashion that is analogous to the treatment of the substantive goals in the basic
model of SPF theory. That is, I have assumed that there are different levels of generality and
specificity, and that the more specific goals are instrumental to the realisation of the more general
and abstract goals. The instrumental hierarchy of metagoals and qualities of social production
functions that resulted presents an analogous and complementary hierarchy of goals that steer
people’s behaviour and affect their subjective well-being, to the original SPF hierarchy.
The identification and elaboration of the metagoals that was achieved in this chapter, is not only
relevant for the further development and application of SPF theory, but it is also crucial for the
question of SPF theory’s adequacy for filling the theoretical void in quality of life studies (cf.
Chapter 2). Provided that SPF theory would meet all the requirements identified in Chapter 2 for
doing this job, the final decisive question is whether SPF theory covers the full concept of
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‘quality of life’ or ‘overall subjective well-being’. As I have argued in Chapter 3, the basic SPF
hierarchy of goals, encompassing immediate social and physical well-being, does cover the
affective component of overall subjective well-being, but not the cognitive component of SWB. It
was argued that cognitive component might be covered by the ‘metagoals’ in SPF theory, but as
this part of the theory was not yet elaborated as explicitly as the hierarchy of substantial goals, the
extent to which cognitive well-being was indeed covered could not be assessed. The elaboration
of the hierarchy of metagoals in this chapter now allowed the examination of the extent to which
the cognitive component of SWB is covered in the ‘complete’ version of SPF theory. Section 7.5.
reported on the confrontation of SPF theory’s metagoals with the cognitive component of SWB,
and it was found there that the present version of SPF theory provides full coverage of the
cognitive component of SWB. It thus seems justified to conclude that the overarching concept of 
‘overall subjective well-being’ in SPF theory covers the whole of what is called ‘quality of life’ or
SWB, and that the theory does not have to be discarded as a candidate to fill the theoretical void
in quality of life studies on the ground of incomplete conceptual coverage.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
8.1. Recapitulation of the problems and objectives inspiring this study
After seven chapters in which the reader had to zoom and unzoom repeatedly in order to
overlook the broad scene of quality of life research and to focus at the detailed particulars of
SPF theory as an element of that broader scene, it is now time to see what this whole exercise
has yielded.
It seems helpful, before turning to the results, to recapitulate the starting point of this study.
Like the chapters of this book, the problems and objectives that motivated this study require
different degrees of ‘zooming in’ to be revealed. The sometimes microscopic problems and
highly specific objectives in the further elaboration and refinement of SPF theory derive their
relevance for an important part from the problems in the field of quality of life studies at large,
which can only be observed when stepping back and taking in the broader scene.
Chapter 2 started out with a short overview of the field of quality of life studies. In surveying
the scene, it was seen that there exists an yet unbridged gap between, on the one hand, the
research efforts that concentrate on the (measurement of) objective conditions that are thought
to affect quality of life and, on the other hand, subjective well-being research. Although at
both sides of the gap much valuable research is (being) done and many important insights
have been gained, it is crucial for all kinds of social interventions in which one could wish to
apply such knowledge and insight, that the theoretical gap between people’s subjectively
experienced quality of life and the objective conditions that affect it be bridged. The prime
objective of this study was to contribute to bridging this gap; to help solve the problem of how
the relation of subjective well-being to objective conditions can be modelled and understood
theoretically.
Deriving directly from this objective, the logical first task was to examine the potential of
existing theories in the field to do this job. Such an examination requires explicit criteria on
which to judge the potential of theories for succeeding this challenge. Thus, it was necessary
to pose and answer the question of what features a theory should have for adequately
explaining how subjective well-being is affected by objective conditions. Identifying these
requirements for an adequate theory of subjective well-being was a second objective that
seemed relevant in the broad context of quality of life studies.
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Examination of the main current theories in the field led me to the conclusion that, in their
present form, none of the existing theories meets all these requirements. Three theories stood
out as potentially adequate, although each of these would have to be adjusted or further
elaborated to do the job. For several reasons, it was decided to select Lindenberg’s Social
Production Function theory from these three candidates, and to find out whether the necessary
adjustments and elaborations could be achieved that would qualify SPF theory for the job of
linking the objective and subjective approaches in quality of life studies.
This decision implied a shift of perspective: we had to depart from our broad view of the
problems in quality of life research, in order to focus on the details of one particular theory
that might eventually provide a remedy for the theoretical void in the general field of research.
Our choice to pursue this potential lead to a solution for the theoretical problems of quality of
life studies thus instigated the zooming in on SPF theory and its particulars in the remainder of
this study.
In Chapter 3 SPF theory in its present state was put under close scrutiny and - guided by the
objectives at the more general level of quality of life studies that were explicated in Chapter 2
- the main problems and needs for elaboration and refinement of the theory were identified. It
appeared that there were three main problems that should be solved in order for SPF theory to
qualify as a theory for linking the objective and subjective approaches in quality of life
studies. The first problem concerned the conceptualisation of the three first-order goals (or
components) of social well-being; the second concerned the identification of main relevant
production factors (the ‘objective conditions’) for social well-being; and the third concerned
the systematic incorporation of metagoals in the theoretical framework of SPF theory. These
problems were taken up subsequently in the chapters 5 through 7, in which the ‘microscopic’
focus on the details of SPF theory was thus retained. This focus was only departed from again
in the last part of Chapter 7, where the results concerning the elaboration of the metagoals
were put (back) into the context of quality of life studies and the existing insights in that field.
In the present chapter, we will draw up the balance of the whole endeavour. The results of this
exploratory study are evaluated both from the general perspective of quality of life studies and
from the more specific point of view of SPF theory. For SPF theory is not only applicable to
the field of quality of life studies, but it is also applied in other fields of research and for
different purposes than for explaining how subjective well-being is affected by objective
conditions.
Section 8.2. gives a summary of the exploratory study, its guiding research questions and the
methods that were used. Section 8.3. then presents the results of the exploratory study, for
each of the three research questions at a time. Each section also contains a critical evaluation
of these results, in terms of their completeness, their practical usefulness and, possibly, the
contribution they may make to theoretical progress.
The general balance of this study, in terms of its potential contribution to progress in quality
of life studies, is drawn up in section 8.4. To what extent has the search for a theory that may
bridge the gap between the objective and the subjective approaches been successful? And are
there other results that are potentially useful for that field of study?
An overview of the questions that were left open in this study and the new questions and
problems that it revealed, with some considerations and suggestions concerning the urgency of
these problems and possible ways to attack them, conclude this chapter (section 8.5.).   
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8.2. Summary of the exploratory study and its method
In search of an adequate quality of life theory, that can explain how objective conditions affect
subjective well-being, the objective of this study was to explore the potential of Lindenberg’s
(1986, 1996) Social Production Function theory, and to search for a remedy for a few
problems in SPF theory that were identified in advance. Three compound research questions
were formulated at the start of the study. Research question 1 concerns the conceptualisation
of the three components (‘first order instrumental goals’) which SPF theory claims constitute
subjective social well-being. It was so formulated that answering it would improve SPF
theory’s adequacy as a theory of subjective well-being, through deletion of ambiguities and
vagueness in its concepts concerning subjective social well-being:
1. a). What are the various and distinctive aspects of ‘status’, ‘behavioural confirmation’,
and ‘affection’, respectively?
b). How and to what extent can the level of these goals be distinguished from the
production factors that may be used to attain them?
Research question 2 concerns the identification of relevant objective conditions (‘availability
of relevant production factors’) for the realisation of social well-being. It was so formulated
that answering it would enhance SPF theory’s adequacy as a theory relating objective
conditions and subjective well-being:
2. a). Which are the essential production factors for status, behavioural confirmation and
affection, respectively, for Dutch adults?
b). What are the complementarity or substitutability relations between these production
factors?
Research question 3 concerns the completeness of SPF theory: the extent to which the
theoretical framework of SPF theory covers the goals people ascribe to themselves and others,
and the extent to which it covers the concepts of ‘quality of life’ and subjective well-being as
these are found in the literature:
3 a). Which are the metagoals in people’s production of social and physical well-being?
b). How are these metagoals related to each other, i.e. can they be modelled in an
instrumental hierarchy?
c). To what extent may we consider the cognitive component of well-being as it is known
from the literature to be represented in the (hierarchy of) metagoals in SPF theory that
is now specified?
All three research questions are - at least in first instance - exploratory and qualitative
questions, requiring an exploratory, qualitative approach. The phenomenology of goals, the
empirical diversity of means and the content of several concepts was to be investigated, and it
should be realised that answering such ‘what’-questions properly demands a wholly different
approach than answering the ‘how much’-questions that most of us are so much more used to
deal with.
 
Because I wanted qualitative data which would allow to explore very broadly and openly the
various goals people find relevant for themselves, formulated in their own words after their
own experiences, as well as the varying contents of the concepts of SPF theory, and
additionally also, for the same respondents, detailed data about their resources and activity
patterns, I could not rely on existing datasets, because even those datasets that might have
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been adequate for one of my objectives, did not include adequate empirical data for the other
objectives.
In this study I have adopted a combination of methods for collecting qualitative data, and of
methods for exploring and analysing these in a ‘grounded theory’-like way. The primary
concern following from the research questions was to find and identify rather than measure or
assess the distribution of aspects of social well-being, alternative means of production, and
metagoals. Therefore, the respondents for the data collection were selected by theoretical
sampling rather than through taking a random (representative) sample of the Dutch adult
population. The theoretical sampling was intended to result in a limited number of
respondents who would yet represent to a reasonable extent1 the multidimensional variety of
the Dutch adult population. In total, 31 people were recruited as respondents for the
qualitative study. All of these respondents were interviewed both by means of a written
questionnaire which they filled in at home preliminary to the further data collection, and in a
focus group interview. Fourteen respondents subsequently also participated in an intensive
one-week time use study, including an individual final interview concerning their time use
patterns and remaining issues bearing on their subjective well-being. The methods of data
collection and the rationale for using these are extensively reported on in Chapter 4, as is the
method of analysis I have applied.
The data that were thus obtained gave insight into the phenomenology of social well-being in
its various forms as experienced by our respondents, as well as into the various further goals
and values they believed of relevance for overall subjective well-being or ‘quality of life’, and
the broad array of activities and resources that play a part in the respondents’ way of achieving
well-being.
In the following stages of the study, the data were analysed for each of the research questions
in turn.
8.3. Summary of the exploratory study’s main results
8.3.1. THE THREE COMPONENTS OF SOCIAL WELL-BEING THOROUGHLY CONCEPTUALISED
Chapter 5 presents the results of the analyses that served to answer the first research question,
concerning the further conceptualisation of the three first-order instrumental goals for social
well-being. The aim was both to identify the aspects of each first-order goal that distinguishes
it from the other two, and to clear the concepts of elements that refer to the means by which
social well-being in that particular form may be achieved. 
By concentrating strictly on feelings and perceptions of social well-being and excluding actual
activities and resources as the means from which these feelings of well-being may be derived,
I arrived at an elaborated conceptualisation of status, behavioural confirmation and affection,
consisting of sets of identified ‘aspects’ by which these components of social well-being may
present themselves in people’s perceptions. The distinctive aspects of status, behavioural
confirmation and affection, respectively, constitute their conceptualisation but also provide the
                                                
1    Of course, the judgement of what is ‘reasonable’ is but subjective. I believe that we have succeeded to find a
selection of respondents who represent to a satisfying extent the multidimensional variety of the Dutch adult
population, but the representation is obviously far from perfect and people may disagree with my opinion that in
this study the variety of Dutch adult population is represented to a ‘reasonable’ extent.
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handles for the empirical investigation of levels of these components of subjective social well-
being.
From the data it also appeared that in people’s perception of status, behavioural confirmation
and affection, each may be perceived to be either given by others or by self. In previous
writings on SPF theory, it has been claimed several times that ‘social approval’ is not
constituted merely by the approval one receives from others, but that it also includes a
component of self-approval. (e.g. Steverink 1996). Here I have taken this notion a step further,
however, by arguing - based on the evidence found in the data - that within each of the three
components of social well-being a part perceived to be given by others, and a self-rewarded
part can be distinguished. The logical consequence, of course, is that for any valid
measurement of status, behavioural confirmation or affection, both parts should also be
represented in the measurement instrument. In order to achieve conceptual clarity, I proposed
that the self-rewarded form of status be named ‘self ranking’, the self-rewarded form of
behavioural confirmation ‘self approval’, and that of affection ‘self liking’. It appeared that
each of the different aspects of status, behavioural confirmation and affection can manifest
itself both as the perceived evaluation by others and in the self-rewarded form.   
What are the different distinctive aspects by which the three components of social well-being
are conceptualised?
For status, six aspects were distinguished. These six aspects of subjective status are:
(1) a sense of being treated respectfully;
(2) a sense of self realisation;
(3) a sense of performing well relative to others;
(4) a sense of being independent or autonomous;
(5) a sense of being influential;
and (6)  a sense of having a good reputation.
For behavioural confirmation, also six aspects were distinguished. These are:
(1) a sense of doing the right (or good) things;
(2) a sense of being useful;
(3) a sense of contributing to a common goal;
(4) a sense of doing well the things that you do;
(5) a sense of being a good person;
and (6)  a sense of belonging to a functional group.
For affection, finally, nine aspects were distinguished. In contrast to the aspects of status and
behavioural confirmation, the aspects of affection do not only refer to feelings concerning
oneself, but also to what one feels towards others. That is, for optimal levels of subjective
affection there must be reciprocity in each of the nine aspects, which, for that reason, are to be
conceived as bi-directional. The nine aspects concerned are:
(1)  a sense of liking and being liked;
(2)  a sense of trusting and being trusted;
(3) a sense of communicating and being communicated with at an ‘existential’ level;
(4) a sense of reciprocal empathy;
(5) a sense of reciprocal interdependency of subjective well-being;
(6) a sense of reciprocity of the way one feels about the other;
(7) a sense of being considered physically attractive and being attracted physically;
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(8) a sense of reciprocal willingness to make give or do things without recompensation;
and (9)  a sense of loving and being loved. 
In this final chapter, drawing up the balance of this study, we must critically consider the value
of this refined conceptualisation of status, behavioural confirmation and affection. It is
obvious that in a general sense we have gained an improved understanding of what social
well-being is, which aspects people experience, and how these aspects may manifest itself. As
compared to the conceptualisation of this part of SPF theory thusfar, I believe that by reading
the description of the aspects of status, behavioural confirmation and affection in Chapter 5, a
better feeling for and insight in the subject matter may be gained by researchers applying the
theory or working with results of its applications. To assess the practical value of the
improved conceptualisations more precisely, three different ways in which they may have
concrete effects are distinguished.
Firstly, the identification of the different aspects constituting the complex components
of social well-being that SPF theory labels as status, behavioural confirmation and affection,
provides a firm grip on these abstract concepts, and has made it possible that measurement
instruments were developed by Nieboer et al. (forthcoming) that are believed to cover the
complete concepts and that are generally applicable. Thus far, applications of SPF theory in
empirical research had been forced to rely either on existing measurement instruments,
originally developed to catch other concepts which were thought to approximate the first-order
goal(s) in question, or on ad hoc operationalisations and measurements of the first-order goals,
which were prone to cover the concept only partially, focussing on the aspects that are most
directly related to the substantive empirical problem and failing to appreciate the further
aspects of the concept2.  Both ways of measurement have a number of drawbacks. Firstly, if
the empirical evidence of levels of the first-order instrumental goals are based on different
measures and operationalisations, there is a problem comparing results from different studies
using SPF theory, inhibiting the cumulation of (empirical) knowledge about and insight in
people’s social production functions and their (subjectively experienced) levels of status,
behavioural confirmation and affection (and comfort and stimulation). Secondly, the uncertain
validity of measured levels of the first-order instrumental goals implies insecurity of
explanations and interpretations. Lacking valid measurement instruments, the conscientious
researcher must present all interpretations and explanations based on his empirical data with
considerable reserve. Of course, there is hardly any study in which the empirical data are such
as to allow interpretations and conclusions without some reserve, but the larger the validity
problems in the measurement of the main concepts, the more doubtful is the value of a study.
Thus the development of a general, valid, standardised measurement instrument for the key
elements of the theory will be highly valuable. The improved conceptualisation of the three
first-order goals for social well-being achieved in this study provides a sound basis for the
development of such a measurement instrument. Thirdly, if existing measures are used, it
often proves troublesome to explain to others what is the added value of introducing SPF
theory above the more conventional concepts and conceptual frameworks to which the
empirical measures that were used pertain. Whether or not there are valid arguments
legitimating that SPF theory is imposed upon a study which for its empirical evidence relies
                                                
2    I think that such a bias should be logically expected to occur when a researcher starts out from a concrete
subject and problem to find ad hoc operationalisations of more abstract and general concepts.
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on measures of other concepts, the question is justified whether it would not be better then to
either incorporate the valuable notions of SPF theory in the existing conceptual frameworks or
to develop adequate measurement instruments for the concepts of SPF theory proper.
Fourthly, when using ad hoc operationalisations that only measure the locally relevant aspects
of the first-order instrumental goals, all interpretation is also insecure because it is part of the
core notion of SPF theory that people substitute in their production of well-being (and of the
respective first-order goals) between contexts. This essential notion of SPF theory implies that
no inferences can be drawn from people’s level of the first-order instrumental goals in one
particular setting or context to either their overall level of subjective well-being or to the
productive rationality of their behaviour.
A fifth, practical, drawback both of using existing measures of other concepts as proxy and of
using ad hoc operationalisations, is of course that each subsequent study using SPF theory
faces the problem of finding adequate empirical evidence anew.          
The improved conceptualisation of the three first-order goals for social well-being that was
achieved in this study has provided the basis for the development of standardised
measurement instruments carefully tailored to the concepts (Nieboer et al., forthcoming).
The improved conceptualisation of the status, behavioural confirmation and affection is also
worthwhile because it enables us to distinguish between the level of the three components of
social well-being at the one hand and the production factors leading to it at the other. One of
the problems that existed thusfar in SPF theory was the difficulty in distinguishing, at the
conceptual level, between the three components of social well-being proper and the
production factors that may contribute to the realisation thereof. This difficulty derived
essentially from the loose and partly ambiguous conceptualisation of status, behavioural
confirmation and affection, which obscured the difference between the constituent
components of experienced well-being and the activities and resources by which that is
brought about.
With the new, more detailed and thorough conceptualisation of status, behavioural
confirmation and affection, this problem is, at least to a very large part, solved. Because we
now have a thorough image of what the three components of social well-being are, what the
subjective experience of them consists of, there is no more need to indicate what they are by
means of referring to how they come about. Also, now that the aspects of the three
components of social well-being are identified, they can be operationalised and in empirical
research, the subjective level of status, behavioural confirmation and affection can be assessed
independently of the measurement of production factors. This entails the feasibility of more
refined empirical testing of hypotheses derived in applications of SPF theory concerning the
instrumentality relations between particular resources and productive activities at the one hand
and levels of the three respective first-order instrumental goals at the other hand. In other
words, now that we are better able to make the conceptual distinction between the first-order
goals for social approval and the means that people may use to produce them, we have opened
up that part of SPF theory to empirical testing. By making a (part of a) theory testable,
theoretical progress is facilitated.
The third way in which the improved conceptualisation of the first-order goals for social well-
being may be of value is by facilitating the comparison of SPF theory as a theory of subjective
well-being, or as a behavioural theory of motivation to other theories. Clarifying the exact
meaning and content of the three first-order goals for social well-being, which belong to the
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main concepts in SPF theory, elucidates the (dis)similarities between the SPF conceptual
framework and the concepts in other theories. It is now possible to assess to what extent the
differently named concepts in SPF theory and other theories overlap or differ; whether SPF
theory and some other theory cover the same phenomena and what parts of a subject or
phenomenon covered by the one theory fall outside the other. For example, now that we have
a clear view of what social well-being and its three components in SPF theory cover, it is
much easier to assess the overlap and dissimilarities between SPF theory and other theories of
(social) goals, such as Maslow’s pyramid of goals, or the goals proposed in socio-evolutionary
approaches. In this way the theoretical discourse, between researchers from different
approaches, or about theories and studies using different approaches, is facilitated.
Of course, some reservations should be made about all three different ways in which the
improved conceptualisation may prove valuable. The most obvious reservation is that only for
the three first-order goals for social well-being an conceptualisation has been achieved. The
two first-order goals for physical well-being, that form the complementary branch in the
framework of SPF theory were, for practical reasons, left out of this exploratory study, and
still lag behind with regard to the clarity and thoroughness of conceptualisation. Thus,
although the improved conceptualisation of status, behavioural confirmation and affection
may prove valuable for empirical and theoretical studies in the three respects sketched above,
the gains are limited because they do not hold for SPF theory as a whole.
In order to add more power and substance to the gains that this study has yielded, the two first-
order goals for physical well-being, comfort and stimulation, should be elaborated in a similar
fashion as the three components of social well-being.
A further reservation concerns the empirical measurement of the subjective level of status,
behavioural confirmation and affection. As indicated above, I think the present study provides
an adequate basis for developing valid measurement instruments for these three goals, and the
preliminary results of Nieboer, who is working on the development of such measures, are
promising (Nieboer et al., forthcoming). However, it would not do to run ahead of the actual
yields of Nieboer’s instrument development, and therefore it should be noted that the gains
that I have mentioned to be associated with obtaining good valid measures for the three
components of well-being in SPF theory must as yet be considered potential gains.
8.3.2. THE MAIN PRODUCTION FACTORS FOR SOCIAL WELL-BEING IDENTIFIED AND SYSTEMATISED
In Chapter 6 reported the results of the analyses that served to answer the second research
question, concerning the main production factors for status, behavioural confirmation and
affection, and the complementarity and substitutability thereof. Although in principle the
number of production factors for well-being is unlimited, as people may always find new ways
of producing well-being and new substitutes for production factors that they lack, this only
prohibits the identification of essential production factors at the most low level(s) of
abstraction, for as soon as we abstract from production factors in their most concrete form,
their relevant features can be detected and categories distinguished that do allow making an
inventory of relevant production factors. From the theory, it could already be expected that
differences should exist between the relevant features of production factors for status as
compared with the features of production factors that are relevant for the realisation of
behavioural confirmation and affection.  It was also obvious beforehand that the characteristic
features of the production factors for status would have to do with scarcity (as relative ranking
only makes sense under the condition of scarcity), and that the characteristic features of the
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production factors for behavioural confirmation would have to do with norm conformity; but
as to what would be the essential features of production factors for affection, no clear ideas
existed.
The yields of this part of the study are threefold:
(1) categorisation of contexts in which well-being is produced into six fields of production,
allowing systematic inventorying of production factors; 
(2) identification of the main relevant production factors for status, behavioural
confirmation and affection, per field of production; and
(3) provision of a heuristics for hypothesising and the tentative formulation of hypotheses
about  the substitutability and complementarity relations between production factors.
Categorisation of contexts in which people produce their well-being
Guided by the data, I have distinguished six fields of production that correspond with a
partitioning that seems rather universal in people’s own thinking about their life and activities.
Divided over the ‘private domain’ and the ‘public domain’, there are the fields of personal
relationships; of private productive activities; of private discretional or recreational activities;
of public productive activities; of public relationships (citizenship and legal / bureaucratic
rights and obligations); and of public non-institutionalised interaction.
I found that for each of these six fields, the production of status, behavioural confirmation and
affection has certain field-specific characteristics or features. Therefore, investigating the main
production factors for each component of social well-being per separate field of production
allows less ambiguous identification of relevant features of production factors and clearer
ordering of these main factors than if the effort were undertaken for all contexts of production
at once.
When categorising the main relevant production factors (see below) per first-order goal over
the six fields of production, it became clear that these production factors are not only similar
per first-order goal over different fields of production, but that they are - in different respects -
also similar within each field of production over the three different first-order goals.
Combining the two approaches for categorising people’s production factors (in a ‘goals-by-
fields of production matrix’) provides a practicable way to inventory, summarise, and quick-
scan a person’s production factors. It is expected that the empirical assessment of a person’s
production factors will be far more easy and practicable when starting out the interview or
questionnaire from the six distinct fields of production (each at a time), then when asking
people in general (thus without specifying the functional context) what resources and
productive activities they use to get status, behavioural confirmation or affection.
Identification of the main relevant production factors for status, behavioural confirmation and
affection
All activities, resources and preconditions discernable in respondents’ statements about the
realisation of one or more components of social well-being were listed. The idea that (the
features of) production factors for status are distinct from those for behavioural confirmation
or affection, combined with the partitioning of contexts in which well-being is realised in six
fields, led me to represent the inventory of production factors in the form of a matrix of
production factors per first-order instrumental goal, per field of production.
After categorising the numerous production factors emerging from the data into the matrix of
components of social well-being by fields of production, leading to cells containing over 30
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production factors, reduction of the impracticable multitude of production factors was
necessary. This reduction was achieved through gradual abstraction from less relevant
variations between concrete activities and resources towards the more goal-characteristic
features they had in common. Thus a systematic and more or less practicable inventory of
main relevant production factors for social well-being was achieved in the form of a matrix of
production factors per first-order goal per field of production. In this matrix, systematic
differences between the relevant (features of) production factors can be found both between
the three components of social well-being and between the categories of contexts in which
social well-being is produced.
The main characteristic features of the production factors for status may be summarised as:
(a) scarce skills or scarce material resources; (b) exploiting one’s scarce skills and other scarce
resources; (c) independency or acknowledged social position vis-à-vis others; (d) managing
the visibility of one’s performance or assets by others, either by showing what’s scarce or
hiding what’s common or low-ranked, or by seeking the right environments for favourable
comparison.
The main characteristic features of the production factors for behavioural confirmation may
be summarised as: (a) norm conforming choices of what to do; (b) adequate, i.e. norm
conforming behaviour and performance in chosen activities; (c) managing the exposure of
one’s behaviour to others’ judgements; (d) the presence of clear behavioural norms; and (e)
relevant social and productive skills.
The main characteristic features of the production factors for affection may be summarised
as: (a) self exposure; (b) spending time together; (c) stability and durability of social contacts;
(d) presence or nearness of others; (e) relational skills. 
The substitutability and complementarity of production factors
When using data on objective conditions for judging the (potential) ‘quality of life’ of
particular categories of people, the inventory of production factors ordered both according to
the three components of social well-being and to the six fields of production, enables us to
disentangle different substitutability and complementarity relations and to get a better grasp on
these.
In the first place, between the three components of social well-being, substitutability of
production factors exists only to the extent that a loss or lack of social well-being in one
component, say behavioural confirmation, may be compensated for by an increase in one or
both of the other components. This limited substitutability was suggested already in
Lindenberg & Frey (1993) and formulated more explicitly in e.g. Ormel et al. (1999. p. 72)
and is assumed to exist only when a minimum level of each of the three components is
secured.
In the second place, there are, within the production functions for status, behavioural
confirmation and affection separately, substitutability and complementarity relations between
production factors from different fields of production. It was argued that the main relevant
production factors within a cell of the matrix are generally complementary, while the main
production factors for a particular first-order goal in different fields of production may, to
some extent, serve as substitutes in the overall production of that component of social well-
being. Lacking adequate quantitative data and the time and opportunity of collecting these, the
hypotheses concerning substitutability and complementarity of production factors from
different fields of production could not be tested, however, and therefore must remain
speculative.
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Obviously, the practical value of these results of the exploration of the main relevant
production factors for social well-being lies mainly in facilitating empirical investigations of
the available production factors and, thus, the productive capacity of people. The feasibility of
empirical assessment of respondents’ production factors, in combination with the possibility
of measuring their level of status, behavioural confirmation and affection (cf. section 8.3.1.),
allows empirical testing of SPF theory’s predictions concerning the relations between
production factors and realised levels of first-order goals. A second gain of a systematic
inventory of people's production factors for the three components of social well-being per
field of production, lies in the guidance it provides to researchers conducting a study that
focuses on a particular empirical setting. It seems that most empirical settings fit in more or
less easily within one (or perhaps a few) field(s) of production.
The main relevant production factors for each of the cells in the goals-by-fields matrix may
serve as a general checklist for researchers to chart the main relevant variables affecting their
subjects’ well-being or social production functions in a particular setting.
The categorisation of production factors in the conceptual matrix of first-order goals for social
well-being and fields of production does also shed light on the substitutability and
complementarity of (sets of) production factors. The general starting point it provides for
deriving hypotheses concerning the substitutability and complementarity relations between
concrete production factors for concrete (groups of) individuals, is in my view a good step
forward in preparing or opening up SPF theory for empirical testing of one more of its
essential elements. In that sense the development of a systematic way of exploring production
factors can be considered a contribution to the testing and refining of SPF theory, i.e. to
theoretical progress.
8.3.3.   THE MAIN METAGOALS IN PRODUCING WELL-BEING IDENTIFIED AND PUT INTO A
TENTATIVE HIERARCHY
In Chapter 7 the results of the analyses that served to answer the third research question,
concerning the identification and modelling of metagoals and the possibility to accommodate
in this way the cognitive component of subjective well-being, were reported and discussed.
The result of this part of the study can be summarised in three points:
(1) Identification of 20 metagoals, ranging from highly general and universal metagoals to
rather specific and situational metagoals that appear to be instrumental to the more
general metagoals;
(2) Elaboration of a theoretical framework in which the identified metagoals could be
modelled, namely an instrumental hierarchy resembling that of social and physical well-
being in the basic theoretical model of SPF theory; and
(3) Assessment of the extent to which the metagoals accommodate the cognitive component
of subjective well-being as known from the literature.
Chronologically, the second point came first. On the basis of the assumption that people’s
main universal motive is to improve their condition and a conceptual framework incorporating
both SPF theory’s substantial goals and a set of operational goals as instrumental to the
improvement of one’s position (Lindenberg 2001) and a preliminary set of seven metagoals
(Lindenberg 1996) a theoretical framework was derived in which the metagoals encountered
in the data could be placed. In this framework the as yet largely unidentified metagoals were,
analogous to the basic theoretical model of the substantial goals in SPF theory, assumed to
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constitute an instrumental hierarchy. The top, overarching both the hierarchy of substantive
goals and the hierarchy of metagoals, was formed by the general and universal motive of
‘improving one’s condition’. Directly below it, it was proposed that there should be two
general metagoals: ‘(immediate) efficiency’ and ‘development of productive capacity over
time’ (cf. figure 7.1.).
For the identification and modelling of further, more specific metagoals (the first point above),
the data of this study were analysed once more. This led to the identification and modelling of
17 metagoals at varying levels of generality and abstraction.  A few are thought to be
universally relevant, whereas others appear only situationally salient. The most universal
among the 17 metagoals that were identified are: agency or having control over one’s own
social production functions; self realisation; consistency or avoidance of moral conflict;
multifunctionality; limiting vulnerability or loss avoidance; and making investments. The
complete list of these is presented in section 7.4.
Although it is not claimed that the list of 17 metagoals is exhaustive, or that one might not
make slightly different distinctions between concepts and arrive at a somewhat different list, I
think the hierarchy of metagoals elaborated in Chapter 7 encompasses by and large the
relevant quality aspects of social production functions that may affect subjective well-being
and that may steer people’s behaviour.
All goals that had surfaced in the exploratory study, which did not qualify as manifestations of
(instrumental goals in the hierarchy of) physical- or social well-being, could without great
difficulty be interpreted as being (part of) one or more of these 17 proposed metagoals.
Further, as was asserted in section 7.5., our hierarchy of metagoals does fully encompass all
elements of what, in the literature on quality of life issues, is called ‘the cognitive component
of social well-being’. By distilling from a comprehensive review of subjective well-being
research the meanings that have been attached to the ‘cognitive component of subjective well-
being (SWB)’ in research and literature, and confronting these meanings with the 17
metagoals I identified, it was possible to evaluate the extent to which the latter cover the
former. The cognitive component of SWB appeared to refer to three kinds of mental
phenomena, namely social comparison, (setting and having) aspirations, and wanting to
perceive oneself moving towards goals. Each of these mental phenomena appears to be amply
covered by the proposed hierarchy of metagoals (cf. section 7.5). Since the incorporation of
the metagoals in the framework of SPF theory thus accommodates the cognitive component of
SWB (the affective component of SWB already being accommodated in the basic model of
SPF theory), this provides one of the required qualifications for SPF theory to suit for the
position of bridging the gap between objective and subjective approaches in quality of life
studies.
Now what is the worth of the identification of metagoals and the theoretical modelling of their
interrelations? I believe its potential value is twofold.
Firstly, what was achieved was the incorporation of other - often mentioned - goals that
people profess to strive for or to value, that could not be modelled as merely instrumental
goals for social or physical well-being. One needs not be a specialist in quality of life or
motivation theory to have been confronted repeatedly with the results of surveys and other
studies in which people are asked what goals they pursue or value. And when one confronts
the goals that usually come up in such studies, it is obvious that these overlap only partly with
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the two universal and five first-order instrumental goals that SPF theory claims to be the
overarching goals motivating people. Of course, several reasons may be thought of why
people would either repress consciousness of their real goals or evade the revelation thereof to
others, but I do not think that a sufficient or satisfying explanation of the obvious discrepancy
between the goals people say they have and the goals in the basic model of SPF theory.
People’s own assertions as to their goals should be taken more seriously than that. In the
identification and elaboration of the metagoals, we have been able to incorporate at least the
main goals that people profess to hold besides the goals concerning social and physical well-
being, in the form of metagoals into the framework of SPF theory. This solves a problem of
SPF theory in its confrontation to people’s real-life experiences, and may thus dissolve much
resistance to its claims.
Secondly, the identification and elaboration of the metagoals may be seen as
explicitating the implications of the behavioural theory on which the theory of goals is built.
The theory of substantial (or affective) goals that constitutes the explicit part of SPF theory is
usually mistaken for the whole of SPF theory. This is a mistake, for the behavioural theory,
which encompasses the cognitive processes and (cognitive or procedural) goals is inseparably
connected to it and forms the foundation for the theory of substantial goals. What was
achieved in Chapter 7 is thus the explication, the bringing to the fore, of the twin-half of SPF
theory which had thus far remained rather at the background. This effort may be worthwhile
not only because it (finally) does justice to the firm cognitive behavioural foundation of SPF
theory but also because it enables adherents of SPF theory to enter the discussion with
adherents of cognitive approaches or behavioural theory, with arguments and ammunition that
clearly belong within SPF theory.
Of course, reservations should be made concerning these yields of the study as well. It is clear
that the interpretation of the respondents’ statements concerning the goals they value and
pursue is but my interpretation, and that, though it was carefully considered, it is open to
disagreement.
Moreover, there has been no empirical testing of any of the proposed relations between the
metagoals that were identified, nor of the relations between these metagoals and people’s
overall subjective well-being. As long as the interpretations and interrelations of the metagoals
emerging from this study are not tested empirically and have not gained empirical support,
they are plausible but tentative. Their value for SPF theory thus remains as yet open.
8.4. General balance: how may this study contribute to quality of life studies?
The context of quality of life studies, a field of research with a large and direct relevancy for
social policy, provides the substantial relevance of and motivation for the study that this book
reports on. Therefore, whatever this study has yielded should be evaluated and judged
foremost in that context. Taking such a broad context as the background against which to
judge the results almost automatically implies that we should not expect to find our study to
have brought radical changes or large steps forward. The objective of this study was much less
ambitious than that. It was simply to add some conceptual insight that might eventually
facilitate progress in the field of quality of life studies, by contributing to bridging the
theoretical gap between subjective well-being on the one hand and the objective conditions
that may affect it on the other.
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When looking back from where we stand now, at the conclusion of this book, to what I knew
or could find in the literature about quality of life studies at the outset, it may be concluded
that in the course of this study some insights have been gained or sharpened.
Firstly, the definition of the theoretical void in quality of life studies provided a sharpened
insight in the main obstacle to progress in that field of research.
Secondly, for the examination of the potential of existing theories to fill the void,
requirements were formulated which an adequate theory of quality of life should meet. It is
important to have in mind a more or less clear set of requirements which should be met, when
setting out to find or develop a theory that is to play a key role in the achievement of further
progress in a field like quality of life studies. Of course several general criteria should be
observed as well. For example, the eventual theory should integrate the valuable elements of
existing theories and insights on both subjective well-being and objective conditions for
quality of life, and relate both in a systematic and understandable way; it should offer a clear
general framework in which specific aspect-theories might be integrated; while it should
encompasses sufficient substantial empirically supported insights to prevent it from being
twisted in any direction. But such general criteria are not sufficiently specific to guide the
search for an adequate theory of life. Therefore four more concrete requirements were
specified, which proved helpful in guiding the search for an adequate theory.  Irrespective of
whether a theory meeting all four requirements would be found in the remainder of this study,
the specification of these concrete requirements seems useful.
The evaluation of existing approaches according to the four criteria that were specified may
also be worthwhile in itself, as it provides an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of these
approaches that clarifies their selective or situational adequacy. For quality of life researchers
who (continue to) work with one or more of the approaches that were put under scrutiny, a
critical appraisal of the pro’s and con’s of these approaches may be useful.
Next, the potential of Lindenberg’s SPF theory to fulfill the role of bridging theory between
the objective approaches and the subjective approaches in the field of quality of life studies
was examined. It appeared that SPF theory meets, at least roughly, the requirements that were
identified for a general quality of life theory. The main problems with SPF theory that were
expounded in Chapter 3 have at least partly been solved in this study. So it might seem that as
a result of the efforts in this project, we can now offer the field of quality of life studies an
adequate theory with which the gap between the subjective and the objective approaches in the
field may be bridged. However, this would be too optimistic. There still remain a number of
serious problems that need to be solved before SPF theory may indeed be considered fit for
this task. These remaining theoretical and practical difficulties are discussed below (section
8.5.1).
Even though the theory as a whole is not yet fully ready for application, some of the separate
elements of the exploratory study reported in this book may already prove useful for certain
aspects of quality of life research. For one thing, the thorough exploration of the
phenomenology of social well-being (chapter 5) can be valuable as frame of reference for
researchers interested in subjective social well-being, to get a better idea of the subject matter
in all its forms and aspects.
A further and no less important result of this study that may be used directly in quality of life
studies is the inventory of relevant production factors for social well-being (chapter 6).
Compared to the usually ad-hoc selection of objective conditions that are used as indicators
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for the life quality that would be attainable for certain categories of people, the inventory of
main production factors for status, behavioural confirmation and affection, although not yet
tested empirically, offers a much better founded alternative. Even more so because there some
ideas are also offered about the complementarity and substitutablity of the production factors
in this inventory. I have not been able to test the hypothesised complementarity and
substitutability relations between production factors in this study. Even so, the suggested
relations between the (abstract) groups of production factors have some face value and might
provide a rule of thumb for policy makers concerned with the quality of life of their subjects
that they lack thus far. For interpreting the scores of categories of citizens in social reports,
that is, for judging - on the basis of data concerning people’s resources, their participation in
diverse social contexts and other objective conditions - the necessity of active intervention in
order to improve the quality of life of certain categories of people, policy makers need general
insights in how certain conditions may make up for a lack of other production factors, or,
reversely, be indispensible for people to profit from other production factors they do have
access to. It surely is desirable that the hypotheses concerning the functionality relations
between production factors be empirically tested, but I think that even before that is achieved,
they are sufficiently plausible to be regarded of value for policy makers and other people
concerned with practical quality of life issues.
Overall, the results of this study provide useful general guidelines for policy makers who seek
to find ways to enhance the well-being of their subjects. In section 1.2.2. a number of
obstacles were identified that a governor who wants to further the well-being of his subjects
would meet. One of these obstacles, for example, was the difficulty of finding out which
people lag behind in terms of happiness and well-being. Ordering a nation-wide survey of
‘happiness’ or ‘well-being’ would help only when these concepts would be clear and could be
measured validly. The results of the present study provide an elaborated conceptualisation of
subjective social well-being and of its components as well as a detailed inventory of the
aspects of these components that should be included in a valid measurement instrument for
social well-being and its components.
Another obstacle was the doubt about the good of imposing government interventions: the
policy maker in our thought experiment felt unsure about the importance of people’s sense of
autonomy for their subjective well-being, and thus about the desirability of policymakers
interfering with people’s investment behaviour and freedom of choice. The chapter about the
metagoals revealed that the sense of agency and control over one’s life seems indeed to be a
universal metagoal and thus highly important for overall subjective well-being. Although this
result does not offer a clearcut solution to the policy maker’s dilemma, it does provide policy
makers with a ground for giving careful thought to the balance between intervening and
respecting people’s autonomy.
Yet another of the multiple obstacles that were discussed in section 1.2.2. was the lack of
guidance in deciding what goods are ‘basic’ and should be accessible to all subjects. Although
this study has not resulted in an actual inventory of basic goods, the inventory of main
production factors presented in Chapter 6 comes close to this – be it only at some level of
abstraction – and also provides general insight into the complementarity and substitutability
relations between goods and condition, which is essential.
Summarising, although this study has not resulted in a recipe for policies to further people’s
subjective well-being, it does provide useful equipment (concepts, a theoretical framework
and many insights) for policy makers to deal with the obstacles they meet.
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8.5. Looking ahead
The extensive discussion of the yields of this study, in the foregoing sections of this chapter,
should not induce one to overlook the problems that are yet to be solved and the impediments
to actual progress that still remain. Looking at the level of Social Production Function theory
and the efforts to make it fit for application in quality of life studies, at least four points can
easily be discerned where there are still unsolved problems:
- Analogous to the conceptualisation of the social well-being components in this study,
their counterpart in the SPF hierarchy of substantive goals, namely the physical well-
being part of the hierarchy, with comfort and stimulation as first-order instrumental
goals, should also be more thoroughly conceptualised. If possible, one would want to
have ‘comfort’ and ‘stimulation’ conceptualised in similar vein as the three components
of social well-being, that is, by identifying the distinctive aspects by which people
experience them;
- Although this study has yielded a more thorough and less ambiguous conceptualisation
of status, behavioural confirmation and affection, the development of measurement
instruments for these three components of social well-being is yet to be achieved. This is
a challenging job and although preliminary results are highly promising there are many
technical and practical problems yet to be solved;
- Similarly, the development of a measurement tool for the empirical measurement of
production factors is yet to be completed. Besides the usual technical and practical
difficulties that have to be overcome there, an extra problem is constituted by the
enormous number of factors that need to be investigated in order to have even a roughly
dependable inventory of people’s possibilities for realising well-being. As yet I have not
been able to think of an acceptable way out of the dilemma between the practical
limitations to what can be asked in any questionnaire and the necessity to assess roughly
the whole range of production factors in order to be able to infer anything at all
concerning people’s potential level of well-being;
- Notwithstanding that this study has advanced the specification and conceptualisation of
the metagoals, it is clear that this part of SPF theory still lags somewhat behind the rest
in the conceptualisation of its relation to overall subjective well-being. As to the
position of the metagoals as to the basic theoretical framework of higher and lower order
substantial goals linked by social production functions, it is clear that the metagoals
come in as the quality of the production functions. Yet, when looking at SPF theory
from the perspective of mainstream SWB research, this may be found unsatisfactory.
From the perspective of SWB research, the basic hierarchy of (social and physical well-
being goals in) SPF theory represents the affective component of SWB, and the
metagoals represent the cognitive component of SWB. Both components, the affective
and the cognitive, are considered equally important as constituent parts of overall SWB.
Therefore, one might demand that the way the cognitive component relates to overall
SWB is modelled analogous to the way the relation between overall SWB and the
affective component of well-being is modelled. The elaborated version of SPF theory
that results from this study, has not achieved that yet: although we know how to
conceptualise the relation of the metagoals to the social production functions by which
people realise social and physical well-being, the direct relation of the metagoals to
overall subjective well-being is not clear yet. Besides this main point, it must also be
acknowledged that the proposed hierarchy of metagoals is but tentative. It is not well
CHAPTER 8 269
possible to both identify concepts (i.c. metagoals) and to ascertain their interrelations on
the basis of the same data. A further investigation and testing of the proposed
interrelations of the metagoals is thus desirable. And, of course, in future we would also
want the metagoals to be operationalised and their hypothesised relation to SWB and to
each other to be tested empirically.
Besides following up these leads, however, I believe it is also highly important that research
along the existing lines in quality of life studies be continued. Both research from the
subjective approach and research focussing on the objective living conditions that appear
relevant for ‘quality of life’ remains indispensible. I think it is true that a bridge between them
is essential in order to make real progress in the field of study, but even so each apart is still
likely to yield valuable results. In the course of the present study, it has become more and
more clear that practically everybody entertains a set of notions and beliefs about ‘quality of
life’ and ‘subjective well-being’ or ‘happiness’ as well as about the actual distribution of
objective resources. This ‘conventional wisdom’ is sometimes wisdom indeed, but just as
often it contains many inconsistencies and false assumptions. Yet it is these semi-conscious
beliefs that people usually act on, in private situations and in public office - such as social
policymaking - alike.
Therefore it remains very important to provide policy makers and others with valid and well-
informed information about the actual distribution of subjective well-being, and of resources
and conditions that appear conducive to high quality of life, as well as with increasingly clear
and hopefully increasingly converging conceptualisations of what ‘quality of life’ is. 
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Appendix A.   Background characteristics of participants
Thirty-one people participated in the focus group interviews. Fourteen of these also participated in the
time use studies and additional in-depth interviews. Some background information on the participants is
summarised below (the names are faked for reasons of confidentiality); the table shows the variation
achieved in the research group.
Anneke de Wit is a married woman of 60 years, two children, who have left the parental home. She has
always been a housewife. She had a lower vocational training as a nurse. She is in good health. Their
household income is over f 2800 a month. She is Dutch.
Annette de Hoog is a married woman of 58 years, whose four children have left the parental home. She
has finished lower secondary education. She is housewife, but has several volunteer jobs besides. Her
health is good. The household income lies between f 2200 and f 2800 a month. She is Dutch.
Barbara van Kesteren is a 53 year-old married woman, whose one daughter has left the parental home.
She has completed intermediary secondary school (HAVO). She is a housewife and holds some high
unpaid functions. She is in good health.  Monthly income lies between f 1400 and f 1800. She is Dutch.
Barend van der Weijde is a 76 year-old married man, who lives with his wife. He has completed
intermediary education (MULO) and some vocational training. Having worked in a drugstore, he is
pensioned now. He is in good health. Monthly income lies between f 2200 and f 2800. He is Dutch.
Bram Kooistra is a 29-year old single man, who lives in a student house. He completed intermediary
vocational training (MBO), and after working as a sailor is now unemployed. He teaches computer
courses as volunteer. He is in good health. Monthly income between f 1100 and f 1400. He is Dutch.
Carol Groothuis is a 28 year-old woman who cohabitates with her (unemployed) boyfriend. She has a
university degree but, being unable to find a fitting job, works as a postman. She is in excellent health.
Her monthly income lies between f 1400 and f 1800. She is Dutch.
Cobie Strating is a single woman of 45 years, no children, living alone. She is unemployed and has a
partial disability allowance. She is in poor health. She has finished intermediary secretarial education
(MEAO). Her monthly income is between f 1400 and f 1800. She is Dutch.
Conny van Ooij is a woman of 27 years, who cohabitates with her boyfriend. After obtaining a degree
as engineer, she works as a teacher / researcher. Her partner has a full-time job too. She is in perfect
health. Her monthly income lies between f 1800 and f 2200. She is Dutch.
Edwin Eijkhof is a married, 67 year old man. He has grown-up children who left the parental home. He
has higher secondary education (HBS-A), and is a pensioner now. He is in good health, and receives a
pension of over f 2800 monthly. He is Dutch.
Frank Zuidema is a married man of 41 years, two children, living with wife and sons. He is part-time
housemaker and works for 12 hours per week as a nurse. He has finished a university study (social
sciences). He is in good health. His monthly income lies between f 1100 and f 1400. He is Dutch.
Gerda Passies is a 34-year old woman, divorced, with two daughters. Her daughters live with her. She
has not finished any secondary schooling and is unemployed. Housekeeping and childraising keep her
busy. She is in good health. Monthly income lies between f 1400 and f 1800. She is Dutch.
Gloria Pareman is a married woman, age 57, living separate from her husband. Her children live
elsewhere. She has intermediary secondary education (MULO), and is unemployed, but much involved
in voluntary work. She is in great health. Monthly income between f 800 and f 1100. She is Antillean.
Greetje Brink is a married woman of 68 years. Her children live on their own by now. She completed
secondary school after her marriage (moeder-MAVO), and never had a paid job. Her health is
mediocre. Monthly household income (AOW) lies between f 800 and f 1100. She is Dutch.
Hetty Stubbe is a married woman of 30 years, who has two sons. She has finished intermediary
secretarial education (MEAO), and since having children she is a housewife. She is in good health. The
household income lies between f 1800 and f2200 a month. She is Dutch.
Hylkje Brouwer is a single woman of 26 years, no children, living in a student house. She holds several
part-time jobs besides studying psychology. She has already finished a higher vocational education
(HBO-J). She is in good health. Her monthly income is about f 1100. She is Dutch.
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Irene van der Wal is a married woman of 59 years, whose three children have left the parental home.
She has a higher vocational education as a biomedical analyst. Since her marriage she has been a
housewife.  Her health is mediocre. The household income is far above f 2800 a month. She is Dutch.
Johan Berghuis is a married man of 60 years. His two daughters have left the parental home. Having a
university degree as civil engineer, he has had a good career, working long hours. He is on early
retirement now. His health is good, and his monthly income still exceeds f 2800 by far. He is Dutch.
Kees Nagelkerke is a 37-year old single man, who lives alone. He has finished intermediary secondary
education and a lower vocational training (LBO). He is unemployed, but has a volunteer job teaching
computer courses. His health is mediocre. Monthly income between f 1400 and f 1800. He is Dutch.
Leonie de Zeeuw is a 38-year old woman, divorced. Her one daughter lives with her. She has completed
a higher vocational training in personnel management (HBO P&O). She is unemployed and has a
volunteer job. She is in good health. Monthly income lies between f 1400 and f 1800. She is Dutch.
Lidia Roodwijn is a 64 year-old divorced woman, who lives alone. She has 4 children. She has been to
domestic science school. She is unemployed. Her health is mediocre. Her income lies between f 1100
and f 1400 per month. She is Antillean.
Mahmet Abbas is a married man, age 25, who lives with his wife and their child. He has completed
higher secondary school (VWO) and is now following a university study. His wife is housewife. He is
in excellent health. The household income lies between f 1800 and f 2200 a month. He is Moroccan.
Marijke Tammenga is an unmarried woman, age 33. She has one daughter, who lives with her. She has
completed lower vocational training (LBO) and is unemployed ever since. No volunteer jobs. Her
health is mediocre (partly through drug problems). Monthly income between f 1400 and f 1800. She is
Dutch.
Mike Bos is a single man, age 29, who lives alone, next door to his parents. He finished intermediary
vocational training (MBO) and is unemployed for four years now. He does no volunteer work. He is in
mediocre health. Monthly income lies between f 800 and f 1100. He is Dutch.
Mirthe Ganzevoort is a 26 year-old woman, living alone, her boyfriend coming over in the weekends.
She holds a university degree, but has no job yet. Besides her unemployment benefit, she works as a
cleaning woman. Her health is good. Monthly income lies between f 800 and f 1100. She is Dutch.
Nannie Doosje is a 59 year-old married woman with a son and two daughters, who all live on their own.
She has intermediary vocational education (MHS). She works halftime as assistant-accountant, does
voluntary work besides. She is in good health. Income between f 1400 and f 1800 monthly. She is
Dutch.
Nasrat Bikhail is a 24 year-old single man, who lives on his own in a student flat. He has completed
vocational training as an architect in Afghanistan. He is a student at a technical college (HTS) in the
Netherlands to gain Dutch license. He is in good physical health, though very worried about the parents
and sisters he left behind. His monthly income lies between f 800 and f 1100. He is Afghan.
Rosa Boogert is a 44 year-old single woman, who lives alone. She has a intermediary college degree in
personnel work (MBO P&O). She is unemployed, and does a little voluntary work. Her health is
mediocre. Monthly income lies between f 1100 and f 1400. She is Antillean.
Rutger van Woerden is a 22-year old unmarried man. He is co-parent to his two daughters, they live
with him part of the week. He has completed higher secondary school (HAVO) and is unemployed. He
is in good health. Monthly income lies between f 1400 and f 1800. He is Dutch.
Simon Goudsmid is a married man of 69 years. He has no children. He has finished intermediary
secondary education, plus miscellaneous courses. He is retired since 4 years, and had his own (thriving)
business before that. His health is good. His income exceeds f 2800 a month. He is a Dutch Jew.
Yasmin Rais is a married woman, age 40, who lives with her husband and grown-up son. She is
schooled (lower level) as a nurse, but is a full-time housewife since her marriage. Her health is good.
She does not know how much her husband earns, does not know about their monthly income. She is
Indonesian.
Yousouf Benadi is a 37-year old, married man. He lives with his wife and children in a small apartment.
He has completed secondary technical school in Africa. He is unemployed and longing for any paid job.
His health is good. Monthly household income lies between f 1800 and f 2200. He is from Somalia.
273
Table A: Summary of the respondents’ background characteristics
SEX                                                      male
                                                          Female
      12   (38.7%)
      19   (61.3%)
       5   (35.7%)
       9   (64.3%)
AGE (range:22-75)                    22-30 years
                                                   31-45 years
                                                   46-60 years
                                                   61-75 years
      10   (32.3%)
        9   (29.0%)
        7   (22.6%)
        5   (16.1%)
        4   (28.6%)
        6   (42.8%)
        3   (21.5%)
        1    (7.1%)
PARTNER                                              yes
                                                                 no
      19   (61.3%)
      12   (38.7%)
         7   (50%)
         7   (50%)
CHILDREN                                            yes
                                                                 no
      20   (64.5%)
      11   (35.5%)
         6   (42.9%)
         8   (57.1%)
HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION        alone
                                                  with partner
                             with partner and children
                              with children, no partner
                                  other (students house)
        8   (25.8%)
      12   (38.7%)
        6   (19.4%)
        4   (12.9%)
        1     (3.2%)
         4   (28.5%)
         6   (42.9%)
         1    (7.1%)
         3   (21.4%)
         0
EDUCATION                 primary education
                                           lower vocational
                           intermediary secondary ed.
                                intermediary vocational
                          higher secondary education
                                          higher vocational
                                     university education
         1     (3.2%)
         5   (16.1%)
         3     (9.7%)
         8   (25.8%)
         6   (19.4%)
         3     (9.7%)
         5   (16.1%)
         0
         2   (14.3%)
         1     (7.1%)
         4   (28.6%)
         1     (7.1%)
         2   (14.3%)
         4   (28.6%)
EMPLOYMENT STATUS full-time empl.
                                     part-time employed
                                      unemployed (WW)
                                                 housemaker
                                                        student
                                   retired (AOW/VUT)
                                         disabled (WAO)
         2     (6.5%)
         3     (9.7%)
        12  (38.7%)
          7  (22.6%)
          2    (6.5%)
          4  (12.9%)
          1    (3.2%)
         1    (7.1%)
         3  (21.4%)
         6  (42.9%)
         1    (7.1%)
         0
         2  (14.3%)
         1    (7.1%)
VOLUNTARY WORK                         yes
                                                                no
         10   (32.3%)
         21   (67.7%)
         6  (42.9%)
         8  (57.1%)
STATE OF HEALTH                          poor
                                                      mediocre
                                                             good
           1     (3.2%)
           8   (25.8%)
          22  (71.0%)
        1    (7.1%)
        3  (21.4%)
       10 (71.4%)
ETHNICITY                                      Dutch
                                                       Antillian
                                                    Indonesian
                                                     Morrocan
                                                         Afghan
                                                      Somalian
        24 (77.4%)
          3   (9.7%)
          1   (3.2%)
          1   (3.2%)
          1   (3.2%)
          1   (3.2%)
       13  (92.9%)
         1   (7.1%)
         0
         0
         0
         0
HOUSEHOLD INCOME              < f 1400
   (per month)                       f1400 – f 2800
                                                       > f 2800
                                                        missing
        10 (32.3%)
        15 (48.4%)         
          5 (16.1%)
          1   (3.2%)
        4  (28.6%)
        8  (57.1%)
        2  (14.3%)
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Appendix B.  Example of the time use form and the activity coding scheme
Explanation of the items in the time use inventory
1. Where were you? 1= at home
                                  2= not at home, in own town / village
                                  3= not at home, out of town
2a. What were you doing? Answer: the main activity in the 30 minutes concerned
2b. Activity code  Answer: see the list of activity codes
3a. Were you alone or in company? 1= alone
2= in company of 1 other person
3= in company of more than one other person
3b. In what company were you? 1= partner 5= colleague
2= son/daughter 6= family
3= father/mother 7= neighbours
4= friend 8= others
4a. Did you interact with someone? 1= no
(outside the comapny you were in) 2= only exchanging greetings
3= ‘functional’/ business-like contact, initiated by me
4= ‘functional’/ business-like contact, initiated by other
5= ‘personal’ contact, initiated by me
6= ‘personal’ contact, initiated by other
4b. Describe concisely the content of the interaction mentioned under 4a. (what was it about)
5a. To what extent did you enjoy the activity in these 30 minutes?
1= greatly enjoyed it / found it highly agreeable
2= enjoyed it / agreeable
3= neutral / neither really enjoyed nor disliked it
4= I did not enjoy it / not agreeable
5= I really disliked it / disagreeable
5b. Can you indicate why you (dis)liked the activity as you did? Note in particular reasons for
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Appendix C: Preparatory Questionnaire for focus group participants
(translated from Dutch)
Preparatory questions for the focus group discussion
Dear respondent, although I of course hope that, in the focus group discussion that you signed
up for, you will be willing to talk freely about your own notions and ideas concerning well-
being and quality of life, your answers to the questions in this questionnaire will remain strictly
confidential. The information that you provide will only be used in the focus group discussions
in anonymously: other participants will not be able to trace information back to you.
If, however, there are questions that you are not willing or able to answer, I would appreciate it
if you could inform me about the reasons for that, as it can help me to improve upon this
questionnaire for later applications.
I. First, you are asked to evaluate your own ‘present day’ life. A continuum is used that
ranges from ‘the worst possible life’ to ‘the best possible life’. You are asked, for each of
the questions below to put a mark on the line at the point that you think corresponds best
with your situation.
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II. The following questions concern your time use pattern. The objective of these questions
is to get an insight into the main important activities in your daily life.
(16) What is the main activity in your daily life, thus, what is it that you do for the largest part of
the day? (e.g. paid work, study, house keeping, voluntary work, etcetera.)
..................................................................................
(17) Please describe this main activity concisely: to what extent does it involve physical




(18) Besides the main activity you mentioned in question 16, which are the five main
important activities in your life (in random order)?
...................................................................................
...................................................................................
(19) Which of these activities (vraag 18) do you find obligatory rather than that you do them
because you like to?
...................................................................................
...................................................................................
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III. In this third block of questions you are asked to think about what things you do for
achieving certain general goals. These activities will probably for a large part overlap with
the activities you also mentioned above.
(22) What do you do to maintain yourself, that is, to get food and housing etcetera?
..................................................................................
..................................................................................
(23) What – if anything - do you do in order to get physical exercise?
..................................................................................
..................................................................................
(24) Are there other activities, that you do for other reasons, which also provide physical
exercise? If so, which activities are these, and for what main reasons do you do them?
..................................................................................
..................................................................................
(25) What – if anything – do you do in order to get mental exercise?
..................................................................................
..................................................................................
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(26) Are there other activities, that you do for other reasons, which also provide mental
exercise? If so, which activities are these, and for what main reasons do you do them?
..................................................................................
..................................................................................
(27) What – if anything – do you do in order to get respect, status or admiration from others?
..................................................................................
..................................................................................
(28) Are there other activities that you do for other reasons, which also provide respect,




(29) Most people feel a need to ‘belong’. Are you conscious of doing certain things in order to
belong to a group or to people you value and to be accepted by others? Are there
things you do in order to get the approval of people that are important to you? If so,
what things do you do?
..................................................................................
..................................................................................
(30) Are there other activities that you do for other reasons, which also provide approval of
people that are important to you, or activities that confirm you belong to a certain
group? If so, which activities are these, and for what main reasons do you do them?
..................................................................................
..................................................................................
(31) What activities do you believe can help to build friendships, how and where do you get
friends from? What – if anything - do you do to get new social contacts and to
maintain existing friendships and contacts?
..................................................................................
..................................................................................
(32) Are there other activities that you do for other reasons, which also provide friendships or
affection? If so, which activities are these, and for what main reasons do you do them?
..................................................................................
..................................................................................
(33) Can you mention 3 through 10 things that you believe crucial for people’s ‘quality of
life’? What do you think necessary preconditions for leading a happy life?
..................................................................................
..................................................................................
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1 yes! means: exactly  applicable to me
2 yes means: largely applicable to me
3 more or less means: more or less applicable to me
4 no means: hardly applicable to me
5 no! means: not at all applicable to me
IV. The next two questions concern your recent moods and the amount of support you
experience from the people around you.
(33) In the last few (3 or 4) weeks, have you felt:
a. enthusiastic about or very interested in something? yes / no
b. so restless that you could not keep sitting  still for long? yes / no
c. proud because someone praised you for what you did? yes / no
d. very lonely or isolated from others? yes / no
e. satisfied about something you achieved? yes / no
f. bored? yes / no
g. great, life is fantastic? yes / no
h. depressed or deeply unhappy? yes / no
i. as if everything was going for you?  yes / no
j. upset because someone criticised you? yes / no
(34) Below you find 11 statements. Please indicate for each of these statements to what extent
it applies to you, as you are these weeks? Please put a circle around the figure of the
answer that is most applicable to you.
The answering categories (note the !’s) have the following meaning:
a. There is always someone around with whom I can share my daily concerns.
 1 yes!
2 yes
3 more or less
4 no
5 no!
b. I miss a real good friend. 1 yes!
2 yes
3 more or less
4 no
5 no!
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c. I experience a void around me. 1 yes!
2 yes
3 more or less
4 no
5 no!
d. There are enough people that I know will support me in time of need.
 1 yes!
   . 2 yes
3 more or less
4 no
5 no!
e. I miss warmth and people around me. 1 yes!
2 yes
3 more or less
4 no
5 no!
f. I find my circle of acquaintances too restricted. 1 yes!
2 yes
3 more or less
4 no
5 no!
g. I have a lot of people that I can trust completely. 1 yes!
2 yes
3 more or less
4 no
5 no!
h. There are enough people to whom I feel closely connected.
1 yes!
2 yes
3 more or less
4 no
5 no!
i. I miss people around me. 1 yes!
2 yes
3 more or less
4 no
5 no!
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j. Often I feel forsaken. 1 yes!
2 yes
3 more or less
4 no
5 no!
k. When I need them my friends are always available for me. 1 yes!
2 yes
3 more or less
4 no
5 no!
V. Finally, I’d like you to fill in some of your background characteristics
(35) What is your sex? 1. male
2. female
(36) What is your age? ... years
(37) What is your living situation / the composition of your household?
1. living alone, no partner
2. living alone, but having a partner
3. living together with partner
4. living together with others than partner
5. living with parents or family
(38) Do you have children? 1. yes
2. no
(39) If you have children, do they live with you? 1. yes
2. no
(40) Where do you live?   ................................................
(41) What is your highest education you completed? .................................
(42) What category applies to your net monthly household income?
1. less than fl. 1400,-
2. between fl. 1400,- and fl. 2800,-
3. more than fl 2800,-
4. no answer
Thank you very much for your cooperation!
SAMENVATTING
Inleiding
In het dagelijks leven zowel als in de kringen van beleidsmakers en non-profit organisaties
zijn de begrippen welzijn en welbevinden - al dan niet voorzien van de kwalificatie ‘sociaal’-
en ‘kwaliteit van leven’ veel gebruikt en heel vertrouwd. Als men een aantal willekeurig
gekozen mensen vraagt een globaal oordeel te geven over de kwaliteit van hun leven of het
niveau van (sociaal) welbevinden dat zij ervaren, blijken slechts weinigen daartoe niet in staat.
Vraagt men deze mensen om aan te geven wat ‘kwaliteit van leven’ of ‘sociaal welbevinden’
voor hen persoonlijk inhoudt, dan komt vrijwel iedereen ook zonder grote moeite met een
omschrijving of enkele steekwoorden. Wat dan echter blijkt is dat deze antwoorden, naast een
duidelijke overlap, ook sterk idiosyncratisch zijn. Ieder individu lijkt, naast een paar basale
algemene ideeën over wat welbevinden inhoudt, daaraan ook een sterke eigen invulling te
geven. Dit is niet verrassend, maar levert wel een probleem op voor beleidsmakers en ieder
die zich bezig houdt met sociale interventies. Immers, ‘kwaliteit van leven’ of ‘(sociaal)
welbevinden’ zijn veelal de ultieme criteria waarop interventies of beleidsmaatregelen
beoordeeld en gelegitimeerd worden.
Quality of Life studies: twee hoofdstromen en voorwaarden voor integratie daarvan
In de sociale wetenschappen is rond dit thema een multidisciplinair veld van onderzoek en
theorievorming ontstaan dat na een eerste bloeitijd rond 1950-1960 in het laatste decennium
een nieuwe opleving doormaakt. Hoofdstuk 2 van dit boek presenteert een verkenning van dit
veld van Quality of Life studies. In Quality of Life studies blijken twee benaderingen zich
sterk te hebben ontwikkeld, een objectieve en een subjectieve benadering. De objectieve
benadering, of de sociale-indicatoren benadering, is geconcentreerd op het meten van
objectieve leefomstandigheden die verondersteld worden de kwaliteit van het bestaan te
bepalen. In deze benadering is sinds de jaren 1950-1960 grote vooruitgang geboekt in de
validiteit en betrouwbaarheid van indicatoren, in meettechnieken en analysetechnieken.
Daarbij is een schat aan data verzameld over tal van aspecten van de leefomstandigheden op
het niveau van individuen, landen en tal van specifieke categorieën burgers binnen landen.
De subjectieve benadering is geconcentreerd op het meten van subjectief welbevinden en
allerlei aspecten daarvan. Ook in deze benadering is een indrukwekkende hoeveelheid
empirisch onderzoek verricht en zijn diverse meetinstrumenten voor subjectief welbevinden
ontwikkeld. Veel vragen over de aard, dimensies en structuur van subjectief welbevinden
worden nog betwist. Wel bestaat brede consensus over het onderscheiden van affectief of
hedonisch en cognitief welbevinden evenals over het onderscheiden van een stabiele
individugebonden component (well-being as a trait) en een veranderlijke, reactieve component
die wordt beïnvloed door omgevings- en situationele factoren (well-being as a state).
Wat het veld van Quality of Life studies echter ontbeert, is integratie van de objectieve en de
subjectieve benadering. In empirisch onderzoek blijkt de samenhang tussen objectieve
condities en subjectief welbevinden zelden eenduidig. Tot dusverre is er geen integrale theorie
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die objectieve condities en subjectief welbevinden verbindt en de relatie tussen beide kan
verklaren. Het tweede deel van hoofdstuk 2 behandelt de voorwaarden waaraan een dergelijke
theorie zou moeten voldoen en beoordeelt bestaande theorieën uit het veld van Quality of Life
studies en een aantal aanverwante velden op hun potentieel om aan deze voorwaarden te
voldoen. Hoofdstuk 2 eindigt met de conclusie dat drie theorieën in potentie de brug zouden
kunnen slaan tussen de objectieve en de subjectieve benadering in Quality of Life onderzoek.
Elk van die theorieën behoeft daarvoor echter nadere uitwerking of aanpassing. Het vervolg
van het boek is gewijd aan de nadere uitwerking van een van deze drie theorieën: de Sociale
Productiefunctie (SPF) theorie (Lindenberg 1986, 1996; Lindenberg & Frey 1993).
Sociale Productiefunctie Theorie: beschrijving en analyse van knelpunten
Lindenberg’s SPF theorie wordt gedetailleerd en kritisch beschreven in hoofdstuk 3.
Grondslag van SPF theorie is de notie dat mensen hun eigen welbevinden produceren door
binnen gegeven randvoorwaarden de realisatie van twee universele doelen, namelijk sociaal en
fysiek welzijn, te optimaliseren. De theorie stelt dat systematische verschillen bestaan in de
manieren waarop individuen welbevinden realiseren. Deze verschillen in de wijze waarop
individuen universele doelen nastreven, weerspiegelen de verschillen in de hulpbronnen
waarover zij beschikken en in de restricties die voortvloeien uit de individuele situaties.
SPF theorie veronderstelt voorts dat fysiek en sociaal welbevinden bestaan uit twee, resp. drie
componenten, de zogenoemde ‘eerste orde instrumentele doelen’, welke eveneens universeel
zijn. Individuen realiseren sociaal en fysiek welzijn door middel van het realiseren van de
eerste orde instrumentele doelen. Voor fysiek welzijn zijn stimulatie en comfort
geïdentificeerd als de eerste orde instrumentele doelen. Comfort is de afwezigheid van dorst,
honger, pijn, uitputting, et cetera. Stimulatie is plezierige activering van het organisme en
omvat mentale en sensorische stimulatie en fysieke activiteit. Comfort en stimulering hebben
beide een afnemend grensnut voor de productie van fysiek welzijn.
Voor sociaal welzijn heeft Lindenberg status, gedragsbevestiging en affectie voorgesteld als
de drie eerste orde instrumentele doelen. Status verwijst naar een relatieve positie ten opzichte
van anderen. Gedragsbevestiging is gedefinieerd als positieve feedback op gedrag door
anderen en zichzelf (het gevoel “het juiste” te hebben gedaan). Affectie omvat liefde,
vriendschap en emotionele betrokkenheid.  Elk van deze instrumentele doelen heeft afnemend
grensnut voor de productie van sociaal welbevinden.
Een belangrijk kenmerk van SPF theorie is de hiërarchische ordening van doelen, met de
ultieme doelen aan de top van de hiërarchie en instrumentele doelen op lagere niveaus,
verbonden door productiefuncties die de relatie tussen lagere en hogere niveaus specificeren.
Een sociale productiefunctie geeft dus voor een bepaald individu of bepaalde categorie
individuen aan hoe welbevinden wordt geproduceerd. Hoe lager in de SPF hiërarchie, des te
contextspecifieker wordt de productiefunctie.
Als een individu geen beschikking heeft over de noodzakelijke hulpbronnen om een hoger in
de hiërarchie gelegen doel te bereiken, kan de productie van deze hulpbronnen op zich tot een
instrumenteel doel worden. Activiteiten kunnen dus direct gericht zijn op de realisering van
een instrumenteel doel, ze kunnen gericht zijn op vergroting van de productiecapaciteit voor
de toekomst (investering), of beide tegelijk.
Binnen SPF theorie speelt substitutie een belangrijke rol. De doelen op de hoogste drie
niveaus van de hiërarchie worden gekenmerkt door beperkte substitueerbaarheid. Fysiek en
sociaal welbevinden kunnen elkaar slechts in beperkte mate substitueren in de realisatie van
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algeheel welbevinden: een zeker niveau van zowel fysiek als sociaal welbevinden is altijd
noodzakelijk voor algeheel subjectief welbevinden. Voor de eerste orde doelen geldt een
vergelijkbare beperking van substitueerbaarheid. Dat wil zeggen, zonder een minimale
hoeveelheid affectie (of status of gedragsbevestiging) kan er geen sprake zijn van sociaal
welbevinden. Boven dit minimale niveau van de eerste orde doelen is echter wel substitutie
mogelijk tussen affectie, gedragsbevestiging en status. Op lagere niveaus in de hiërarchie zijn
doelen in het algemeen onbeperkt substitueerbaar. Substitutie vindt plaats op basis van de
relatieve kosten van alternatieve doelen. Wanneer bijvoorbeeld de mogelijkheden voor de
productie van status afnemen, zal een individu zich toeleggen op een grotere productie van
affectie en gedragsbevestiging indien hij die tegen lagere kosten kan produceren. Op nog
lagere niveaus substitueren mensen tussen productiemiddelen wanneer de relatieve prijzen
daarvan veranderen.
SPF theorie verschaft tevens inzicht in de ‘efficiëntie’ van alternatieve productiefactoren. De
meest efficiënte productiemiddelen zijn die welke multifunctioneel zijn: activiteiten en
hulpbronnen waarmee zowel directe productie als investering worden gediend en die welke
meerdere hogere orde doelen dienen (Ormel et al. 1997).
Het tweede deel van hoofdstuk 3 beschrijft op welke onderdelen SPF theorie nadere
uitwerking en invulling behoeft. Daarbij gaat het om drie niveaus in de theorie. In de eerste
plaats blijkt de conceptualisering van de drie ‘eerste orde instrumentele doelen’ voor sociaal
welbevinden (status, gedragsbevestiging en affectie) voor verbetering vatbaar: tot dusverre is
daarin sprake van ambiguïteit, van uiteenlopende definities en deels van vermenging van
doelen en middelen. In de tweede plaats blijken de lagere niveaus in de instrumentele
hiërarchie tot nu toe nauwelijks uitgewerkt. Wat met name ontbreekt is een inventarisatie van
hulpbronnen en activiteiten die van belang zijn als productiemiddelen voor de drie
componenten van sociaal welbevinden. Dat realiseerbaarheid van een dergelijke inventarisatie
door verschillende theoretische en praktische argumenten wordt begrensd, neemt niet weg dat
het invullen van dit niveau in de hiërarchie cruciaal is voor de bruikbaarheid van SPF theorie
als brug tussen de subjectieve en objectieve benaderingen in Quality of Life onderzoek.
In de derde plaats blijkt dat de notie van ‘metadoelen’ in SPF theorie tot dusver slechts heel
beperkt is uitgewerkt en weinig is geïntegreerd in het theoretisch model. Daardoor dekt SPF
theorie in zijn huidige vorm het begrip ‘subjectief (sociaal) welbevinden’ zoals dat in Quality
of Life studies wordt gebruikt slechts ten dele. In zijn huidige uitwerking, die grotendeels
beperkt is gebleven tot de instrumentele hiërarchie van doelen die tot sociaal en fysiek welzijn
leiden, dekt SPF theorie weliswaar de affectieve of hedonische component van subjectief
welbevinden, maar veel minder de cognitieve component van subjectief welbevinden. De
metadoelen waarvan in een aantal publicaties over SPF theorie gewag wordt gemaakt maar
waaraan nog slechts beperkt invulling is gegeven, lijken in principe de cognitieve component
wel te kunnen dekken.
Voor de exploratieve studie worden aan het slot van hoofdstuk 3 derhalve drie
onderzoeksvragen geformuleerd:
1: Wat zijn de onderscheidende aspecten van respectievelijk ‘status’, ‘gedrags-
bevestiging’ en ‘affectie’, en in hoeverre kan het niveau van deze componenten van
sociaal welbevinden worden onderscheiden van de productiefactoren waarmee zij
gerealiseerd kunnen worden? 
2: Welke objectieve informatie met betrekking tot de beschikbaarheid van
productiefactoren op individueel niveau is nodig om (binnen redelijke marges) te
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kunnen voorspellen welk niveau van sociaal welbevinden voor dat individu bereikbaar
is?
Deze vraag is gespecificeerd in twee sub-vragen:
2a: Wat zijn, voor volwassenen in Nederland, de essentiële productiefactoren voor
respectievelijk status, gedragsbevestiging en affectie?
2b: Welke complementariteits- en substitutie relaties bestaan tussen deze
productiefactoren?
3: Welke doelen streven mensen na die niet als instrumenteel doel in het basismodel van
SPF theorie kunnen worden geïnterpreteerd; kunnen deze doelen gemodelleerd worden
als metadoelen (als kwaliteitsaspecten van sociale productiefuncties) en zo ja, hoe?   
    
Het exploratieve empirische onderzoek: methoden van dataverzameling en –analyse
Voor de beantwoording van de onderzoeksvragen en daarmee de verdere uitwerking van SPF
theorie, is gekozen voor een exploratieve, kwalitatieve onderzoeksopzet. De
onderzoeksvragen betreffen de fenomenologie van doelen, de empirische diversiteit van
productiemiddelen en de inhoud van een aantal concepten. Elk van de vragen is dus
kwalitatief van aard, hetgeen een heel andere empirische benadering vergt dan de voor velen
meer vertrouwde kwantitatieve vragen. In hoofdstuk 4 worden de overwegingen voor de
selectie van respondenten en de methoden van dataverzameling en -analyse besproken.
Hoofddoel van het onderzoek was niet het meten of vaststellen van de verdeling maar het
vinden en identificeren van aspecten van welbevinden, alternatieve productiefactoren en
metadoelen; daarom was – in plaats van representativiteit – het bereiken van optimale variatie
op de afhankelijke variabelen het voornaamste criterium bij de selectie van respondenten.
Voor het verzamelen van de kwalitatieve data is een combinatie van methoden gebruikt: een
vragenlijst, focusgroep interviews, aanvullende individuele diepte-interviews, observatie en
tijdsbestedingonderzoek.  In totaal hebben 31 respondenten deelgenomen aan de focusgroep
interviews. Voorafgaand daaraan hebben deze respondenten ook allen een vragenlijst
ingevuld. Veertien respondenten hebben vervolgens deelgenomen aan een intensief
zevendaags tijdbestedingonderzoek en een afsluitend individueel diepte-interview.
De data zijn op systematische wijze geanalyseerd, met gebruikmaking van veel van de
inzichten en technieken uit Westers (1995) versie van de gefundeerde theoriebenadering.
Daarbij is gebruik gemaakt van Atlas/ti, een computerapplicatie voor kwalitatieve analyse.
Alle data, ook die zijn verzameld door middel van het tijdbestedingonderzoek, zijn gebruikt
voor de kwalitatieve analyse. De verschillende methoden van dataverzameling zijn gebruikt
als wederzijdse aanvulling en controle (triangulatie).
Aspecten van status, gedragsbevestiging en affectie: een verbeterde conceptualisering
In hoofdstuk 5 worden de resultaten gepresenteerd van de analyses ten aanzien van de nadere
conceptualisering van de eerste-orde doelen voor sociaal welbevinden (onderzoeksvraag 1).
Daarbij ging het, voor elk eerste-orde doel, zowel om de identificatie van de aspecten die het
onderscheiden van de beide andere eerste-orde doelen, als om de zuivering van elementen die
betrekking hebben op de middelen waarmee het doel wordt bereikt in plaats van op het doel
zelf. De analyses van de kwalitatieve data, ondersteund met literatuurstudie, hebben geleid tot
een nadere conceptualisering van status, gedragsbevestigingen en affectie, bestaande uit voor
elk doel een afgebakende set van ‘aspecten’ waarmee deze component van sociaal
welbevinden zich in de perceptie van mensen voordoet. Deze onderscheidende aspecten van
status, gedragsbevestiging en affectie vormen hun conceptualisering, maar bieden tevens
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aangrijpingspunten voor empirische meting van de niveaus van deze componenten van
subjectief sociaal welbevinden. In de analyses van de data bleek dat het zeer aannemelijk is
dat niet alleen gedragsbevestiging maar ook status en affectie uit twee delen bestaan: een deel
dat wordt verkregen uit de beoordeling door anderen en een deel dat het individu uit de relatie
met zichzelf verkrijgt. Dit ondersteunt de notie dat in elk van de drie eerste orde doelen sprake
is van een zelfwaarderingscomponent (zie bijv. Lindenberg 1996).
Voor status zijn zes onderscheidende (belevings-) aspecten geïdentificeerd die tezamen het
concept vormen. Deze zijn:
(1) het gevoel serieus genomen te worden en met respect te worden behandeld;
(2) het gevoel zichzelf waar te maken, zelfverwezenlijking;
(3) het gevoel goed te presteren in vergelijking met anderen;
(4) het gevoel zelfstandig, autonoom te zijn;
(5) het gevoel invloed te hebben op anderen;
en (6) het gevoel een goede reputatie te hebben, goed bekend te staan.
Gedragsbevestiging is eveneens geconceptualiseerd door zes onderscheidende aspecten,
namelijk:
(1) het gevoel het juiste, of goede dingen te doen;
(2) het gevoel nuttig te zijn;
(3) het gevoel bij te dragen aan een gezamenlijk (groeps-) doel;
(4) het gevoel datgene wat je doet goed te doen;
(5) het gevoel een goed mens te zijn;
en (6) het gevoel deel uit te maken van een functioneel geheel.
Affectie is geconceptualiseerd door negen onderscheidende (belevings-) aspecten. Anders dan
bij gedragsbevestiging en status, lijkt het voor het niveau van affectie als component van
sociaal welbevinden niet alleen van belang wat de gevoelens over en ten opzichte van het
individu (Ego) zijn, maar zijn ook de gevoelens van Ego ten opzichte van anderen op elk van
de aspecten van affectie van belang. Voor een optimaal niveau van ervaren affectie is dus een
zeker tweerichtingsverkeer op elk van de negen aspecten nodig. De negen aspecten van
affectie zijn:
(1) het gevoel aardig gevonden te worden en aardig te vinden;
(2) het gevoel vertrouwd te worden en te kunnen vertrouwen;
(3) het ervaren van wezenlijke communicatie, zowel vanuit jezelf als vanuit anderen;
(4) het gevoel dat een ander zich in jou kan verplaatsen en zichzelf in een ander te
      kunnen verplaatsen (wederzijdse empathie);
(5) het ervaren van een wederzijdse afhankelijkheid van subjectief welbevinden;
(6) een gevoel van overeenstemming van de gevoelens voor en van de ander;
(7) het als plezierig ervaren van fysieke nabijheid van anderen en ervaren dat anderen  
      jouw fysieke nabijheid prettig vinden;
(8) een gevoel van wederzijdse bereidheid dingen voor de ander te doen zonder dat     
      daar iets tegenover hoeft te staan;
en (9) een gevoel van liefhebben en te worden liefgehad. 
Met deze nadere invulling van drie componenten van sociaal welbevinden is een beter inzicht
verkregen in de aard van sociaal welbevinden en in de vormen (aspecten) waarin mensen dat
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sociaal welbevinden concreet ervaren.  Dit inzicht is van belang voor onderzoekers die met
SPF theorie werken, met name bij het interpreteren van onderzoeksuitkomsten. Ook zijn op
basis van de identificatie van de aspecten van status, gedragsbevestiging en affectie
meetinstrumenten voor deze componenten van welbevinden ontwikkeld (Nieboer et al., in
press). Op grond van de eerste testresultaten lijken deze meetinstrumenten breed toepasbaar te
zijn voor het meten van subjectief sociaal welbevinden en de theoretische en alledaagse
inhoud van deze concepten goed te dekken. 
Systematische inventarisatie van productiemiddelen voor sociaal welbevinden
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt een systematiek gepresenteerd die is ontwikkeld voor het in kaart
brengen van de productiefactoren voor status, gedragsbevestiging en affectie waarover
individuen of groepen beschikken. Deze systematiek geeft tevens in algemene zin aan wat de
essentiële productiefactoren voor de drie componenten van sociaal welbevinden zijn, op een
niveau dat concreet genoeg is om gemakkelijk te kunnen worden vertaald in concrete
hulpbronnen, activiteiten en situatiekenmerken en tegelijkertijd abstract genoeg is om
tegemoet te komen aan de vindingrijkheid van mensen om te substitueren tussen
productiefactoren. (In principe is het aantal productiefactoren waarmee welbevinden kan
worden gerealiseerd onbeperkt. Immers, mensen kunnen steeds nieuwe manieren ontwikkelen
om welbevinden te realiseren en steeds nieuwe substituten vinden voor de productiefactoren
die hen ontbreken.) Daarnaast reikt de indeling in zes velden van productie een heuristiek aan
van waaruit hypothesen ten aanzien van de substitutie- en complementariteitsrelaties tussen
productiefactoren kunnen worden (en zijn) afgeleid.  
De systematiek die is ontwikkeld onderscheidt zes velden van productie die alle functionele
contexten omvatten waarin individuen handelen, te weten (1) productieve activiteiten in het
private domein; (2) persoonlijke relaties in het private domein; (3) ontspanning en vrije
tijdsbesteding in het private domein; (4) productieve activiteiten in het publieke domein; (5)
formele, bureaucratische en burgerschapsrelaties in het publieke domein; en (6)
ongeinstitutionaliseerde relaties in het publieke domein. In elk van deze zes velden blijken
veld-specifieke kenmerken een rol te spelen bij de productie van status, gedragsbevestiging en
affectie.
Op grond van de theorie kon vooraf worden verondersteld dat systematische verschillen
bestaan tussen de relevante kenmerken van productiefactoren voor status, gedragsbevestiging
en affectie: voor status zouden de essentiële kenmerken van productiefactoren te maken
hebben met schaarste en voor gedragsbevestiging met normconformiteit. Voor affectie echter
was niet vooraf duidelijk wat de essentiële kenmerken van de productiefactoren zouden zijn. 
Voor het inventariseren en ordenen van productiefactoren is de indeling van sociaal
welbevinden in de drie componenten status, gedragsbevestiging en affectie gecombineerd met
de indeling van de productiecontexten in zes velden. Die combinatie levert een matrix op
waarmee de productiefactoren waarover een individu beschikt op hanteerbare wijze in kaart
gebracht en samengevat kunnen worden. In deze matrix zijn systematische verschillen te
vinden in de relevante kenmerken van productiefactoren zowel tussen de drie componenten
van sociaal welbevinden als tussen de velden van productie.
Als voornaamste kenmerkende productiefactoren voor status werden gevonden: (a) bezit van
schaarse vaardigheden of materiele hulpbronnen; (b) exploitatie van de schaarse vaardigheden
of materiele hulpbronnen waarover men beschikt; (c) onafhankelijkheid van anderen; (d)
managen van de zichtbaarheid van de eigen prestaties of verworvenheden voor anderen door
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zaken te tonen, te verbergen of door gunstige vergelijkingsgroepen te zoeken. 
Als voornaamste kenmerkende productiefactoren voor gedragsbevestiging werden gevonden:
(a) normconforme keuzes van activiteiten; (b) adequaat, d.w.z. normconform gedrag en
presteren binnen de gekozen activiteiten; (c) managen van de onderwerping van het eigen
gedrag aan het oordeel van anderen; (d) aanwezigheid van heldere gedragsnormen; en (e) bezit
van relevante sociale en productieve vaardigheden.
Als voornaamste kenmerkende productiefactoren voor affectie werden gevonden: (a) ‘self
exposure’, dat wil zeggen het blootgeven van zichzelf; (b) samen tijd doorbrengen; (c)
stabiliteit en duurzaamheid van sociale contacten; (d) aanwezigheid of nabijheid van anderen;
en (e) bezit van relationele vaardigheden. 
De indeling van productiefactoren in een matrix van eerste orde doelen en velden van
productie bracht aan het licht dat er systematische verschillen bestaan tussen de kenmerken
van productiefactoren voor de verschillende componenten van sociaal welbevinden, evenals
tussen de typische productiefactoren per veld van productie. Mede daardoor kan deze
systematische indeling worden gebruikt om verschillende substitutie- en
complementariteitsrelaties uiteen te leggen en daarover globale hypothesen te formuleren.
Zoals reeds verondersteld in Lindenberg & Frey (1993) en Ormel et al. (1999. p. 72) is tussen
de drie componenten van sociaal welbevinden slechts beperkte substitutie mogelijk. Binnen de
productiefuncties voor status, gedragsbevestiging en affectie bestaan echter substitutie- en
complementariteitsrelaties tussen productiefactoren uit verschillende velden van productie. In
hoofdstuk 6 wordt gesteld dat kenmerkende productiefactoren binnen elke cel van de matrix in
het algemeen complementair zijn, terwijl tussen de (complementaire sets van) belangrijkste
productiefactoren voor een bepaald eerste orde doel in verschillende velden van productie tot
op zekere hoogte substitutie mogelijk is.
De systematische indeling die het praktisch mogelijk maakt empirisch vast te stellen welke
productiefactoren een individu tot zijn beschikking heeft opent  – in combinatie met de
mogelijkheid om het niveau van status, gedragsbevestiging en affectie te meten – de deur naar
empirische toetsing van de in SPF theorie veronderstelde relaties tussen productiefactoren en
de gerealiseerde niveaus van de eerste orde doelen.
Identificatie en modellering van metadoelen in de productie van welbevinden
De identificatie van metadoelen in de productie van welbevinden (onderzoeksvraag 3) staat
centraal in hoofdstuk 7. Daar wordt allereerst een overkoepelend model (op basis van
Lindenberg 2001a,b) voorgesteld waarin de hiërarchie van substantiele doelen van SPF theorie
en een nog onvolledige hiërarchie van operationele of metadoelen worden geïntegreerd. Het
hoogste niveau in dit conceptuele model wordt gevormd door een universeel streven naar het
verbeteren van de eigen situatie: ‘improving one’s condition’. Direct instrumenteel aan dit
streven zijn twee algemene metadoelen: ‘(onmiddellijke) efficiëntie’ en ‘ontwikkeling van
productiecapaciteit over de tijd’.
Op grond van de kwalitatieve analyses van het empirische materiaal wordt vervolgens een
aantal potentiele metadoelen besproken. Zeventien van deze potentiele metadoelen worden na
de kritische bespreking geaccepteerd als metadoelen die in de hiërarchie van operationele
doelen worden opgenomen. Deze zeventien metadoelen verschillen in abstractieniveau en
algemene geldigheid. Tot de meest algemeen geldige metadoelen behoren ‘agency’ ofwel de
controle over de eigen sociale productiefuncties; zelfverwerkelijking; consistentie ofwel het
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vermijden van morele conflicten; multifunctionaliteit in productie; beperking van
kwetsbaarheid ofwel vermijden van verlies; en investeren in de eigen productiecapaciteit. De
lijst met alle zeventien onderscheiden metadoelen is gepresenteerd in § 7.4.
Er wordt niet gepretendeerd dat de resulterende hiërarchie van metadoelen uitputtend is, noch
dat anderen niet tot een enigszins andere indeling van metadoelen zouden kunnen komen. Wel
wordt gesteld dat deze hiërarchie van metadoelen alle kwaliteitsaspecten van productiefuncties
omvat die het subjectief welbevinden en het gedrag van individuen beïnvloeden.
Met het oog op de empirische validiteit van SPF theorie is het van belang te constateren dat
alle doelen die in de exploratieve studie door respondenten zijn genoemd, welke niet als
manifestaties van (instrumentele doelen voor) sociaal of fysiek welzijn konden worden
gekwalificeerd, zonder problemen konden worden ondergebracht in de hiërarchie van
metadoelen.
Voorts bleek de hiërarchie van metadoelen alle elementen te omvatten van wat in de literatuur
over quality of life de cognitieve component van sociaal welbevinden wordt genoemd. De
cognitieve component van subjectief welbevinden verwijst, zo kan op grond van een gedegen
overzichtsstudie van onderzoek naar subjectief welbevinden (Diener et al. 1999) worden
vastgesteld, naar drie soorten mentale verschijnselen: sociale vergelijking, het hebben en
stellen van doelen en ambities en het interpreteren van veranderingen in de eigen positie als
beweging van en naar gestelde doelen.
De voorgestelde hiërarchie van metadoelen blijkt de volledige inhoud van elk van deze drie
mentale processen te dekken. Met de inbedding van de metadoelen in SPF theorie krijgt dus
tevens de cognitieve component van subjectief welbevinden een plaats in de theorie (de
affectieve component van subjectief welbevinden had die plaats al in de hiërarchie van
substantiele doelen, het basismodel van SPF theorie, zie hoofdstuk 3). Daarmee wordt voldaan
aan een van de cruciale voorwaarden voor de toepasbaarheid van SPF theorie voor het
overbruggen van de kloof tussen objectieve en subjectieve benaderingen in Quality of Life
onderzoek (hoofdstuk 2).
Conclusie
De vraag hoe de samenhang tussen objectieve leefomstandigheden en gedragingen enerzijds
en subjectief welbevinden anderzijds kan worden begrepen is met deze studie zeker niet
beantwoord. Wel kon op grond van een theoretische analyse een aantal theorieen worden
geidentificeerd die voor dit doel geschikt zouden kunnen zijn. Vervolgens is een nadere
uitwerking gegeven aan een van de potentieel geschikte theorieen, SFP theorie. Daarmee is
een noodzakelijke stap gezet op weg naar het overbruggen van de kloof tussen objectieve en
subjectieve benaderingen in Quality of Life onderzoek. Ook voor andere toepassingen is de
nadere uitwerking van SPF theorie echter zinvol.
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Stellingen
behorende bij het proefschrift
Individual Production of Social Well-Being
An Exploratory Study
Alinda van Bruggen
1. Subjective well-being has both ‘trait-like’ and ‘state-like’ properties (cf. Veenhoven 1994
and Stones et al. 1995 in Social Indicators Research). The notion of subjective well-being
as a process accommodates both, while adding the explicit possibility of dynamic
interaction between the trait-like and the state-like.
2. The core concern of quality of life studies is to explain how objective living conditions
affect subjective well-being.
(Chapter 2 of this dissertation)
3. Within the restrictions they are facing, people produce their own well-being by managing
and combining resources and activities.
(Chapter 3 of this dissertation)
4. Social scientists that treat qualitative and quantitative methods as competing approaches
are like carpenters debating whether one should use a saw or a hammer in making a chair.
5. The conventional interpretation and measurement of ‘status’ in the social sciences has
disregarded one of the concept’s most general and important aspects: being taken
seriously.
(Chapter 5 of this dissertation)
6. One of the main important general production factors for affection is simply spending
time together. The main general production factor for affection that individuals can
control themselves is self exposure.
(Chapter 6 of this dissertation)
7. Given socio-demografic changes and trends, in the next 10 through 15 years the
functioning and survival of recreational sports clubs will strongly depend on the extent to
which they succeed in integrating older sportsmen (‘masters’) in a multifunctional way
within their organisation.
8. Democracy is more than the right to vote. The right to bring out one’s vote is empty
unless the real issues are  subject to voting and substantial alternatives are offered to
choose between.
9. Social scientists greatly overestimate the problem of sensitive information. Abstaining
from asking respondents about supposedly sensitive (‘private’) information is seldom
necessary, provided that the respondents feel  treated respectfully, honestly and
considerate.
10. The growing insight that old distinctive views and moral stances between religious
denominations have become outmoded, has led to a much broader normative reorientation
at the local level. Where mergers take place between local congregations of different
denominations, the subsequent search for and formulation of joint norms and values often
results in these ‘Samen op Weg’ -congregations  finding themselves unanticipatedly
running in front of societal changes.
11. Incorporation of firms’ impact on quality of life in measures of ‘sustainable corporate
performance’ requires a quality of life theory that provides clear and measurable concepts
of subjective well-being and explains how people’s possibilities to realise subjective well-
being are affected by restrictions and resources that follow from corporate activity.
